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THE LAW

RELATING TO

COPYRIGHT AND TRADE MARKS.
THE LAW
RELATING TO
COPYRIGHT AND TRADE MARKS,
TREATED MORE PARTICULARLY WITH REFERENCE TO
INFRINGEMENT.
FORMING A DIGEST OF THE MORE IMPORTANT
ENGLISH AND AMERICAN DECISIONS,
TOGETHER WITH
THE PRACTICE OF THE ENGLISH COURTS AND FORMS OF
INFORMATIONS, NOTICES, PLEADINGS, AND INJUNCTIONS.

BY
JOHN HERBERT SLATER,
of the Middle Temple, Esq., Barrister-at-Law

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PREFACE.

The Law relating to Copyright is, in many of its phases, of a dubious and complex nature, and the application of its principles to particular cases frequently becomes a matter of extreme difficulty. That this should be so will surprise no one who may have occasion to define the meaning of a large number of imperfectly drawn Acts of Parliament, rendered more confusing by reason of conflicting decisions.

The truth appears to be that this branch of Law, having been built up gradually to suit the requirements of successive generations, has become overburdened with exceptions, which, however unpleasant to contemplate, it is still necessary to weigh and apply.

The American Authors (undoubtedly the best exponents of the Law on the subject of Copyright) are unsparing in their criticism, and do not hesitate to condemn numerous decisions of the Courts either as manifestly wrong or altogether out of harmony with the demands of the age.

In the following pages I have endeavoured to lay before the Profession the Law relating to Copyright and
Trade Marks, treating it more particularly with reference to the many questions of Infringement which have from time to time arisen for adjudication in this country as well as in America.

To codify and condense is at all times a difficult task, owing to the risk of omission which such a course of procedure necessarily involves; I have, however, thought it better to incur such risk, hoping to avoid the consequences by a careful analysis of principles which could undoubtedly have been more easily enlarged upon.

The Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act of 1883 proceeds in a great measure upon the lines of the repealed Act of 1875; where the verbiage has been altered it has been mainly in conformity with precedent as gathered from the reported cases.

J. H. S.


June, 1884.

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# Table

**Showing the Times during which Copyright subsists in Various Productions.**

## Great Britain.

**Books.** During the natural life of the author, and a further period of seven years, commencing from the time of death; or, for the term of forty-two years from publication, whichever shall be the longer. When the book is published posthumously, then for forty-two years from the date of publication (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 3).

**Maps, Charts, and Plans (separately published).** As in the case of "Books" (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 2). The term provided by the 1st sect. of 8 Geo. II. c. 13, is fourteen years from the day of first publication (see infra, pp. 89, 111).

**Engravings, Prints, and Lithographs.** Twenty-eight years from the day of first publication (7 Geo. III. c. 38, s. 7; the provisions of the Acts relating to Prints and Engravings were extended to Lithographs by 15 & 16 Vict. c. 12, s. 14).

**Paintings, Drawings, and Photographs.** During the natural life of the author, and a further period of seven years, commencing from death (25 & 26 Vict. c. 68, s. 1).

**Sculpture, Models, and Casts.** Fourteen years from date of publication (54 Geo. III. c. 56, s. 1); with a further term of fourteen years, if the artist be living at the expiration of the former period (ibid. s. 6).

**Designs.** Five years from the date of registration (46 & 47 Vict. c. 57, s. 50).

**Playright.** As in the case of books (3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15; 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 20); but see infra, pp. 118, 124.

## United States.

**In the Case of all Works.** Twenty-eight years from the time of registering the title (Rev. Stat. a. 4953). An additional term of fourteen years may be secured by the author, if he be living at the expiration of the former period, or by his widow or children, if he be dead (ibid. a. 4954).
ADDENDA.

Re Ralph (infra, pp. 229, 250, 280), also reported 25 Ch. Div. 194.


Re Anderson's Trade Mark (W. N. 1884, p. 75). A portrait is not a sufficiently "distinctive device" to be entitled to registration per se. A person is not entitled to register words which are merely descriptive and publici juris (Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875, s. 10).

Nicola v. Pitman (W. N. 1884, p. 82). Where a lecture is delivered to an audience admitted without payment, any person present may take notes verbatim or otherwise for his own private use, but not for purposes of publication or for his own personal gain. The fact of the publication being in shorthand characters makes no difference. (See infra, pp. 2, 132, 133.)

Ager v. P. & O. Steam Navigation Co. (W. N. 1884, p. 104). In an action for infringing the copyright in a book, it is no defence to say that the defendant merely used the pirated copies by giving them to his agents abroad, and to merchants with whom he corresponded by telegraph.

Beard v. Coulter (W. N. 1884, p. 111). Where the plaintiff within the time limited by R. 8. C., O. XXVIII. r. 2, amends his statement of claim in such a way as to change his form of action, and to bring it within the provisions of a different statute, the defendant's proper course to pursue is to move under O. XXVIII. r. 4, that the amended pleading be disallowed, or if allowed then only on proper terms as to costs. A motion that the plaintiff may be ordered to pay the costs up to the time of the delivery of the defence, together with the costs of the motion, and that the action may be stayed until payment, is irregular (see infra, p. 215).

Wittman v. Oppenheim (W. N. 1884, p. 122). Section 51 of the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883, applies to the marking, after the Act came into operation, of an article made according to a design registered under the old Act. [Whether the proviso in the section applies where no mark at all is placed on the article, quære. (See infra, pp. 102, 109, 188, 223).]
THE LAW
RELATING TO
COPYRIGHT AND TRADE MARKS.

PART I.—COPYRIGHT.

CHAPTER I.

THE RIGHT OF COPY IN A LITERARY COMPOSITION AS IT SUBSISTS AT COMMON LAW.

Copyright is the sole and exclusive liberty of printing or otherwise multiplying copies of an original work or of composition (Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. C. 920); and it exists either by virtue of the Common Law, or under the protection of some particular statute. It may also be described as the exclusive right of the owner to multiply and to dispose of copies of an intellectual production, which in the case of statutory copyright endures only for a limited time. The word "copyright" is sometimes used to signify the right of the owner to the production resulting from his own skill and labour, in some instances before, and in others after the publication thereof; in the former case, it is called Copyright at Common Law, and in the latter Statutory Copyright. Now this Common Law right of copy, which the owner of every intellectual production has in the fruits of his labour, has for its essence not merely the paper and print...
of the author, nor the marble block of the sculptor, nor yet again the canvas of the painter; but the performance—considered as an incorporeal creation embodied in material form. All ideas are free, and no one can therefore claim for himself the exclusive possession of a bare conception, yet where such conception is reduced to some tangible and definite form so as to be capable of identification, the rights of the author will be entitled to protection. Thus, a lecture delivered extempore has all the attributes of property attached to it; that is to say, to the ideas and sentiments of the lecturer as expressed and conveyed in the words which he utters, and if anyone should take down these words as they are dictated, and afterwards publish them either verbatim or with mere colourable differences, he would, without doubt, be restrained (see Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 3 L. J. Ch. 209; 1 Hall & Tw. 40; Caird v. Simé, 28 Journ. Juris., Jan. 1884). The property in an intellectual production is therefore incorporeal, and wholly distinct from the material in which the conception is concentrated; such material is indeed necessary as a vehicle of transmission, and the recognition of this fact forms the basis of the law of copyright considered in relation to infringement. So long as the intellectual production is stolen, it matters not that the pirate may have varied the language in which it is expressed, for if he has unwarrantably taken the arrangement and combination of the ideas and sentiments as displayed in the original work, no diversity in the mere detail of expression will protect him from the consequences of his act.

As already stated, the Common Law right of copy in a composition of the intellect subsists only so long as the owner does not publish it in the technical sense of that word; the composition may indeed be reduced to a tangible and material form, and still remain the exclusive property
of the author, but once published, his right has gone for ever; unless, indeed, he has taken care to bring himself within the protective provisions of any statute which may happen to subsist with regard to the particular subject. Before actual publication the author has the uncontrolled mastery over his material production; he may destroy it or give it away, either with or without any conditions, he may part with the possession and reserve the property (Marquis of Queensbury v. Shebbeare, 2 Eden, 329; Thompson v. Stanhope, Amb. 737; Southey v. Sherwood, 2 Meriv. 485), or exercise any other act of ownership over it (see Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 De G. & Sm. 652; 1 Mac. & G. 25; Bartlett v. Crittenden, 4 McLean, 300 (Amer.); Ibid., 5 McLean, 41, per McLean, J.; Jeferys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. Cas. 667, per Erle, J.). His creditors may indeed seize, by fi. fa., the composition itself, a manuscript for instance, but they cannot publish the words contained in it; the author's property in them they cannot touch, however valuable it may be (Bartlett v. Crittenden, 5 McLean, 37 (Amer.); and refer also to Stevens v. Cady, 14 How. (Amer.) 528; Stevens v. Gladding, 17 How. (Amer.) 447). The Common Law right as subsisting before publication must therefore be carefully contrasted with the Statutory right as conferred by virtue of the authority of some particular Act of Parliament; for upon a true appreciation of the difference depends the whole law relating to copyright. The Common Law right of copy is personal property, and prima facie passes with a transfer of the manuscript or work of art to which it is incident (Turner v. Robinson, 10 Ir. Ch. 142, per Smith, M. R.; Palmer v. De Witt, 2 Sickel, 538, per Allen, J.); yet it will not do so if the owner should manifest an intention to reserve the right of publication to himself (Queensbury v. Shebbeare, 2 Eden, 329; Lucas v. Cooke, 13 L. R. Ch. D. 872), and in the absence of any express
understanding between the parties, the question is always one of evidence of intention (Queensbury v. Shebbeare, Ibid.; Thompson v. Stanhope, Amb. 787; Southey v. Sherwood, 2 Meriv. 485). Consequently the literary property in an unpublished manuscript may be assigned by mere word of mouth, and a writing is never necessary, for it is the statute (if anything) that insists on writing, and not the Common Law (see Power v. Walker, 3 Maule & S. 7). The right at Common Law cannot, in the case of a manuscript, be evaded by an abridgment, a summary, or even a review (Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 De G. & Sm. 693, per Bruce, V.-C.); nor is it lost by a publication made by a third person without the authority of the proprietor (Boucioulell v. Wood, 2 Biss. (Amer.) 34, 39; Crowe v. Aikin, 2 Biss. (Amer.) 208; Palmer v. De Witt, 2 Sweeney (N. Y.), 530, 551; 2 Sickel, 532; Shook v. Neuendorf, 11 Daily Reg. (N. Y.) 995). If, however, the author of the production should publish it, he must minutely comply with the provisions contained in the statute governing the case, or else both his common law and statutory right of copy will be gone, for on publication the common law right ceases, and unless such publication be in accordance with the statute, the statutory right will not attach; and such common law right of property once destroyed by publication is not revived after the expiration of the time allowed by the Copyright Acts (Donaldson v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408) as it would be if both description of rights could subsist concurrently; for as the law is at the present time generally supposed to stand, the common law right of property is divested simultaneously with the publication of the work or production. On analysis of the cases, however, it would appear to be by no means clearly settled that the Common Law right becomes merged in or otherwise destroyed by the statute, or ceases to exist on the publication of the work to which it originally attached.
The first copyright Act, passed in 1710 (2 Anne, c. 19) was repealed by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 1, and prior to the former statute there is no doubt but that authors had a perpetual right of property in their works by virtue of the common law; if, therefore, that right of property was taken away, it must have been by operation of the statute. This question was first raised in the case of Tonson v. Colline, 1 W. Bl. 801, 821, in which the Court inclined to the plaintiff's contention that he had a right of property independently of the statute, but as the action seemed to have been brought by collusion, and a nominal defendant set up in order to obtain a judgment, the Court refused to proceed (see per Willes, J., 4 Burr. 2327). At any rate the common law right of the author was so extremely doubtful in 1765, that Lord Northington declined to continue an injunction obtained by the assignee of an author after the expiration of the two terms of years allowed by the statute of Anne (Osborne v. Donaldson, 2 Eden, 327). In the famous case of Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, it was decided by a majority of three judges of the King's Bench, that it was impossible to say that the Act of Anne tacitly abolished the common law right, or could be quoted to show that no such right ever existed, and that had there been any intention to take away every pretence of right at the common law it would have been so expressly enacted. The opinion of Mr. Justice Yates, the one dissenting judge, was based upon a belief that there could be no right of property at all in any intellectual production, or in anything else that had not a corporeal existence, but that in the case of literary copyright such right was confined to the manuscript, and, further, that before the statute of Anne, no copyright existed, either at the common law, or otherwise. He admitted, however, that the statute gave a certain right of property in books for the time mentioned therein, though he denied that an intellectual production
THE RIGHT OF COPY IN A LITERARY COMPOSITION

could be identified so as to be entitled to protection — statements totally irreconcilable, since the right of property does not subsist in the paper and printed matter alone, but in the ideas, sentiments, and expressions which are thus externally endowed with life and form. It is now generally admitted by such writers as have dealt with the subject, that the judgment of Mr. Justice Yates cannot safely be relied on, and it certainly contributes nothing, either in force or argument, or in accuracy of historical facts to promote the success of a contention which he vainly urged as Counsel at the Bar, in the case of Tonson v. Collins, 1 W. Bl. 832, already referred to. The principal case defining the common law rights of authors, and which of necessity applies to every species of intellectual production, is Donaldson v. Becket and Others (4 Burr. 2408), decided on appeal to the House of Lords from a decree of the Court of Chancery. On the case coming before the House, it was felt to be of such grave importance that the Common Law Judges were directed to deliver their opinions upon five questions submitted to them; whereupon, the judges desiring that some time might be allowed for that purpose, the further consideration of the cause was adjourned until the Tuesday following, the 15th of February, 1774. The questions submitted to the judges were the following:—

1. Whether at common law an author of any book or literary composition had the sole right of first printing and publishing the same for sale, and might bring an action against any person who printed, published, and sold the same without his consent?

2. If the author had such right originally, did the law take it away upon his printing and publishing such book or literary composition, and might any person afterward reprint and sell for his
own benefit such book or literary composition against the will of the author?

3. If such action would have lain at Common Law, is it taken away by the statute of 8 Anne? And is an author, by the said statute precluded from every remedy, except on the foundation of the said statute, and on the terms and conditions prescribed thereby?

4. Has the author of any literary composition and his assigns the sole right of printing and publishing the same in perpetuity by the common law?

5. Is this right in any way impeached, restrained, or taken away by the statute, 8 Anne?

On the first question eight judges were in favour of the affirmative against three for the negative. Two of the minority, however, agreed with the majority on the general view that at common law an author had the sole right of first publishing his composition, but they doubted his ability to bring an action except under certain circumstances; the remaining judge thought an author had no right of property at common law, and consequently could not bring an action at all.

On the second question eight judges were in favour of the negative, and three of the affirmative.

On the third and fifth, six for and five against;

And on the fourth question, seven for and four against.

Now, the chief question under discussion here was the third, upon the answer to which depends the solution of the fifth; and we find that six judges were of opinion that the action at common law was taken away after publication by the Statute of Anne, and that the author was by the said statute precluded from every remedy except on the foundation of the statute itself. The remaining five judges held the direct contrary. As a matter of fact, Lord Mansfield, at that time the Lord
Chief Justice of the King's Bench, "from reasons of delicacy," as the report says, did not speak. Had he done so, he would have agreed with the minority, for it is "notorious that Lord Mansfield adhered to his opinion" (4 Burr. *2417), which he expressed in the Court below. Had this opinion been again expressed in the House of Lords the judges would have been equally divided on the question; and since the great weight of Sir William Blackstone and Lord Mansfield was thus virtually put in the scale in favour of the survival of the common law right, it is a matter of speculative inquiry how far the opinion of these two great authorities, combined with that of their colleagues on the same side, can even now be justly ignored.

The effect of the judgment as propounded by a majority of the common law judges in Donaldson v. Becket & Others, is recognised at the present day as a convenient statement of the law; but if the question is still res integra, as was hinted by Williams, J., in Reude v. Conquest, 9 C. B. N. S. 767, it would certainly appear that the law is by no means so firmly settled as is generally supposed to be the case. No decision is beyond question unless and until it is based upon a principle older even than the law itself, the principle of Truth. It is not the fact that the judgment of the majority in Donaldson v. Becket was satisfactory to the lawyers of that day; it was subsequently questioned by Lord Campbell in Boosey v. Jefferys, 6 Ex. Rep. 592, by Mr. Justice Erle and Mr. Justice Coleridge in Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. Cas. 875, 899. It has been doubted in Scotland (Cadell v. Robertson, 5 Pat. App. Cas. 518, per Lord Monboddo); and in America (Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591), where the judges were again divided in opinion. In all the subsequent English cases the judges have followed the judgment propounded in Donaldson v. Becket, as a matter of course, and without discussion, and in many of them doubts have been freely expressed. The opinion
of Mr. Justice Yates, in Miller v. Taylor, 6 Burr. 2961, that "nothing can be an object of property which has not a corporeal substance," is therefore in a fair way of being realised. There is one point, however, which still operates in favour of the author, and this arises from the decision of a majority of the judges with respect to question number two, considered in relation to the succeeding question, and both being evolved from a consideration of the first. As, therefore, the owner of any work has by the common law an exclusive right to publish it (Question 1), and that right is not lost after publication by virtue of the common law (Question 2), but is taken away solely by virtue of the statute (Question 3), it is obvious that if no statute has been passed relative to the particular description of work, the force of the common law will operate to protect it. So, also, as a further development, if the work has not been published within the meaning of the statute, it will still be entitled to the protection of the common law, for the statute does not cover a work not so published, and hence can have no effect on the common law rights therein. The conclusion arrived at is that no common law rights in a work are lost by publication, unless there be a statute to take away such rights, and unless the work is published within the meaning of the statutes (Donaldson v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408; Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 654 (Amer.), affirming the general principle). Instances in which particular cases are affected and influenced by the operation of the common law are given in their proper place. The present object is merely to show and define the broad distinction existing between the ownership by virtue of some particular statute and at the common law generally.

It is on the whole submitted that, although the owner of an intellectual production has no exclusive property in the general subject or in the manner of treating it (Mathewson...
Subject must have a present existence.

v. Stockdale, 19 Ves. 270; Longman v. Winchester, 16 Ves. 290; Druce v. Patton, 2 Paine, 303 (Amer.); Bowle v. McDowell, 13 Blatchf. (Amer.) 166), and although property cannot exist in simple ideas or thoughts, but only in their arrangement and combination constituting a production having a present existence as a composition (Platt v. Walter, 17 L. T. (N. S.) 137; Maxwell v. Hogg, L. R. 2 Ch. 307; 15 W. R. 467). Still, where an intellectual production is embodied in some outward form, and does not subsist merely in nubibus, there, by every consideration of justice and right, the author of such production would seem morally as much entitled to the results of his own genius as he would be to the possession of any other description of property; his rights, whether at common law or by the statute, should co-exist, and the author of a work be protected sometimes by one and sometimes by the other, and in certain instances by both.

There is no doubt that if the claim of an author were judged from a standpoint of natural right and upon principles of fairness he would be entitled to a perpetual right of copy in his production. This is admitted by an author who is unfavourably disposed towards any such perpetual right (Copinger), his objection being based on the fact inter alia that after a lapse of years the copyright would belong to an endless number of descendants. Any apprehension on this head might, however, speedily be dispelled by changing the nature of the property in an intellectual production and investing it with the attributes of real estate.

As the author—and this term is not limited to the producing agent of a literary composition only but of every species of intellectual production—is thus protected by the common law in the enjoyment of his property before publication or after publication in the event of there being no Act of Parliament specially applicable to the case or within the provisions of which his production
can be said to fall; no, also, he is protected subsequently to statutory
such publication for a limited time, provided he complies
with the provisions as to registration and otherwise con-
tained in the statute applicable to his particular case.

The following is a list of the English statutes regulating
the subject of copyright in all its branches:—

8 Geo. II. c. 18.—Engravings.
7 Geo. III. c. 28.—Engravings.
15 Geo. III. c. 53.—Universities and colleges.
17 Geo. III. c. 57.—Engravings.
54 Geo. III. c. 56.—Sculpture.
3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15.—Playright.
5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 65.—Lectures.
6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 59.—Engravings.
5 & 6 Vict. c. 45.—Books. Dramatic and musical com-
positions. (Sect. 20, extending the provisions of
3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15.)
5 & 6 Vict. c. 45.—Maps, charts, and plans.
7 & 8 Vict. c. 12.—International copyright.
15 & 16 Vict. c. 12.—International copyright.
15 & 16 Vict. c. 12, s. 14.—Engravings.
25 & 26 Vict. c. 68.—Paintings, drawings, and photo-
graphs.
38 & 39 Vict. c. 12.—International copyright.
45 & 46 Vict. c. 40.—Musical compositions.
46 & 47 Vict. c. 57.—Designs.

The American Legislation is confined to the Act of
July 8th, 1870, ss. 4948—4971, the Act of June 18th,
1874, and certain provisions contained in the revised
statutes relating to jurisdiction (see ss. 629, 699, the Act
of March 3, 1875, 18 U.S. Stat. at L. 470, and also s. 4970
Rev. Stat. supra), and as in cases of doubt and difficulty
the American decisions are frequently referred to at the
English bar generally with approval and always with
advantage, it has been thought advisable to incorporate
the most important of them in the ensuing statement of the law relating to the infringement of copyright and trade-marks. It is sufficiently obvious from what has been already said that the question whether or no an intellectual production has been "published" within the meaning of any particular Act of Parliament must in many instances be of vital importance; the question of "publication" will therefore be considered from time to time as it arises in the course of the treatise. It has been found more convenient to adopt this plan than to give a special chapter to the subject, for many of the arguments and authorities adduced must necessarily consist merely of recapitulations and repetitions; while no very great advantage would seem to be secured by massing them together in support of a series of propositions which are better distributed under the different headings to which they naturally belong.
CHAPTER II.

ON THE INCIDENTS OF THE PLAINTIFF'S TITLE.

Whatever disputed points may arise from time to time during a study of the law relating to copyright, nothing is better understood or more universally recognized than the principle of "originality," an essential qualification, without which no one can be considered an author, or be fairly entitled to protection for his work.

No man is, however, capable of writing directly from his own thoughts and experiences; he must necessarily consult authorities, and may inadvertently recapitulate their sentiments and ideas. It consequently becomes apparent that the word "original" may have in legal phraseology a slightly different meaning to that accorded to it in every-day conversation.

In the first instance the word is inherently capable of two significations; the first, as applicable to a work different in its component parts taken separately from any other work; and secondly, as applicable to the arrangement and combination of common materials, that is to say, materials taken or collected from a source publici juris, or common to all; and in order to constitute an original work both these qualifications should subsist.

Now it is clear that no one can monopolise the subject of even his own production; subjects like ideas are free, and as one author may treat of any subject he pleases, even although the ground may have been repeatedly traversed, so also another author has an equal liberty, and both are entitled
to refer to the same common sources of information. The principle is the same whether the author claims protection by virtue of the common law or under the provisions of some statute, for the element of originality is of the very essence of all productions, literary or otherwise intellectual. There are and can be but few, if any, things which in an abstract sense are strictly new and original throughout. Every book in literature, science, and art borrows, and must necessarily borrow and use much which was well known and used before. No man creates a new language for himself, he contents himself with the use of language already known and used and understood by others. No man writes exclusively from his own thoughts unaided and uninstructed by the thoughts of others. The thoughts of every man are more or less a combination of what other men have thought and expressed, although they may be modified, exalted, and improved by his own genius and reflection (see Emerson v. Davies, 3 Story, 779, 4 West, L. J. 261 (Amer.), per Story, J.). What the law requires, therefore, is not that the subject of a work shall be entirely new and original, for this at the present day is hardly possible, but that the method of treating it shall have some degree of originality about it (Cary v. Longman, 1 East, 358, 3 Esp. 273; Tonson v. Walker, 3 Swanst. 672; Tonson v. Collins, 1 W. Bl. 301, 321; King v. Reed, 8 Ves. 223, n.; Hogg v. Kirby, 9 Ves. 215; Longman v. Winchester, 16 Ves. 269; Lewis v. Fullarton, 2 Beav. 6, 3 Jur. 669; Leader v. Purday, 7 C. B. 4, 6 Dowl. & L. 408; Barfield v. Nicholson, 2 Sim. & St. 1, 2 L. J. Ch. 90; Jarrold v. Houston, 3 K. & J. 708, 3 Jur. (N. S.) 1051; Atwell v. Ferrett, 2 Blatchf. (Amer.) 39; Bartlett v. Crittenden, 5 McLean (Amer.) 32). And so a new and original work may consist entirely of information already perfectly well known, and this information may be collected from other works or from general observation; all that is necessary is
shall either shall search into the common sources of information for himself, and not avail himself of the labours of his predecessor (Jarrold v. Houston, 3 K. & J. 703, 3 Jur. (N. S.) 1051), the question at all points being whether there is any material product of authorship on the part of the person claiming copyright; that is to say, whether the publication is the result of independent labour or of mere copying (see Drone on Copy. 202); for a mere copy or reprint not differing materially from the original matter is not entitled to protection (see Bouci-cault v. Fox, 5 Blatchf. (Amer.), 87, 101). The question in all these cases is not whether the materials which are used are entirely new, and have never been used before, or even whether they have never been used before for the same purpose; but whether the same plan, arrangement and combination of materials have been used before for the same purpose, or for any other purpose (Emerson v. Davies, 3 Story (Amer.) 778, per Story, J.). Under certain conditions it is possible for two works to be almost exactly alike, and yet there may be copyright in both of them, for the question is not as to any similarity which may or may not exist between them, but whether the production is original, that is to say, the result of independent labour (see Blunt v. Patten, 2 Paine (Amer.) 400, per Thompson; J.). The points of resemblance are useful only for the purpose of determining whether there has or has not been copying (Roworth v. Wilkes, 1 Camp. 94; De Berenger v. Wheble, 2 Stark. 548; Barfield v. Nicholson, 2 Sim. & St. 1, 2 L. J. Ch. 90; Nichols v. Loder, 2 Coop. 217; Benn v. Le Clercq, 30 Leg. Int. 185 (Amer.) ). It is obvious that there may and probably will be but little difference between one map and another, or between one chart and another, or between two photographs of the same scene, and yet there may be a valid right of copy in each and every of them. In cases of this description the resem-
blances are valuable chiefly as evidence showing whether there has been unlawful copying, and certainly not as proof positive that there necessarily must have been; the question whether there has been unlawful copying or not is for the jury (Blunt v. Patten, 2 Paine 400, per Thompson, J.). So, if two persons were to write independently of each other a series of works couched in precisely the same language, each would have a copyright in his production (Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. Cas. 869, per Erle, J.), for no person can claim an exclusive property in the method of treating a subject (Lewis v. Fullarton, 2 Beav. 0, 3 Jur. 669), or in the general plan of a work, or in the purpose for which materials are used (see Mack v. Petter, L. R. 14 Eq. 431; Pike v. Nicholas, L. R. 5 Ch. 251). An author is entitled to collect his general information from a copyrighted work, or he may use it for the detection of errors, omissions, and faults in his own; but, as before stated, he must go to the original common sources for his information (see Cox v. Land & Water Journal Co., L. R. 9 Eq. 332), for the privilege of fair use accorded to a subsequent writer must be such and such only as will not cause substantial injury to the proprietor of the first publication (Lawrence v. Dana, 2 Am. L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 428; Drone on Copy. 396). Thus, the compiler of a Directory or Guide Book, containing information derived from common sources, should obtain and work out the information independently for himself, although he can verify the correctness of the results by comparison with previous works (Kelly v. Morris, L. R. 1 Eq. 697, 35 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 423; Morris v. Wright, 5 Ch. App. 279). The compiler must not print his directory from slips cut from a previous copyrighted work of the same kind, even although he verifies all the statements (Morris v. Ashbee, L. R. 7 Eq. 34); but he may use such slips for the purpose of directing himself to the
parties from whom he may obtain information (Morris v. Wright, L. R. 5 Ch. App. 279; 18 W. R. 327, explaining Kelly v. Morris, Morris v. Ashbee, supra). The same principles of consideration in determining whether any given production is or is not original have been laid down with respect to other descriptions of works (Hogg v. Scott, L. R. 18 Eq. 444; Pike v. Nicholas, L. R. 5 Ch. 231; 18 W. R. 321; Scott v. Stanford, L. R. 3 Eq. 722; 36 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 729). The case of Pike v. Nicholas, supra, is very important, as it clearly illustrates the principle that where a person derives his information from a common source, and bona fide works up the materials so found by his own independent labour, it matters not that he advocates the same arguments or theories, or uses the same illustrations or quotations, as may happen to be found in some previous protected work (and see Spiers v. Brown, 6 W. R. 352; Lawrence v. Duna, 2 Amer. L. T. (N. S.) 423, per Clifford, J.). And upon the same principle a play may be original, although the details and internal incidents are the same as a novel, the copyright in which is vested in another (Bouicault v. Fox, 5 Blatchf. (Amer.) 87, 100); and, again, an arrangement of music may under certain circumstances be original, as, for instance, an arrangement of an opera for the pianoforte (Wood v. Boosey, L. R. 3 Q. B. 223; and see Boosey v. Fairlie, 7 Ch. D. 301, 309); and hence it could not be successfully argued that the publication of the arrangement amounted in point of fact to the publication of the original (Boosey v. Fairlie, supra). So an original photograph, that is to say, a photograph directly taken from some object, animate or otherwise, is a proper subject of copyright, although it cannot be denied that such a production is a copy of the original object (Graves' Case, L. R. 4 Q. B. 723, per Blackburn, J.). The description of specimens of fruit (Hogg v. Scott, L. R. 18 Eq. 444), the reproduction
and description of monumental designs (Grace v. Newman, L. R. 19 Eq. 623), may amount in many instances to original productions. And so where directions were given in an Act of Parliament for drawing up certain forms to be used under the Act, the drawer of such forms in pursuance of and in conformity to the directions so given creates an original production for which he is entitled to protection; alter if the statute had contained the forms themselves and he had merely copied them (Alexander v. Mackenzie, 9 Sc. Sess. Cas. 2nd Ser. 748). Specifications of patents when once filed become the property of the public, and any one can republish them and use them in any way not amounting to an infringement of the patent (Wyatt v. Barnard, 3 V. & B. 77).

To constitute originality it is, as previously mentioned, by no means absolutely necessary that the production should be wholly and entirely original; for if this were so, abridgments and translations would not be original productions, nor would dramatizations or compilations be entitled to any protection whatever; whereas in point of fact, compositions of this nature are frequently protected by the Courts. A person may, by publishing a reprint of a work in which the copyright has expired, acquire a new copyright in it if at the same time he add notes and illustrations from other works, or otherwise improve it to a material extent; that is to say, he will create an original work if the alterations are of sufficient importance to so constitute it (Black v. Murray, 9 Sess. Cas., 3rd Ser. 341; and see Banks v. McDivitt, 13 Blatchf. (Amer.) 163); and in such cases the test of originality is applied to the additions, and in fact to everything which represents the labour and skill of the person claiming the copyright (Drone, Copy. 200). The character and extent of the alteration necessary to constitute a material distinction varies according to circumstances. Lord Dees (Black v.
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Murray, supra, 350), was of opinion that the sole alteration of the word "spear" to "spur" in a poem of eleven stanzas was sufficient to support a claim of originality in the second poem, but his opinion was not shared by the rest of the Court, and it is difficult to understand how the alteration of a single word can constitute a new composition (see Maxwell v. Hogg, L. R. 2 Ch. 317, per Lord Cairns). To create a new copyright it is clear that the alterations must be extensive and substantial, practically making a new book (Black v. Murray, 9 Sess. Cas. 3rd Ser. 355, per Lord Kinloch).

The test of originality is in all cases whether the production is the result of honest and independent labour as contrasted with mere copying or colourable imitation, and such test will vary according to the nature of the production itself. For instance, a person who makes an abridgment or a translation reproduces an existing work in a new and useful form, but his production, to be entitled to protection, must be something more than a mere copy of the whole or parts of the original (Drone on Copy. 158), and an abridgment is in point of fact no abridgment at all if it consists of a mere transcript of some portions of the original and the omission of others (see Lawrence v. Danu, 2 Am. L. T. R. (N. S.) 402). In the case of a translation the question is whether any essential part of a previous copyright translation of the same work has been taken, although the fact of there being identity of a few phrases does not make the translation a piracy (see Shook v. Rankin, 6 Biss. (Amer.) 492). So also, as previously mentioned, a person may arrange music composed by another in such a way as to acquire copyright in the arrangement, as where the score of a whole opera is arranged for the pianoforte (Wood v. Boosey and Another, L. R. 2 Q. B. 340; on appeal, 3 id. 223). A photograph may be original although all photographs are copies of some object or other,
and the test is whether the photographer has copied direct from the subject, or merely reproduced another photograph or the negative thereof (Graves' Case, L. R. 4 Q. B. 723). In the case of a compilation, that is to say, a collection of old materials gathered and arranged to form a treatise, the test of originality is applied to the arrangement and combination, and not to the materials themselves (see Emerson v. Davies, 3 Story (Amer.) 778; 4 West. L. Journ. 201); and consequently the compilation must have some intrinsic merit not to be found in such materials, as in the case of tables of calculations (Baily v. Taylor, 3 L. J. (Ch.) 60; 1 Russ. & My. 73); or of a directory (Morris v. Wright, L. R. 5 Ch. 279; 2 T. T. (N. S.) 78); the same general test being applied to every species of compilation, and to every new edition of a previously published volume. With respect to dramatizations the test is whether the work upon which it is founded has been reproduced in a substantially new form, that is, in a form materially different, not indeed so far as the characters, circumstances, and incidents are concerned, for these must necessarily to some extent be the same—the dialogue may even in parts be preserved—but as regards the situations, aspects, climaxes, contained in a work not originally adapted to, or suitable for the stage (see Boucicault v. Fox, 5 Blatchf. (Amer.), 100, 101). In every case, therefore, where the question of originality is involved, the true test is whether the production complained of is the result of the author's independent exertions, or whether he has merely copied from some previous work; similarity, or even identity of expression, may go far to augment evidence of piracy, but, as a rule, it is merely auxiliary to other evidence, save in those cases where the author is unable to explain away such similarity or identity.

It would seem that the owner's right of copy in an unpublished production at common law does not depend
upon any question of merit or intrinsic value as a composition (Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 De C. & Sm. 694); and although there is no direct decision on the point, as a matter of argument it is clear that the question of merit or value is nothing to the public before publication, for it will not interest them under any circumstances: the author of manuscripts, whether he is famous or obscure, high or low, has a right to say of them, if innocent, that whether interesting or dull, light or heavy, saleable or unsaleable, they shall not without his consent be published (Prince Albert v. Strange, supra, 694, per Bruce, V.C.). Furthermore, there may be copyright in letters or other communications, although they may be entirely destitute of literary merit, and of no extraneous value whatever, for every letter is in the general and proper sense of the term a literary composition, which cannot lawfully be published by the receiver, or any third person, without the consent of the writer, except for purposes of vindication (see Drone on Copy. 134; Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 2 Bush. (Ky.) 480, there cited).

The Act to amend the law of copyright (5 & 6 Vict. Even under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45) recites that "it is expedient to amend the law relating to copyright, and to afford greater encouragement to the production of literary works of lasting benefit to the world;" but the Act does not confine the privilege of copyright to works of literary merit (Maclean v. Moody, 20 Sess. Cas. 2nd Ser. 1163, per Lord Deas). Nor a fortiori need they by any means be of "lasting benefit to the world." The exposition of the law on this subject appears to be that the very slightest tinge of merit if contained in a work of any value, either as an addition to knowledge, or as the receptacle of any useful or general information, will be sufficient to protect the production and to make it a fit subject of copyright. Where, how-
worthless, or of such a trivial nature as to be totally insignificant, there it lacks one of the essential qualifications of copyright, and consequently becomes common to the world (Page v. Wieson, 20 L. T. (N. S.) 435; 17 W. R. 483; and see Cables v. Murka, 52 L. J. Rep. (N. S.) Ch. 107). The true inquiry, therefore, is not whether one production is more meritorious or of greater literary value than another, but whether the work in question may fairly be considered to constitute a material addition to useful knowledge.

When, however, the author of a work seeks to recover for a loss of profits which he has sustained by reason of the destruction of unpublished manuscripts, there the question of merit may form an important part of the inquiry (see Priestley's Case, cited 2 Meriv. 437); but in general it is not necessary that a work should possess any very great literary or art merit, and it may be definitely laid down that the right of protection afforded to an unpublished manuscript does not depend upon its pecuniary value or intrinsic merit, and the law is in this respect the same both in England and America (Woolsey v. Judd, 4 Duer (N. Y.) 386; 11 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 49).

Another qualification essential to copyright is that the work intended to be protected thereby shall not have the effect of deceiving, or be intended to deceive the public. Consequently, where the plaintiff employed one H. to write a book, and with intent to deceive and defraud the public, and to make them believe that the book was a translation of an original book written by one Sturm, fraudulently published it as and for a translation of the said work with a false preface, it was held that these matters were sufficient to negative the existence of a valid copyright in the plaintiff (Wright v. Tallis and Another, 1 C. B. 893; 9 Jur. 946). The Court will also on similar principles restrain the publication of a book
falsely purporting to be written by a well-known author (Byron v. Johnson, 2 Mer. 29; Seeley v. Fisher, 11 Sim. 581; 10 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 274; Harte v. De Witt, 1 Cent. Law Journ. 360 (Amer.); and refer also to Archbold v. Sweet, 5 Car. & P. 219; 1 Moody & R. 162), whether the false allegation is contained on the face of the publication itself (Barnard v. Pillow, W. N. 1868, p. 94), or in any other manner (Seeley v. Fisher, 11 Sim. 581). This view of the law rests upon a general consideration of the question of fraud rather than on the infringement of any literary property (Lord Byron v. Johnson, 2 Meriv. 29). There is, however, a wide distinction between a deliberate intent to deceive the public, and the mere assumption of some nom de plume, or an innocent allegation that the work is, for instance, a translation of an ancient manuscript, a method adopted by Moore in his “Epicurean,” and probably by many other authors as well, ever since the art of writing was practised. The test would seem to rest upon the intention of the author, coupled with the probable deception of the public, for the very object in all these cases is not merely to conceal the name of the genuine author, and to publish opinions to the world under an innocent disguise, but to deceive the public by inducing them to believe that the work is the original work of the author who is named, with the object of obtaining from the purchaser a greater price than would otherwise be obtained (see the remarks of Tyndall, C. J., in Wright v. Tallis, 1 C. B. 907; 9 Jur. 946).

It is to the last degree essential that every publication should be of an innocent nature, that is to say, not calculated to disturb the public peace, neither must it be seditious or have a libellous tendency, whether the public or merely a private person is the victim, nor must it be immoral or blasphemous. Neither in England nor America is there any statutory definition defining the
word "innocent," and each case as it arises will, therefore, be dealt with on principles peculiar to itself; but whatever may be the judicial interpretation, nothing is clearer than this, that a work to be entitled to protection must in the eye of the law be free from anything tending to corrupt the morals of, or to libel, individuals or society at large; the tendency, both moral and political, must not be injurious; and consequently, when a work is found to be tainted, the Courts have uniformly refused to interfere either in protecting it against infringement or in restraining its sale or publication. This principle is deeply rooted in English law, and applies to every description of intellectual production, whether published or unpublished, for neither by common law nor statute will a work be protected unless it be innocent (Southey v. Sherwood, 2 Meriv. 437, per Lord Eldon). The interference of the Courts is based upon the ground of a title to the property in the plaintiff, and the test is whether the plaintiff could maintain an action in damages at law (Walcott v. Walker, 7 Ves. 1; Southey v. Sherwood, 2 Mer. 439); if he can do so with success the title to the property must necessarily be complete, and as a matter of liability no one can be fined or imprisoned for doing that for which he can maintain an action at law (Poplett v. Stockdale, 1 Ry. & M. 338, per Bst, C. J.). A man may publish anything which twelve of his countrymen think is not blameable (Rex v. Cuthell, 27 How. St. Tr. 675, per Lord Kenyon). And, as before stated, where a manuscript is not innocent the common law affords no protection to it, and any one who obtains possession of it may publish it (Southey v. Sherwood, 2 Mer. 435), the effect being that an author has no right to prevent the publication of a work which he himself cannot lawfully publish, as, for instance, a work having a tendency to encourage the commission of crime (Martinetti v. Maguire, 1 Deady
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(Amer.) 229). This at first sight may appear anomalous, but in reality it is not so, for although the Courts will not restrain either the publication or sale of, for instance, a libellous work as such (Prudential Assurance Co. v. Knott, L. R. 10 Ch. 142; 44 L. J. Ch. 192), at least not until the verdict of a jury is first obtained (Saxby v. Easterbrook, 3 C. P. D. 330; 27 W. R. 188; Thorley's Cattle Food Co. v. Massam, 6 Ch. D. 582; 41 L. T. 542; Thomas v. Williams, 14 Ch. D. 864; 43 L. T. 91), and although there may be no proof of actual damage (Thorley's Cattle Food Co. v. Massam, supra; Thomas v. Williams, supra), yet the publication of such a treatise is a violation of the law, and the guilty party will be dealt with as the law shall direct. The criminal courts are perfectly competent to deal with offenders, and for this reason courts of civil procedure have invariably refused to extend their jurisdiction. Where, however, a libel amounts to a contempt of Court, there it will be restrained in the interest of the administration of justice. Seditious and libellous publications will not therefore, be protected, and treatises tending to encourage the commission of an offence against the criminal law are in their nature seditious (Martinetti v. Maguire, 1 Deady (Amer.), 229); and where a composition appears on the face of it to be a libel so gross as to affect public morals no protection will be afforded; and further, no action will lie for the piracy of a composition amounting to a gross and nefarious libel upon the solemn administration of justice (Hime v. Dale, 2 Camp. 27 (note)), for the Court ought not to take account of the unhallowed profits of libellous publications (Walcot v. Walker, 7 Vea. 2). It would appear that in order to establish a defence that a certain work is libellous or seditious it must be shown that the publication threatens a breach of the peace or is actually libellous on the state; the mere fact of it containing or even abounding in obnoxious or satirical obser-
vations is not sufficient (Drone on Copy. 185). Whether a work containing a libel on a particular individual would be entitled to protection is a matter of argument, since there is no decision on the subject, but it is anticipated that inasmuch as an offence against an individual is also more or less an offence against society of which he is an integral part, there will be little difficulty in arriving at a satisfactory conclusion whenever such a question shall be propounded.

Upon the plainest principles of the law, founded upon common sense and justice, it is apparent that productions of an indecent nature will not be protected (Stockdale v. Onwhyn, 5 B. & C. 176; Poplett v. Stockdale, Ry. & M. 337), for laws are not passed "for the promotion or benefit of authors and inventors, except as a means of promoting the progress of science and the useful arts" (Martineti v. Maguire, 1 Deady (Amer.), 216, per Deady, J.).

By 20 & 21 Vict. c. 83, an Act for more effectually preventing the sale of obscene books, pictures, prints, and other articles, power is given to any metropolitan police magistrate, or other stipendiary magistrate, or for any two justices of the peace, to authorize a search of any premises in which any obscene books, papers, writings, prints, pictures, drawings, or other representations are suspected to be kept (s. 1), and any person wilfully exposing to view in any street, road, highway, or public place, any obscene print, picture, or other indecent exhibition shall be deemed a rogue and a vagabond, and may be punished accordingly (5 Geo. IV. c. 83, s. 4, amended by 1 & 2 Vict. c. 38, s. 2, and extended by 20 & 21 Vict. c. 83, supra).

No less deleterious to the public welfare are blasphemous writings punishable by law and subversive of all morality, and these consequently will not be protected (Murray v. Benbow, Jac. 474; Lawrence v. Smith, Jac. 471). Anything tending to impugn a fundamental doc-
trine of the Christian religion would appear to be blasphemous, as, for instance, a denial of the immortality of the soul (Lawrence v. Smith, supra, per Lord Eldon), for Christianity is part and parcel of the law of the land (Cowan v. Milbourn, L. R. 2 Ex. 230, per Kelly, C.B.). The general principle as laid down by Lord Eldon in Murray v. Benbow and Lawrence v. Smith would appear to be perfectly correct, but the only difficulty is in the application of that principle in such a practical way as to ensure substantial justice. It is evident that if to doubt the immortality of the soul is the beginning of blasphemy made perfect on the publication of such a doubt, other doctrines may be held equally obnoxious even though widely diffused or perhaps ardently embraced by a particular sect or body. A Unitarian, for instance, might be a blasphemer, and probably would have been held to be so by Lord Eldon, but now in all cases the intent to corrupt the public morals, to shock and insult believers, or to bring the established religion into hatred and contempt is an essential element in the crime. Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea (Odgers on Libel and Slander, 395).

The law with respect to the essential qualifications of copyright is equally applicable to one subject as to another, and consequently it has been held that no copyright can exist in engravings or prints which have an obscene, immoral, or libellous tendency (Fores v. Johnes, 4 Esp. 95), and the same rule would no doubt apply to statuary or photographs. It is certain, however, that the law holds these productions in such abhorrence that no protection whatever will be afforded to any one who has knowingly been instrumental in the making of them. A printer, for instance, is not bound to continue printing a work which he finds to be tainted with libel, and if he stops he will be entitled to recover for so much as he has done before he made the discovery (Clay v. Yates, 1 H. & N.)
ON THE INCIDENTS OF

73; 2 Jur. (N. S.) 908; Poplett v. Stockdale, Ry. & M. 337; 2 Car. & P. 198); and so where A. agrees to supply B. with a manuscript to be printed by the latter on an equal division of profits, and it is found that the intended publication is of an illegal nature, no action will lie against A. for refusing to supply the manuscript (Gale and Another v. Leckie, 2 Stark. 107). It is thought that to an action of trespass for destroying a picture the defendant may plead that it was a scandalous libel upon individuals, and that being publicly exhibited he cut it to pieces by way of abating a nuisance; and if the defendant does not avail himself of that defence, still, in estimating the value of the picture for the purpose of assessing the damages, the nature of the subject will be taken into consideration (Du Bost v. Beresford, 2 Camp. 511; but see the remarks of the Lord Chancellor in The Emperor of Austria v. Day and Another, 7 Jur. (N. S.) 641; 4 L. T. (N. S.) 494), but secondary evidence of illegality will not be accepted where primary, such as the production of the obnoxious publication, can be obtained (Gale v. Leckie, 2 Stark. 110). Save in the instances previously enumerated, and others which might be considered as reflecting upon public good and morality, the liberty of the owner of an intellectual production is practically secured. The spirit which actuated and perhaps originated the restrictive influence of the old Star Chamber would seem to have disappeared from society, and of the practice and procedure of that obnoxious Court, its subpoenas and writs of rebellion, not a trace remains.

It may here be mentioned that the term "proprietor" so frequently made use of in all the copyright Acts differs in signification from "inventor." A proprietor is one who finds out something either by his own ingenuity, or he may be a mere owner without having exercised his brains at all, e.g., he may acquire by purchase; an inventor, on
the contrary, signifies a person who actually discovers or contrives any new process, manufacture, or substance (see Millingen v. Picken, 9 Jur. 714). The word "proprietor," when applicable to the owner of a new and original design, is further defined in the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883 (40 & 47 Vict. c. 57, s. 61).

The right of the Lord Chamberlain to prohibit the acting of stage plays (6 & 7 Vict. c. 68, s. 14) is founded upon just and generous principles clearly productive of the public good, and is the only instance of censorship which can be said to remain in England at the present day.
CHAPTER III.

ON THE INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT.

The term infringement is identical with that of piracy, and both differ in some respects from mere plagiarism. The plagiarist appropriates to himself the labour of another, and passes the result off as his own production in such a way as to avoid the penalties of the law, which attach only on the invasion of some legal right. The literary pirate goes a step further and incurs actual liability, and that, whether he passes off the production as his own, or fairly acknowledges the sources from which he has copied or stolen (Scott v. Stanford, L. R. 3 Eq. 718); there can, therefore, be no plagiarism without at the same time misrepresentation as to authorship, although an infringer is equally liable whether there be any misrepresentation or not.

Literary property is liable to invasion in three modes. First, open piracy, as where a publisher in this country publishes an unauthorised edition of a work in which copyright exists, or where a man introduces and sells in this country a reprint made abroad. Secondly, literary larceny, as where a man, pretending to be the author of a book, illegitimately appropriates the fruits of previous authors' literary labour. Thirdly, where a man is selling a work under the name or title of another man or another man’s work. Against the first two species of offences the Copyright Acts afford protection; against the third, the common law. (See the remark of James, L. J., in Dicks v.
Yule, 50 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 815.) It must be remembered, however, that piracy consists only in the unlawful multiplication of copies, or extracts from such copies, whether for gratuitous circulation or for purposes of profit (Novello v. Sudlow, 12 C. B. 177;) and there is consequently nothing whatever to prevent a person from reading publicly the whole or any portion of a copyright work (Tinsley v. Lucy, 32 L. J. Ch. 535; 11 W. R. 877, per Wood, V.-C.).

Any description of intellectual property which is capable of becoming the subject of copyright may be infringed, and this, whether it is actually published at the time, or is merely under the protection of the common law; in both instances it is obvious that the owner has a right of property in his production, unless, indeed, it be of a libellous, immoral, or blasphemous nature (see ante, p. 23).

In some few instances the infringer will deliberately copy verbatim the salient features of another's work (Maxwell v. Somerton, 30 L. T. (N. S.) 11), and this is of course a gross piracy, not only by reference to the general judicial interpretation, but by reference to the statutory law also, for by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 13, it is enacted "that if any person shall, in any part of the British Dominions, after the passing of this Act, print or cause to be printed, either for sale or exportation, any book (see s. 2) in which there shall be subsisting copyright, without the consent in writing of the proprietor thereof, or shall import for sale or hire any such book so having been unlawfully printed from parts beyond the sea, or knowing such book to have been so unlawfully printed or imported, shall sell, publish, or expose to sale or hire, or cause to be sold, published, or exposed to sale or hire, or shall have in his possession for sale or hire any such book so unlawfully printed or imported without such consent as aforesaid, such offender shall be liable to a special action on the case, at the suit of the proprietor of such copyright, to be brought in any
court of record in that part of the British Dominions in
which the offence shall be committed." Further, no
person, not being the proprietor of the copyright or some
person authorised by him, may import into any part of
the United Kingdom, or into any other part of the British
Dominions, for sale or hire, any copyrighted book first
composed or written, or printed and published in any part
of the United Kingdom, and reprinted elsewhere, under
a penalty of forfeiture thereof, and also of £10 and double
the value (ibid. s. 17, and see s. 23; Brooke v. Milliken,
3 T. R. 509, as to separate penalties; 39 & 40 Vict. c. 36;
Customs). It will be observed, that under s. 15 no remedy
is given against a person who prints or imports for gratui-
tous distribution, or who gratuitously distributes copies
printed or imported without authority (but see Novello
v. Sdlow, 12 C. B. 177). And independently of the
section, it has been decided in Ireland that a common
law right of action attaches upon the invasion of the
statutory right, even though it be invaded by printing,
publishing, &c., part of a work only, and not the whole of

The principles at the foundation of the body of law
which has from time to time been built up and promul-
gated by the decisions of the Courts, are not limited in
their application to instances where the ipsissima verba
have been slavishly copied, for the identity of internal
composition as contrasted with the slavish and outward
embodiment of words is principally regarded (see Perris
v. Hexamer, 99 U. S. (Amer.) 674). Words are mere
instruments of expression, that which is expressed forms
the principal subject of consideration; and where a person
deliberately copies the actual sentences one by one in
their natural order and sequence, it would appear that
the interference of the Courts would be based more on
considerations referring to the sentiments and ideas as
arranged and assorted, and to the method which the author had adopted, than to the identity of mere words which are common to all (see \textit{Romney v. Kelly}, 14 Ir. Law Rep. (N. S.) 172). Of course, the arrangement of the words constitutes an embodiment which will clearly be protected, for to appropriate an assortment of words is \textit{prima facie} proof of piracy, and for this reason a defendant will, in the vast majority of instances, be found to have retained the meaning and effect of the composition, while at the same time he has to some extent discarded the verbal arrangement. He will appropriate the substance of the production, and the question in all these cases is whether he has done so, and not merely whether the identical language is used \textit{(Lawrence v. Dana, 4 Cliff. 40, 2 Am. L. T. R. (N. S.) 420, per Clifford, J.)}, although that will, of course, enter into the spirit of the enquiry \textit{(Alexander v. Mackenzie, 9 Sess. Cas. 2nd Ser. 734 (note); see the remarks of the Lord Ordinary)}. Thus, no person can under the pretence of quotation publish either the whole or part of another's work, though he may use any quotation in a fair manner \textit{(Wilkins v. Aikin, 17 Ves. 422; Mawman v. Tegg, 2 Russ. 393, per Lord Eldon; Smith v. Chatto, 31 L. T. (N. S.) 775; and see \textit{Story's Executors v. Holcombe, 4 McLean (Amer.) 306}). And one work may be a piracy of another although the passages copied are properly described as quotations, and although they are not so extensive as to render the piratical work a substitute for the other \textit{(Bohn v. Bogue, 10 Jur. 420)}. Reviewers may make extracts sufficient to show the merits or demerits of the work reviewed, but they cannot so exercise the privilege as to supersede it. Sufficient may be taken to give a correct view of the whole, but the privilege of making extracts is limited to those objects, and cannot be exercised to such an extent that the review shall become a substitute for the book.
reviewed (Lawrence v. Dana, 2 Am. L. T. R. (N. S.) 428, per Clifford, J.). So where a person, under the pretence of an essay on modern English poetry, introduces by way of illustration a material part of another's property, he will be restrained (Campbell v. Scott, 11 Sim. 31).

The test of fair use of the copyright work of another has been differently applied by different judges. For instance, the question may be whether the one publication is "a legitimate use of the other in the fair exercise of a mental operation deserving the character of an original work" (Wilkins v. Aikin, 17 Ves. 426, per Lord Eldon); or whether the similarity between the substance of a second work and of a first is a mere coincidence, the result of similar observation, or whether the second work is substantially a transcript of the first with merely colourable alterations (Alexander v. MacKenzie, 9 Scotch Sess. Cas. 2nd Ser. 754, per Lord Fullerton). In no civil case is it necessary for the plaintiff to prove any animus furandi on the part of the defendant (see Reade v. Lucy, 1 J. & H. 527), for a piracy may be committed with the best intentions, and even although the defendant had not the slightest idea that he was infringing an existing copyright. The question as to whether certain copyrighted property has been improperly appropriated may, perhaps, best of all be resolved with reference to the rule stated by Wood, V.-C., in Scott v. Stanford, 16 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 52; L. R. 3 Eq. 722; taken from the judgment of Mr. Justice Story in Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story (Amer.) 116, where the learned judge said, "In short, we must, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the nature and object of the selections made, the quantity and value of the material used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects of the original work." It is not, however, necessary that all of these things should concur in order
to entitle the plaintiff to relief (Smith v. Chatta, 31 L. T. (N. S.) 776, per Hall, V.-C.) ; and in all cases the primary, though not necessarily the exclusive subject of enquiry, is, what effect the extracts are likely to have upon the original work. The value and materiality of the part taken is looked to as well as the quantum (Bramwell v. Holcomb, 3 My. & Cr. 738; Saunders v. Smith, ibid. 711); for it is obvious that the quintessence of a book may be reproduced in a very small substance (see Campbell v. Scott, 11 Sim. 31; Bradbury v. Hotten, L. R. S Ex. 1; Story's Executors v. Holcombe, 4 McLean, 309 (Amer.), per McLean, J.; Tinsley v. Lacy, 1 Hem. & M. 753, per Wood, V.-C.; Chatterton v. Caver, 3 App. Cas. 497, per Lord O'Hagan). The rule of law is consequently sufficiently settled that an author is not entitled to save himself labour and pains by appropriating the results of the industry of another to such an extent or in such a manner as to enhance his own work at the expense of the previous one; and therefore where a plaintiff published a work to the copyright of which he was not entitled, with certain improvements and additions, and then the defendant published the whole work with the plaintiff's improvements, the Court refused to interfere, and Lord Loughborough, stated that if he was to do strict justice he should order the defendants to take out of their book all they had taken from the plaintiff, and reciprocally the plaintiff to take out of his all he had taken from the original work (Cary v. Faden, 5 Ves. 23).

It is frequently a matter of extreme difficulty to say whether a suspected document or work of intellectual production is or is not a "copy" of, or "substantially identical" with a former production, for the person infringing the rights of another will, as a rule, adopt every artifice to protect himself against the consequences of his act.

A "copy" has been described as "that which comes so
near the original as to give to every person seeing it the idea created by the original" (West v. Francis, 5 B. & Ald. 743, per Bayley, J., and see Lewis v. Chapman, 3 Beav. 133). To constitute "substantial identity," it is not necessary that one production should be a "copy" of the other, although the term "copy" may be, and no doubt is, included in the expression "substantial identity." This latter term is of much larger scope, and embraces instances in which the matter complained of, being spread over a greater area, is consequently more difficult to adjudicate upon. Both terms are exceedingly elastic; and while at one time a question of substantial identity is decided by the Court by comparison, at another, long and laborious evidence of minute analysis may have to be gone into (see Pike v. Nicholas, L. R. 5 Ch. 251; 38 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 529). And although as a matter of principle the Judges may be perfectly in accord upon the question as to what amounts in theory to piracy, yet it by no means follows that any two of them will arrive at the same conclusion respecting the facts to which the principle is applied. Thus in one case James, V.-C., was of opinion that the plaintiff's work had been pirated, whereas the Lords Justices of Appeal came to a directly contrary conclusion (Pike v. Nicholas, supra). The question of "copy" or "substantial identity" is applied to every description of composition which can form the subject of copyright—to directories, and every species of literary property; to pictures, sculpture, designs, photographs, or in fact anything entitled to protection, either under the copyright statutes or at the common law. For instance, a person who deliberately copies a picture is liable to an action and cannot escape by showing that the copy is larger or smaller than the original (Gambart v. Ball, 14 C. B. (N. S.), 306; Graves v. Ashford, L. R. 2 C. P. 410; Bradbury v. Hotten, L. R. 8 Ex. 1).
There would appear to be authority for the statement that a person is entitled as of right to take the copyrighted work of another and republish it, provided he materially improve it, either in corrections, revisions, or annotations, and does not servilely copy it (Smyre v. Moore, 1 East, 362, note, per Lord Mansfield; and see Cary v. Kearsley, at nisi prius, 4 Esp. 169, per Lord Ellenborough; Mattheison v. Stockdale, 12 Ves. 275, per Lord Erskine; Martin v. Wright, 6 Sim. 298, per Shadwell, V.-C.; Saunders v. Smith, 3 My. & Cr. 711). There are, however, one English and two American authorities pointing to a different conclusion (Scott v. Stanford, L. R. 3 Eq. 722, per Wood, V.-C.; Lawrence v. Dunn, 2 Am. L. T. R. (N. S.) 431, per Clifford, J.; Drury v. Ewing, 1 Bond, 549, per Leavitt, J.); and it is submitted that if a plea of this nature were allowed to prevail, it would be impossible to afford protection to literary property at all. If ever the question should be raised again it may almost certainly be predicted that the judgment of the Court will be against the contention that a person has a right to appropriate the work of another for the mere purpose of improving it, whether by annotation, revision, or otherwise.

The principal test of piracy, where it is otherwise difficult to say whether one production is a copy of or identical with another, is to collect the inaccuracies in both works, "for when a considerable number of passages are proved to have been copied by the copying of the blunders in them, other passages which are the same with passages in the original book must be presumed, prima facie, to be likewise copied, though no blunders occur in them" (Maweum v. Tegg, 2 Russ. 394, per Lord Eldon). But to show that defendant has quoted the same authorities as the plaintiff, that he has used a similar quotation or utilized the information contained in plaintiff's work, is in itself and without further evidence, no proof of copying (Pike v. Nicholas, L. R. 5 Ch. 262), but had he made
several identical mistakes it might be so considered, although this would again depend upon circumstances, for in one case where a defendant in a series of 7,000 mathematical calculations had made seven mistakes identical with mistakes made by the plaintiff, and had made other mistakes as well which the plaintiff had avoided, the defendant's conduct was only described as "suspicious" (McNeill v. Williams, 11 Jur. 344). On a prima facie case being made out against the defendant, the onus of proving the contrary is immediately thrown upon him (Hotten v. Arthur, 1 Hem. & M. 603; Mawman v. Tegg, 2 Russ. 395), and he can only escape by showing conclusively either that he has not used the plaintiff's work in any way, or that having used it he has nevertheless gone direct to common or other sources for his information. Evidence that the extracts complained of are to be found in other works than those of the plaintiff, while it may lessen the probabilities that there was unlawful copying, can never create a substantial defence (see Drone, Copy. 431). This proof by means of the identity of mistakes, though a most valuable assistance, is not necessarily in all cases a complete and final test, since it is obvious that one person may carefully copy or imitate colourably the work of another, and find out and correct all the mistakes during the process, and on the other hand the identity of mistakes may spring from the fact that the basis of argument adopted by each party has been erroneous and identical in both instances, and such a basis as would at first sight be adopted as a matter of course. Consequently, one author after another may, and does frequently, fall into the very same errors and mistakes, and in these cases it may be of the greatest assistance to the defendant to show that the same mistakes are to be found in the work of an author other than the plaintiff. The subject of the tests of piracy is very learnedly and lucidly treated at large in the judgment of Lord Hatherley in Pike v. Nicholas, L. R. 5
of copyright.

Ch. 257, and refer also to Cox v. Land and Water Journal Co., L. R. 9 Eq. 324; Mawman v. Tegg, 2 Russ. 385.

The *animus furandi*, or fraudulent intention of the person charged with committing a piracy is not a necessary element in the case, and the absence of it cannot be made the basis of a defence (Roworth v. Wilkes, 1 Camp. 94), for if A. takes the property of B., *animus* is inferred from the mere act, even although the offence were committed without any dishonest intention, since every man must be presumed, in point of law, to intend everything to which his acts naturally lead. If, for instance, the rights of an author are clearly infringed, it can be of no importance to know with what intent this was done (Campbell v. Scott, 11 Sim. 31; and see Scott v. Stanford, L. R. 3 Eq. 723, per Wood, V.-C.; Bradbury v. Hotten, L. R. 8 Ex. 1, 42 L. J. (N. S.) Ex. 28; Smith v. Chutto, 31 L. T. (N. S.) 775, 23 W. R. 290); and the American law on the subject is to the same effect (Millett v. Snowden, 1 West. Law Journ. 240; Story's Executors v. Holcombe, 4 McLean, 306; Lawrence v. Dana, 2 Am. L. T. R. (N. S.) 427, per Clifford, J.). On the other hand, it must be remembered that evidence of innocent intention may have a bearing upon the question of "fair use," and evidence of *animus* may be given for the purpose of showing that the copying is either not fair or the contrary (see Spiers v. Brown, 6 W. R. 352, per Wood, V.-C.). A person cannot, unless protected by some statutory provision, plead *ignorance* in an action for piracy, for in any event the injury to the plaintiff is the same, and the defendant must, if he would enjoy the fruits of another's labour, take also the risk (see Murray v. Bogue, 1 Drew. 353, 17 Jur. 210; Novello v. Ludlow, 12 C. B. 177, 16 Jur. 689; Gambart v. Sumner, 5 Hurl. & N. 5, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 1109; Reade v. Conquest, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 479, 8 Jur. (N. S.) 764; Rock v. Lazarus, L. R. 15 Eq. 104, 42 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 105; Millett v. Snowden, 1 West.
Law Journ. (Amer.) 240. It may, therefore, be considered as settled that a plaintiff’s rights do not depend upon the innocence or guilt of the defendant, and that allegation and proof of scirent are not necessary (Lee v. Simpson, 3 C. B. 883, per Wilde, C.J.). A person who prints or imports a work in which there is subsisting copyright, contrary to 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 15, cannot plead that he was in point of fact ignorant of the right of the proprietor of the copyright; but if a person not knowing that he was committing an injury, should sell, publish, or expose to sale a work so printed or imported, he would not be liable, unless he were at the same time the printer or importer. The words of the section are adopted from the corresponding section of 54 Geo. III. c. 156 (s. 4), which it follows, except that instead of repeating the words “without the consent in writing,” to each condition of infringement, it uses the words, “so unlawfully printed, &c.,” which were perhaps incorrectly adopted to avoid repetition (Novello v. Ludlow, 12 C. B. 189, per Talfourd, J.). It is apparent, therefore, that a decision on this point, under the statute of George III., would be entitled to the same degree of weight, as if it had been given under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, and it is plain that according to the former statute, as well as according to the reason of the case, a person not knowing that he was committing an injury, may publish or sell a work of which the copyright is in another with perfect innocence. The Act, speaking of the person publishing or selling, says, that it must be with notice that the work was unlawfully printed. The situation of the printer is more onerous: he may be an offender within the terms of the Act and liable to its penalties even when it is possible that he may have acted in ignorance that he was committing a wrong upon anyone (see Colburn v. Simms, 2 Hare, 557, per Wigram, V.-C.). There are also other cases in which knowledge of piracy must be proved, but they always arise...
out of some statutory provision, and can consequently be referred to when the statutes themselves come to be discussed. In the United States *animus* must be shown on the part of the seller of any piratical copy of any work (s. 4964) or "of a copyrighted map, chart, musical composition, print, cut, engraving, photograph, chromo, painting, drawing, statue, statuary or model, or design, intended to be perfected and executed as a work of the fine arts" (Revised Statutes, s. 4965; Millet v. Snowden, 1 West. Law Journ. 240). A similar rule does not, however, hold in England under the statute relating to engravings (17 Geo. III. c. 57), for here the seller is liable, whether he was actuated by guilty knowledge or not (West v. Francis, 5 B. & Ald. 737; Gambart v. Summer, 5 H. & N. 5). The idea that a certain *animus* is necessary to be proved in all actions of piracy at one time held its place or was introduced into the arguments of counsel, and this seems to have sprung from the dictum of Lord Ellenborough in Cary v. Keasley, 4 Esp. 167. It is, however, now certain, that save in such cases as may be governed by special legislative enactments it is never necessary to show either *animus* or knowledge (see Reade v. Lacy, 1 J. & H. 527), although in some instances it may be advisable to prove either one or the other, for if the alleged piracy should be difficult to discover, the question of intent may very materially affect the question. In one case where there was copying, but it was exceedingly difficult to say whether it was piratical or not, and the defendant went out of his way to deny the copying in toto, this was held to be a strong indication of *animus* (Jarrold v. Houlston, 3 K. & J. 708, and see Spiers v. Brown, 6 W. R. 352); and under these circumstances the intention of the party raises, with respect to what might otherwise have been held to be an innocent production, a *prima facie* suspicion of piracy.
In actions under 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15, s. 2, as extended by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, ss. 20, 21, an Act to amend the laws relating to dramatic literary property; it is not necessary to show that the defendant knowingly invaded the plaintiff's right (Lee v. Simpson, 3 C. B. 871).

The first statute regulating the law relating to copyright was 8 Anne, c. 19, repealed by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 1. The Act itself applied exclusively to books, and this is practically the case with the statute of Victoria. Under other enactments different descriptions of intellectual productions are protected, and at the present day there are but few, if any, which do not come within the provisions of one or other of the statutes relating to copyright.

The word "book" as defined by the second section of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, is construed "to mean and include every volume, part, or division of a volume, pamphlet, sheet of letter-press, sheet of music, map, chart, or plan, separately published." The words of the section have been most liberally interpreted by the Courts; for instance, periodicals and magazines are "books" (Henderson v. Maxwell, 4 Ch. D. 163), and so was "any composition large or small" within the meaning of 54 Geo. III. c. 156, an Act now repealed (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 1) (White v. Geroch, 2 B. & Ald. 208, 1 Chit. 24). Where a work consists of several independent parts each of them will be protected as a "book" (White v. Geroch, supra; D'Almaine v. Boosey, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 288). Musical compositions are included in the words "sheet of music" occurring in 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 2, although they were protected by earlier statutes (Bach v. Longman, Comp. 623; Clementi v. Golding, 2 Camp. 25; Storace v. Longman, 2 Camp. 26, note (u); Platt v. Button, 19 Ves. 447; White v. Geroch, supra; D'Almaine v. Boosey, supra; Chappell v. Purday, 4 Y. & C. Ex. 485; 14 Mees. & W. 303; and see Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H. L.
Cas. 815). In one case it was held that a subject of copyright existed in eight lines of letter-press (Cobbett v. Woodward, L. R. 14 Eq. 407, 41 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 656), but in another that seven lines of letter-press were not entitled to protection (Page v. Wielden, 20 L. T. (N. S.) 435), and a separate article advertised to form part of a periodical publication is not a "book" within the meaning of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 2 (Murray v. Maxwell, 3 L. T. (N. S.) 466, 1 J. & H. 312, reported as Mayhew v. Maxwell). Copyright may, however, exist in a single sheet of composition or letter-press (see Clementi v. Golding, 2 Camp. 25; Hime v. Dale, 2 Camp. 27 (note b); White v. Geroch, 2 B. & Ald. 298; D'Almaune v. Bossey, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 209, per Lord Abinger). The "title" of a book is not however "part" of such book within the 2nd and 13th sections of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, and consequently will not be protected on registration (Hogg v. Maxwell, L. R. 2 Ch. App. 317, 16 L. T. (N. S.) 190). But a newspaper is a "book" within the meaning of the 18th section of the same statute, and must therefore be registered in order to give the proprietor a copyright in its contents and a right to sue in respect of the piracy of any article therein (Walter v. Howe, 50 L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 621, 44 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 727; Cox v. Land and Water Journal Company, 39 L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 152, L. R. 9 Eq. 324, not followed). It has recently been decided that a card perforated so as to make a picture by way of a shadow on a wall, and accompanied by a paper having on it descriptive verses—both enclosed in an envelope having on it a printed title—is not an original work of such a character as to be entitled to copyright (Cable v. Marks, W. N. 1882, p. 165, 52 L. J. Rep. (N. S.) Ch. 107). There is, however, nothing in the copyright Acts to exclude from the benefits of its protection, books consisting of pictures only, or to restrict the Act to books containing letter-press (Maple v. Junior Army and Navy Stores, 52 L. J. Rep. (N. S.) Ch. 67). In the
United States no attempt has been made to determine by statute the meaning of the word "book;" the judicial decisions are, however, to the same effect as the English (see Drury v. Ewing, 1 Bond (Amer.), 540). Whether a private letter from one person to another could be brought within the protection of the Act in cases where such letter had not been written in the ordinary way, but printed or lithographed by the author, is a matter of speculative inquiry; and it is a question whether a letter so printed could be described as a "sheet of letter-press" within the meaning of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 2, and as such not liable to protection unless registered under the Act. The principle applying to private letters is practically the same as that which applies when the owner of a manuscript permits another to make a copy of it or to read it; in this case the owner of the manuscript retains all his rights of property so far as publication is concerned (Duke of Queensbury v. Shebbeare, 2 Eden, 329), and what rights of property are lost and what retained is a question of intention as appearing from the evidence (ante, p. 3). So also the writer of a letter, whether he actually wrote it or whether he printed it, would not appear to part with any Common Law right of property, unless he clearly from the evidence intended so to do (see Thompson v. Stanhope, Amb. 736). The law assumes that the sender of a letter did not as a matter of fact intend to part with his property in it, and in one case where the writer had refused to receive his own letters when tendered by the writer, saying at the same time that she (the receiver) must keep them; this was held to give her no right of publication (Thompson v. Stanhope, Amb. 736), and the utmost rights of property a receiver could have would be in the paper on which the letter was written (Pope v. Curl, 2 Atk. 341, and see Howard v. Gunn, 32 Beav. 462; Oliver v. Oliver, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 139; Boosey v. Jefferys, 6 Ex. 588, per L. Campbell). And to this extent
an action of detinue would lie against any person into whose possession the letter might have passed, even against the writer himself (Oliver v. Oliver, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 139), or the receiver might, should he think fit, apply for an injunction to restrain the publication by a third party (Granard v. Dunkin, 1 Ball & B., Irish, 207). An author therefore may be said to retain a qualified property in the contents of letters written by him to others, and he alone has a right to publish them for his own benefit. On the other hand the recipient of a private letter, sent without any reservation express or implied, is invested with the general property in such letter, qualified only by the incidental right in the author to publish and prevent publication by the recipient or any other person. The general property implies the right in the recipient to keep the letter or to destroy it, or to dispose of it in any other way than by publication, consequently the author and the recipient cannot hold a joint property in the letter because that would entitle each to the possession (see Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 2 Bush. Ky. 480).


It must be observed that it is in all instances perfectly immaterial for what purposes the defendant intends to publish the letter (Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 415, per Lord Eldon), as the right of property subsisting in the
author, and which is the ground of the interference of the Court, is in any case equally infringed (idem, and see also Woolsey v. Judd, 4 Duer. (N. Y.) 384; Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 2 Bush. (Ky.) 480).

In some cases letters are by virtue of the relationship existing between the parties the exclusive property of the receiver, or some person other than the writer, as for instance where the solicitor of a company wrote a letter to a third person respecting the company’s business it was held that the document belonged to the company and not to the solicitor. In this case the solicitor swore that the letter was written and forwarded by him in his private capacity (Howard v. Gunn, 32 Beav. 465), but no intimation to that effect appeared on the face of the letter itself, as for instance by the use of such words as “private,” “confidential,” or the like (ibid. p. 466). It was stated obiter by the Vice-Chancellor in Percival v. Phipps, 2 Ves. & B. 28, that it would be very extraordinary to describe ordinary business correspondence as a literary work in which the writer could have copyright; but it is now certain that the Vice-Chancellor was in error when he drew the distinction between business letters and letters possessed of literary merit (Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story (Amer.) 110; Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 426, per Lord Eldon; Woolsey v. Judd, 4 Duer. (N. Y.) 379, overruling Wetmore v. Scowell, 3 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 515, and Hoyt v. Mackenzie, 3 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 320; Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige’s R. (Amer.) 24, 26). The receiver of a letter, no matter of what nature, has consequently no right to publish it without the consent of the person who wrote it; he may have a perfect right to destroy it, to read it, or to let any third party read it (unless this should be held to amount to a publication), but he has no right to publish it save and except in one instance only, that is to say as a refutation against false
charges against his character subsequently made by the writer (Percival v. Phipps, 2 Ves. & B. 19, and see the American cases Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story, 111; Woodsey v. Judd, 4 Duer. (N. Y.) 407; but refer to the decision of Bruce, V.-C., in Pullin v. Gatherecole, 1 Coll. 505); and even in this case such right of publication does not extend beyond the purposes of an action at law, and as a necessary part of the evidence (see Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story, 111, per Mr. Justice Story; also 2 Story's Eq. Juris. par. 948).

The whole subject of private letters was very carefully considered in the American case of Woodsey v. Judd, 4 Duer. 379, and the principles there laid down, founded as they are upon the English decisions, may be considered to be a correct exposition of the law. The case came before the superior court of the city of New York on appeal, and the complaint stated in substance that the defendants by some unlawful means had possessed themselves of a copy or copies of a certain letter, wholly private in its character, which the petitioner had written and forwarded to one William Crowell, and that they had avowed their intention to publish the same in a weekly journal of which they were the editors, proprietors, or publishers. The complaint therefore prayed that they might be restrained from printing, publishing, circulating, or in any other manner, either by writing or otherwise, making public the said letter or any part thereof. The Court below had granted an injunction in these terms and the defendants now moved upon affidavits to dissolve it. It was eventually decided by the Court as follows:—

1. That equity will not interfere to restrain the publication of private letters merely because such publication may be, or even will be, injurious to society. (An injunction will be granted whenever it is necessary to prevent the unauthorized use of that which is the exclusive pro-

2. The foundation of its jurisdiction is the right of property at Common Law subsisting in the plaintiff after the letter has been delivered at its destination (see Curtis on Copyright, pp. 84, 150, 159).

3. The writer of letters, whether they are literary compositions or familiar letters, or letters of business, possesses the sole and exclusive right of publishing the same, and that without this consent they cannot be published either by the person to whom they are addressed or by any other person (see *Pope v. Curl*, 2 Atk. 341; *Thompson v. Stanhope*, Amb. 7:37; *Percival v. Phripps*, 2 Ves. & B. 19; *Wetmore v. Scovell*, 3 Edw. Ch. R. (Amer.) 515; *Hoyt v. McKenzie*, 3 Barb. Ch. R. (Amer.) 314).

4. That the receiver of letters may, however, justify their publication when it is shown to be necessary to the vindication of his own rights or conduct against unjust claims or imputations (see *Gee v. Prichard*, 2 Swanst. 402; *Story's Eq. Jurisp.* par. 945-8; *Folsom v. Marsh*, 2 Story R. (Amer.) 100).

5. If the receiver attempt to publish the letters, or any parts of them, against the wishes of the writer, and upon occasions not justifiable, a court of equity is bound to prevent the publication by injunction as a breach of that exclusive property which the writer retains.

6. As against a stranger who has possessed himself of the letters or of copies thereof unlawfully, the right to restrain the publication by an injunction is absolute. Such person not being justified in publishing the letters for any purpose whatever.

The cases of *Wetmore v. Scovell*, 3 Edw. Ch. R. 515, and of *Hoyt v. McKenzie*, 3 Barb. Ch. R. 314, in so far as they decided that an injunction to restrain the publication of private letters could only be granted when it
appeared that the letters possessed a certain value as literary compositions were disapproved of.

The right of property in private letters or other communications of a like nature, is therefore, in the majority of cases, vested in the person who inscribes them, and this subsisting right of property is founded solely on the strong probability that had he intended to part with such right, the intention would have been apparent, either by presumption, from the nature of the case, or from direct evidence.

The proprietor of a periodical is clearly entitled to publish all letters received from correspondents, unless indeed he be expressly or impliedly forbidden to do so; the inference in this case is, that letters sent to the editor or proprietor are intended for publication (see Hogg v. Kirby, 8 Ves. 215.) There is nothing, however, to prevent the writer from withdrawing the permission, whether given expressly or impliedly, before the publication actually takes place (Davis v. Miller and Another, 17 Ct. Sess. Cas. 2nd Ser. 1166). According to an American decision it is clear that the Government has the right of property in all communications addressed to its officers, and this of course carries with it the dependent right of publication; this exception is founded on principles of general policy (Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story, 113, per Story, J.).

It has not yet been decided whether an action of damages will lie at the suit of the writer for the wrongful publication of his letters (see Davis v. Miller, supra), but it is thought that the plaintiff would be entitled to recover either nominal or substantial damages by action founded on the common law. The measure of damages would be a question of the greatest difficulty, but it is probable that the plaintiff would be entitled to nominal damages for the injury to his property, without any proof of de-
privilege of profits or consequential loss (see Blafield v. Payne, 4 B. & Ad. 410; Burnett v. Plaxton, 21 How. Pr. (Amer.) 100). It would be exceedingly speculative, however, to extend the supposition to any greater length.

It will have been clearly observed that the property which the writer of a letter has in his production is exclusive by virtue of the common law, and that the question of publication is one dependent entirely upon evidence; and with respect to this the primary rule is that the sender of a written communication must, in the absence of any positive or apparent intention, be taken to have reserved the right of publication.

An author has a copyright in a portion only of a work (Law v. Ward, L. R. 6 Eq. 418, per Giffard, V.-C., 37 L. J. Ch. 841), and is, it would seem, entitled to an injunction against a person who copies the whole (Manson v. Murray 1 East, 360 (cited)); and in those cases in which part of a work is for some reason or other not entitled to protection, the copyright will be valid to the extent of the matter which will stand the test of the law (Blafield v. Nicholson, 2 Sim. & St. 1; Lawrence v. Dana, 2 Amer. L. T. (U. S.) 402, Cary v. Longman, 1 East, 358). It was at one time considered that unless a party had an exclusive right to the whole work he could not claim copyright in any portion of it, and although this opinion is founded at first sight on grounds apparently substantial, it cannot now be supported (Cary v. Longman, 1 East, 360, per L. Kenyon; Blafield v. Nicholson, supra; Lawrence v. Dana, supra; for since copyright protects the whole of a book, it must be taken a fortiori to protect any part thereof, whether consisting of text, or engravings to illustrate the text (White v. Gerowd, 2 B. & Ald. 298, 1 Chit. 24; D’Almacine v. Boossey, 1 V. & C. Ex. 288, 4 L. J. (N. S.) Ex. Eq. 21; Roworth v. Wilkes, 1 Camp. 94;
Wilkins v. Aikin, 17 Ves. 422; Bradbury v. Hotten, L. R. 8 Ex. 1, 42 L. J. (N. S.) Exch. 28. 21 W. R. 120; Boyce v. Houlston, 5 De G. & Sm. 275, per Parker, V.C.).

The mere title of a book, newspaper, or other publication is not a subject of copyright (Maxwell v. Hogg, L. R. 2 Ch. 307, 36 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 433; Dicks v. Yates, 50 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 809; and see Jones v. Daly, 7 Jones & Sp. (Amer.) 511), even although it be registered under the copyright Acts (Maxwell v. Hogg, supra); but there is nevertheless a right of property in such title, which is somewhat analogous to that which the owner of a trade mark has in his mark, and consequently where it can be shown that the use of it by the defendant is calculated to deceive the public, an injunction will be granted (Bradbury v. Beeton, 39 L. J. Ch. 57, 18 W. R. 33; Weldon v. Hicks, 10 Ch. D. 247), and this whether he had or had not any intention to injure the plaintiff or any third person (Clement v. Maddick, 1 Giff. (Ch.) 98; 5 Jur. (N. S.) 592). There are cases from which it might with some show of plausibility be argued, that the property subsisting in a "title" is altogether different from that subsisting in a trade mark (Spottiswoode v. Clarke, 2 Ph. 157, per Lord Cottenham; Mack v. Petter, L. R. 14 Eq. 434, per Lord Romilly; and see the remarks of Bacon, V.C., in Kelly v. Byles, 40 L. T. (N. S.) 626); but unless these cases can be supported, and it is submitted that they cannot, the law with respect to the subject will be the same as that regulating rights analogous to trade marks proper. It is clearly settled that there can be no property in a title descriptive of the contents of the volume (Young v. Maccrae, 9 Jur. (N. S.) 324, per Wood, V.C.; Braisden v. Bustard, 1 H. & M. 447), or in a title which is a mere advertisement of the contents (Cheavin v. Walker, L. R. 5 Ch. D. 850); and so also on similar principles, where the defendant
has not copied the exact title, the plaintiff must show that the appearance and existing title of the publication are calculated to deceive ordinary purchasers (Bradbury v. Becton, 18 W. R. 33; Kelly v. Byles, 40 L. T. (N. S.) 626, per Bacon, V.-C.), that is to say, he must prove a probability of deception (see Hall v. Barrows, 12 W. R. 322; Chappell v. Davidson, 2 K. & J. 123); for if no deception is to be apprehended the plaintiff will have no case, even although it be proved that part of his title has in point of fact been used (Spiers v. Brown, 6 W. R. 352; Kelly v. Byles, 40 L. T. (N. S.) 623, on Appeal, 13 Ch. Div. 691, and refer to Jarrold v. Houlston, 3 Kay & J. 712; Reade v. Lacy, 1 Johns. & H. 524). In one case it was decided that although there was no copyright in the mere title of a song, still a defendant would be restrained from adopting the title itself or a colourable imitation of it, on principles analogous to those regulating the infringement of trade marks, and this clearly affirms the recognised principle (Chappell v. Sheard, 2 K. & J. 117; Same v. Davidson, 2 K. & J. 123). And so also the title of a newspaper, although there is nothing analogous to copyright in it, is still a species of property to which the owner is entitled against any other person (Bell v. Lack, 8 Paige (Amer.) 75); and it is also a chattel interest, capable of assignment (Kelly v. Hutton, 3 Ch. App. 703). It has, however, been decided that the name of the editor on the title page of a periodical does not form part of the title (Crookes v. Petter, 3 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 225).

The American law with respect to the title of a publication is regulated by Secs. 4937-4947, 4956 of the Revised Statutes, where it is in effect provided that the title of every publication shall be registered as a trade mark, and if this is done the registered proprietor may of course
maintain an action for infringement (see Donnelley v. Ivers, 20 Blatchf. 381).

Copyright which protects an original edition protects also every subsequent edition if it be substantially the same, but new matter in such subsequent edition will not be protected unless the work be re-registered (Tomson v. Walker, 3 Swanst. 672; Cary v. Faden, 5 Ves. 24; Cary v. Longman, 1 East, 358, 3 Esp. 273; Hedderwick v. Griffin, 3 Sc. Sess. Cas. 2nd Ser. 383; Black v. Murray, 9 Sc. Sess. Cas. 3rd Ser. 341). The American law in this respect is substantially the same (Gray v. Russell, 1 Story, 11, 2 Law Rep. 294; Lawrence v. Dana, 2 Amer. L. T. (N. S.) 402; Banks v. McDivitt, 13 Blatchf. 163; Farmer v. Calvert Publishing Co., 5 Amer. L. T. R. 168, 173). The law on the subject has been succinctly stated by Lord Ardmillan in the Scotch case, Black v. Murray, 9 Sess. Cas. 3rd Ser. 353, in which that learned judge is reported as having said, "A new edition is not necessarily a subject of copyright, but it may be so. There must be some originality in it, it may be in new thoughts or in new illustrations, or in new explanatory and illustrative annotation, or even in some peculiar instances, in simply new arrangement. If in any of these respects there is independent mental effort then, in the result of that mental effort there may be copyright." But in order to create copyright in a new edition there must be more than a few emendations of the text or a few additions of unimportant notes: they must be extensive and substantial, practically making a new book; and with regard to the notes they must exhibit an addition to the work which is not superficial or colourable, but imports to the book a true and real value over and above that which belongs to the text (Black v. Murray, supra, 355, per Lord Kinloch). Consequently the consideration does not resolve itself merely into a question of quantum, but into one of sub-
stantial intellectual distinction. The alteration of a single word was in one instance thought to constitute a material difference (Black v. Murray, supra, per Lord Dass), but in another, where a plaintiff claimed copyright in a revised edition of Dr. Channing's works, and the revision consisted merely in a change of various titles, and a few corrections and emendations, it was held that the alterations were insufficient to sustain copyright; and this is doubtless the proper method of viewing the matter (Hodderwick v. Griffin, 3 Sc. Sess. Cas., 2nd Ser. 383).

In considering whether a new edition of a work is entitled to a fresh copyright, the question whether such copyright will protect simply such parts of it as may happen to be new, or whether it will extend to the whole work, depends upon the nature and extent of the revision in each case (Cary v. Longman, 1 East, 358; Black v. Murray, 9 Sc. Sess. Cas., 3rd Ser. 341). It is, however, immaterial whether the copyright in the original edition or in any of the previous editions has or has not expired; where it has expired any one may by revision or annotation re-publish the work as original, and it will be protected on registration (Tonson v. Walker, 3 Swanst. 672; Gray v. Russell, 1 Story, 11; Cary v. Longman, 1 East, 358; and see Cary v. Faden, 5 Ves. 24); but where the copyright has not expired, none but the author, or some person with his assent, has a right of republication (Sweet v. Cater, 11 Sim. 572). The copyright in each edition registered as a new and independent work will extend from the date of such registration without reference to any of the preceding editions (Murray v. Bogue, 1 Drew. 353, 17 Jur. 219), and a person who has a right to annotate the work of another will be entitled to copyright in the annotations as combined with the original text (Tonson v. Walker, 3 Swanst. 672; Black v. Murray, 9 Sc. Sess.
Cas. 3rd Ser. 341; Lawrence v. Dana, 4 Amer. L. T. (N. S.) 402; Banks v. McDivitt, 13 Blatchf. 163).

Selections from sources which are common or publici juris, arranged or combined in any useful or original way are entitled to copyright as "compilations," and any number of people may use the same common materials for a similar work so long as they do not servilely copy one from another, or from any previous copyrighted compilation (Hogg v. Kirby, 8 Ves. 215; Hotten v. Arthur, 1 H. & M. 603, 32 L. J. Ch. 771; Bullinger v. Mackay, 15 Blatchf. 550). A work of this description will, therefore usually depend for its protection upon questions of arrangement or combination (Hedderwick v. Griffin, 3 Sc. Sess. Cas. 2nd Ser. 383; and see Jollie v. Jaques, 1 Blatchf. 618), for the materials are commonly taken verbatim from the same source common to all, and are very unfrequently found to be new or original (Lawrence v. Dana, 2 Am. L. T. (N. S.) 402; Black v. Murray, 9 Sc. Sess. Cas. 3rd Ser. 341; Banks v. McDivitt, supra).

It has been decided in a recent American case that a person is not entitled to copyright for a plan, arrangement or method, which is such as would naturally occur to any intelligent person intending to impart information of a similar character (Bullinger v. Mackay, 15 Blatchf. 550), and this decision is right, for unless the author arranges and combines his materials in a new form, and gives them an application previously unknown, he cannot be said to have exercised any skill or discretion in making his selections, nor to have presented anything that is new and useful to the world.

A compilation may consist of any number of facts or pieces of information which the compiler has collected, arranged, and reduced into writing; a dictionary is a compilation, so is a directory, and so also is a collection of
material facts obtained from manuscripts (Scott v. Stan-
ford, L. R. 3 Eq. 718; and see Mudran v. Moody, 20 Se.
Sess. Cas. 2nd Ser. 1154) as well as selections made from
previously published works; the compiler must in each
instance have a right to use the materials he has collected,
otherwise he may render himself liable to an action for
piracy. Where a compiler in the course of his investiga-
tions is referred by another whom he consults to a state-
ment or quotation contained in the works of some ancient
author, in whose production copyright does not exist,
there the compiler may copy the identical words from the
later author, without rendering himself liable to an action,
for the copyright protects the arrangement, and not the
materials (Pike v. Nicholas, L. R. 5 Ch. 251); but if a
compiler use the same materials in the same combina-
tion as a previous writer, he is clearly liable, although
he might with impunity adopt a similar arrangement
for different selections, or employ the same selections
in a different manner (see Barfield v. Nicholson, 2
Sim. & St. 1; Spiers v. Brown, 6 W. R. 352). So
where the compiler does not give the common matter
exactly as he finds it, but remodels it by clothing it in
different language, or by abridging it or by altering the
vernacular, as in a translation, his work is clearly entitled
to protection, as an original production. So, "if any one
by pains and labour collects and reduces into the form of
a systematic course of instruction, those questions which
he may find ordinary persons asking in reference to the
common phenomena of life with answers to those ques-
tions and explanations of those phenomena, whether such
explanations and answers are furnished by his own recol-
lection of his former general reading, or out of works
consulted by him for the express purpose, the reduction of
questions so collected, with such answers, under certain
heads, and in a scientific form, is amply sufficient to con-
stitute an original work, . . which the copyright will be protected" (Jarrold v. Houldon, 3 K. & J. 713, per Wood. V.-C.; Lawrence v. Dana, 2 Am. L. T. (N.S.) 402).

A collection of hymns may in some cases be a valuable compilation (Marzials v. Gibbons, L. R. 9 Ch. 518, 43 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 774, and see Randall v. Murray, Jac. 314). A person does not necessarily cease to be entitled to protection merely because his work is precisely similar to that of a previous compiler, for it may be that both works if correct, cannot be otherwise than similar, as in the case of interest-tables and mathematical calculations based on the same data and on the same principles (Bailey v. Taylor, 3 L. J. Ch. 66, 1 Russ. & My. 73; McNeill v. Williams, 14 Jur. 344). It would appear that a compilation to be entitled to protection must in general possess a value in the arrangement of the materials, and the test of piracy is consequently applied to the general arrangement or combination of such materials, which must possess a value not found in the separate parts, and for this reason the copyright in a compilation of tables of figures is in the various results, i.e., sums total, quotients, &c., and not in the process of calculation (Bailey v. Taylor, supra). And where a person collects and arranges receipts in a book, he is entitled to copyright in respect of the arrangement, but where the receipts are merely collected and handed over to the publisher, the person who collected them has no right of copy (Randall v. Murray, Jac. 314, per Lord Eldon). There may be cases, however, in which copyright will attach in a certain compilation with respect to the materials themselves, as, for example, where a person takes common materials, and then translates them or arranges them in some very unusual form; under these circumstances, no one would have a right to take the translated or specially arranged matter, even although he should re-translate or re-arrange it (Lawrence v. Dana,
ON THE INFRINGEMENT

2 Am. L. T. R. (N. S.) 424, per Clifford, J., passim. There would seem to be nothing to prevent a compiler from imitating the plan, arrangement, or scheme, found in a previous work of a similar or different nature (Meck v. Potter, 14 Eq. 431, 41 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 781; Banks v. McDivitt, 13 Blatchf. 163), but he must not use the same materials in the same order. The question has yet to be decided whether if a person bona fide obtains his materials from a common source and then adopts an arrangement similar to that employed by a previous author, such person is liable for piracy. If the materials are new he is clearly not liable; but where he goes to a common source for his materials, has he then a right to arrange them in the order, and on a plan similar to that employed by a previous author? In order to succeed, the plaintiff would have to show some injury to his right of property, and no right of property can exist in mere classification, or in common materials; the question consequently arises can it subsist in the union of both. This point has never been decided, so far as I am aware, but as no one is allowed to appropriate to himself the result of the labour of another to his detriment, and as there can be no doubt but that if an author adopts the arrangement of a previous author, he takes in effect his work and labour, although he should go direct to common sources for his extracts, and since the injury inflicted is none the less merely because the subsequent compiler copied from the original sources instead of from the previous compilation, I do not think that the conduct of such subsequent compiler could be defended in a court of law, or that he could escape the consequences of an action of piracy. The chief value of a compilation is the order in which the contents are stated, and just as these are judiciously or indifferently arranged, so the compilation becomes valuable or the reverse, and to deliberately take
all that is valuable would seem to be one of the very best illustrations that could be found, were it necessary to prove such a self-evident proposition, that no person can be allowed with impunity to avail himself of the labour of another. It may be here proper to observe that there is a vast difference between a compilation and an abridgment, the former consists of selected extracts; an abridgment is a condensation of the views of the author, and necessarily must adopt the arrangement of the work abridged. A compilation infringes the copyright, if the matter transcribed when published, shall be found to impair the value of the original book; a fair abridgment, though it may injure the original, is lawful (see Story's Executors v. Holcombe, 4 McLean (Amer.) 314, per Leavitt, J.) The following list forms a table of several descriptions of compilations with the leading cases upon each:

**Abstracts of Title to Real Property:**
- Banker v. Caldwell, 3 Minn. (Amer.) 94.

**Annotations:**

**Calendars:**
- Matthewson v. Stockdale, 12 Ves. 279.
- Langman v. Winchester, 16 Ves. 269.

**Catalogues:**
- Wilkins v. Aikin, 17 Ves. 422.
- Holton v. Arthur, 1 Hem. & M. 663; 32 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 771
- Hogg v. Scott, L. R. 18 Eq. 441; 43 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 705.

**Chronological Works:**
- Trusler v. Murray, 1 East, 362. note.

**Dictionaries:**
- Barfield v. Nicholson, 2 Sim. & St. 1; 2 L. J. Ch. 90.

**Directories:**
- Kelly v. Morris, L. R. 1 Eq. 607; 35 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 423.
- Morris v. Ashby, L. R. 7 Eq. 34; 19 L. T. (N. S.) 559.
- Morris v. Wright, L. R. 5 Ch. 279; 18 W. R. 327.

**Gazetters:**
- Lewis v. Fullarton, 2 Beav. 6; 3 Jur. 689.
Fair reviews, extracts, and quotations are entitled to protection, and the question of fairness or the reverse is referable to each individual case. It matters not that the work which is reviewed, or from which the extracts or quotations are taken is the subject of copyright (Black v. Murray, 9 Sess. Cas. 3rd Ser. 356, per Lord Kinloch), for an author's works are for the good of mankind, as well as
for himself, and while on the other hand he is protected against infringement, on the other he is not entitled to insist on the exclusive retention of every individual part of his work or production. If so much of a copyrighted work is extracted under the pretext of a review as practically to injure the sale of it, the author of the work is entitled to protection, but a fair review is clearly defensible (Rowarth v. Wilkes, 1 Camp. 97, per Lord Ellenborough). And it has been decided that the publication of an article from another periodical for the purpose of criticism, and for other purposes, is not such a form of publication as will injure the sale of the original work (Bell v. Whitehead, 8 L. J. (Ch.) N.S. 141, 3 Jur. 68). Where a defendant had in two numbers of a periodical inserted detached extracts, consisting of six or seven pages taken from a farce of forty pages, the Court refused to interfere (Whittingham v. Wooler, 2 Swanst. 428; and see Bell and Another v. Whitehead, supra); but the appropriation of such a material quantity would no doubt in some cases be instantly condemned. In Smith v. Chatto (31 L. T. (N. S.) 775, 23 W. R. 290) the defendant had written a book entitled "Thackeryana," and in order to show that the works of William Makepeace Thackeray contained the biography of that author within themselves, large selections were made from his copyright works to establish the proposition. The Court decided that the effect of the publication was to supersede to a damaging extent the works from which the selections had been made, and granted an injunction. It should also be remembered that a work may be a piracy from another, though the passages copied are stated to be quotations, and are not so extensive as to render the piratical work a substitute for the original work (Bohn v. Bogue, 10 Jur. 420). There can, however, be no piracy, if an extract from a copyrighted work is copied into a work of an entirely different nature and
description; for instance, if the author of a book of travels had incidentally described the composition of some favourite dish, and the author of a cookery book were to copy the instructions and details, even in the identical words, it is submitted that no action would lie for so doing (Bradbury v. Hotten, L. R. 8 Ex. 3, per Bramwell, B.); and, therefore, a person is not liable for the reproduction of certain prints or engravings to be used in a totally different manner, and for a purpose different from the originals (see Bradbury v. Hotten, L. R., supra).

The American law on the subject of piracy by means of extracts and quotations is practically the same as above stated, and is thoroughly reviewed and set forth in the elaborate and learned judgments delivered in the leading cases on the subject (Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story, 100; Story’s Executors v. Holcombe, 4 McLean, 306; Lawrence v. Dana, 2 Am. L. T. R. (N. S.) 402).

Maps and plans are distinct subjects of copyright, and their protection is expressly provided for, sometimes by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, and sometimes under the Engravings Acts (8 Geo. II. c. 13, 7 Geo. III. c. 38, 17 Geo. III. c. 57). Under section 2 of the first-named Act it is provided that in the construction of the Act the word “book” shall be construed to mean and include inter alia every “map, chart or plan separately published,” and by the 13th section of the same Act provision is made for the registration of such “book,” and no proprietor of copyright in any “book” can maintain any action or summary proceeding in respect of any infringement of such copyright unless he shall have registered the same in the way pointed out under the Act (sec. 24). The term of copyright vested in an author under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, endures for the term of his natural life, and for a further term of seven years, commencing at the time of his death, or for a period of forty-two years, whichever shall be the longer (sec. 3).
Under the Engravings Acts no registration is necessary, but the proprietor must engrave his name on each print (8 Geo. II. c. 13, s. 1), and it seems the date also (Newton v. Cowie and Another, 4 Bing. 234, 5 L. J. C. P. 159). By 7 Geo. III. c. 38, the words "map, chart, or plan" are expressly mentioned, and the copyright is vested in the proprietor for a term of twenty-eight years (sec. 7). The 17 Geo. III. c. 57, gives an action for damages in certain cases.

Doubts have from time to time arisen whether the provisions of the Engravings Acts so far as they relate to maps, charts, and plans, are not virtually repealed by the operation of the later Act of Victoria. When letterpress accompanies an engraving of a plan, or a series of engravings, then there is no doubt at all but that it is sufficient to register the whole work under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45 (Bogue v. Houlston, 16 Jur. 372; 21 L. J. Ch. N. S. 470; Bradbury v. Hotten, L. R. 3 Ex. 1, 42 L. J. (N. S.) Ex. 28; Grace v. Newman, L. R. 19 Eq. 623, 44 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 298), and therefore the name of the proprietor, with the date, need not be placed on every copy of such engraving; it is with respect to maps and plans separately published that the difference of opinion has arisen. In Stannard v. Lee, 23 L. T. (N. S.) 306, it was decided by Bacon, V. C., that maps separately published are within the earlier statutes, and need not therefore be registered under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, the decision was however reversed on appeal (L. R. 6 Ch. 346). In Stannard v. Harrison, 24 L. T. (N. S.) 570, 19 W. R. 811, it was held by the same Vice Chancellor that a bird's eye view map of a certain locality was clearly within the statutes of George II. and George III., and need not therefore be registered under 5 & 6 Vict. 45. The truth appears to be that a single map, chart, or plan separately published must be registered under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, as decided in Stannard v. Lee, L. R. 6 Ch. App. 346; but
that any single publication of the kind which is an object of artistic interest as contradistinguished from practical utility, will fall within the provisions of 8 Geo. II. c. 13, and 7 Geo. III. c. 38, and must consequently be printed with the name of the proprietor and date of publication, these earlier Acts apply exclusively to art-engravings, for in former times maps were undoubtedly considered artistic works, although at the present day they have been brought into their proper place as literary productions (Stannard v. Lee, 6 Ch. 348, per James, L.J.). It may be doubted, however, whether a bird's eye view of a certain locality arranged in the form of and intended to serve the purposes of a plan, is not primarily an object of utility rather than art, the decision in Stannard v. Harrison is not therefore to be relied upon with confidence, and a map, or chart, or plan of any kind should in addition to being marked with the proper name and date, also be registered under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45. A person may maintain proceedings for infringement of a plan as a designer and inventor, even although he himself did not actually execute it (Stannard v. Harrison, 24 L. T. (N. S.) 570; 7 Geo. III. c. 38), for where a person designs a plan and furnishes the materials for preparing it, but employs another to make the drawing, the former is the author within 7 Geo. III. c. 38 (Stannard v. Harrison, supra).

With respect to the infringement of maps, charts, and plans, it is obvious that in most cases great similarity will exist between one production and another, for if for instance a map of Europe be drawn on the scale of an inch to the square mile, and made to contain towns with a population of over 2000 persons, it is clear that there is in this plan or scheme nothing exclusive, and any other person may draw a map of Europe on a similar scale, containing towns of similar magnitude, and under these circumstances both productions will be almost if not
quite identical. If both are correct, both must necessarily be the same, and it might be impossible to prove piracy, but when the original is incorrect, as it will be in many cases, infringement may be established by reference to the identity of mistakes subsisting in each (see Alexander v. Mackenzie 9 Sc. Sess. Cas. 2nd Ser. 758; Taylor v. Bayne, Mor. Dic. of Dec., Vols. 19, 20, p. 8308. On appeal, Ibid. App. pt. 1, 7; Carman v. Bowles, 2 Brown, C. C. 80, 1 Cox, 283; Blunt v. Patten, 2 Paine (Amer.) 393).

In a recent American case it was decided that to take the boundaries of townships from another map without going to the common source of information was an infringement (Farmer v. Calvert Publishing Co., 5 Am. L. T. R. 168) and in all cases it is a proper question for the jury whether one production is a copy of the other or not. If the two are in all respects alike, the presumption probably would be that one was a copy of the other; yet both might be originals, and if there was some small variance it would be a proper subject of inquiry whether the alteration was not merely colourable, and that the one was in substance a mere transcript of the other (Blunt v. Patten, 2 Paine, 400 (Amer.) per Thompson, J.). In the United States Revised Statutes, sec. 4752, plans are not mentioned, although proper provision is made for the registration of maps and charts.

No action will lie against a person who fairly abridges a copyright work (Giles v. Wilcox, 2 Atk. 143, per Lord Hardwicke, Bell v. Walker, 1 Bro. C. C. 451; Dodsley v. Kinnersley, Amb. 402), and such abridgment may be published in defiance of the author of the original work; but the protection afforded by the common law with respect to unpublished literary compositions cannot be evaded by an abridgment, and they consequently differ in this respect from works lawfully published (Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 De G. & Sm. 693, per Bruce, V. C.); and so
not even a list or catalogue of manuscripts in which the
author has a common law right can be legally published
or abridged without his consent (ibid).

In America a bona fide abridgment of a published
work is entitled to protection as a fresh subject of copy-
right (Story's Executors v. Holcombe, 4 MeLean, 306, per
MeLean, J.). It must be in good faith an abridgment
and not a treatise interlarded with citations. To copy
certain passages from a book, omitting others, is in no just
sense an abridgment of it. It makes the work shorter
but it does not abridge it. The judgment is not exer-
cised in condensing the views of the author, his language
is merely copied, and the views of the writer in this
mode can be but partially given. An abridgment
differs somewhat from a compilation; the former is
a condensation of the views of the author, the latter
consists of selected extracts from his works (Story's Executors v. Holcombe, supra, 311). In all the cases bear-
ing on the question of infringement under the pretext
of an abridgment, the Courts have been unanimous in
insisting on a very strict application of the principle that
the abridgment must be fair. The reduction of a work
to a condensed form by copying out some of the parts
and omitting others is a clear piracy, and so considered
by both English and American tribunals (Gray v. Russell,
1 Story 11; Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Id. 100; Story's Execu-
tors v. Holcombe, 4 MeLean, 306; Lawrence v. Dana,
2 Amer. L.T. (N.S.) 402; Gyles v. Wilcor, 2 Atk.
141).

And so also a digest may be made of a published work,
and will if it is fair be protected as a new work; but the
party must apply the exertion and skill of his own brain
in extracting the principle or the substance of the work
before him, and dressing it up in his own language so
as to produce an original work (Sweet v. Benning, 16 C. B.
482, per Jervis, C. J.). Both digests and abridgments are
governed by precisely the same rules of law, and in either
case a mere colourable shortening of the original work
will not be protected as an independent composition. So
also where a person copied verbatim, reports of cases
declared in the courts of law from plaintiff's protected work
he was held to be guilty of a gross act of piracy; and to
condense the reports by leaving out the arguments of
counsel, together with some other portions of the cases, is
a mere evasion (Butterworth v. Robinson, 5 Ves. 709),
and see the remarks of Lord Eldon in Wilkins v. Akin,
17 Ves. 424). In Norbury's case, Lofft. 775, heard before
Lord Chancellor Apsley, assisted by Mr. Justice Black,
stone, the law relating to the subject of a fair abridg-
ment is propounded in terms which accurately describe
the present state of the law on the subject. The Lord
Chancellor laid down the following propositions:

1. A fair abridgment of a work is not any violation of
the author's property.

2. To constitute a true and proper abridgment of a work
the whole must be preserved in its sense and then
the act of abridgment is an act of understanding,
employed in carrying a large work into a smaller
compass, and rendering it less expensive and more
convenient to the reader.

3. To be protected an abridgment must be in the nature
of a new and meritorious work, and while the sub-
stance of the original is preserved the abridgment
must be in different language.

It would seem, therefore, that any person may make a
fair abridgment of the published work of another without
his consent, and that such abridgment when published
will be entitled to protection against piracy, but not
against another abridgment of that abridgment.

It has been frequently doubted by high judicial authority
whether an abridgment can under any circumstances amount to a fair reproduction of an original work. There is very little doubt that an abridgment is in some cases nothing whatever but a direct and often successful attack on the property of another, for this form of production frequently, and if well composed always, contains the whole of the spirit of the original. It may even be made of greater value by the introduction of notes; it is always cheaper, and most persons who purchased a copy of the abridgment would not after a perusal of it go to the expense of obtaining the work on which it is founded. The original author's right of property must undoubtedly suffer. On the other hand, a fair abridgment is frequently of the greatest use and assistance; it consists of a substantial condensation of the original materials, refashioned by means of intellectual labour and skill; it contains all that is useful in the original without any of the surplusage, and is often to be preferred to it. The effect of an abridgment is undoubtedly to withdraw public interest from the original production; for if the abridgment is good, it is often to be preferred on account of cheapness and practical utility, while if it is bad, it may probably will tend seriously to damage the sale of the original.

The actual legality of an abridgment is seriously questioned by some authors, and when the cases bearing on the subject are carefully considered, it will be found that they are not as unanimous as they are generally supposed to be. In Dickens v. Law, 8 Jur. 184, Knight-Bruce, V.-C., remarked as follows: "I am not aware that one man has the right to abridge the works of another. On the other hand, I do not mean to say that there may not be an abridgment which may be lawful, which may be protected; but, to say that one man has the right to abridge and so publish in an abridged form the work of another, without more, is going much beyond my notion of what the law of this
country is." The learned Vice-Chancellor however agreed with the opinion of Lord Eldon in *Wilkins v. Aikin*, 17 Ves. 426, that "the question upon the whole, is, whether this is a legitimate use of the plaintiff's publication, in the fair exercise of a mental operation, deserving the character of an original work," and he decided that an imitation, or as the defendant called it, an "analytical condensation" of Dickens' "Christmas Carol," was not entitled to any protection. It would further appear from the report of the case that the fact of the difference in price and other circumstances of difference being such as to render the invasion of no practical mischief to the plaintiff, cannot be taken into consideration, for the person whose property has been taken is entitled to judge for himself how far he will consider that abstraction of his property to be prejudicial or not prejudicial (*Dickens v. Lee*, supra, 184). In another case it was observed "Digests are of great use to practical men, and the same may be said of abridgments of any study, but it must be a bonâ fide abridgment" (*D'Almaine v. Boosey*, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 301, per L. C. B.), and dicta to the same effect are to be found in *Gyles v. Wilcox*, 2 Atk. 143; *Prince Albert v. Strange*, 2 De G. & Sm. 693; *Tunson v. Walker*, 3 Swanst. 678; *Dodsley v. Kinnersley*, Amb. 402; *Millar v. Taylor*, 4 Burr. 2311; *Bell v. Walker*, 1 Bro. C. C. 451. There is, however, only one English case directly in point, and upon this all the opinions and dicta of the judges would appear to be founded (*Newbery's Case*, Lofft. 775). In an American case, *McLean v. McLean*, J., although he expressed himself bound by the English and American decisions upon the subject, yielded more to a principle of law than to a rule of reason and justice (*Story's Exors. v. Holcombe*, 4 McLean, 309). In *Gray v. Russell*, 1 Story 19, the right to make a fair abridgment was apparently recognised, but only under certain circumstances; a similar right has also been conceded in
other cases (Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story, 106; Webb v. Powers, 2 Woodb. & M. 520; Lawrence v. Dana, 4 Clifford, 1).

At present, therefore, both in England and America, an abridgment may or may not amount to an infringement of copyright, but it is submitted that although an abridgment may be made or framed in such a manner as to escape the penalties of piracy, it will most likely be capable of inflicting serious loss on the author of the original work. The probability of this ought most certainly to be prevented, and no abridgments of copyright works should be allowed during the term of copyright without the consent of the owner of the copyright (see the report of the Copyright Commissioners, 1878, par. 67).

There is copyright in a translation, and whether produced by personal application and expense, or obtained by gift or purchase, such copyright will be protected by injunction (Wyatt v. Burnard, 3 Ves. & B. 77; and see Rooney v. Kelly, 14 Ir. Law Rep. (N. S.) 158; Shook v. Rankin, 6 Biss. (Amer.) 477). The better opinion is that any person has a right to translate even a work protected by copyright, for "the translator has bestowed his care and pains upon it" (Burnett v. Chetwood, 2 Mer. 441, per L. C.), and practically made a new book (see the remarks of Willes, J., Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2311). It would appear therefore to be tolerably well settled that a production, whether the subject of copyright or not, is liable to be translated into another language by any person who possesses the necessary ability and who thinks it worth his while to make such a translation.

The American law is to the same effect (Emerson v. Davies, 3 Story, 780, per Story, J.; Stowe v. Thomas, 2 Wall Jr. 547), except that by the revised statutes, s. 4952, authors may reserve the right to translate their own works. The question as to the legality of any particular translation would therefore only arise in America in
those cases where the author has neglected to make such a reservation, but how and in what manner he must make it the section omits to explain.

A translator is required to make no change whatever except such as is naturally produced by the employment of different language (see Rooney v. Kelly, 14 Ir. L. R. 158; Emerson v. Davies, 3 Story, 768; Shook v. Rankin, 6 Biss. 477), and it seems that the right of copy will only suffice to protect a literal transcript of the words themselves, for it is evident that the ideas, sentiments, or speculations of the writer cannot be protected, since the chief object of a translator is to retain the production of the brain, and to embody in the new language as much of the intelligence of the original as possible.

At Common Law a manuscript is, of course, as much entitled to protection against an unauthorised translation as it is against an abridgment (Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 De G. & Sm. 693, per Bruce, V.-C.), but in all other instances it would certainly appear that a translation may be made with impunity; and this proposition once admitted it is difficult to see where the application of the principle is to stop. Why, for instance, should there be any objection to a translation of a protected work into the Lancashire, Yorkshire, or other provincial dialect? for if the solution of the question lies in a consideration "of the care and pains" bestowed by the translator (Burnett v. Chetwood, 2 Merv. 441), he would clearly be entitled to copyright; if, on the contrary, it turns on the question whether substantially a new work has been made, and this, it is submitted, is the proper way to look at the point, then as those dialects differ from ordinary language, so much so in fact, that most persons would be quite unable to understand the translation without reference to the original, it is further submitted that the translator has practically made a new if not a particularly
instructive work, and should be entitled to copyright therein. If this question should ever be raised in the Courts a distinction would doubtless be drawn between one language and another, and two dialects of the same language; but it is very difficult to see how such a distinction could be maintained, assuming of course that the dialects are so dissimilar that a person ignorant of one of them would be unable from his knowledge of the other to decipher both.

Again, if to translate is no piracy why should a re-translation be prohibited; that it is prohibited is certain, for if a foreigner translates a protected English work and then an Englishman re-translates that foreign work into English again, this would amount to an infringement of the original copyright (Murray v. Bogue, 1 Drew, 353, 17 Jur. 219). It may be taken for granted that the re-translation would not if it were bonafide be in the very same words as the original, and by permitting the first translation all right of property in the intellectual and intrinsic portion of the work was set at nought. Why, then, if a translation is permissible should a re-translation be prohibited? The law relating to piracy by means of an unauthorised translation would seem to be in a highly unsatisfactory condition, and it is based moreover on a distinctly false foundation, for a translation cannot be considered to amount in substance to a new work, it is a mere reproduction, in a different form certainly, but it is the manner of the production that is new, not the work itself; the work is the same work to those who can read it, and conveys to them the same ideas and sentiments as the original. The better the translation the grosser the piracy.

By 15 & 16 Vict. c. 12, s. 2, it is enacted that her Majesty may, by order in Council, direct that the authors of books which are, after a future time, to be specified in
such order, published in any foreign country, to be named in such order shall, subject to certain provisions, be empowered to prevent the publication in the British dominions of any translations of such books not authorized by them, for the limited time therein mentioned.

Law reports can be the subject of copyright, but only to a limited extent (Butterworth v. Robinson, 5 Ves. 709; Saunders v. Smith, 3 My. & Cr. 711; Sweet v. Shaw, 3 Jur. 217; Sweet v. Maughan, 11 Sim. 51; Hodges v. Welsh, 2 Ir. Eq. 266; Sweet v. Benning, 16 C. B. 459), for it would seem that no copyright can be claimed in the judgment of the Court, for that is the exclusive property of the Crown. (Atkine's case cited, 4 Burr. 2315, and see Butterworth v. Robinson, supra; Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. (Amer.) 608.) The Courts have moreover unlimted authority to restrain the publication of their proceedings, or any part thereof, and this privilege has several times been exercised (Rex v. Clement, 4 B. & Ald. 218; Tichborne v. Mostyn, L. R. 7 Eq. 55 (note); Gurney v. Longman, 13 Ves. 493), subject to these exceptions, however, the head notes (Sweet v. Benning, 16 C. B. 491), and such other parts of the report as are the result of the author's labour and skill are entitled to protection. Acts of Parliament are the property of the Crown, and no one is entitled to the exclusive publication of them (Baskett v. The University of Cambridge, 1 W. Bl. 105; Stationers' Co. v. Partridge, 4 Burr. 2402 (cited)).

Specifications of patents when filed become publici juris, and no copyright can consequently be claimed in them (Wyatt v. Barnard, 3 V. & B. 77).

No action will lie for pirating a mere advertisement for the sale of particular articles, nor for appropriating a "method" of advertising (Ehret v. Pierce, 18 Blatchf. (Amer.) 302), even although the advertisement assumes the form of a guide embellished with engravings (Cob-
bitt v. Woodward, L. R. 14 Eq. 407, but see Maple v. Junior Army and Navy Stores, L. R. 21 Ch. Div. 369, affirmed on appeal, ibid., 375), but a work having a merit over and above its value as an advertisement is none the less protected simply because the author employed it for advertising purposes. A bookseller's catalogue, for instance, containing notes and descriptions of the various works offered for sale is clearly entitled to protection (Hotten v. Arthur, 1 Hem. & M. 603, followed by Grace v. Newman, L. R. 19 Eq. 623; and see also Hogg v. Scott, 18 Id. 444; Ehret v. Pierce, 18 Blatchf. (Amer.) 302), and it is no defence to say that such catalogue is not offered for sale itself, but only used to promote the sale of the books mentioned in it (Hotten v. Arthur, supra). But although a publication may be adjudged to be a mere advertisement, still any portion of it susceptible of copyright will be separated from the remainder and its infringement restrained (Cobbett v. Woodward, L. R. 14, Eq. 407); for we have seen that a valid right of copy may subsist in part of a work (ante, p. 42). The case of Cobbett v. Woodward, though disapproved of by the M. R. in Maple v. The Junior Army and Navy Stores, L. R. 21 Ch. Div. 379, would seem to be perfectly sound in so far as it supports this principle of law. It is not to be supposed, however, that any person may copy another's advertisement with impunity; for although it is clear that he cannot be restrained on the ground of any infringement of copyright, yet if the tendency of the imitation is to induce the public to believe that they are purchasing the goods of the original advertiser, this will furnish a ground of action for infringing a right of property in the nature of a trade mark.

The proprietor of a periodical or magazine is entitled to restrain the publication in a separate form, of a serial
published in successive numbers of such periodical or magazine (Henderson v. Maxwell, 4 Ch. D. 163). And a person who publishes a magazine in the name of another and without authority, will be restrained (Hogg v. Kirby, 8 Vea. 215). A periodical is a "book" within the meaning of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, but the article or serial is only 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 15, part of a "book," and consequently does not itself require registration (Henderson v. Maxwell, supra, per Jessel, M.R., and see Mayhew v. Maxwell, 1 J. & H. 312). The right to commence proceedings in respect of the infringement of this description of copyright property is subjected to certain conditions by virtue of the Literary Copyright Act, 1842 (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45), and is further regulated by several important judicial decisions. By s. 18 of the said Act it is provided that when any publisher, or other person, shall before or after the passing of the Act, have carried on, or be the proprietor of "any encyclopaedia, review, magazine, periodical work, or work published in a series of books or parts, or any book whatsoever," and shall have employed or shall employ any persons to compose the same or any volumes, parts, essays, articles, or portions thereof, for publication in or as part of the same, and such work shall have been composed under such employment, and on the terms that the copyright therein shall belong to such proprietor, and paid for by such proprietor, then in this case it is further enacted that "the copyright in such encyclopaedia, review, magazine, periodical work, and work published in a series of books, or parts, and in every volume, part, essay, article, and portion so composed and paid for," shall be the property of such proprietor, who shall enjoy the same rights as if he were the actual author thereof. It is further provided in the same section that the proprietor shall have the same term of copyright as is given to authors and assignees of books under the Act
(s. 8) except only in the case of "essays, articles, or portions forming part of and first published in reviews, magazines, or other periodical works of a like nature;" for after the term of twenty-eight years from the first publication, the right of publishing the same in a separate form reverts to the author for the remainder of the term given by the Act. There is a further proviso that during the term of twenty-eight years the proprietor shall not publish any such essay, article, or portion, separately or singly, without the consent previously obtained of the author thereof or his assigns, and also that nothing in the Act shall be taken to alter or affect the right of any person to publish such composition, provided he shall have reserved the right to do so.

The effect of this section is to enable proprietors of the periodicals and the other enumerated works to acquire copyright in a composition of which some other person is the author, and this without any formal assignment.

There was copyright in a cyclopaedia before the Act (Mauvman v. Tegg, 2 Russ. 385), and the same remark applies to periodicals generally (see Hogg v. Kirby, 8 Ves. 215), the section, therefore, merely defines the relative rights of authors and publishers, and the various conditions contained therein are conditions precedent to a right of action in the event of any infringement taking place. It has been held under the section that the right which the proprietor obtains under it, is merely a qualified right of publication in the particular work for which the article was written, and that he cannot use it in any other manner unless it was written on the terms that the copyright therein should belong to the proprietor for all purposes (Bishop of Hereford v. Griffin, 16 Sim. 190; Smith v. Johnson, 4 Giff. 632; Strahan v. Graham, 16 L. T. (N. S.) 87, 15 W. R. 487). It has further been held that the proprietor must actually pay for the composition before it
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will vest in him (Walter v. Howe, 50 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 621, 44 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 727), and this proposition is divisible into two considerations; first, the proprietor, or other person named in the section, must pay, for where the publisher of a magazine employed and paid an editor who employed and paid persons for writing essays, it was doubted whether the copyright in such essays would vest in the publishers (Brown v. Cooke, 11 Jur. 79, per Shadwell, V.-C.). The second consideration is that the proprietor or other person must actually pay, and that a mere constructive payment, or contract or agreement to pay will not suffice (Richardson v. Gilbert, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 336, and see Brown v. Cooke, supra; Walter v. Howe, supra). It is not at all necessary that the proprietor of a periodical should enter into an express contract for the license to use the articles composed for him, so long as he himself actually pays the author for such articles as previously mentioned. The presumption arises that such license was intended to be conferred. And so also there is nothing to prevent the proprietor of a periodical from stipulating for the copyright for all purposes, and the copyright will then vest in him accordingly; in this case also the agreement may be merely implied (see Sweet v. Benning, 10 C. B. 459).

The proprietor of the copyright in any encyclopaedia, review, magazine, periodical work, or other work published in a series of books or parts is entitled to all the benefits of the Act on registering the first number of such periodical (see 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 19), and it is never necessary to register separately any serial that may subsequently be commenced in the periodical (Henderson v. Maxwell, 4 Ch. D. 163). Assuming that the proprietor has himself paid for the article to be published in a particular periodical, and that the first number of the periodical has been duly registered pursuant to section 19 of the Act, the question
arises in whom is the copyright in such article vested during the period of twenty-eight years. In *Sweet v. Benning*, 16 C. B. 434, it was stated that the mere fact of a proprietor of a periodical employing another to write an article or series of articles for publication in such periodical, raised a presumption that the copyright was vested in the proprietor, unless there was something in the surrounding circumstances to negative such a supposition, and the case was decided upon this view of the law. In the *Bishop of Hereford v. Griffin*, 16 Sim. 197, another view altogether was taken, for here the Vice-Chancellor observed that according to the law, the copyright was in the author, except so far as he had parted with it.

The case of the *Bishop of Hereford* was subsequently cited with approval by Stuart, V.-C. (*Smith v. Johnson*, 4 Giff. 682), and the law as it at present stands, may be taken to be that the meaning of the proviso contained in the 18th sect. of 5 & 6 Vict., c. 45, taken with the whole clause, is not to vest any copyright in the proprietors or publishers of a periodical work, but simply to give them a license to use the matter for a particular purpose. Consequently during the term of twenty-eight years specified in the Act, assuming the absence of any contrary agreement, the proprietor has simply a license to use the article or essay in connection with the particular periodical for which he contracted, he cannot publish in a separate form; and on the other hand, the author is subjected to the same restriction until after the expiration of the limited time. The copyright is always vested in the author, subject, as to a term of twenty-eight years, to a license subsisting in a third person, to the exclusive use of the article in connection with a particular periodical, and not otherwise, and during this period neither author nor publisher can, without the consent of the other of them, republish such article in a separate form. In one case the
question was raised whether the right of the author of an article in a periodical, under the 18th section of the Act, to prevent a separate publication, did not in itself amount to a copyright within the meaning of the 24th section; it was, however, decided by Wood, V.-C., that no registration was necessary (Mayhew v. Maxwell, 1 J. & H. 312). This learned judge, however, proceeded upon the assumption that the copyright had vested in the proprietor of the periodical, whereas if the decisions in the Bishop of Hereford's Case, 16 Sim. 197, and Smith v. Johnson, 4 Giff. 632, are to be followed, the contention can hardly be supported, even assuming it to be made out that the plaintiff (i.e. the author) had by express contract reserved the right of separate publication. The meaning of the term "separate" was discussed at length in Smith v. Johnson, 4 Giff. 692, where the licensee had republished in a weekly supplementary number, intended to be sold either with or without the current number, a series of tales written by the plaintiff.

A newspaper is a "periodical work," and, as a "book" newspaper includes "a sheet of letterpress" under ss. 2 & 18 of the Literary Copyright Act (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45), such newspaper must consequently be registered under this Act; unless this is done the proprietor of the newspaper has no right to sue in respect of the piracy of any article appearing therein (Walter v. Howe, 50 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 621; 44 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 727; and see Platt v. Walter, 17 L. T. (N. S.) 159, per Lord Chelmsford, ex parte Foss, 2 De G. & J. 239, per Turner, L.J.). The case to the contrary, Cox v. Land & Water Journal Co. 9 L. R. Eq. 324, 39 L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 152, in so far as it asserts a contrary doctrine cannot be supported, and was not followed by the Master of the Rolls in Walter v. Howe, supra.

In America the question whether copyright exists in a
magazine or newspaper as a whole, or in any of the articles or serials published from time to time therein, is determined solely upon principles applicable to other productions of a literary nature, no express statutory provisions having been made concerning copyright in publications of this kind. It may be said, therefore, that as both newspapers and periodical publications frequently contain matter of the utmost importance in the literary world, and that as a literary production to be the subject of copyright need not be a book in the common acceptance of the term, that is to say, a volume written or printed, made up of several sheets and bound together, but that on the contrary, a book may be printed on one sheet, as in the case of the words of a song or the music accompanying it, it follows that newspapers and other periodicals are "books," and as such entitled to the protection of the law. It is exceedingly doubtful whether the opinion of Mr. Justice Thompson in *Clayton v. Stone*, 2 Paine, 392, to an effect contrary to that detailed above, would be followed at the present day (see Drone on Copy: 169). In practice it is usual in the case of periodicals to obtain a copyright in each issue, as would, but for the saving operation of the 19th section of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, have to be done in England; and if the author of any article wishes to reserve the copyright to himself he must register such article.

The whole of the Acts of Parliament referring to and regulating the issue of newspapers were repealed by 32 & 33 Vict. c. 24, in the schedule to which, some of the provisions of the previous Acts are re-enacted. It is provided by 39 Geo. III. c. 79, s. 29 (re-enacted), that every person who shall print any paper for hire, reward, gain or profit, shall carefully preserve and keep one copy (at least) on which he shall write or print the name and place of abode of the person by whom he was employed
to print the same. The penalty for neglecting to do this or to produce the copy within the space of six calendar months after the publication on being required to do so by any justice of the peace, is fixed at £20. By 51 Geo. III. c. 65, s. 8, the name and residence of the printers need not be placed upon banknotes, bills of exchange, &c., or to any paper printed by authority of any public board or public office. The penalty of £20, mentioned above, was originally not discretionary, but by 51 Geo. III. c. 65, s. 1, it was made so: this latter Act was, however, repealed by 32 & 33 Vict. 24, and the question of penalties for printing, publishing, or dispersing any newspaper or book whatsoever, is now regulated by 2 & 3 Vict. c. 12 s. 2. This Act imposes a penalty upon the printer of any paper or book whatsoever which shall be meant to be published or dispersed, who shall not print upon the front of such paper, or upon the first and last leaf, as the case may be, his name and usual place of abode or business; and penalties are also imposed on persons publishing or dispersing, or assisting in publishing or dispersing copies which shall not be printed as aforesaid. Actions for penalties are to be commenced in the name of the Attorney or Solicitor-General in England, or the Queen’s Advocate in Scotland (sec. 4).

It was decided under 39 Geo. III. c. 79, s. 27, an Act now repealed (32 & 33 Vict. c. 24), and it is presumed that the law will be the same under the corresponding Act (2 & 3 Vict. c. 12), that the omission to insert the name of the printer on a given pamphlet, not coming within the exceptions clause of the Act, is fatal to the printer’s right to sue for labour or materials used in printing, and the mere fact that the Act specifies a certain penalty is no ground of argument to the contrary (Bensley v. Bignold, 5 B. & Ald. 335).

In order to carry out the spirit and meaning of the Acts
regulating the practice relating to the discovery of the name of any person concerned as printer, publisher, or proprietor of any newspaper, it is provided by 32 & 33 Vict. c. 24, repealing in part 6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 76, but re-enacting the 19th section thereof, that if any person shall file a bill for discovery of the name of any such person concerned as aforesaid, or of any matters relative to the printing or publishing of any newspaper, in order the more effectually to bring or carry on any suit or action for damages alleged to have been sustained by reason of any slanderous or libellous matter, it shall not be lawful for the defendant to plead or demur to such bill, but he must make the required discovery: there is a proviso, however, that such discovery shall not be made use of as evidence or otherwise, in any proceeding against the defendant, save only in that proceeding for which the discovery is made. Under this section a person may on complaining of a libel in a newspaper proceed against the printer and publisher to ascertain the names of the proprietors for the purpose of bringing his action against the proprietor alone (Dixon v. Enoch, 20 W. R. 359, per Wickens, V.-C.)

The Newspaper Libel and Registration Act (44 & 45 Vict. c. 60) now provides for the establishment of a register of the proprietors of newspapers (sect. 8), and it is the duty of the printers and publishers for the time being of every newspaper to make or cause to be made to the registry office in the month of July in every year a return of the following particulars, according to the form in the schedule, that is to say:

(a.) The title of the newspaper.

(b.) The names of all the proprietors of such newspaper, together with their respective occupations, places of business (if any), and places of residence (sect. 9).

Penalties are likewise imposed for the omission to make annual returns (sect. 10), or for wilful misrepresentation
in or omission from such return (sect. 12). Copies of entries in and extracts from the register are to be evidence of the contents of the said register (sect. 15). By the 2nd section, fair and accurate newspaper reports of certain meetings are privileged, and no prosecution is to be commenced against any proprietor, publisher, editor or any person responsible for the publication of a newspaper for any libel published therein, without the written fiat of the Director of Public Prosecutions (sect. 3).

It had been previously held, that upon an information for maliciously publishing a defamatory libel under Lord Campbell’s Act (6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 5), the magistrate had no jurisdiction to receive evidence of the truth of the libel (Reg. v. Carden, 5 Q. B. Div. 1; 41 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 504); but now by the 4th section (44 & 45 Vict. c. 60) a court of summary jurisdiction may receive evidence as to the publication of a libel contained in a newspaper, being for the public benefit, and as to the matters charged in the libel being true, and as to the report being fair and accurate and published without malice. A court of summary jurisdiction may also, if it is of opinion that, though the person charged is shown to have been guilty, the libel is of a trivial character, impose a fine, subject, however, to the defendant’s right to be tried by a jury, should he demand one (sect. 5). It must also be noticed that books or other papers printed at the University Press of Oxford, or the Pitt Press of Cambridge, are to be marked with an announcement to that effect (2 & 3 Vict. c. 12, s. 3).

The mere “title” of a newspaper is no more a subject “Title” of copyright than the title of any other book, but the proprietors have an inherent right to prevent any other persons from adopting it, and this is a right in the nature of a trade mark (see Kelly v. Hatton, 3 Ch. App. 703; Netsler v. Wood, 8 Ch. D. 606; Bell v. Locke, 8 Paige (Amer.) 75).
Engravings are protected under the joint operation of the statutes 8 Geo. II. c. 18, 7 Geo. III. c. 88, 17 Geo. III. c. 57, and remedies are provided for the infringement of the copyright subsisting in such engravings. It is provided by 8 Geo. II. c. 18, s. 1, that "every person who shall invent and design, engrave, etch, or work in mezzotinto, or chiaro-oscuro, or from his own works and invention shall cause to be designed and engraved, etched, or worked in mezzotinto or chiaro-oscuro, any historical or other print or prints, shall have the sole right and liberty of printing and reprinting the same for the term of fourteen years, to commence from the day of the first publishing thereof, which shall be truly engraved with the name of the proprietor on each plate, and printed on every such print or prints." By the same section certain penalties are imposed upon print-sellers and others pirating the same by engraving, etching, or working, or in any other manner copying and selling, or causing to be engraved, etched, or copied and sold, in the whole or in part, by varying, adding to, or diminishing from the main design, or who shall print, reprint, or import for sale, or cause, &c., without the consent of the proprietor first had and obtained in writing, signed in the presence of two or more witnesses. Persons who publish, sell, or expose to sale, or otherwise, or in any other manner dispose of, or cause to be published, sold, or exposed to sale or otherwise, or in any other manner disposed of, any pirated print or prints, without such consent first had and obtained, are only liable under this section if they knew the same to be so printed or reprinted without the consent of the proprietor or proprietors.

The 2nd section contains a saving clause in favour of those persons who should purchase any plate for printing from the original proprietor, and the 3rd section contains certain provisions relating to the limitation of actions.
This Act was subsequently found to be defective, for it was decided that it applied only to those cases in which the designer had himself personally worked on the engraving, and not to those in which he had employed a printer or engraver to work for him (Jefferys v. Baldwin, Ambl. 164). This illiberal interpretation is on a par with the reasoning of the then Attorney-General in his attempt to show that the Act had no application at all unless the engraver had represented something purely imaginative, and not to be found in anything already in nature (Blackwell v. Harper, 2 Atk. 92).

The statute 7 Geo. III. c. 38, was passed to remedy the defects contained in the previous Act of George II. and by sect. 1 it is enacted that “all and every person and persons who shall invent or design, engrave, etch, or work in mezzotinto or chiaro-oscuro, or from his own work, design, or invention, shall cause or procure to be designed, engraved, etched, or worked in mezzotinto or chiaro-oscuro, any historical print or prints, or any print or prints of any portrait, conversation, landscape or architecture, map, chart or plan, or any other print or prints whatsoever, shall have and are hereby declared to have the benefit and protection of the said Act” (i.e., the Act of Geo. II.) “and this Act.” By the 2nd section, “All and every person and persons who shall engrave, etch, or work in mezzotinto or chiaro-oscuro, or cause to be engraved, etched, or worked, any print taken from any picture, drawing, model, or sculpture, either ancient or modern, shall have, and are hereby declared to have the benefit and protection of the said Act and this Act, for the term hereinafter mentioned, in like manner as if such print had been graved or drawn from the original design of such graver, etcher, or draughtsman.” By sect. 7, “The sole right and liberty of printing and reprinting intended to be secured and protected by the said former Act and this Act
shall be extended, continued, and be vested in the respective proprietors for the space of twenty-eight years," to commence from the day of the first publication. Under 17 Geo. III. c. 57, an action on the case for damages is given, and the Act is also extended to Ireland by 6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 95.

The joint effect of these statutes is to sweep away all invidious distinctions of the nature raised in Jefferys v. Baldwin, Ambl. 164, and also greatly to extend the range of subjects which can form the basis of a legitimate engraving (see Blackwell v. Harper, 2 Atk. 92). Doubts having arisen whether the provisions of the said Acts extended to lithographs and certain other impressions, it was provided by 15 & 16 Vict. c. 12, s. 14, that the provisions of the Engravings Acts should be extended to "prints taken by lithography or any other mechanical process by which prints or impressions of drawings or designs are capable of being multiplied indefinitely." Consequently the copying of a picture or engraving by means of photography or by any other process, mechanical or otherwise, whereby copies may be indefinitely multiplied, is a clear infringement, as being a copy within the meaning of the Copyright of Engravings Acts (Gambart v. Ball, 14 C. B. (N. S.) 306; 9 Jur. (N. S.) 1059; 32 L. J. (N. S.) C. P. 166; affirmed by Graves v. Ashford, L. R. 2 C. P. 410; 36 L. J. C. P. (N. S.) 139); but whether copies made by hand, with pen or pencil, and not capable of being reproduced in large quantities are within the Acts is a question of argument (Gambart v. Ball, 9 Jur. (N. S.) 1059, per Willes, J.).

Where a copy of an engraving has been made for an entirely different purpose, and is useful only for such purpose, there is no infringement; consequently a mosaical pattern forming or intended to form a groundwork for wool-work, is no infringement of the engraving or picture from which it is taken, for any one may reproduce a print
or design, if he does so in connection with a production of an entirely different class, as a reproduction upon earthenware, tapestry, and the like (Dick v. Brooks, L. R. 15 Ch. D. 22, per James, L.J.).

By virtue of the provisions of 7 Geo. III. c. 38, a person who employs another to make drawings for him in accordance with a certain plan of which he is the inventor has such a right of copy in the design as to justify him in proceeding against any person who infringes it (Stannard v. Harrison, 10 W. R. 811); the mere fact of a person being unable to draw for himself is a matter wholly unimportant if he has caused other persons to draw for him from plans or ideas which he himself has supplied (ibid. 818, see per Bacon, V.-C.). It would appear, therefore, that in order to ensure a valid copyright in any drawing, print, or engraving the inventor must furnish the conception to the designer, that is, to say, he must give him something more than a bare idea what to design.

The American law on the above subject has been decided in accordance with the words of an Act of Congress of the 29th April, 1802, now repealed (see U. S. Rev. Stat. s. 4952, also the Act of June 18, 1874), to the effect that "any person being a citizen of the United States or a resident within the same, who shall invent and design, engrave, etch, or work, or from his own works and inventions shall cause to be designed and engraved," &c. Now the words of the equivalent English statute are, "all and every person and persons who shall invent or design, engrave, etch, or work in mezzotinto or chiaro-oscuro, or from his own work, design, or invention shall cause or procure to be designed, engraved," &c. (7 Geo. III. c. 38). The words of the two statutes are in this respect so much alike that there can be no doubt that the English provision served as a model for the American draughtsman, and it is thought that the American judicial
interpretation of the clause in question, may appropriately be applied to the English section at present in force in this country (see Binns v. Woodruff, 4 Washington's Reports, 48). The person in whom the right is vested must be the author of the invention, although the form and completion of the work may well be left to another.

The provisions of the Act relating to prints "which shall be truly engraved with the name of the proprietor on each plate, and printed on every such print or prints" (8 Geo. II. c. 13, s. 1), must in all respects be strictly complied with or proceedings to restrain infringement will fail. (But see Roworth v. Wilkes, 1 Camp. 97).

It has been decided after some difference of opinion that the date of publication must be engraved or printed in addition to the name of the proprietor (Newton v. Cowie and Another, 4 Bing. 234, following Sayer v. Dicey, 3 Wils. 60; Thompson v. Symonds, 5 T. R. 41; McMurdo v. Smith, 7 T. R. 518; Bonner v. Field, cited 5 T. R. 44; and see Tuck v. Canton, 51 L. J. Rep. Q. B. (N. S.) 863); and any decisions to the contrary cannot now be relied on (see Blackwell v. Harper, 2 Atk. 92; Harrison v. Hogg, 2 Ves. 322). This date must be the actual and true date, that is to say, the date when the impressions are taken off the plate, and any mistake in this respect is fatal (Bonner v. Field, supra). The date is of importance that the public may know the period of the monopoly, the name of the proprietor, in order that those who wish to copy the engraving may know to whom to apply for consent (Thompson v. Symonds, supra, 45; see the remarks of Lord Kenyon); but it must be remembered that where the engravings form part of a book in which they are bound up, neither of these requisites is essential, and the registration of the book itself under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45 is sufficient to secure copyright in the contents, including the engravings (Bogue v. Houlston, 5 De G. & Sm. 267).
With respect to the name of the proprietor it is of course essential that this should be engraved according to the statute, although the designation "proprietor" need not be added (Newton v. Cowie and Another, 4 Bing. 234). Nor in the case of a firm need the name of every partner appear, but the general description of such firm by its trade name will suffice (Rock v. Lazarus, L. R. 15 Eq. 104). And it is further to be observed that the name of the first proprietor must be continued on the print, and on no account should the name of his assignees be substituted. The name and the title are dependent terms, and if a person had de facto no title on the day mentioned on the print, it would seem that he would be non-suited, and that whether original proprietor or assignee (Bonner v. Field, cited 5 T. R. 44).

This stringent rule applies, however, more particularly with respect to a mistake in the date, for although the statute 17 Geo. III. c. 57 has given to the person aggrieved or injured through or by the infringement of copyright, an action on the case for damages, yet it has been decided that, although the plaintiff's name is not engraved upon the prints, yet if there has been a piracy the plaintiff is entitled to judgment by virtue of the Common Law (see Roworth v. Wilkes, 1 Camp. 97; also Beckford v. Hood, 7 T. R. 620).

Maps, charts, and plans separately published are within the provisions of the Engravings Acts, and should therefore be printed with the date and name of the proprietor; or they may, in some cases at least, be viewed in the light of literary productions, and as such should be registered under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45. The best plan, however, is to utilize the provisions of all these enactments (see Stannard v. Lee, L. R. 6 Ch. 346; Stannard v. Harrison, 24 L. T. (N. S.) 570).

The question as to what amounts to an infringement of What amounts
a print or an engraving is for the jury, and each case as it arises is dealt with on principles applicable to itself. An infringement of a print for instance, like that of a literary production, may be open and barefaced, as when the original is deliberately reproduced, but by far the greater number of cases of infringement depend upon the question of colourable imitation. In all instances there must be such a degree of evidence as will tend to establish the fact that the defendant’s production is a transcript of the plaintiff’s, either completely, or with such variations or additions as make it in fact a colourable imitation, and by virtue of which the public are likely to be deceived (see Sayre and Others v. Moore, 1 East, 302, per Mansfield, C.J.), and thus it is that where a copy is made, but used for an entirely different purpose to the original, or differs from the original in character, no action will lie for the infringement thereof, that is to say, if the plaintiff had not used the original previously in the way the copy was then being used (see Martin v. Wright, 6 Sim. 297; Dicks v. Brooks, 15 Ch. D. 22).

The provisions of the Newspaper Acts relative to the printing of the name and address of the printer are not applicable to engravings (see 32 & 33 Vict. c. 24, 2nd Schedule, re-enacting sect. 31 of 39 Geo. III. c. 79).

By the Revised Statutes, s. 4952, engravings, cuts, prints, photographs, and the negatives thereof, are entitled to copyright; but by the Act of June 18th, 1874, the words “engraving,” “cut,” and “print,” are restricted to pictorial illustrations, or works connected with the fine arts. Consequently an engraving without art value will not be protected against piracy (Collender v. Griffith, 11 Blatchf. 212); yet in one case playing cards were protected as prints (Richardson v. Miller, 12 U. S. Pat. Off. Gaz. 3), although the utility of such articles is certainly not referable to their artistic value. Labels have, how-
ever, been held not to be within the above statutes, and must therefore be registered at the Patent Office (Act of June 18th, 1874; Coffeen v. Brunton, 4 McLean, 516).

The substantial identity test of piracy is applied in America on principles analogous to those practised in England, and in this respect the law of the two countries is the same, so much so in fact that the decisions of one country are frequently quoted in the other (see Turner v. Robinson, 10 Ir. Ch. 121, 510; Gambart v. Bull, 14 C. B. (N. S.) 306; Graves v. Ashford, L. R. 2 C. P. 410; Blunt v. Putten, 2 Paine (Amer.) 307; Richardson v. Miller, 3 L. & Eq. Rep. 614).

Cards of congratulation, such as Christmas, Easter, and birthday cards may be prints within the Engravings Acts, or they may be designs (46 & 47 Vict. c. 57), or paintings, drawings, or photographs (25 & 26 Vict. c. 68), according to circumstances, and in every case they must either be properly marked, or registered under the appropriate Act, or they will not be entitled to protection.

Previous to the statute 25 & 26 Vict. c. 68, the author of an original painting, drawing, or photograph, had not such an exclusive right of property in his production as to enable him to bring an action to restrain the infringement of it. Where an engraving was made from an original picture, the engraver was protected under the Engravings Acts, and no one might reproduce or colourably imitate such engraving, but it was no piracy for another artist to make a fresh engraving from the original picture (De Berenger v. Wheble, 2 Stark. 548). The same remarks applied to drawings of all kinds, and in later times to photographs also.

At common law the author of any painting, drawing, or photograph, or his assignee, had and now has, a right to prevent any person from copying his production; and even
the publication of a mere catalogue, containing a description of any works of art in which a common law right of copy subsists, is an infringement of such right, and will be restrained (Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 De G. & Sm. 652; 1 Mac. & G. 25). After publication, however, the author bases his right to protection solely on the provisions of the statute 25 & 26 Vict. c. 68.

First, to consider what amounts to such a publication of a work of art as will destroy the author's common law right of copy. It is a fundamental rule that to constitute publication there must be such a dissemination of the work of art itself among the public, as to justify the belief that it took place with the intention of rendering such work common property. It follows, therefore, and it is submitted, that if an artist permits a wood engraving of a painting to be made and published in a periodical, this is not a publication of the painting (see Turner v. Robinson, 10 Ir. Ch. (N. S.) 133); and so, where a plaster cast taken from a bust is published, this is no publication of the bust itself. The sale of a work of art cannot be said to amount to a publication, nor can the exhibition of a similar work at a public exhibition, where there are bye-laws against copying, or where it is tacitly understood that no copying shall take place; for in this instance the public are **prima facie** admitted to view the picture on the implied understanding that no improper advantage will be taken of the privilege. For similar reasons the exhibition of a picture, with the object of obtaining subscriptions for engravings to be made from it, does not amount to a publication, if it be intimated, either expressly or impliedly, that no copying will be permitted. To constitute publication, therefore, it must appear that the object with which the exhibition or dissemination takes place, amounts to, or includes a deliberate intention to endow the public at large with the perpetual right to
reproduce the work of art in question (see the judgment of the Court, *Turner v. Robinson*, 10 Ir. Ch. 182).

By 25 & 26 Vict. c. 68, s. 1, it is provided that the "author," being a British subject or resident within the dominions of the Crown, of every original painting, drawing, and photograph, whether made in the British dominions or elsewhere, and his assigns, shall have the sole and exclusive right of copying, engraving, reproducing, and multiplying such painting or drawing, and the design thereof, or such photograph, and the negative thereof, for the term of his natural life and seven years after his death; provided that on sale or disposition of the original, or where the same has been made or executed for any other person for a valuable consideration, the person so selling or disposing of or making or executing the same, shall not retain the copyright thereof, unless it is expressly reserved to him by agreement in writing signed by the vendee or assignee or the person for whom the picture, &c., was made, at or before the time of such sale or disposition, but the copyright shall belong to the vendee or assignee or to the person on whose behalf the same shall have been made or executed. It is, however, by the same section further provided, that the vendee or assignee shall not be entitled to the copyright, unless at or before the time of such sale or disposition, an agreement in writing signed by the person so selling or disposing of the same, or by his agent duly authorised, shall have been made to that effect.

Nothing, however, is to prejudice the right of any person to copy or use any work in which there shall be no copyright, or to represent any scene or object, notwithstanding that there may be copyright in some representation of such scene or object (sect. 2).

By the 4th section a register of proprietors is to
be kept at Stationers' Hall, and provisions are made for the inspection of the register and the delivery of certified copies thereof, production in evidence of such copies, application to the Courts by parties aggrieved, the expunging and varying of entries, and other similar provisions, as in the case of books registered under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 5. All the provisions of the International Copyright Act (7 & 8 Vict. c. 12) are extended to paintings, drawings and photographs (sect. 12). Under this statute (25 & 26 Vict. c. 68), it has been judicially determined that a photograph of an engraving of a painting, is within the Act, and that in the case of an assignment of the copyright in a picture, it is sufficient to register the assignment (sect. 4), and that it is under these circumstances immaterial that the original copyright of the author has not been registered (Graves' Case, L. R. 4 Q. B. 715; Beal's Case, L. R. 3 Q. B. 387).

Where an assignee neglects to register his assignment under the Act, he cannot of course sue in respect of any infringement, but a licensee to reproduce, is in a different position from the assignee of the whole copyright, for a mere license need not be registered (Tuck v. Canton, 51 L. J. (N. S.) Q. B. 363).

It is of course clearly unlawful to copy a photograph, or a negative thereof entitled to protection under the Act, but this will not prevent any person from copying the object from which the photograph was taken, assuming of course that it be common property (Graves' Case, supra, per Blackburn, J., 723) for an "original photograph" within the meaning of the Act can mean nothing else than a direct reproduction of a particular object by means of photography; any one can reproduce the same object, but he cannot copy the photograph without permission, for the copy would not then be original (ibid.).

It has very recently been decided that where a firm of
photographers registered themselves under 25 & 26 Vict. c. 68, ss. 1 and 4, as the authors of a photograph, the negative of which, as it turned out, had been taken by an employee, they were properly speaking proprietors, but certainly not "authors," and consequently that they were precluded from bringing an action (Nottage v. Jackson, 52 L. J. Q. B. (N. S.) 760, on appeal, ibid. 766). The term "author" involves originating, making, producing, as the inventor or master mind, the thing which is to be protected, whether it be a drawing, or a painting, or a photograph (ibid. per Cotton, L. J., 768). This decision, which would seem at first sight to operate with peculiar harshness, turns entirely on the meaning of the word "author," the person on whose life the duration of the copyright depends, and the most likely person to be the "author" of a photograph would appear to be he who effectively is as near as he can be the cause of the picture which is produced—that is, the person who has superintended the arrangement, who has actually formed the picture by putting the objects into position and arranging the place in which such objects are to be (ibid. 767). From this view of the meaning of the word, the decision is founded upon a substantial basis, although it may well be doubted whether the general principles involved do not stand greatly in need of revision. The "author" of a picture is doubtless the person who paints it, and none other, but between an original picture and a photograph there is a wide difference; the one is the result of personal skill solely, the other of personal skill—though of a much inferior order—combined with a mechanical process in which many persons may take part. The word "author" would therefore appear to be inappropriate when used in connection with photography.

In those cases in which an artist wishes to reserve to himself a right of reproduction, he must take care to

Right to reproduce painting
do so by agreement in writing, signed at or before the
time of the sale or disposition of the painting, by the
vendee or assignee. On the other hand, if the vendee
or assignee should stipulate for the right of reproduction,
he must obtain an agreement in writing to that effect,
signed by the vendor or by his agent duly authorised (25
& 26 Vict. c. 68, s. 1). If neither of these courses is
adopted the right of copy will become publici juris, and
the market value of the original picture as a matter of
course depreciated.

It has not yet been expressly decided in whom the
copyright of a picture painted on commission will vest
in those cases where no agreement is entered into between
the artist and his customer, but it is submitted that the
copyright will be included in the commission and pass to
the latter. In the case of an ordinary photograph, which
is nearly always taken on commission, the copyright would
seem to belong to the customer, and if the photographer
has any interest in it at all, it is merely in the materials
forming the negative.

The 6th section of the 25 & 26 Vict. c. 68, imposes a
penalty on the author of any painting, drawing, or photo-
graph in which there shall be subsisting copyright, and
who after having sold or disposed of such copyright shall,
without the consent of the proprietor, repeat, copy, colour-
ably imitate, or otherwise multiply for sale, hire, exhibition,
or distribution, any such work or the design thereof.

The point arises under this section, whether an artist
who has disposed of the copyright in a certain picture has
the right to copy for sale, hire, &c., any of the studies
composed by him as the groundwork for his picture. The
Copyright Commissioners in their report (pars. 118-124)
doubt whether the artist would have any such right. It
is submitted, however, that the solution of the question
entirely depends upon principles analogous to those
governing the ordinary examples of colourable imitation. In some instances the study might bear not the slightest resemblance to the picture, in others not such a resemblance as to destroy or impair the value of the latter as an object of unique interest, while in others it might be either practically identical, or the embodiment of all its salient and interesting features. The relief to be afforded would therefore entirely depend upon the nature of the case and the degree of identity subsisting between the study and the picture.

Under and by virtue of 54 Geo. III. c. 50, the sole right and property in all new and original sculpture, models, copies and casts is vested in the proprietors for the term of fourteen years from first putting forth or publishing the same, provided in all and in every case the proprietor do cause his name with the date to be put on all and every such new and original sculpture, model, copy, or cast before the same shall be put forth or published. Under section 6 it is provided that the sole right of making and disposing of such new and original sculpture, or model, or copy, or cast, shall return to the person who originally made the same, if he shall then be living for the further term of fourteen years (sect. 6.) The Act contains no provision for the registration of any sculpture, &c., and all the proprietor has, therefore, to do, is to cause his name with the date to be put on every original work. He might at one time, however, if he had thought fit, have registered under the Act to Extend and Amend the Acts relating to the Copyright of Designs (13 & 14 Vict. c. 104, s. 6), under which Act certain penalties were imposed on unauthorised persons making or selling copies of registered sculptures, &c. This statute is repealed (46 & 47 Vict. c. 57), and the Act of Geo. III. is the only one now regulating the subject of copyright in sculpture, models, copies and casts. There was also at one time
another Act regulating the copyright in sculpture, but its provisions were so utterly inadequate for the protection of artists, that it was first amended and subsequently altogether repealed (38 Geo. III. c. 71, amended by 54 Geo. III. c. 56, and repealed by 24 & 25 Vict. c. 101, see Gahagan v. Cooper, 3 Camp. 111).

It will be observed that under the subsisting Act the artist has copyright in his work for the term of fourteen years, from first putting forth or publishing the same. We have seen that where a plaster cast is taken from a bust and published, that this is no publication of the bust itself (ante, p. 92), it may give a right to copy the cast but not the detailed working of the bust (see per Smith, M. R., Turner v. Robinson, 10 Ir. Ch. (N. S.) 134); and in the same case on appeal the Right Hon. Maziere Brady, Lord Chancellor of Ireland, is reported to have said, "Many large works in this branch of art (sculpture) which decorate public squares and other places are of course so published, but there are others not designed for such purposes, which could never be published in any other way than in exhibitions, therefore I apprehend that these works of sculpture must be considered as 'published' by exhibition at such places as the Royal Academy and Manchester, so as to entitle them to the protection of the statutes from the date of such publication" (ibid. 516); and the Lord Chancellor goes on to say that publication by exhibition may be restricted by the rules of the place, as for instance by a prohibition against copying and the like, thus agreeing with the judgment of the Master of the Rolls to the same effect with respect to pictures, in the Court below (ibid. 130). There can be but little if any doubt that sculpture, and other works of art multiplied by casts or copies, thereby become published, that is to say, if such casts or copies are for sale or public use, for the word "published" signifies made public by those means
which are appropriate to the particular article or thing. A book is published by being printed; a dramatic piece or musical composition by being publicly represented; a print or article of sculpture is published by being made the subject of copy in casts or prints, and it is probable that with regard to sculpture and other works of art being multiplied by casts or other copies, it would depend in each case upon that which applies to the particular thing, if it be for sale or public use (Bouicault v. Chatterton, 35 L. T. (N. S.) 746; 5 Ch. D. 275; see per James, L. J.).

There is here, consequently, a clearly defined difference of opinion as to what amounts to "publication" of a piece of sculpture. The publication of a copy or cast either is or is not a publication of the original also; it is clear that it is a publication of the copy or cast itself. As copyright may subsist in the original and in a copy thereof as two distinct subjects, at one and the same time, it is quite possible that serious differences might at any moment arise, for it is obvious that copyright may commence in the original at one time, and in the cast or copy at another. In case of a piracy being committed, the defendant would therefore plead that he had copied the original or the cast, according to circumstances, taking care to select the one in respect of which the copyright had expired. This procedure is rendered possible by the words of the Act, providing a right of copy in an original sculpture, and another and totally distinct right of copy in a cast of such original sculpture. Furthermore, the right of copy is to date from the time when the work is "first put forth or published," an ambiguous phrase, to explain which no attempt whatever is made.

With respect to publication by means of exhibition, it is certain, that where the public are admitted under an express or implied understanding that they shall not make
copies of any of the works of art, for them to do so would be a violation of trust or confidence, which the courts would restrain; it might, therefore, be urged that the common-law right of property subsisting in the author of every intellectual production whatsoever, before and until publication, can never be taken from him against his will, to be notified either in express words or from the nature of the case. To say that prima facie the author of such a production intends to dedicate it to the public on every occasion in which he is good enough to exhibit it for the benefit of the public, unless, indeed, there be some special provision against copying so as to negative the supposition, would certainly seem to place the property of many exhibitors upon a very precarious footing, and to be altogether contrary to justice and right. It would be equally just and proper to hold, that a stranger may legally make use of a picture while it is in transitu between the owner's house and the exhibition room; the Irish Lord Chancellor referred to this point only to avoid it, he put it in such terms as to imply that a doubt might reasonably be supposed to exist on the subject (Turner v. Robinson, 10 Ir. Ch. 517).

From this and other instances it would appear that common-law rights of copy are not at the present time regarded with favour, although it may reasonably be doubted whether the various statutes relating to copyright in intellectual productions are any improvement at all, or have in any way tended to promote the interest of either authors or the public at large.

It may be convenient here to remark that the various decisions affecting engravings, with respect to the annexation of the date and proprietor's name, apply equally to sculpture protected under the provisions of 54 Geo. III, c. 56, and consequently if a sculptor wishes to acquire copyright under that Act, in the model as well
as in the original sculpture, he must affix his name, together with the date, to the model also.

Before publication a sculptor has such a common-law right of property in his work as will enable him to restrain any one seeking to copy the production by means of drawings or photographs, but after publication it is submitted that this right of protection is lost, for the penalties imposed by 54 Geo. III. c. 56, s. 3, apply only to pirated copies or casts, and not to engravings or copies produced otherwise than by modelling or fashioning.

New and original designs for sculpture are expressly excepted from the operation of the Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 57, see s. 60).

By the law of the United States copyright is secured in American law relating to paintings, drawings, chromos, statues, statuary, and of models or designs intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts (Rev. Stat. 4952), and such copyright may vest in a “proprietor” as well as in an author, inventor, or a designer, for a citizen or resident of the United States may acquire copyright in certain descriptions of works which he has bought from a foreign author. It is true that nothing in the chapter is to be construed to prohibit the printing, publishing, importation, or sale of any book, map, chart, dramatic or musical composition, print, cut, engraving, or photograph, written, composed, or made by any person not a citizen of the United States nor resident therein (Rev. Stat. 4971); but unfortunately no mention at all is made of paintings, drawings, chromos, statues, statuary, models, and designs, and it is apprehended, therefore, that a valid right of copy may be procured in the United States with respect to these, even although the work of an alien or non-resident.

As to what amounts to a “publication” of a painting or sculpture, is just as difficult to determine as it is in England.
ON THE INFRINGEMENT

(see Oertel v. Wood, 40 How. Pr. 10; Oertel v. Jacoby, 44 How. Pr. 170; Drone on Copy. 286).

It must be remembered that the American statutes do not prohibit the exhibition of a copy of a painting, statue, or other work of art, but are merely directed against multiplication and circulation of piratical copies (Rev. Stats. s. 4965).

Designs.

The proprietor of a new or original design not previously published in the United Kingdom, has by virtue of 46 & 47 Vict. c. 57, ss. 47, 50, the exclusive copyright in such design with respect to any class or classes of goods in which it is registered, during five years from the date of registration. Under the Act registration is absolutely necessary, and provisions are made for the determination of the copyright, in case the proprietor of the design shall not before delivery on sale of any articles to which a registered design has been applied, have caused each such article to be marked with the prescribed mark, or with the prescribed word or words, or figures, denoting that the design is registered; or unless he can show that he took all proper steps to ensure the marking of the article (s. 51).

So, also, where delivery on sale of any articles to which a registered design has been applied, the proprietor must (if exact representations or specimens were not furnished on the application for registration), furnish to the comptroller the prescribed number of exact representations or specimens of the design; and if he fails to do so, the comptroller may erase his name from the register, and thereupon his copyright in the design is to cease (s. 50 (2)).

For the purposes of the Act "design" is defined to mean any design applicable to any article of manufacture, or to any substance artificial or natural, or partly artificial and partly natural, whether the design is applicable for the pattern, or for the shape or configuration, or for the ornament thereof.
or for any two or more of such purposes, and by whatever means it is applicable, not being a design for a sculpture, or other thing within the protection of the Sculpture Copyright Act of the year 1814 (s. 00). The term “proprietor” is also defined in s. 01 as the author of any new and original design, unless he executed the work on behalf of another person for a good and valuable consideration, in which case such person shall be considered the proprietor, and every person acquiring for a good and valuable consideration a new and original design, or the right to apply the same to any such article or substance as aforesaid, either exclusively of any other person or otherwise, and also every person on whom the property in such design or such right to the application thereof shall devolve, shall be considered the proprietor of the design in the respect in which the same may have been so acquired, and to that extent, but not otherwise (s. 61). A penalty of £50 for the piracy of a registered design (s. 58), or an action for damages (s. 59), is imposed by the Act, the provisions of which in this respect will be noticed in their proper place.

The definition of “design” given in the Act, would seem to have been drafted almost verbatim from the third section of the repealed Act, 5 & 6 Vict. c. 100, and designs are now no longer of two distinct kinds, that is to say, those applicable to the ornamenting of various articles (5 & 6 Vict. c. 100, s. 3), and those applicable to any article of manufacture having a reference to some purpose of utility, so far as such design shall be for the shape or configuration of such article, and that whether it be for the whole shape or only for a part (6 & 7 Vict. c. 65, s. 2), but the species or character of the device will be considered entirely with reference to the particular class or classes in which it may be registered (46 & 47 Vict. c. 57, s. 47). It is provided, however, by the Designs Rules, 1883, that an application for the registration of a design shall, in
describing the nature of the design state whether it is applicable for the pattern, or for the shape or configuration of the design, and the means by which it is applicable (rule 9). Questions may therefore even yet arise as to the applicability of any particular design, i.e., whether for the "pattern," or for the "shape or configuration," and if the design is wrongly described, it is apprehended that a plea alleging the fact would be a good answer to a statement of claim in an action for infringement. All previous Acts relating to the registration of designs, are repealed by the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883 (s. 113), which is now the only enactment on the subject; all previous rules are likewise repealed (see Designs Rules, 1883, r. 37), but nothing is to affect the past operation of any of the repealed enactments or rules or anything done in pursuance thereof (ibid.).

The new Act prohibits two things: first, the application of a registered design, or any fraudulent or obvious imitation thereof, without the licence or written consent of the registered proprietor, in the class or classes of goods in which such design is registered, for purposes of sale, to any article of manufacture, or to any substance, artificial or natural, or partly artificial and partly natural; and in the second place, it prohibits any person without such consent as aforesaid, from publishing or exposing for sale any article of manufacture or any substance to which such design, or any fraudulent or obvious imitation thereof, shall have been so applied, knowing that the same has been so applied without the consent of the registered proprietor (sect. 58). The result of this section will probably be, that where a person wrongfully applies the design within the protected period of five years, he will be prohibited from selling the article with the design attached after the period has expired (see Crossley v. Beverley, 1 Russ. & M. 166 (note); Daglish v. Jarvie, 14 Jur. (N. S.) 945).
OF COPYRIGHT.

Notwithstanding the very plain words of the 3rd section of the repealed Act, 5 & 6 Vict. c. 100, it was doubted whether the time during which a design would be protected, dated from the publication of the manufacture or from the publication of the design (Daylish v. Jarvie, 14 Jur. (N. S.) 945. In all cases under the new Act the copyright is to subsist for five years from the date of registration (46 & 47 Vict. c. 57, s. 50).

A "design" is a picture or diagram suitable for application to a particular subject or class of subjects, and may consist in variations on old forms in respect of size, configuration, colour, and other qualities, or it may consist in alteration of certain given proportions (Harrison v. Taylor, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 1221, per Byles, J.).

The definition of "design" given in the 60th section of the new Act is incomplete, in this sense, that the text does not explain of what a design may consist, but only how it may be applied, and to what description of articles. The design must be "new or original," and to discover a new application for an old design, does not make such design either new or original (see Adams v. Clementson, 12 Ch. D. 714).

A new and original combination may be a "design," but the result of such combination must not be a multiplicity of designs, but one design only. Consequently where the plaintiff had registered a design for a shawl having the two sides of different texture and colours, a scollop pattern on parts of it, a particular border round it, a particular configuration of the corners, and a newly invented fringe to surround it, and it appeared that these points had been applied to shawls before, but the combination was new, it was held that no action for infringement would lie. The merit of this shawl was stated to be that by varying the method of folding, it might be converted in appearance into eight different shawls; this, then, constituted a multiplicity of
ON THE INFRINGEMENT

designs (Norton v. Nicholls, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 1208), besides which it was doubted whether there can be a "design" where all the points of a combination are old, even though the combination itself be new (ibid. per Lord Campbell, C.J., 1205).

But a new combination of old patterns may be a "new or original" (46 & 47 Vict. c. 57, s. 47) design, and as such entitled to registration (Harrison v. Taylor, 5 Jur. (N.S.), 1219: and see Mulloney v. Stevens, 10 L. T. (N.S.), 100). Under the old law a design of merely an ornamental character must have been registered under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 100; if not ornamental it was essential that it should combine novelty with utility in the "shape or configuration" of the article, and be registered under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 65. Both these statutes are, however, now repealed.

The phrase "shape or configuration" occurring in the second section of the repealed statute, 6 & 7 Vict. c. 65, and repeated in the definition of a "design," already referred to, as occurring in the 60th section of the Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act of 1883, has not received any judicial interpretation; it cannot, however, be said to mean the same thing as "combination of parts" (Patteson, J., in Reg. v. Bessell, 15 Jur. 774). Nor would it seem to apply to part of a whole (Margeson v. Wright, 2 De Gex & Sm. 420); it is clearly not applicable to the eyelet forming part of a protector label (ibid.), nor to a mechanical contrivance within the stem of a parasol (Millingen v. Picken, 1 C. B. 799).

On the other hand a brick intended, when arranged with other bricks, to act as a ventilating apparatus, was held to contain *intra se* a design having reference (under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 65) to some article of utility, that is to say, the design was applicable to the "shape or configuration" of the brick; no opinion, however, was given as to what
those particular words actually meant (Rogers v. Driver, 20 L. J. (N.S.), Q. B. 31).

The term "article of manufacture" (40 & 47 Vict. c. 57, Article of manufac-
ture, s. 00), is explained to some extent in Heywood v. Potter, 1 E. & B. 439, a case decided under the 4th section of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 100, a statute now repealed. The explanation here given is, however, by no means satisfactory, and there was a difference of opinion as to the application of the phrase to particular articles. The truth would appear to be that the phrases "shape or configuration" and "article of manufacture" will not bear an interpretation which can equally apply to every case, and consequently such phrases must be applied according to circumstances and as reason and argument shall suggest.

A similar remark applies to the expression "new and original," made use of in the repealed statute, 5 & 6 Vict. c. 100, s. 3. It is curious that the Legislature should have gone out of its way to raise gratuitously matter for dispute. The words "new and original," it is true, may mean nothing, may be utterly useless, and incapable of application, but they are infinitely to be preferred to others, which by reason of their less extended scope, afford opportunity for that difference of opinion which it is or should be the policy of the Law to quieten. The equivalent phrase employed in the 47th section of 46 & 47 Vict. c. 57, is "new or original," a phrase which may mean anything, and which may, and probably will, give rise to disputes supported by many plausible arguments applicable to the circumstances of the particular case. For instance, under the old Act, it was held that a copy of the photograph of a well-known public character was not a "new and original design," and that the special purpose for which it was used was beside the question (Adams v. Clementson, 12 Ch. Div. 714). It would, however, doubtless be going too far to say that this decision is
at all binding now, for the copy of the photograph in question may be new or it may be original, under circumstances where it could not well be both. If ever a similar question should arise again, it will have to be reargued, and the object of the Legislature in using the phrase "new or original" at one time (s. 47), and "new and original" at another (s. 61), properly inquired into at the expense of the litigants.

There is a great difference between a design and the subject-matter of a patent, the former is a picture or drawing (Harrison v. Taylor, 5 Jur. (N.S.), 1221, per Wightman, J.), and has no connection with the principle of any mechanical or other contrivance; it would appear consequently that the mere fact of an invention being the subject of a patent, will be no objection to the design being registered under the Patents Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883 (see Millingen v. Picken, 1 C. B. 790: Rogers v. Driver, 20 L. J. Q. B. (N. S.), 81).

The subject-matter to be registered under the Act is the design and not the article of manufacture, and it will be noticed that the method of registration is no longer divisible into two heads, as was the case under the old Acts, where the design might be registered either in respect of some ornamental peculiarity or with reference only to its shape or configuration. Under the old Acts it was held that a plea traversing a count that the plaintiff was the inventor of a new and original design for an article of manufacture, having reference to a purpose of utility, so far as the said design was for the shape or configuration of the article, did not raise the question whether or not the design of the alleged invention was a proper subject of registration (Millingen v. Picken, 1 C. B. 790).

Designs for sewed muslin collars transferred to the muslin, and consisting of a pattern to be worked over
by the needle, would appear to be designs applicable for the ornament "of a substance natural or artificial" (46 & 47 Vict. c. 57, s. 60) (see Lowndes v. Browne, 12 Ir. Law Rep. 293); the same remark applies to a design for ornamenting collars, and in each case the design must be registered under its appropriate class (Riego de la Branchardiere v. Elvery, 18 L. J. (N. S.) Ex. 381).

In order to decide in which particular class a design should be registered, the final result must be looked to, and not the modus operandi, or the various steps in the process by means of which the result was attained (Lowndes v. Browne, 12 Ir. Law Rep. 303, see per Crampton, J.). A person who wishes to protect his design may register under one or more of the enumerated classes (46 & 47 Vict. c. 57, s. 47, sub-s. 4); and if a design be registered under a wrong class, it would seem to be more than doubtful whether this mere circumstance would justify the infringement of it (Lowndes v. Browne, 12 Ir. Law Rep. 293). In case of doubt as to the class in which a design ought to be registered, the comptroller may decide the question.

The 47th and 50th sections of the Patents Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883, provides for registration in all cases in which the proprietor (s. 61, Jewitt v. Eckhardt, 8 Ch. Div. 407) of any new or original design not previously published in the United Kingdom, wishes to obtain the benefit of the Act. The design must be registered in respect of some class or classes of goods (s. 47, sub-s. 3), whether consisting of articles of manufacture or of any substance artificial, or natural, or partly artificial and partly natural (s. 60), and before delivery on sale of any articles to which a registered design has been applied, the proprietor of the design shall cause each such article to be marked with the prescribed
mark, or with the prescribed word or words or figures denoting that the design is registered (s. 51). By rule 32 of the "Designs Rules," 1883, where any article is included in any of the classes 1 to 12 (see 3rd Schedule), such article must be marked with the abbreviation "Rd.," and the number appearing on the certificate of registration, and if such article is included in the classes 13 or 14 of the same schedule it must be marked with the abbreviation "Regd."

The 48th section of the same Act describes the procedure to be adopted by applicants for registration, and the 101st section authorises the Board of Trade to make rules inter alia for classifying goods, and generally for regulating the business of the patent office where such designs are for the future to be registered. These rules which are cited as the "Designs Rules, 1883," are given in Appendix B, post.

Where the registration of a design under secs. 4 and 15 of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 100, consisted in leaving with the registrar an entire shawl, with an intimation that it was to be registered in connection with class 8 (now class 14), it was held that this was not a sufficient registration (Norton v. Nicholls, 5 Jur. (N.S.) 1203) as no information was afforded of the nature of the plaintiff's claim (see 21 & 22 Vict. c. 70, s. 5, now repealed (46 & 47 Vict. c. 57) Holdsworth v. McCrea, 16 W. R. 220).

It was absolutely essential under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 100, that the patterns when published should have the letters "Rd." and the proper number, marked thereon or affixed thereto, as provided by section 4 of that Act, otherwise the proprietor would have had no protection against piracy, even though the sale had taken place abroad (Heywood v. Potter, 1 E. & B. 430, and see 21 & 22 Vict. c. 70, s. 4, Sarazin v. Hamel, 32 Beav. 151, 32 L. J. Ch. 380), and so in a case under
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6 & 7 Vict. c. 65, where the plaintiff had registered the
design of an improved chair, and was shown to have
subsequently sold chairs of a similar kind without having
the word "Registered" and the date of registration
notified on such articles, as was provided by section 3 of
the Act, it was held that he was precluded from taking
proceedings to restrain infringement (Pierce v. Worth, 18
L. T. (N. S.) 710).

As we have already seen, the 51st section of the new
Act provides that the proprietor of the design shall cause
each article to which it has been applied to be marked
with the abbreviations "Rd." or "Regd.,” denoting that
the design is registered, and if he fails to do so the copy-
right in the design will cease, unless the proprietor shows
that he took all proper steps to ensure the marking of the
article (see the “Designs Rules, 1883,” rule 32). It would
not, however, seem to be necessary to allege in the state-
ment of claim, that the requirement of the Act has been
complied with (Surazin v. Humel, 32 Beav. 145, 32 L. J.
(Ch.) 378).

Where the registration took place by sample, under 21
& 22 Vict. c. 70, it would appear that in order to establish
a charge of piracy, it must have been shown that the
design had been appropriated either entirely or with the
exception of unimportant variations (Thom v. Syddall,
20 W. R. 291). Under the new Act an applicant for
registration may, instead of furnishing to the comptroller,
drawings, photographs, or tracings of the design, supply
exact representations or specimens thereof (s. 48, Rule 9),
and where this is done, the law with respect to registra-
tion by sample will subsist as before the Act, so far indeed
as it is not altered by express words; consequently where
the design is reproduced in an apparently though not
actually identical form, this will amount to such an in-
fringement as the Courts will restrain (Holdsworth v.
McCrea, L. R. 2 H. L. 380); if, however, part only of the
design be used in combination with other materials, there
will be no infringement (ibid. and see McCrea v. Hold-
sworth, L. R. 6 Ch. App. 418), for where a design consists
of different parts, protection is afforded to the design as a
whole, and not to the parts taken separately (Holdsworth
v. McCrea, supra), since "it must be considered that
the protection of the statute is invoked for the entire
thing that appears upon the register, and is applicable to
nothing but an exact copy of the thing so registered" (ibid.
388, per Lord Westbury).

A person registering by sample, which would certainly
seem to be the more convenient method (see sec. 50, sub-
sec. 2), should therefore always file now, as heretofore, a
written description, minutely describing the component
parts of his design, and stating which parts of it are new
and which old (see Thom v. Syddall, 20 W. R. 291), and
in case of a combination, care should be taken that the
design is registered as one design only, and not as a mul-
tiplicity of designs (Norton v. Nicholls, 5 Jur. (N. S.)
1203, 1205).

The appointment of the comptroller-general and exami-
ners is provided for by section 83, and it is further pro-
vided that during the existence of copyright in a design,
the design shall not be open to inspection except by the
proprietor, or a person authorised in writing by the pro-
prietor, or a person authorised by the comptroller or by
the Court, and furnishing such information as may enable
the comptroller to identify the design, nor except in the
presence of the comptroller, or of an officer acting under
him, nor except on payment of the prescribed fee; and
the person making the inspection shall not be entitled
to take any copy of the design or any part thereof.
When the copyright in a design has ceased, the design
shall be open to inspection, and copies thereof may be
taken by any person on payment of the prescribed fee
(s. 52, Rule 33).

By 13 & 14 Vict. c. 104, certain designs might have been registered provisionally for one year, but this Act is repealed, and no provisional registration is now provided for.

Dramatic compositions are as to their conception either original, or they are founded upon matter already subsisting and contained in some previous work, whether published or otherwise: the right of copy in such a composition is quite distinct from that exclusive right of representation called indifferently playright, acting, or stage right.

It is a principle both of English and American law that a copyright novel may be dramatized for the stage by any one capable of the task, even although he may have received no permission to do so from the author of the novel (Reade v. Conquest, 9 C. B. (N. S.) 755; ibid. 470; 9 W. R. 434; Tinsley v. Lacy, 1 Hem. & M. 747; Boucicault v. Fox, 5 Blatchf. 67 (Amer.)); a publication in print would, however, be a clear infringement (Tinsley v. Lacy, supra), the test of piracy in this event being whether a material part of the novel had been taken.

The statute 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15, as extended by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 20, enacts in effect, that the author of, inter alia, any dramatic piece, whether published or not, shall have as his property the sole liberty of representing it or causing it to be represented at any place of dramatic entertainment, for the time therein specified, and therefore if the novel or work which is dramatized can itself be regarded in the light of a dramatic production, then and in this case a public performance of another dramatic production founded on such work would seem to be a violation of copyright, and against the express words of the Acts referred to.
Again, if a person should publish a novel, any one may dramatize it, but if a drama is composed before the novel, a subsequent dramatization of the novel would indirectly amount to a copy of the drama, or at any rate to an infringement thereof; consequently an author who wishes to preserve the exclusive right of dramatizing his novel should first publish the drama and afterwards the novel (see Reade v. Conquest, 9 C. B. (N. S.) 755, 11 ibid. 470; 9 W. R. 484; Toole v. Young, L. R., 9 Q. B. 523).

As a corollary to this proposition it is submitted, that whether the drama be actually published or not is a matter of indifference, so long as it is actually in manuscript before the publication of the novel, and this because the author would have a common law right (and now a statutory right, 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15, s. 1) in his drama, and any one who endeavoured to make use of it contrary to his wishes would be restrained on ordinary principles of law (Bouicault v. Fox, 5 Blatch. 97 (Amer.) per Shipman, J.). Acting a play was however held to be no publication under the statute of Anne (Coleman v. Wuthen, 5 T. R. 245. Where a person in adapting a novel for the stage, ignorantly copies the words of a drama upon which the novel is founded he will be restrained (Reade v. Lacy, 1 J. & H. 524, and see Lee v. Simpson, 3 C. B. 871).

The policy of the law in permitting the unauthorised dramatization of novels has been much questioned, while the successive argumentative steps used to justify such a policy, can hardly be looked upon as satisfactory. For instance, it has been conclusively settled that although a dramatic composition may be faulty in its construction and bad in detail, yet although it be improved in these respects to such an extent as to amount practically to a fresh production, yet there is no title in the improved
work (see Levy v. Rutley, L. R. 6 C. P. 523; Shelley v. Ross, ibid. 581), and this although the novel upon which the original and defective drama was founded was common property. It is however quite possible that a second dramatization of a novel may amount to an infringement thereof, as for instance where the novel can fairly be regarded as a dramatic production, and in this case, where the copyright in the novel, and in the first dramatization, are in different hands, the proper person to sue would, it is thought, be the owner of the first dramatization and not the owner of the novel. The truth appears to be that an ordinary literary production and a dramatization, are looked upon as two totally distinct species of property.

By 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15, it is provided that the author of any tragedy, comedy, play, opera, farce, or any other dramatic piece or entertainment, composed, and not printed and published by the author thereof or his assignee, or which hereafter shall be composed, and not so printed or published, shall have as his own property the sole liberty of representing, or causing to be represented, at any place of dramatic entertainment, any such production as aforesaid, and shall be deemed and taken to be the proprietor thereof; and that the author of any such production, printed and published within ten years before the passing of the Act by the author thereof or his assignee, or at any time after the passing of the Act shall, until the end of twenty-eight years from the day of the first publication, and also if the author or authors, or the survivor of the authors, shall be living at the end of that period, during the residue of his natural life, have as his own property the sole liberty of representing, or causing to be represented, the same at any such place of dramatic entertainment as aforesaid, and shall be deemed and taken to be the proprietor thereof (s. 1). It is further enacted by the 2nd section of the Act
that if any person shall, contrary to the intent of the Act, or right of the author or his assignee, represent or cause to be represented, without the consent in writing of the author or other proprietor first had and obtained, at any place of dramatic entertainment, any such production or any part thereof as aforesaid, he shall be liable to a penalty of forty shillings for each and every representation, or to the full amount of the benefit or advantage arising from such representation, or the injury or loss sustained by the plaintiff therefrom, whichever shall be the greater damages, together with double costs of suit. (Double costs taken away by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 97, s. 2; and see 45 & 46 Vict. c. 40, s. 4).

The provisions of this Act are extended by the 20th section of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, to the representation or performance of any musical composition, and it is enacted that the sole liberty of representing or performing, or causing or permitting to be represented or performed, any dramatic piece or musical composition, shall endure and be the property of the author thereof, and his assigns, for the term in the Act provided for the duration of copyright in books: and the provisions in the Act contained in respect of the property of such copyright, and of registering the same, shall apply to the liberty of representing or performing any dramatic piece or musical composition, save and except that the first public representation or performance of any dramatic piece or musical composition shall be deemed equivalent in the construction of the Act to the first publication of any book. By 45 & 46 Vict. c. 40, The Copyright (Musical Compositions) Act, 1882, it is provided, that the proprietor of the copyright in any musical composition first published after the passing of the Act, or his assignee, who shall be entitled to and be desirous of retaining in his own hands exclusively, the right of public representation or performance of the same, shall print or cause to be
of copyright.

printed upon the title page of every published copy of such musical composition a notice to the effect that the right of public representation or performance is reserved (s. 1). In case, after the passing of the Act, the right of public representation or performance of, and copyright in, any musical composition shall be or become vested before publication of any copy thereof in different owners (see Chappell v. Boosey, 51 L. J. Ch. 625; 46 L. T. Rep. N. S. 854), then, if the owner of the right of public representation or performance shall desire to retain the same, he shall, before any such publication of any copy of such musical composition, give to the owner of the copyright therein notice in writing requiring him to print upon every copy of such musical composition a notice to the effect that the right of public representation or performance is reserved; but in case the right of public representation or performance of, and the copyright in, any musical composition shall, after publication of any copy thereof, subsequently to the passing of the Act, first become vested in different owners, and such notice as aforesaid shall have been duly printed on all copies published after the passing of the Act previously to such vesting, then, if the owner of the right of performance and representation shall desire to retain the same, he shall, before the publication of any further copies of such musical composition, give notice in writing to the person in whom copyright shall be then vested, requiring him to print such notice as aforesaid on every copy of such musical composition to be thereafter published (s. 2). The following section imposes a penalty of £20 on the owner of the copyright, if he neglects or fails to print legibly or conspicuously upon every copy of the composition published by him, such note or memorandum as aforesaid. The penalty may be recovered in any court of competent jurisdiction (s. 3).

Notwithstanding the provisions contained in the 2nd
section of 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15, relating to the recovery of costs (see ante), it is provided that the costs of any action or proceedings for penalties or damages in respect of the unauthorised representation or performance of any musical composition published before the passing of the Act shall, in cases in which the plaintiff shall not recover more than 40s. as penalty or damages, be in the discretion of the court or judge before whom such action or proceeding shall be tried (s. 4).

The right of publicly representing a dramatic piece or musical composition is totally distinct from the right of copy, (Chappell v. Boosey, 51 L. J. (N.S.) Ch. 625); but in cases where a dramatic composition is printed as an ordinary book, the rules of law are the same as those governing any other literary work. Where however a play is acted, so as to amount to a visible representation of the subject-matter of the composition, there, whether the composition be published or not, the rights of representation vested in the author are exclusive (Boucicault v. Chatterton, 5 Ch. D. 270, per Malins, V.-C.), provided the first representation takes place in the United Kingdom (Boucicault v. Delafield, 1 Hem. & M. 597; Boucicault v. Chatterton, supra).

The first point calculated to strike the mind in attempting an interpretation of the 1st section of 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15, is a palpable defect in the form of words by which the sole right of representation, is given to the author of any tragedy, comedy, play, &c., "not printed and published," for no time is mentioned during which the enjoyment of such a right shall continue, consequently, a question arises, whether the owner of such a production, may not have a perpetual and exclusive right of representation; for although it is true that the copyright in a book is generally supposed to be lost at common law by a publication in print, and that by analogy, a common law right to perform
a play, may also be lost after it has once been publicly performed, and that as a consequence the unpublished manuscript would then become published, yet it would not, as in the words of the statute, be "printed and published," and so the author may perhaps, by conforming to the conditions upon which protection is granted and by avoiding printing, obtain a perpetual and exclusive right of representation. It is also true that the 20th section of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45 extends the term of protection granted by the statute of Will. IV., but it is submitted that the section only applies to plays which have been printed. The statute of William clearly recognised two distinct rights of representation, one where the play has been "printed and published," and the other where it has not been "printed and published," and in the latter case the author's rights are perpetual. The Act 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, "extends" the term (the perpetual term), which is of course absurd.

It is, moreover, by no means admitted that the public performance of an unpublished manuscript play, is itself a publication of the manuscript, notwithstanding s. 20 of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, but as there are excellent reasons for assuming the contrary to be the case, the above argument becomes so much the stronger. (See Coleman v. Wathen, 5 T. R. 245; Murray v. Elliston, 5 B. & Ald. 657; Morris v. Kelly, 1 Jac. & W. 481.)

A second point to which reference may here conveniently be made, is the construction of the words occurring in the 20th section of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, as follows: "and the provisions hereinbefore enacted in respect of the property of such copyright, and of registering the same, shall apply to the liberty of representing or performing any dramatic piece or musical composition." Now under section 2 of the same Act there is a wide difference between a "book" and a "dramatic piece," and
section 24 has reference only to the registration of any "book."

It is not denied that a "dramatic piece" may under certain circumstances be a "book," but in order to become one, it must clearly be treated as such, that is to say, printed and published (see Russell v. Smith, 12 Q. B. 217; Clark v. Bishop, 25 L. T. (N. S.) 911). A dramatic piece, therefore, which is not a "book," need not be registered under the 24th section of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, notwithstanding the apparently plain words of the 20th section above referred to. It consequently follows that in order to preserve the right of representation, it is necessary either to keep the composition in manuscript, or to print and register it as a book.

Assuming a case in which a public representation has preceded the publication in print, from what date will the author's copyright commence to run?

If the first representation should be in a foreign country, this is a "publication" within the meaning of the International Copyright Act, 7 Vict. c. 12, s. 19, and the author loses his right of exclusive representation here, unless, indeed, he can shelter himself under the Act (Boucicault v. Delofield, 1 Hem. & M. 597; Boucicault v. Chatterton, 5 Ch. D. 207). And the same result would clearly follow if the publication took place in print abroad, and that whether any convention existed between this and the foreign country or not. In these cases the common law rights of copy and of representation are gone in favour of the public, for copyright and stage right are supposed as a rule to be co-existent.

Where a musical or dramatic composition is, in the first instance, printed and published in this country, it must be properly registered, or the author's right of copy, properly so called, will be gone, but this will not in any way interfere with the acting right, which is a separate and distinct
species of property altogether. (See Chappell v. Boosey, 21 Ch. Div. 232; 51 L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 625.)

Taking this statement of the law as correct, let us now assume that the representation precedes the publication in print: from what time will the author's right under these circumstances, commence to run? It is conceded that his copyright will date from the publication in print, and that this cannot be defeated by any previous public performance of the play, unless indeed it be under 7 Vict. c. 12, s. 19 (see D'Almaine v. Boosey, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 288, 299; Clark v. Bishop, 25 L. T. (N. S.) 908; Bouicault v. Delasfield, 1 Hem. & M. 597). A dramatist may therefore enjoy the exclusive right of representing his drama, and on his publishing the words of it in print, he will secure the copyright in the "book" from the date of the publication of such "book." The further question now arises, from what date does his exclusive right of representation commence to run. If from the date of the first representation (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 20), then he will have a copyright in a drama, which he may have no exclusive right of representing, a contingency productive of a crop of litigation of the most delicate and intricate nature, while, if the exclusive right of representation dates from the time of publication in print, it is possible, and indeed probable, that playwright which may have run out long before, would be revived on such publication taking place.

To assume an instance, suppose a manuscript play is first represented abroad, and that the author then prints and registers the work as a book in England; here the exclusive right of representation is gone (Bouicault v. Chatterton, 5 Ch. D. 281, per Brett, L. J.), but the literary copyright remains; in other words, the author has the exclusive right of selling copies of the play, for the period allowed by the Act, without however any exclusive right of performance, a state of things anomalous in the extreme, for
the value of a play lies in its suitability for purposes of representation, at least this is so in the vast majority of instances.

On the other hand, assume that the stage right is secure, and that the copyright is subsequently lost for non-compliance with the statutory requisites, in this instance, would the owner of the stage right have the power to prevent the performance of a play which anyone was at liberty to publish? (See Boosey v. Fairlie, 7 Ch. D. 309).

The solution of these questions would appear to depend upon the reasonable probability that copyright and stage right are correlative terms, and that both are governed by precisely the same principles, save and except where some third question arises, and then the stage right is subordinate to the copyright. So far as the infringement of these several rights is concerned, while statutory copyright is infringed by publication in print and not by any mere oral use of the composition (but see Wall v. Taylor, Wall v. Martin, 52 L. J. Rep. Q. B. 558, 11 Q. B. D. 102), playright or stage right is invaded by performing the dramatic piece, but not by printing it or selling printed copies (Chappell v. Boosey, 51 L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 625).

It has never been expressly decided whether the author of a dramatic piece has the right to restrain another from singing in public the melody with other words, but it is apprehended that as a composition of the kind is entitled to protection as a whole, and as a whole includes every component part thereof, of which the melody is clearly one, the author would be entitled to claim an injunction.

These are some of the questions liable to arise in England at any moment; in America, however, stage right can only be secured as an incident of copyright, and cannot exist without it (see Revised Statutes, U. S. s. 4952, s. 4966; Boucicault v. Hart, 13 Blatchf. 47; Do. v. Fox, 5 Blatchf. 87; Shook v. Rankin, 6 Biss. 477).
In connection with the many difficult questions arising from a study of the law, so far as it affects the copyright in dramatic publications, and the analogous but distinct right of representation, it may be questioned to what extent a common law right of copy can subsist in a manuscript play which has been acted in public.

The exclusive right of representing a manuscript play is provided for by 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15, and it would seem to be doubtful whether the common law right of property in such manuscript has not gone on the first representation in public.

In Bouicault v. Delafield, 1 Henn. & M. 597; Bouicault v. Chatterton, 5 Ch. D. 267, it was decided that where an English author first represents his play abroad and in a country with which no convention exists, he is deprived of his exclusive right of representation here, by virtue of the statute 7 & 8 Vict. c. 12. In these cases the court did not touch the question whether subsequent copyright in this country would have revived the right of representation, nor did the plaintiff's counsel suggest (as he might have done) that a common law right of representation existed independently of the right provided by statute. In America it is clear that the mere representation of a play does not interfere with the common law rights of the owner. (See Palmer v. De Witt, 23 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 823.)

With respect to the common law right of copy (if any) subsisting in books after publication, reference must be made to the decision of the House of Lords in Donaldson v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408, a case previously referred to on several occasions. Assuming, however, for the moment that no common law right exists in a manuscript play after a public performance or representation, then such right is equally gone, whether the proprietor conduct the performance himself, or whether he merely acquiesce in its
unlicensed use. (See Tinsley v. Lacy, 1 Hem. & M. 747; Correspondent Newspaper Co. v. Saunders, 12 L. T. (N. S.) 540; Boucicault v. Wood, 2 Biss. 34; Keene v. Clarke, 5 Rob. (N. Y.) 70). Such acquiescence of course presupposing knowledge on the part of the proprietor (Keene v. Clarke, supra).

As a matter of fact, however, the question whether an owner's common law rights in a manuscript are or are not lost by the public performance of the manuscript play, is involved in obscurity. The common law itself does not cease to protect any work of intellectual production merely because it has been published, it is the statute if anything that destroys the common law right, and hence if such right is destroyed, it must be by the operation of some statute or not at all. By 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15, the author of a dramatic piece, whether in manuscript or otherwise, has the exclusive right of representation, and by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 20, it is provided that the first public representation or performance of any dramatic piece or musical composition, shall be deemed equivalent "in the construction of this Act" to the first publication of a book. It would appear, therefore, that statutory playright must be secured by a conformity to the requirements of these Acts, and that if this is not done, the playright at any rate will become publici juris. But how is the manuscript affected? Copyright and playright are two distinct subjects of property (Chappell v. Boosey, 51 L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 625), and under 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15, the author's right of performance is perpetual in those cases in which the manuscript is not printed and published; it is submitted that the statute 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 20, does not apply to manuscript plays, and further, that so long as the author does not cause them to be printed and published he has a perpetual right of representation and a perpetual right of copy also.
A dramatic composition published in print becomes a "book," and the author's common law right of copy will be dealt with as in other and similar cases where books are concerned; the author cannot, however, be deprived of his common law rights unless the publication occurred with his consent, express or implied (Boucicault v. Wood, 2 Biss. 84 (Amer.)), and he who alleges consent must prove it (ibid.).

There would even yet appear to be a lingering belief in the minds of the public, that the unauthorised performance of a play, provided the dialogue has been committed to memory by the actors and not taken down in writing, is no infringement of the exclusive right of representation vested in the author or his assigns, that, in other words, a person is justified in publicly performing a play, even where the exclusive right of representation is vested in another, provided he can carry off the dialogue in his memory. No question of the kind has ever yet arisen in England, although in one case Mr. Justice Buller is reported to have observed: "Reporting anything from memory can never be a publication within the statute. Some instances of strength of memory are very surprising; but the mere act of repeating such a performance cannot be left as evidence to the jury that the defendant had pirated the work itself" (Coleman v. Wathen, 5 T. R. 245).

In America the state of the several authorities on the subject leave the point at issue in doubt. In favour of the proposition that the unlicensed performance of a play committed to memory is lawful, the following cases would doubtless be quoted: Keene v. Wheatly, 9 Am. Law Reg. 33; Keene v. Clarke, 5 Rob. (N. Y.) 38; Crowe v. Aiken, 2 Biss. 208; Keene v. Kimball, 16 Gray, 545; Shook v. Rankin, 6 Biss. 477; to the contrary and against such a proposition: French v. Conolly, 2 N. Y. Weekly Dig. 197; Palmer v. De Witt, 2 Sweeney (N. Y.)
530; 47 N. Y. 532, and see Drone on Copyright, pp. 558—572.

"Dramatic piece." A "dramatic piece" as defined in the 2nd section of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45 "shall be construed to mean and include every tragedy, comedy, play, opera, farce, or other scenic, musical or dramatic entertainment," and the term has also frequently been the subject of judicial consideration. The 2nd section of 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15 imposes a penalty upon any person who shall "represent or cause to be represented, without the consent in writing of the author or other proprietor first had and obtained, at any place of dramatic entertainment" any such production, (that is to say, any tragedy, comedy, play, opera, farce, or any other dramatic piece or entertainment, s. 1) as aforesaid. The words of these statutes when considered as a whole, "comprehend any piece which could be called dramatic in its widest sense, any piece which on being presented by any performer to an audience, would produce the emotions which are the purpose of the regular drama, and which constitute the entertainment of the audience" (Russell v. Smith, 12 Q. B. 236, per Lord Denman).

"Pantomime." In an action for penalties under the statute of Will. IV. it was contended that pantomimes were not "dramatic entertainments" because they were not expressly mentioned, and further that the Act being penal was to be construed strictly. It was decided that an introduction to a pantomime, that is, the only written part of the entertainment, was within the Act (Lee v. Simpson, 3 C. B. 871; 11 Jur. 127; and see Russell v. Briant, 14 Jur. 201; 8 C. B. 830).

Scenic effects and spectacular representations are within the interpretation clause of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, and therefore where a person takes the "setting" or visible arrangement and incidental part of a scene, the property of which is in another, he will be restrained, even although the dialogue is quite different (Chatterton v. Cave, 10 C. P. 572;
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38 L. T. (N. S.) 255). And in all cases of colourable imitation, the crucial test, as in the case of books, is whether a material and substantial part of another’s production has been taken (ibid.), and this is a question for the jury (Planché v. Braham, 1 Jur. 823), who will be guided not so much by considerations of quantity as of value (Chatterton v. Court, 3 App. Cas. 480, per Lord Hatherley). Both in England and in America the question whether there has been any infringement is referable chiefly to considerations of common sense (Reade v. Conquest, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 470; Boosey v. Fairlie, 7 Ch. D. 301; Daly v. Palmer, 6 Blatchf. (Amer.) per Blatchford, J., 256; Martinetti v. Maguire, 1 Deady, (Amer.) 216), and as in the case of literary productions, a charge of piracy will be defeated, if the defendant clearly shows that his materials were derived from a common source.

A play which is common property may be adapted to the stage by the aid of scenery, dresses, music and accompaniments, and although there can of course be no property in the words, the production as a whole will be protected by the joint operation of the statutes 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15 and 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45 (Hatton v. Kean, 7 C. B. (N. S.) 268; 6 Jur. (N. S.) 226). On the other hand, it would appear that neither scenery, costumes, nor in fact any of the ordinary appointments of the theatre are essential to constitute a “dramatic piece” within the meaning of the statutes, for, where the plaintiff, who was the composer of a musical composition of a representative character, called “The Ship on Fire,” sang it with a pianoforte accompaniment, but without scenes or costumes, it was held that the performance was a “dramatic piece” within s. 20 of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45 (Russell v. Smith, 12 Jur. 723), even although there was only one actor (and see Russell v. Briant, 8 C. B. 836; Clark v. Bishop, 25 L. T. (N. S.) 908). It follows, therefore, that almost anything capable of repre-
sentation may be a "dramatic piece or entertainment," but until it is actually performed, recited, sung, or otherwise impressed on the feelings, no question of infringement can arise, save at the common law.

A dramatic musical composition, that is to say, a musical composition having dramatic incidents, though not necessarily dramatic accessories, was protected by a judicial interpretation of the words, "dramatic piece or entertainment" (3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15, Planche v. Braham, 1 Jur. 823); but now by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 2, the title "dramatic piece" is to extend inter alia to every "scenic, musical, or dramatic entertainment," and by the 20th section protection is afforded inter alia to every "musical composition," whether dramatic or otherwise.

It has lately been decided that to sing a musical composition in public, whether at a place of dramatic entertainment (3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15, s. 2) or otherwise, is an infringement of the rights of the proprietor (Wall v. Taylor; Wall v. Martin, 11 Q. B. D. 102, 52 L. J. (N. S.) Q. B. 558), for the right which is given by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 20, is not expressly confined to those cases in which the representation takes place at a place of dramatic entertainment, and the following section cannot be considered as incorporating the whole of 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15, because the circumstances stated in section 2 of the latter Act are omitted in such following section (ibid.).

Where however a copyright play was performed at a hospital, the admission being free, and the governors of such hospital paying all the expenses, it was held that the performers were not liable to the owners of the copyright, the place of performance not being a "place of dramatic entertainment" within the above Acts (Duck v. Bates, 49 L. T. (N. S.) 507; 32 W. R. 169).

"Part" of a dramatic piece, What is it

A song taken from an opera is clearly "part" of a dramatic piece within the meaning of 3 & 4 Will. IV. c.
15, s. 2, and if it is sung in a place of dramatic entertainment (but see Wall v. Taylor; Wall v. Martin, ante), an action for penalties will lie (Planché v. Braham, 1 Jur. 823); and an action will also lie for infringing copyright in a song consisting of new words and a new accompaniment written to an old air (Leader v. Purday, 7 C. B. 4).

And so the music of an opera written in scores for different instruments, may be adapted either by the composer, or by any third person having permission so to do (D'Almaine v. Boosey, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 280), for any single instrument, and a fresh subject of copyright will be created (Wood v. Boosey, L. R. 2 Q. B. 340, on app. L. R. 3 Q. B. 223; Boosey v. Fairlie, 7 Ch. Div. 301; and see Leader v. Purday, supra), for any substantially new arrangement or adaptation of an old piece of music is a proper subject of copyright (Wood v. Boosey, L. R. 2 Q. B. supra; Boosey v. Fairlie, supra; and see the American cases, Atwill v. Ferrett, 2 Blatchf. 39; Jullie v. Juques, 1 Id. 618; Reed v. Carusi, 8 Law Rep. O. S. (Amer.) 411).

A person who piratically publishes and sells a musical or other composition, cannot escape liability by proving that he had instructed his servants to inform purchasers that the song was not original (Chappell v. Davidson, 2 K. & J. 128; Sykes v. Sykes, 3 B. & C. 541), and it has been held that the publication of a piece of music, not for sale or hire, but by the gratuitous distribution of lithographed copies amongst the members of a musical society, is a publication for which the defendant is liable—as for an invasion of the property of the proprietor therein,—independently of the 15th section of the statute 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45 (Novello v. Sudlow, 12 C. B. 177).

It would seem to be doubtful whether the author of a dramatic piece can restrain the public representation of a fair abridgment of such piece (see Murray v. Ellison, 5 B. & Ald. 657).
The consent in writing "of the author or other first proprietor first had and obtained," and without which, the representation "at any place of dramatic entertainment" of any dramatic piece or entertainment is prohibited, under a penalty by the 2nd section of 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15, may be given by an agent, the secretary of the Dramatic Authors' Society, for instance (Morton v. Copeland, 16 C. B. 517; and see Fitzball v. Brooke, 2 Dow & Lown, 477; Shepherd v. Conquest, 25 L. J. (C. P.) 127), but the onus of proving such consent, and in fact any consent at all lies on the defendant (Morton v. Copeland, supra); and where the permission to play certain dramas amounted to a general permission to play all dramas composed by members of the Society, it was held that the license so given applied to the dramas that might be composed after the date of the license (ibid.). It has, however, been decided, that a person who wishes to represent a dramatic piece belonging to two or more persons jointly, must obtain the consent of all the owners, and in case this is not done, any single plaintiff, except the one who gave the consent, is entitled to recover his proportion of the penalty (Powell v. Head, 12 Ch. Div. 686).

The penalty provided by section 2 of 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15, is inflicted upon any person who shall represent or "cause to be represented" any such production as is therein mentioned. The expression "cause to be represented" may be explained by reference to a case decided under 10 Geo. II. c. 28, s. 2, an Act which imposed a penalty upon persons performing or "causing to be performed" certain plays, &c. In the case referred to it was held that proof of a person being the acting manager of a theatre, and that he paid the salary of and dismissed one of the performers, was sufficient to show that he caused the performance, and further, that if he caused the performance, it was not material whether he did so as the agent of
others or not (Parsons v. Chapman, 5 Car. & P. 33); on the other hand, it is not sufficient to show that the defendant supplied the platform furniture, &c., for a room which he had let for a general musical entertainment, and that he had sold a ticket and received the money at the door (Russell v. Briant, 14 Jur. 201), for it must be shown that the defendant himself, or his agent by his direction, has participated to some extent in the actual performance (ibid.). Again, where the proprietor of a theatre lets it for a term to an actor, and provides gas, music, scene shifters, and other essentials, upon the understanding that the gross profits are to be divided, this does not of itself make the proprietor responsible either as partner or otherwise for the wrongful representation of a dramatic piece by the actor (Lyons v. Knowles, 11 W. R. 266; 10 L. T. (N. S.) 876).

The remedies provided by the statute 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15, extended by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 21 (see Wall v. Taylor; Wall v. Martin, 11 Q. B. D. 102, 52 L. J. (N. S.) Q. B. 558), are the only remedies available for the protection of playright, and cannot be made applicable to the unlawful publication of a dramatic piece by printing, that is to say as a book, for if the infringement assumes this form, the injured party must proceed under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 15, by action on the case.

Where a building is used for the public representation, for profit, of a dramatic piece, it becomes ipso facto a place of dramatic entertainment within the meaning of s. 2 of 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15 (Russell v. Smith, 12 Jur. 725, per Lord Denman), even although it has never been used for such a purpose before, since the mere fact of performing a dramatic piece makes the place where it is performed a place of dramatic entertainment (Wall v. Taylor, 11 Q. B. D. 108, per Brett, M. R.); consequently the question whether a given place is or is not "a place of
dramatic entertainment" is not determined by reference to the circumstance whether or not a theatrical license has been taken out, but with regard to all the circumstances of the case, as for instance, whether any charge was made for admission and the like (see Duck v. Butes, 40 L. T. 507; 32 W. R. 169).

Where the performance is public, the defendant cannot escape the penalty, by showing that the audience were admitted free; this is only one element in the case, and not in itself absolute proof.

Furthermore, the plaintiff cannot contend that if the performance is dramatic in character, the place is consequently a place of dramatic entertainment, for according to this view of the case, the street where "Punch" is performed, or the place where a strictly private performance was held, would for the time being come within the Act (Russell v. Smith, 12 Q. B. 232, per Patteson, J.), nor can he contend that the phrases "place of public entertainment" and "place of dramatic entertainment" are identical (Wall v. Taylor; Wall v. Martin, 51 L. J. Q. B. 547). There is consequently no decision directly stating what is or is not a place of dramatic entertainment; but on the contrary, the opinion of Brett, M.R., in Wall v. Taylor, 11 Q. B. D. 108, and that of Patteson, J., in Russell v. Smith, supra, are diametrically opposed to each other, and leave the whole question in uncertainty and confusion.

Where a lecture is delivered on the express or implied understanding that it shall be received as a lecture simpliciter, and not for publishing purposes, there, the unauthorised delivery of such unpublished lecture will be restrained, on the ground of breach of trust or confidence (Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 1 Hall & Tw. 40). A person has no right to report, phonographically or otherwise, a lecture or other written discourse, which the author delivers
before a public audience, and which he desires again to use in like manner for his own profit, and consequently, although a student who attends a medical demonstration, may have a perfect right to remember as much of it as he can, and afterwards to use the information thus acquired in his own medical practice, or to communicate it to students or classes of his own, he would not be justified in committing the lecture to writing for the purpose of subsequent publication in print, or by oral delivery (Keene v. Kimball, 16 Gray (82 Mass.), per Hoar, J., 551 (Amer.), and see Bartlett v. Crittenden, 4 McLean (Amer.), 800).

So also any person who is present at a concert or opera, may play a tune which his ear has enabled him to catch, or sing a song which he may carry away in his memory, whether for his own entertainment or that of others, for compensation or gratuitously, but at the same time he would have no right to copy or publish the musical composition (Keene v. Kimball, 16 Gray (82 Mass.), 551, per Hoar, J., supra).

The Act 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 65, entitled “an Act for preventing the publication of lectures without consent,” c. 15. confers upon the author of any lecture, or the person to whom he hath sold or otherwise conveyed the copy thereof for certain purposes, the sole right of printing and publishing such lecture, and imposes a penalty upon persons who without leave “shall print or lithograph or otherwise copy and publish the same,” or who, “knowing the same to have been printed or copied and published without such consent, shall sell, publish, or expose to sale, or cause to be sold, published, or exposed to sale,” any such lecture.

By s. 2 the printer or publisher of a newspaper publishing a lecture without such leave, shall be deemed and taken to be a person printing and publishing as aforesaid, and by the 3rd section, persons allowed for certain fee and reward, or otherwise, to attend lectures, are not on
that account licensed to publish them. In order, however, to secure the benefits of the Act it is necessary that notice in writing of an intention to deliver the lecture should be given to two justices, living within five miles of the place where such lecture shall be delivered, two days at least before delivering the same. Exceptions are, however, made in favour of any university or public school or college, and of lectures by any individual in virtue of or according to any gift, endowment, or foundation (s. 5).

It will be observed that this statute applies only to printing, copying, publishing, and exposing for sale, and not to the oral repetition or delivery of the lecture. The common law remains to this extent, therefore, intact, while the statute itself is so little known to lecturers, that its protection is hardly ever sought in practice.
CHAPTER IV.

ON THE VESTING OF COPYRIGHT.

In addition to the question whether an act amounts in point of fact to an appropriation of the fruits of the labour of another, so as to constitute an infringement of his right of copy, the further enquiry necessarily arises, whether that right of copy is so exclusively vested in the person laying claim to it, as to enable him to prevent or to recover compensation for any infringement.

In order to acquire exclusive copyright, it is absolutely necessary that the first publication should take place within the United Kingdom, for if either a foreigner or a British subject originally publishes his production abroad, it is clear that he will have no copyright in this country, save such as he may acquire under the International Copyright Act (7 & 8 Vict. c. 12). In the event of no treaty existing to give effect to the Act in the particular instance, no copyright can subsist in this country (Boucicault v. Delafield, 1 Hem. & M. 602; 33 L. J. (Ch.) N. S. 38; and see Boucicault v. Chatterton, 5 Ch. D. 267).

The International Copyright Act (extended to paintings, drawings, and photographs, 25 & 26 Vict. c. 68, s. 12) enacts inter alia, that neither the author of any book, nor composer of any dramatic piece or musical composition, nor the inventor, designer, or engraver of any print, nor the maker of any article of sculpture, or of such other work of art as is previously mentioned in the Act, which shall after the first passing of the Act be first published out of Her Majesty’s dominions, shall have any copyright
therein respectively, or any exclusive right to the public representation or performance thereof, otherwise than such (if any) as he may become entitled to under the Act (s. 19).

By virtue of this section, if a foreigner, the author of a dramatic piece, has it originally represented abroad, he loses his claim to the exclusive right of representation here, unless he can bring himself within the saving provisions of the Act; and where Englishmen have their plays first represented abroad, they are by this statute placed on the same footing as foreigners; if they have them first represented in England they do not come under this statute at all; but their rights will be governed by 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15, and 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45 (Bouicacault v. Chatterton, 5 Ch. D. 281), for it is not possible to enjoy any rights conferred by these Acts, concurrently with those created by the International Copyright Act (Bouicacault v. Delafield, 1 Hem. & M. 602, per Wood, V.-C.).

Where a foreign author residing abroad, composes a work there, which he first publishes in this country, he himself being in his own country at the time of publication, he can acquire no copyright here, neither can a British subject to whom such work is assigned by the foreign author, gain any such right, but should an Englishman first publish his production in this country, or simultaneously in this country and abroad (Cocks v. Purday, 2 Car. & Kirw. 269, per Erle, J.; Routledge v. Low, L. R. 3 H. L. 100), he will be entitled to an exclusive right of copy, no matter where he may be residing at the time of publication, because he owes a natural allegiance which he cannot shake off (Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. Cas. 985, per Lord St. Leonards). This however does not apply to the foreigner, who owes no allegiance to this country, and to entitle his works to protection, it has been held that he must be resident within the British dominions at the time of publication in the United Kingdom (Jefferys
v. Boosey, 4 H. L. Cas. 815; Routledge v. Low, L. R. 3 H. L. 100; and see also Low v. Ward, L. R. 6 Eq. 415; Bouicault v. Delasfield, 1 H. & M. 597).

It is not material where the work is composed, nor that the foreigner entered the British dominions solely for the purpose of acquiring copyright, nor that he did not remain there, either "before" or "after," so long as he remained "at" the time of publication. He cannot, however, be present by deputy, but must actually go in his proper person. The extent of the British dominions is defined by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 2. It is consequently undeniable that statutory copyright commences with publication, and if "at" that time a foreigner is not actually within some part of the British dominions, he is not considered to be a person whom the Copyright Acts meant to protect (Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. Cas. 815; Novello v. James, 5 De G. M. & G. 876; and see Chappell v. Purday, 14 Mecc. & W. 318; Boosey v. Purday, 4 Ex. Rep. 145). This statement of the law is directly opposed to that propounded in several previous cases, notably Cocks v. Purday, 5 C. B. 860, and Boosey v. Davidson, 13 Q. B. 257, but both these, and others to a similar effect, cannot now be considered any authority on the subject.

The judgment in Jefferys v. Boosey (supra), although followed in Novello v. James (supra), was not unanimous, and has since been doubted (Routledge v. Low, L. R. 3 H. L. 118, per Lords Cairns and Westbury), and as a matter of argument, although the reasons which prompt the executive to insist upon a first publication in this country are perfectly intelligible, yet it is not so easy to understand why the courts should, in addition, insist upon a foreigner being resident within certain circumscribed limits.

If the object of the Copyright Acts is "to afford greater encouragement to the production of literary works of
lasting benefit to the world" (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 1), and if this proposition should have an universal application, then it is not material where an author resides, but if on the contrary the application is only particular, that is to say, for the benefit and encouragement of authors first publishing in the United Kingdom, what can it matter to us where such author resides, provided we obtain the benefit of the first publication of his work?

It must also be observed that the judgments in *Jefferys v. Boosey* are chiefly based upon a construction of the word "author," as used in the preamble to the Statute of Anne (8 Anne, c. 10), and as the construction of this word might be different under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, where it is again used, it is quite possible that the decision might not at the present day be followed, for in all the Copyright Acts at present in force, there is nothing to restrict the term "author" to British subjects, nor to make any distinction between them and foreigners. "It is impossible not to see that the *ratio decidendii* in *Jefferys v. Boosey*, proceeded mainly, if not exclusively, on the wording of the preamble of the Statute of Anne, and on a consideration of the general character and scope of the legislation of Great Britain at that period. The present statute has repealed that Act, and professes to aim at affording greater encouragement to the production of literary works of lasting benefit to the world. And accepting the decision of this house, as to the construction of the Statute of Anne, it is, I think, impossible not to see that the present statute would be incompatible with a policy so narrow as that expressed in the Statute of Anne" (*Routledge v. Low*, L. R. 3 H. L. 111, *per* Cairns, L. C.).

There is nothing in the English statutes to show an intention to extend the privilege of copyright to publications printed abroad, and it is probable therefore that such copyright is confined to books actually printed in this

So also it is plain that the object of the legislature was to protect prints and engravings, designed, engraved, etched, or worked in Great Britain, and not those which were designed, engraved, etched, or worked abroad, and only published in Great Britain (*Page v. Townsend*, 5 Sim. 404, *per* Shadwell, V.-C.).

Sculpture models and casts are governed by 54 Geo. III. *In sculp-*
c. 56, and prints and engravings by 8 Geo. II. c. 13; 7 Geo. III. c. 38; 17 Geo. III. c. 57; and in none of those statutes is any distinction made between native and foreign authors.

The author of paintings, drawings, and photographs *In paint-*
must, however, either be a British subject, or he must be *ings,draw-*
resident within the dominions of the Crown at the time of *ings, and*
publication (see 25 & 26 Vict. c. 68, s. 1).

Concerning prints and engravings it has been already *In en-*
mentioned that the object of the legislature is "to protect *gravings.*
those works which were designed, engraved, etched, or worked in Great Britain," and not merely those which were struck off abroad and only published here (*Page v. Townsend*, *supra*; and refer to *Clementi v. Walker*, *supra*; *Jefferys v. Boosey*, 4 H. L. Cas. 983, 986, *per* Lord St. Leonards).

From what has been said it will appear that a foreign author, in order to secure copyright in his production in this country, must publish the work in the United Kingdom in the first instance; that is to say, there must be no prior publication elsewhere, and in addition to this essential, he must, at the time of publication, be resident within the British dominions. Subject, however, to these qualifications, an alien has at common law an equal right with a British subject to the protection of his copyright interests (*Calvin's Case*, 7 Coke, 17a; 33 Vict. c. 14, s. 2).
By the revised statutes of the United States (4952) it is provided, that an exclusive right of copy can only be granted in America, to such author as shall be a "citizen of the United States, or resident therein;" and this restriction is applicable to "proprietors" as well as "authors, inventors, or designers" of any "book, map, chart, dramatic or musical composition, engraving, cut, print or photograph, or negative thereof, or of a painting, drawing, chromo, statue, statuary, and of models or designs intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts."

If a foreign author should assign his property in a production to a citizen of the United States, or to some one resident there, it would consequently be protected under this section, and when such foreign author is himself a resident, a similar rule would apply (Boucicault v. Wood, 2 Biss. (Amer.) 34, and see Rev. Stat. 4971.

The term "resident" has here, however, a very different meaning to that put upon it in the judgment of the House of Lords (Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. Cas. 815, ante, p. 137), for the question whether an author is or is not resident in the United States at the time of publication, does not depend upon mere actual presence for a limited period of one or two days, it having been decided that no one can be considered a resident within the meaning of the Rev. Stat. 4971 (supra), unless he has taken up his abode in the United States with the intention of making that country his place of permanent residence. The intention is to be gathered from the acts of the party himself, and while, on the one hand, a subsequent change of intent will not deprive the author of a right of copy already secured, on the other, a person who proceeds to the United States with the intention of staying temporarily, is a mere sojourner only, and this although he may actually stay there many years. (Drone on Copyright, 233.) A resident in the United States may, however, be
a boarder or lodger in the house of another (Boucicault v. Wood, 2 Biss. (Amer.) 38, per Drummond J.).

Where the author is an American citizen, it is immaterial in what part of the world he resides, or where his production was executed or completed, so long indeed as it is first published within the dominions of the Republic.

When a work is the joint production of an American citizen and of a foreign author, copyright will vest in that part of it of which the former is the author; if, however, that part cannot be identified, it will not vest at all (Drone, 232).

As the statute confers a right of copy upon "any citizen of the United States, or resident therein," or upon "the executors, administrators, or assignes" of such person, and as this right may also be held by "proprietors" as well as by "authors, inventors, and designers," it is conceived that an assignee must also be a citizen of the United States, or resident therein (Rev. Stat. 4952).

When the name of the author or composer of an intellectual production has not been properly registered, by reason of some other person having, in point of fact, been the author or composer, this fact should be pleaded in bar to any action for infringement (Wood v. Boosey, L. R. 3 Q. B. 223); for although a person may well be the proprietor of a production which he never composed, this does not justify him in registering himself either as author or composer.

It has been decided that a person may be the author of a work, even although he has obtained the assistance of others to get up the details (Hatton v. Kean, 7 C. B. (N. S.) 281, and see Burfield v. Nicholson, 2 Sim. & Stu. 1; Hazlitt v. Templeman, 13 L. T. (N. S.) 593; Stannard v. Harrison, 24 L. T. (N. S.) 570), and in this respect the American Law is the same (Heine v. Appleton,
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4 Blatchf. 125; Little v. Gould, 2 Blatchf. 165; Laurence v. Dana, 4 Cliff. 1; Commonwealth v. Desilver, 3 Phila. (Pa.) 31.

And so where a person composes music to accompany a drama, the whole becomes the property of the owner of the latter (Wallerstein v. Herbst, 16 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 453, following Hatton v. Keun, 7 C. B. (N. S.) 208), although where an employer merely suggests the subject, and leaves the practical details to be carried out by another person, the rule is different (Shepherd v. Conquest, 17 C. B. 445, and see Levy v. Rutley, L. R. 6 C. P. 523). The property in a translation is in the translator, and a similar remark applies to dramatizations, abridgments, compilations, and other works of a similar nature. The arrangement of the full score of an opera for the pianoforte, is the property of the adaptor and not of the composer of the full score (Wood v. Boosey, L. R. 3 Q. B. 223; Boosey v. Fairlie, 7 Ch. D. 301).

The author of a photograph is he who takes the negative and arranges the objects to be represented, and not the person who employed him to do so (Nottage v. Jackson, 11 Q. B. D. 627; 52 L. J. Q. B. 760).

By the 18th sect. of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, the proprietor of any periodical work, or work published in a series, or of any book, who has employed another to prepare articles, on the terms that the copyright therein shall belong to him, is accordingly entitled to such copyright, and is, so far as his rights and interests are concerned, regarded as the actual author thereof. There is, however, in the same statute, a proviso that the author may by contract, either express or implied, reserve to himself the right to publish his production in a separate form.

The primary rule under this section is that the copyright remains in the author, unless he has expressly
(Bishop of Hereford v. Griffin, 10 Sim. 100; Mayhew v. Maxwell, 1 Johns. & H. 312) or implicitly (Smith v. Johnson, 4 Giff. 632; Sweet v. Benning, 10 C. B. 484) disposed of it. It is consequently a matter of evidence in each particular case whether the proprietor of the periodical is entitled to publish the article in a separate form or not (Sweet v. Benning, supra), and in the absence of such evidence he has no such right.

Irrespective of the Act, there is no doubt at all but that a person who employs another for reward, to compose a work, is himself entitled to the copyright (Grieve v. Newman, L. R. 19 Eq. 623) either by virtue of an express agreement, or by reason of a mutual but tacit understanding to that effect. (Sweet v. Shaw, 3 Jur. 217.) Consequently if an author be regularly employed by a publisher, or be expressly employed to write a certain article, the publisher becomes primâ facie the owner of the copyright (Sweet v. Benning, 16 C. B. 459). The question as to what amounts to a separate publication is discussed in Smith v. Johnson, 4 Giff. 632, and Mayhew v. Maxwell, 1 Johns. & H. 312.

In the case of essays or articles, forming part of and first published in reviews, magazines, or other periodical works of a like nature, the right of publishing the same reverts to the author after the period of twenty-eight years from the first publication, for the remainder of the term given by the Act (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 18); and it would appear that the only persons the section can affect, are, first, publishers or other persons who shall "project, conduct, and carry on, or be the proprietors of any encyclopædia, review, magazine, periodical work, or work published in a series of books or parts, or any book whatsoever;" and, secondly, "the authors of essays, articles, or portions forming part of and first published in reviews, magazines, or other periodical works of a like nature." In
those cases, therefore, which do not come within the express words of the section, there will be no reverter to the author at the end of the twenty-eight years, but the copyright, either limited or absolute, as the case may be, will continue in the proprietor of the periodical during the entire statutory term. The point whether the section does or does not cover any particular case is by no means unlikely to arise; and if it should do so, it will be the policy of the law to construe the words of such section in the strictest possible manner (Richardson v. Gilbert, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 330; 15 Jur. 389).

The words "or any book whatsoever" are also extremely ambiguous, and may at any moment give rise to an interesting discussion.

Without regard to s. 18 of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, although the mere fact of employment for reward, is prima facie sufficient to make the copyright in the production the property of the employer on the basis of an implied contract to that effect (Hutton v. Kean, 7 C. B. (N. S.) 268; Wullerstein v. Herbert, 16 L. T. (N. S.) 453; 15 W. R. 838); still it is submitted that such employer would have no right to use it, save and except for the purpose for which it was originally composed. Again, it is only on the basis of an agreement, express or implied, that the copyright can vest in the employer, for the property is in the author unless he has consented to part with it (Bishop of Hereford v. Griffin, 16 Sim. 190).

"The title to literary property is in the author whose intellect has given birth to the thoughts and wrought them into the composition, unless he has transferred that title by contract, to another" (Boucicault v. Fox, 5 Blatchf. 95). Subject to this it is conceded that when a person is employed by another to compose for instance, certain music on occasion, the employer has an equitable right of copy in the production, although in some cases
for a limited time only, and under such circumstances as to amount to a mere license (Shepherd v. Conquest, 17 C. B. 427; Levy v. Rutley, L. R. 6 C. P. 523; Boucicault v. Fox, 5 Blatchf. (Amer.) 87). But where a person composes a literary production for his employer, without the scope of his agreement with the latter, it would by analogy seem to be clear, that he does not thereby part with his right of copy. It has been decided in America, that where an author prepares a fresh edition of a work, the copyright of which is vested in another person, and such person agrees to make no use of the additions in any fresh issue, the copyright in the new matter is equitably in the author, though the legal title is vested in such person, who consequently holds in trust for the author (Lawrence v. Dana, 4 Cliff. 1; and see Delf v. Delamotte, 3 Jur. (N.S.) 933).

Where the plaintiff, a cemetery stone mason, employed and remunerated a person to collect monumental designs, and published a book containing sketches of such designs, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction to restrain the publication of designs copied from it (Grace v. Newman, L. R. 19 Eq. 623; and see Barfield v. Nicholson, 2 L. J. Ch. 90; Sweet v. Shaw, 3 Jur. 217).

A person who causes or procures to be designed, engraved, etched, or worked in mezzotinto or chiaro oscuro, any print or prints, engravings, maps, &c., is prima facie entitled to the copyright (7 Geo. III. c. 38, s. 1, Stannard v. Lee, L. R. 6 Ch. 346; Stannard v. Harrison, 24 L. T. (N. S.) 570), and so also a person who employs another to make any new and original sculpture, or model, or copy, or cast, has the sole right and property of all and in every such new and original sculpture (54 Geo. III. c. 56, s. 1).

When any painting or drawing, or the negative of any photograph, is sold or disposed of, or is made or executed
for or on behalf of any other person for a good or a valuable consideration, neither the person so selling or disposing of, or making or executing such production, as the case may be, nor the vendee or assignee, will be entitled to copyright unless an agreement in writing is entered into at or before the time of such sale or disposition. If no agreement is made, the copyright would appear to become \textit{publici juris} (see 25 & 26 Vict. c. 68, s. 1).

With reference to designs, the author of any new and original design is to be considered the proprietor thereof, unless he executed the work on behalf of another person for a good and valuable consideration, in which case such person shall be considered the proprietor (see 46 & 47 Vict. c. 57, s. 61).

Where no question of employment is involved, an author may, of course, make any terms he can with the purchaser of his production; he may either sell it entirely, or for a limited time, or for a particular purpose, or he may grant a mere license of user, absolute or conditional.

The grant of a license of user, is quite a different thing from an assignment of the right of copy itself (\textit{Reade} v. \textit{Bentley}, 4 K. & J. 661), for in the former, the copyright remains vested in the author, and the licensee obtains a mere equitable right of user on the terms agreed upon—a right sufficient, however, to enable him to restrain any third person, and probably the author also, from publishing the work (\textit{Sweet} v. \textit{Cuter}, 11 Sim. 572, 578). In order to divest the copyright, there must be an actual legal assignment, otherwise at the most, a mere equitable right will pass (\textit{Sweet} v. \textit{Cuter}, supra; \textit{Lawrence} v. \textit{Duna}, 4 Cliff. 1).

The difference between an assignment and a mere license is a point of importance, affecting the conduct of the action and the consequent construction of the pleadings,
for large as the powers of amendment vested in the court now are, it is hardly to be supposed that they can give relief, in cases where the title of the plaintiff is based upon an erroneous construction of law, or upon a gross and important error of fact.

An agreement between an author, and a publisher or proprietor of a periodical or other work, or an absolute assignment between the same parties, will be construed on ordinary principles of Law in so far as they are applicable to the particular case; a discussion of these principles would, however, be out of place in a work affecting to deal with controversial points.

It may, however, be mentioned that a license to publish a work which has gone through several editions, or a license to publish the last edition, extends to the matter contained in all the previous editions, unless the agreement provides for the contrary (Sweet v. Cate, 11 Sim. 580, per Shadwell, V.-C.); and although an absolute license to publish for all time, amounts in effect to a disposition of the copyright, yet if the agreement be conditioned upon the performance of certain acts on the publisher's or proprietor's part, a different construction will be placed on the document, and if any material condition is not complied with the contract will be at an end (Stevens v. Benning, 1 Kay & J. 174, per Wood, V.-C.). Where also an agreement is entered into under such circumstances as would impose duties on the parties which are clearly personal, such duties are incapable of vicarious performance (Stevens v. Benning, supra; on appeal, 6 De G. M. & G. 223).

In those cases in which the duration of an agreement is not fixed, the author may at any time give notice of his intention to determine it, and this will operate to prevent the publication of any new edition upon which the publisher has not, at the receipt of the notice, actually incurred author may determine conditional agreement and stop further publication.
expense (Reade v. Bentley, 3 K. & J. 271; Reade v. Bentley (No. 2) 4 K. & J. 656, 4 Jur. (N.S.) 52), but it is for the publisher to determine the number of copies and the price at which they are to be sold when the agreement is silent upon the subject (ibid.).

Where the license extends to "a second edition," it does not necessarily follow that the publisher is precluded from inserting on the title page "third edition," for an edition cannot always be limited to the number of copies struck off at one impression (Pulte v. Derby, 5 McLean (Amer.) 328). The question is, or ought to be, one of fact, whether or no the extra copies printed formed a third edition or only part of a second, and as to this, it may be remarked, that where an edition is put forth to the public, and fresh batches of the work are subsequently issued at successive periods, each batch constitutes a new edition, although not reprinted, but kept in stock the whole time (Reade v. Bentley (No. 2), 4 K. & J. 666). It was decided in a Scotch case, that where a number of copies are destroyed by fire, and fresh copies are printed to supply their place, such fresh copies are merely in substitution, and do not constitute a new edition (Blackwood v. Brewster, 23 Sc. Sess. Cas. (2nd Ser.) 142).

An author, who unjustifiably refuses to deliver the remaining part of a manuscript which he has contracted to supply, may be proceeded against for damages for breach of the contract, the measure of damages being, the expense incurred by the publishers, and the profits they would probably have realized by the publication (Gale v. Leckie, 2 Stark. 109).

In the United States, the ownership of property in periodical literature and contributions, is governed upon principles similar to those applying to ordinary literary productions in that country, and it has been judicially determined that a "proprietor" may become entitled to
copyright, by virtue of the contract of employment subsisting between himself or his assignor, mediate or immediate, and the author (U.S. Rev. Stat. 4952. *Little v. Gould*, 2 Blatchf. 165; *Heine v. Appleton*, 4 Blatchf. 125; *Lawrence v. Dana*, 4 Cliff. 1); at one time, however, this was a disputed point (see *Pierpont v. Fowle*, 2 Woodb. & M. 23; *Atwill v. Ferrell*, 2 Blatchf. 39).

Lastly, copyright may vest in joint owners, but in order that it shall do so, the production must be the result of a preconcerted joint design, and mere subsequent improvements by another person will not constitute him a joint author of the work (*Lery v. Rutley*, L. R. 6 C. P. 523, and see *Shelley v. Ross*, cited *idem*, p. 531). Where copyright does vest in joint authors, they will each obtain a distinct but undivided part or share of the production, and each can use his own right alone, without using or receiving any aid or benefit whatever from the other or others (*Carter v. Bailey*, 64 Maine (Amer.) 458, *per* Virgin, J., and see *Gould v. Banks*, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) Amer. 563; *Maclean v. Moody*, 20 Sc. Sess. Cas. (2nd Ser.) 1154).

As already stated, a Common Law right of copy, which is the inherent property of every author, is vested in him until he shall do something to deprive himself of such right. It is, therefore, a mistake to suppose that registration is absolutely necessary, before the proprietor can acquire a legal title; that he already has at the Common Law, and all the legislature has done, is to decree that the right of the proprietor to sue for any infringement of his copyright, shall, unless he sues at Common Law, remain in abeyance until he has conformed to the provisions of the statute (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 24. *Cassell v. Stiff*, 2 K. & J. 279; *Chappell v. Davidson*, 25 L. J. (C. P.) 225, 18 C. B. 194). Consequently, the proprietor is not required to prove that his production was registered when the right of action first arose (*Murray v. Bogue*, 1 Drew. 358;
Stannard v. Lee, L. R. 6 Ch. 340; Hogg v. Scott, L. R. 18 Eq. 444; Goulbain v. Wallace, 36 L. T. (N. S.) 704), but he may register at any time before action brought (ibid).

In England, the proprietor of copyright in any book, should, if he wishes to be able to sue for the infringement of his right of copy therein, make entry in the registry book of the Stationers’ Company, of the title of such book, the time of first publication, the name and place of abode of the publisher, and the name and place of abode of the proprietor of the book or of any portion of the copyright (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 13), and in any action for infringement the defendant may set up by way of defence, that any one or more of the facts stated in the book are untrue in point of fact, or insufficient (Collette v. Goode, 7 Ch. D. 842). Thus he may plead that the month only, and not the day of publication is registered (Mathieson v. Harwood, L. R. 7 Eq. 270), or that the wrong date is given (Low v. Routledge, 33 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 717, and see Page v. Wisden, 20 L. T. (N. S.) 435), or that a mistake in the publisher’s name or firm (Low v. Routledge, supra), that is, in the name of the “first publisher” (Coote v. Judd, 23 Ch. D. 727), or in the name or place of abode of the author or composer (Wood v. Boosey, L. R. 3 Q. B. 223) has occurred, or that such name is not that of the true author or composer (Wood v. Boosey, supra). Again, a plea that the registered proprietor was not the proprietor at the time of registration is good, even although he was the original proprietor (Weldon v. Dicks, 10 Ch. Div. 247), and so also is an allegation by way of defence, that the date given is not the original date of publication (Page v. Wisden, 20 L. T. (N. S.) 433). But when the proprietor was abroad at the time of publication, he was held to be justified in giving his address as that of the publisher (Lover v. Davidson, 1 C. B. (N. S.) 182); it is presumed, however, that if a work
should be registered before actual publication, that this would be fatal (Correspondent Newspaper Co. v. Saunders, 11 Jur. (N. S.), 540, per Wood, V.-C., and see Murray v. Bogue, 1 Drew. 353). Further, when the proprietor of copyright in a book, desires to make entry thereof, he must enter the name of the first publisher, and if the name of the proprietor himself be entered as publisher, he not being the first publisher, such an entry will be bad (Coote v. Judd, 28 Ch. Div. 727).

Any one or more of these defences if proved, is or are fatal, and as no power of amending the register at this stage exists, the plaintiff must make a new and correct entry and commence de novo (Low v. Routledge, L. R. 1 Ch. 42; Stannard v. Lee, 6 Id. 346; Hogg v. Scott, L. R. 18 Eq. 444).

If an author should publish another edition of his work which is not a mere reprint of the first, it is a new work, so far as the materials, alterations, and additions are concerned, and in order to enable him to sue in respect of the infringement of his rights in those portions of the second edition which are new, he must first register the book in which they are contained (Murray v. Bogue, 1 Drew. 365, per Kindersley, V.-C., and see Hutchings v. Sheard, W. N. 1881, p. 20). The statute 25 & 26 Vict. c. 68, s. 4, regulating the right of copy in paintings, drawings, and photographs, provides inter alia, that a "short description of the nature and subject of the work" shall be entered in the register; it has been held that this provision is sufficiently complied with, when words are used descriptive of the appearance of the composition, as for example, "painting in oil—my first sermon," "photograph—my second sermon" (ex parte Beal, L. R. 3 Q. B. 387).

Maps, if coming within the provisions of 5 & 6 Vict. c. Maps registered 45, (see Stannard v. Lee, L. R. 6 Ch. 346), should be registered as "books;" but a bird's eye view of a locality
is a landscape within 7 Geo. III., c. 38, s. 1, and no registration is essential (Stannard v. Harrison, 24 L. T. Rep. N. S. 570), but it must be remembered that under the statutes relating to engravings, prints, and lithographs (8 Geo. II., c. 13; 7 Geo. III., c. 38; 17 Geo. III., c. 57; 6 & 7 Will. IV., c. 59; 15 & 16 Vict. c. 12, s. 14), no action for piracy can be maintained, unless the date of publication and the name of the owner appear on the print, engraving, or lithograph (Harrison v. Hogg, 2 Ves. 323; Thompson v. Symonds, 5 T. R. 41; Newton v. Cowie, 4 Bing. 234; Brooks v. Cock, 3 Ad. & Ell. 138; Aranzo v. Mudie, 10 Ex. Rep. 203; Graves v. Ashford, L. R. 2 C. P. 410; Rock v. Lazarus, L. R. 15 Eq. 104).

Assuming an engraving to be bound up with a book, the former is incorporated in the latter, and it is sufficient if that is registered (Bogue v. Houlston, 5 De G. & Sm. 267; Bradbury v. Hotten, L. R. 8 Ex. 1).

No proprietor of any copyright in any painting, drawing, or photograph, not registered under 25 & 26 Vict. c. 68, s. 4, is entitled to the benefit of that Act, and no action is sustainable, nor can any penalty be recovered in respect of anything done before registration. The forms of entry prescribed by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45 with respect to books, are applicable to 25 & 26 Vict. c. 68, with such variations as the nature of the case may require.

In the case of cyclopædias, reviews, magazines, or periodical works, or other work published in a series of books or parts, the proprietor must register, 1, the title of the work, 2, the date of publication of the first number, volume, or part, 3, the name and place of abode of the proprietor and the publishers (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 19, and see Sweet v. Benning, 16 C. B. 459). After registration of the first number, each succeeding number (Platt v. Walter, 17 L. T. (N. S.) 159, per Lord Chelmsford; and see Correspondent Newspaper Co. v. Saunders, 11 Jur. (N. S.) 540;
Maxwell v. Hogg, L. R. 2 Ch. 307; Henderson v. Maxwell, 4 Ch. D. 168; 5 Id. 892), including the contents (Henderson v. Maxwell, supra), will be protected.

It has been judicially determined that a newspaper must be registered under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, ss. 2, 18, and unless this is done the proprietor of the newspaper will have no right to sue in respect of any article appearing therein (ante, p. 79). The Newspaper Libel and Registration Act (44 & 45 Vict. c. 60), though it establishes a register of proprietors, and provides penalties in certain cases, in no way affects any of the rights of copy in a periodical of this nature.

The right of representation of a dramatic piece or musical composition, as well as the maintenance of an action for the infringement of that right, is secured without any registration of the text (Russell v. Smith, 12 Q. B. 217; Clark v. Bishop, 25 L. T. (N. S.) 908; and see also Lucy v. Rhys, 4 Best & S. 873; Marsh v. Conquest, 17 C. B. (N. S.) 418; 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 24).

In the case of sculpture, the name of the owner and the date, must be placed on the production, "before the same shall be put forth or published" (54 Geo. III. c. 56, ss. 1, 3), and if this is not done, no proceedings can be taken in respect of any infringement.

By 46 & 47 Vict. c. 57: the Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883, the proprietor of a design will have copyright in it during five years from the date of registration (s. 50). Consequently it would appear that no action will lie either for penalties or damages in respect of anything done before registration (see sect. 58), though in some instances an action on the case for damages at common law might be sustainable.

Any entry on the register may be expunged or varied on application to the court (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 14; 25 &
26 Vict. c. 68, s. 5), but it must clearly be shown not only that the entry complained of is false, but that the true entry can be substituted (Ex parte Davidson, 18 C. B. 207; 2 Jur. (N. S.) 1024), and the application must be made by some person aggrieved (Chappell v. Purday, 12 M. & W. 303; Ex parte Davidson, supra; Re Walker and Graves, 20 L. T. (N. S.) 877; Graves’ Case, L. R. 4 Q. B. 721). A person is considered to be aggrieved, when he can show that “the entry is inconsistent with some right that he sets up on himself, or some other person, or that the entry would really interfere with some intended action on the part of the person making the application” (Graves’ Case, supra, 724, per Hannon, J.), that is, he must “have some substantial objection, going to the merits of the registered proprietor’s title” (ibid. per Blackburn, J.).

In the case of designs, the court may on the application of any person aggrieved by the omission without sufficient cause of the name of any person from any register kept under the Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883, or by any entry made without sufficient cause in any such register, make such order for making, expunging, or varying the entry, as the court thinks fit; or the court may refuse the application; and in either case may make such order with respect to the costs of the proceedings as the court thinks fit (46 & 47 Vict. c. 57, s. 90). The court may in any proceeding under the section, decide any question that it may be necessary or expedient to decide for the rectification of a register, and may direct an issue to be tried for the decision of any question of fact, and may award damages to the party aggrieved (ibid. sub-s. 2). Power is also vested in the comptroller to correct clerical errors of the kind mentioned (ibid. s. 91), and with the sanction of the Board of Trade, to dispense with the performance of any act or thing, document, declaration, or
evidence, which may be necessary to be done by any person under the rules (r. 29).

In all cases of registration under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, the certified copy obtained, is _prima facie_ proof of ownership only, and may consequently be rebutted (s. 11; Boosey v. Davidson, 13 Q. B. 257; Jeffreys v. Kyle, 18 Sc. Sess. Cas., 2nd Ser., 906; Hazzitt v. Templeman, 13 L. T. (N. S.) 503; Graves' Case, L. R. 4 Q. B. 715).

In the United States a person is not entitled to copyright in any production, without registration (Parkinson v. Lauelle, 3 Sawyer, 333, _per_ Sawyer, J.) under the proper statute (U. S. Revised Stat. ss. 4948—4971), and consequently he cannot bring any action in respect of anything done before registration. It is further provided that every copy of a copyrighted production must have inscribed on it, or on the substance on which it is mounted, the notice of entry in the prescribed form (s. 4962). In America, as in this country, provision is made for the delivery of copies of books to various public institutions, but the omission to do this merely involves a pecuniary penalty, and cannot be pleaded in bar (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 8; U. S. Revised Stats. ss. 4959, 4960).

Both in this country and in America, the author of a work may before publication, by virtue of the common law, and afterwards, either by operation of statute or independently of it, assign his right and interest to another (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, ss. 2, 3; and refer to Cocks v. Purday, 12 Jur. 678, _per_ Wilde, C. J.; Jeffreys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. Cas. 853, _per_ Crompton, J.; Rev. Stat. ss. 4952, 4955; Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story (Amer.), 100; Paige v. Banks, 13 Wall (Amer.), 608; Lawrence v. Dana, 4 Cliff. 1).

At common law, the author's rights over his production may be transferred by simple delivery of the manuscript, coupled with the intent of parting with all his rights in it (see Lawrence v. Dana, _supra_), or by
operation of law, (see *Little v Gould*, 2 Blatchf. (Amer.), 103, 302; *Folsom v. Marsh*, 2 Story (Amer.), 100), and it is even supposed that a person who finds a manuscript, under such circumstances as to render it *res nullius*, would be entitled to the right of copy, and in this event it would make no difference whether the author's name were known or not (see the remarks of Lord Deas in *Maclean v. Moody*, 20 Sc. Sess. Cas., 2nd Ser. 1163). A right of copy may therefore be secured by an author of a work, or by any person or corporate body (*Murzials v. Gibbons*, L. R. 9 Ch. 518), by any of the modes of transfer recognized at common law, for, independently of statute, there is no distinction between the transfer of literary property and personal property of any other description (*Parlon v. Prung*, 3 Cliff. (Amer.), 550, *per* Clifford, J.).

**By statute.** Copyright coming within or protected by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, may after publication, be assigned under the 13th section by making entry of such assignment in the book of registry, as is in the said section provided; it is, however, evident, that this section will not apply to any assignor who is not himself registered, for the terms of the section are limited to the "registered proprietor." As however it is by no means essential that a production should be registered under this Act immediately on publication, but only before action brought (*ante*, p. 149), it becomes necessary to inquire, how copyright can be transferred independently of the statute, that is to say, after publication and before registration, or after registration, where it is not intended to rely on the provisions of the Act itself.

It was at one time universally thought that copyright in a literary production must be assigned by instrument in writing, at least that was the presumption acted upon in many decided cases (see *Power v. Walker*, 3 Maule & S. 9; *Davidson v. Bohn*, 6 C. B. 456; *Jefferys v. Boosey*, 4 H. L.
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Cas. 815; Jeffreys v. Kyle, 18 Sc. Sess. Cas., 2nd Ser., 006; and on appeal Kyle v. Jeffreys, 3 Macq. 011; Shepherd v. Conquest, 17 C. B. 427; Barnett v. Glossop, 3 Dow. Pr. Cas. 625; Cumberland v. Copeland, 1 Hurl. & C. 194), although a deed was never considered necessary for that purpose (Marsh v. Conquest, 17 C. B. (N. S.) 418), but as these authorities were all decided under 8 Anne, c. 19 and 54 Geo. III. c. 156, both now repealed by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, and confessedly upon the assumption that the legislature having required a mere license on the part of the proprietor to be in writing (8 Anne, c. 19), could never have intended an assignment to be by parol, it is evident that this statement of the law cannot be considered to be binding at the present day. It was indeed doubted at the time, or soon after (Cumberland v. Copeland, 7 Hurn. & N. 133, per Bramwell, B.; Jeffreys v. Kyle, 18 Sc. Sess. Cas., 2nd Ser. 914, passim), for there never was, nor is there now, any express reference in any enactment on the subject. It has, however, been held that the construction placed on the two repealed statutes, is equally applicable to the statute 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, and if this decision is correct every assignment even independently of that Act must be in writing (Leyland v. Stewart, 4 Ch. D. 419). It is submitted that this decision is open to doubt, for the Statute of Victoria does not refer to the subject of assignment any further than to recommend an entry on the register, and it is provided by s. 2 that the word “assigns, shall be construed to mean and include every person in whom the interest of an author in copyright shall be vested, whether derived from such author before or after the publication of any book, and whether acquired by sale, gift, bequest, or by operation of law, or otherwise.” Now as a matter of law, it is clear that an assignment before publication is good at common law, even if by parol (see Lover v. Davidson, 1 C. B. (N. S.) 182), and as an acqui-
sition by operation of law is, in some instances at least (as in bankruptcy), good without writing (In re Curry, 12 Ir. Eq. 391; and see Manman v. Tealby, 2 Russ. 392, per Lord Eldon); it follows that the only logical conclusion to which it is possible to arrive, is, that the framer of the Act did not intend to make any distinction between copyright derived from the author "before publication" and that derived "after publication" (Cocks v. Purday, 5 C. B. 860).

Assuming for the moment, however, that an assignment must be in writing, then it is clear that all intermediate assignments will be presumed to exist on proof of the last transfer, and the onus of showing that such mesne assignments never existed, is on the defendant (Morris v. Kelly, 1 Jac. & W. 481). The title, however, must be a legal one, for no action can be sustained unless the holder of the legal title is before the Court (Colburne v. Duncombe, 9 Sim. 151, 2 Jur. 654).

An assignment of copyright to a foreigner in a foreign country, made according to the law of that country, would not seem to confer on the foreign assignee, any sufficient right to make an assignment here (see Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. Cas. 815; Chappell v. Purday, 14 Mee. & W. 303, overruling to this extent Cocks v. Purday, 5 C. B. 860; Boosey v. Davidson, 13 Q. B. 257; 18 L. J. Q. B. 174).

Assignments of copyright in paintings, drawings, and photographs must be in writing, and such assignment must also be registered (25 & 26 Vic. c. 68, ss. 1, 3, and 4). In these and similar cases, it would appear that no assignment or license can be registered before the author or proprietor himself has registered (Jewitt v. Eckhardt, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 410, per M. R.); although a contrary opinion was at one time held (Graves' Case, L. R. 4 Q. B. 715). Consequently where the transferee becomes bankrupt before the transferee has registered, the better opinion is that the
trustee is legally entitled to the copyright (Longman v. Tripp, 2 Bos. & Pul. N. R. 97). It has been held under 25 & 26 Vic. c. 68, s. 3, that where the plaintiff, who was the proprietor and publisher of a magazine, agreed verbally with the defendant to purchase from him the right to engrave certain photographs, no action for specific performance or damages would lie, there being no written agreement or part performance to take the case out of the statute (Strahan v. Graham, 17 L. T. (N. S.) 457).

The Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883, vests in designs, in the person for the time being entered on the register as proprietor of, inter alia, any design, power to assign licenses as to, or otherwise deal with his design, comptroller on request and "on proof of title," shall cause the name of the assignee or be entered as proprietor (s. 87). Rule 22 of the Rules 1883, provides that where a person becomes entitled to the copyright in a registered design, or to any share or interest therein, by assignment, transmission, or other operation of law, or where a person acquires any right to apply the design either exclusively or otherwise, a request for the entry of his name in the register as such proprietor of the design, as of having acquired such right, as the case may be, shall be addressed to the Comptroller, and left at the Patent Office, Designs Branch. It would appear that an assignment in writing is not necessary, since provision is made for a statutory declaration, verifying the statements contained in the claimant's application, and it is further directed that the comptroller may demand such other proof of title as he may deem necessary (see rules 23—28). It remains, however, to be seen whether the comptroller will consider an assignment in writing to be the only satisfactory proof of title (see Jewitt v. Eckhardt, 8 Ch. Div. 404).
It has not yet been judicially determined how the copyright in engravings should be transferred, but as the Stat. 8 Geo. II., c. 13, s. 1 provides that a license under the Act must be in writing, signed in the presence of two witnesses, it is thought that an assignment would be properly carried into effect in the same manner. It is probable that a person would acquire a right of copy by taking a delivery of the plate from which the engraving was struck (see 8 Geo. II. c. 13, s. 1, Stevens v. Gladding, 17 How. 452).

Maps are treated as "Books," and the copyright in them will be assignable in the same way. In cases falling within Stanford v. Harrison, 24 L. T. Rep. 570, copyright in maps should be transferred as in the case of copyright in engravings.

On an absolute assignment of copyright in a dramatic production, the right of representation is included (Cumberland v. Paroche, 1 Ad. & Ell. 580), but the assignment must embrace "all property" (Ex parte Hutchings, W. N. 1879, 114), otherwise the rule will be the reverse, for the rights in the production itself, and over the representation are quite distinct (5 & 6 Vic. c. 45, s. 22, Chappell v. Boosey, 51 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 625).

Whether a transfer of the right of representation must be in writing, would seem to be doubtful (Shepherd v. Conquest, 17 C. B. 427; but see Lacy v. Toole, 15 L. T. (N. S.) 512, per Byles, J.; Marsh v. Conquest, 17 C. B. (N. S.) 418; Lacy v. Rhys, 4 B. & S. 883, per Cockburn, C. J.), that it need not be attested (Cumberland v. Copeland, 1 Hurl. & C. 194), nor sealed (Marsh v. Conquest, 17 C. B. (N. S.) 418) is clear. The question when it shall again arise, will probably be decided with reference to the combined provisions of 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15, and 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 20, although in neither of these Acts is there any direct provision for an assignment in writing.
Nothing is said in the Act regulating the right of copy in sculpture (54 Geo. III. c. 56) respecting assignment, and therefore it may be inferred that a writing is not necessary. By the 4th section of the Act, however, it is provided that no person or persons who should or might thereafter purchase the right or property of any now and original sculpture or model, or copy or cast, or of any cast from naturae, or of any of the matters and things published under or protected by virtue of the Act, of the proprietor or proprietors, expressed in a deed in writing signed by him, her, or them respectively, with his, her, or their own hand or hands, in the presence and attested by two or more credible witnesses, shall be subject to any action for copying or casting or vending the same, anything contained in the Act to the contrary notwithstanding.

The right of copy in sculpture is protected for a term of fourteen years (s. 1), provided that after the expiration of such term, the right shall return to the person or persons who originally made or caused to be made the same, if he or they shall be then living, for the further term of fourteen years (s. 6). Suppose now, that the proprietor should dispose of all his interest in the copyright, making in point of fact a complete and absolute assignment, would the second term of fourteen years pass as well as the first? It is thought not, for the second term is in nubibus only, and the proprietor in that, has merely a kind of reversion and certainly not a term in esse which alone is capable of assignment (Sweet v. Shaw, 8 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 217).

It is not however denied, that the author might assign all his rights of copy, in such a way as to give the assignee an equitable title to the second term also.

It is of course, not at all essential to the validity of an assignment that it should in its terms be absolute, for copyright may be disposed of in such a way as to make
the assignor and assignee joint owners, or it may be assigned for a limited time (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 13; Davidson v. Bohn, 6 C. B. 458, per Maule, J.), or a certain interest therein only may be parted with (ibid.).

So far as locality is concerned, the proprietor's right of copy is indivisible; for instance, he could not assign his right to different persons, limited to different portions of the United Kingdom, although if he has copyright in two countries, he may assign his right in one of them independently of the other, for this is not a division of a single right but an assignment of one of two (Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. Cas. 815; and refer to Low v. Ward, L. R. 6 Eq. 415; Routledge v. Low, L. R. 3 H. L. 100).

On an assignment for a limited time, the copyright must at the end of that time be re-assigned, or in case of the refusal of the assignee, the assignor should apply to the Court for a declaration of trust and re-transfer (Hazlitt v. Templeman, 13 L.T. N.S. 595). On account of the inconvenience attending an assignment limited as to the period of duration, a license to publish would appear to be a more preferable instrument. This, in its nature, is essentially different from an assignment properly so called (Reade v. Bentley, 4 K. & J.) for the licensor has the legal title and the licensee nothing more than a right in equity to the enforcement of the terms of his license. This, however, will generally be found sufficient, while at the end of the term the equitable title will revert to the licensor (see Tuck v. Canton, 51 L. J. Rep. (N. S.) Q. B. 363).

Such a license arises in effect where an author under the 18th sect. of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, permits a publisher to make use of an article or contribution in a separate form, or when he reserves such a right to himself, and it may arise either under an express agreement or by implication only.
OF COPYRIGHT.


A mere license to use a contribution does not in itself, however, give the publisher a right to use it in a separate form (see 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 18; Stewart v. Black, 9 Sc. Sess. Cas. 2nd Ser. 1020).

Copyright is transmissible by bequest, or in case of intestacy, is subject to the same law of distribution as other personal property (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 25; see Thompson v. Stanhope, Amb. 737; Cruttwell v. Lye, 17 Ves. 335).

Seizure and sale of the plates from which a work is printed, does not amount to an assignment of the copyright (Stevens v. Cady, 14 How. (Amer.) 528; Stevens v. Gladding, 17 Id. 447; Carter v. Bailey, 64 Maine (Amer.) 458), although a voluntary sale might, under certain circumstances, carry with it the right of copy as well. The copyright in a published work, passes to the trustee for the benefit of the creditors of a bankrupt, yet it is clear, that both in this country and in America, his manuscript does not pass (Longman v. Tripp, 2 Bos. & Pull. New. 67; Stevens v. Gladding, supra), and it is submitted that the Bankruptcy Act of 1883 does not in any way affect the question (see ss. 50-57, 46 & 47 Vict. c. 52).

So far as the right of representation of a musical or dramatic piece is concerned, it is as yet undecided whether it can be transferred by registration under the Act (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, ss. 13, 22), or by bequest, or whether it vests in the representatives of the proprietor, in case of intestacy (idem, s. 25).

It is plain, that before copyright can be actually assigned, it must be in esse (Sweet v. Shaw, 8 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 216), yet for all that an agreement to assign hereafter is valid (Gould v. Banks, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 562; Leader
v. Purday, 7 C. B. 4), and the person with whom such agreement is made, will have an equitable title to the copyright when it comes into existence (Sims v. Marryat, 17 Q. B. (N. S.) 281).

No form of assignment is necessary, any thing being sufficient which clearly shows on the face of it an intention to divest the copyright in favour of the assignee, and for a valuable consideration (Cocks v. Purday, 5 C. B. 560; Lacy v. Toole, 15 L. T. (N. S.) 512).

A mere receipt for purchase-money is not generally supposed to amount to a legal assignment (Latour v. Bland, 2 Stark. 382; Lover v. Davidson, 1 C. B. (N. S.) 182); but even this conclusion has been doubted (see the remarks of Lord Ivory in Jeffreys v. Kyle, 18 Sc. Sess. Cas., 2nd Ser. 911); it may on the whole be considered as tolerably certain, that such a receipt will operate as an assignment in equity, and that specific performance of the implied agreement to hand over a legal assignment would be decreed (see Howitt v. Hall, 6 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 348; Strahan v. Graham, 17 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 457).

Where a manuscript was presented as a gift to a publisher by the author thereof, the latter was held to be bound by his conduct; for although it is clear that there was no assignment, yet the gift operated as an equitable license to publish for the time permitted by the Act (Rundell v. Murray, Jacobs, 311).

Where an assignment is registered under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, ss. 11, 13, a certified copy of the entry is only prima facie proof of ownership (see Low v. Routledge, 33 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 717, 723; Wood v. Boosey, L. R. 2 Q. B. 340; on app. 3 Q. B. 223; Graves' Case, L. R. 4 Q. B. 715; Boosey v. Fairlie, 7 Ch. D. 301).

In the United States, copyright is "assignable in law,
by any instrument of writing, and such assignment shall be recorded in the office of the Librarian of Congress, within sixty days after its execution; in default of which it shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee, for a valuable consideration, without notice.” (U. S. Rev. Stat. s. 4955.)

By the American law, a license to publish must be given by the licensor in writing, signed by two witnesses; as in England, the method of transfer before publication, is regulated by the common law and a writing is therefore unnecessary.

An assignment can in no case be presumed from mere length of user alone (Platt v. Button, 19 Ves. 447; 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45); the plaintiff’s laches may, however, bar his remedy, and in this event the copyright becomes publici juris.

If a defendant seeks to rely inter alia upon the absence of an assignment in writing, or that the assignment is defective, he must specially plead the matter relied on (Barnett v. Glossop, 1 Bing. N. C. 633; but see Moore v. Walker, 4 Camp. 9, note).

It is doubtful whether a person who disposes of a copyright, impliedly warrants his title; but where the executor of an author deceased, not knowing that such author had disposed of the copyright in a certain work during his lifetime, gave permission to a third person to publish the work, it was held that the executor had, in certain letters he had written, expressly warranted his title, and was liable in an action of assumpsit (Sims v. Marryat, 17 Q. B. 281).

A person who has disposed of his copyright, is not entitled to reproduce substantially the same matter in another publication (Colburn v. Simms, 2 Hare, 543), and the same rule applies to an artist who has disposed of his
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copyright in a picture (25 & 26 Vict. c. 68, s. 6; see Rooney v. Kelly, 14 Ir. Law Rep. (N. S.) 158).

In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the assignor of a copyright is entitled after assignment, to continue selling copies of the work printed by him before the date of the assignment and remaining in his possession (Taylor v. Pillow, L. R. 7 Eq. 418; Howitt v. Hall, 6 L. T. (N. S.) 348; and see also Murray v. Heath, 1 B. & Ad. 804); but when the copyright is assigned for a certain term, the assignee obtains the exclusive right to print and sell the work during such term, and if any copies remain unsold after the term has expired, the loss will fall on him. Where an author agrees with a publisher, the latter to bring out a work at his own expense, paying the author a royalty upon every copy sold, the publisher cannot prevent the author or a third person from bringing out a fresh edition until the copies in his own possession are disposed of (Warne v. Routledge, L. R. 18 Eq. 497, overruling the dictum of Wood, V.-C., in Stevens v. Benning, 1 K. & J. 176); in such a case as this, however, there would seem to be no doubt that the publisher would be entitled to dispose of any unsold copies in hand (Howitt v. Hall, supra).

Under ordinary circumstances, the sale of a copyright or license to publish, confers no right of alteration of the draft or other production, and the remedy of the author would seem to be for an injunction, or damages, or both (see Byron v. Johnston, 2 Mer. 29; Archbold v. Sweet, 5 Car. & P. 219); but where the author's name is not intended to be used on publication, the rule is probably otherwise (Cox v. Cox, 11 Hare, 118).

In connection with this subject it may be mentioned that a publisher, whether the absolute owner of copyright or not, has no right to represent any particular edition,
as the work of the original author, when in point of fact it has been revised by a third person (Archbold v. Sweet, supra; and see Wright v. Tullis, 1 C. B. 893). The reason of this is of a twofold nature—in the first instance, the public might and probably would be deceived; and secondly, the author's literary reputation would be in the hands of a stranger.
CHAPTER V.

ON THE REMEDIES FOR INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT.

(a.) Remedies at Law.

The proprietor of a copyright is possessed of several remedies for the protection thereof: in the first place, he may have a right of action at common law; again, he may have a right of action by virtue of some statute in which a particular remedy is pointed out or provided; he may have a right to the recovery of penalties, or to the delivery up of the pirated works themselves. Such proprietor has also in some cases an equitable remedy, consisting of an action for an injunction founded on the common law right, or he may have a similar action based on the ordinary principles of equity itself, where the piracy can be shown to have been accompanied by circumstances of fraud, or breach of trust, confidence or contract, express or implied (see Turner v. Robinson, 10 Ir. Ch. (N. S.) 131, per M. R.).

We will first proceed to consider the remedies at law, including in this term, actions for damages founded on statute and at common law, and proceedings before the magistrates for the recovery of penalties. The Judicature Acts, while they have decided in favour of an equitable interpretation in those cases in which the rules of law and equity were formerly in conflict, do not in the least affect the rights and remedies of persons aggrieved, and it is as advisable now as heretofore, to seek in the proper court, that remedy which is most appropriate to the particular circumstances of the case.

It is to be observed, that such remedies as are in-
separably attached to the *Lex non Scripta* or ancient common law, are available under the *Lex Scripta* or statutory law, in all those cases in which the latter, while conferring a right, does not at the same time provide a sufficient remedy for the protection thereof, for where a right is secured by the statute, a remedy is if necessary supplied by the *Lex non Scripta*, for otherwise there would be a right without a remedy. (See *Comyns's Digest, Action on Statute*, A 2; *Novello v. Sudlow*, 12 C. B. 187, *per* Talfourd, J.) The remedy so imported, assumes in the case of copyright, the form of an action for damages, and as a matter of technical distinction, it is clear upon general principles of law, that this action is one of case and not of trespass (see *Atwill v. Ferrett*, 2 Blatchf. (Amer.), 47).

The proprietor of a copyright which has been infringed, would not appear to have any common law right to the delivery up of the pirated copies of his work (*Colburn v. Simms*, 2 Hare, 543; but see *McRae v. Holdsworth*, 2 De G. & Sm. 496).

Where a statute creates a new offence and imposes *injunction*, a penalty, the auxiliary remedy by injunction may be claimed, for that is a mode of preventing a thing being done, which if done would be an offence. If the thing threatened is illegal, the Court can interfere. As to the mode of granting the injunction, the Court will grant it, either when the illegal act is threatened, or when the thing has been done, and there is a threat to continue (*Cooper v. Whittingham*, 28 W. R. 720). The right to apply the appropriate common law remedy is, of course, dependent upon the statute, for if no right is secured by the latter, it is obvious that a remedy cannot exist. For instance, where the statute 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, speaks of a "Book," part of a book is equally referred to, and this upon common law principles, for a right is secured by virtue of the statute, and the common law supplies any deficiency in
the remedy. On the other hand, an actor or any other person, may recite a copyright poem or other work, and this even in public, although he would not be permitted to distribute copies for sale (*Tinsley v. Lacy*, 1 Hem. & M. 751, *per* Wood, V.-C.). The reason of this is, that the statute 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, by its very terms, and the connexion of its sections, is directed against printing or otherwise multiplying copies of works only, and has nothing to do with the right of representation or performance, itself expressly secured by statute (3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15). Where there is no right there is no remedy, but when the right is provided, though without any adequate remedy, then the common law steps in (refer to *Clark v. Bishop*, 25 L. T. (N. S.) 908).

By 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 15, it is provided, that if any person shall, in any part of the British Dominions, print or cause to be printed, either for sale or exportation, any book in which there shall be subsisting copyright, without the consent in writing of the proprietor thereof, or shall import for sale or hire, any such book so having been unlawfully printed, from parts beyond the sea, or, knowing such book to have been so unlawfully printed or imported, shall sell, publish, or expose to sale or hire, or cause to be sold, published, or exposed to sale or hire, or shall have in his possession, for sale or hire, any such book so unlawfully printed or imported, without such consent as aforesaid, such offender shall be liable to a special action on the case at the suit of the proprietor of the copyright, and such action can be brought in any court of record in that part of the British Dominions in which the offence is committed. Now it is obvious at the first glance, that the manner in which this section is worded is sufficient to destroy its utility, for all that is prohibited is, the unlawful printing "in any part of the British Dominions," of any copyrighted work, and the importing or selling any book "so having been unlawfully printed," that is to say, printed in any
part of the British Dominions. Consequently, if the section is to apply at all, it will be to those cases in which a person has piratically printed a book in the British Dominions, exported it "to parts beyond the sea," and then imported it (refer to Boozev v. Tolkien, 5 C. B. 480, per Wilde, C. J.).

It is clear that although the publisher or seller of a pirated work would escape liability under the section, on showing that he did not sell, publish, or expose to sale or hire, knowing the work to have been unlawfully printed or imported, yet the printer or importer cannot rely on such a defence (Colburn v. Simms, 2 Hare, 557; Leader v. Strange, 2 Car. & Kir. 1010). Nor is it any defence to show, that the work was printed or imported for gratuitous circulation, and not for "sale or hire," because here the common law supplements the section of the Act, and provides a remedy sufficiently adequate (Novello v. Sudlow, 12 C. B. 177).

Where any person is proceeded against under the section, for unlawfully printing any book for sale, hire, or exportation, or "for importing, selling, publishing, or exposing to sale or hire, or causing to be imported, sold, published, or exposed to sale or hire, any such book," the defendant on pleading thereto, is to give to the plaintiff a notice in writing of any objections on which he means to rely on the trial (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 16). If the nature of his defence is, (a) that the plaintiff in such action is not the author or first publisher of the book, or (β) is not the proprietor of the copyright, or (γ) that some other person than the plaintiff was the author or first publisher of the book or proprietor of the copyright, then the defendant must specify in the notice, (α) the name of the person who he alleges to have been the author or first publisher, or (β) the proprietor of the copyright, together with the title of the book, and the time when and the place where such book was first
published. In default of a proper notice under the section, the defendant will not be allowed at the trial to give evidence that the plaintiff was not the author, or first publisher, or proprietor, and "no other objection shall be allowed to be made on behalf of such defendant than the objection stated in such notice, or that any other person was the author or first publisher of such book, or the proprietor of the copyright therein, than the person specified in such notice," nor can the defendant give in evidence in support of his defence, any other book than one substantially corresponding in title, time, and place of publication, with the title, time, and place specified in such notice (ibid. s. 16). The effect of this section is, that the defendant must, not merely in an action under s. 15, but in any action for piracy of a book, give notice of the objections on which he means to rely, and further, if the nature of his defence be special he must give the further particulars required. Where, however, the defendant by his pleading denied in effect that the plaintiff was the author or first publisher, it was held that this was sufficient, as the pleader's only object is to let the plaintiff know what the objection is, and either the author's or the first publisher's name (Dicks v. Yates, 50 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 813).

Again, in a very recent case, the defendant did not serve his notice of objections until issue had been joined and notice of trial served, but it was nevertheless held, that the action might be dismissed on a defect in the registration being brought out from the plaintiff's evidence (Coote v. Judd, 23 Ch. Div. 727). The notice to be given under the Act should be delivered with the statement of defence, and as its purport and effect will be construed strictly, great care is necessary in its preparation.

In an action for the infringement of copyright in a musical composition, the defendant, under a notice of objections, which stated that the plaintiff was not the
proprietor of the copyright, and that there was no subsisting copyright in the work, was held to be precluded from showing at the trial, that the plaintiff derived his title through an informal assignment. This notice, it will be observed, did not specifically mention who the proprietor was, as it ought to have done (Leader v. Purday, 7 C. B. 4).

Where a defendant intends to rely upon the absence of a valid assignment, it is not sufficient for him to allege in his notice, that there has been no "valid assignment" to the plaintiff, without at the same time showing how, or in what way, the assignment is defective (Boosey v. Purday, 10 Jur. 1038).

A pleading alleged, "the defendant denies that the said song has been duly registered, the time of the first publication thereof is not truly entered on the register." Held, that proof of the publisher's name being wrongly stated could not be received, and leave to amend refused (Collette v. Goode, 7 Ch. D. 842; 47 L. J. Ch. 370).

If a defendant merely states in his notice, that the work in question was not printed or published in the British Dominions, the statement is not sufficiently explicit, and is consequently bad (Boosey v. Purday, supra).

An allegation that the plaintiff never acquired any title by assignment "or otherwise," is too vague, and where a notice stated that there was no copyright in a work first published out of the British Dominions, "under such circumstances as the books in question were published," the concluding words were struck out with costs as misleading (Boosey v. Davidson, 4 D. & L. 147).

The defendant ought not to state that the proprietor of the copyright is not the plaintiff, but "some persons whose name is to the defendant unknown," but he should find out and allege the names of such persons.

Where the first publication of a work has taken place abroad and at a remote distance of time, the rule would
appear to be that it will be sufficient to state the year of publication; but the defendant is, notwithstanding, bound to state the name of the party whom he alleges to be the proprietor or publisher, he must also state the title of the work, and the place and time of publication (Boosey v. Davidson, 4 D. & L. 147).

As registration of a copyright is bad, if the name entered as that of "the publisher" is not that of the first publisher (Coote v. Judd, 23 Ch. Div. 727), a notice embodying such an objection must state who the first publisher really is.

Should the plaintiff consider the notice for any reason defective or not sufficiently explicit, he should apply to a judge at chambers, before reply, for an order for the delivery of a more specific notice, or to strike out any of the clauses or allegations that he finds fault with. In case he neglects to do this, the defendant may at the trial give in evidence anything he can manage to bring within the scope of his notice, the sole question being, whether the notice is sufficiently general to include the objections (see Neilson v. Hanford, 8 M. & W. 806).

It is unlawful for any person, not being the proprietor of the copyright, to import into any part of the United Kingdom, or into any other part of the British Dominions, for sale or hire, or knowingly to sell, publish, or expose to sale or let to hire, or have in his possession for sale or hire, any printed book first composed or written, or printed and published in any part of the said United Kingdom, wherein there shall be copyright, and reprinted in any country out of the British Dominions (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 17). A breach of this provision is a cause of forfeiture of the work (which must be destroyed by the officer of customs taking it), and a further penalty of £10 and double the value of every copy of such book imported, or knowingly sold, published, or exposed to sale or let to hire, or which shall
be in the possession of the defendant for sale or hire (ibid.). The Customs Act (39 & 40 Vict. c. 36), also provides for the seizure of copies of books piratically imported (ss. 42, 44, 45, 152).

Some little difficulty would seem to arise with respect to books piratically imported, for s. 17 of the Act provides for the destruction of such works, and imposes a penalty, while another section (s. 23) enacts that books unlawfully printed or imported, shall be deemed to be the property of the proprietor of the copyright, who shall, after demand in writing, be entitled to sue for and recover the same, or damages for the detention thereof, in an action of detinue, from any party who shall detain the same, or to sue for and recover damages for the conversion thereof in an action of trover. Generally speaking, however, this section will be found of the greatest importance, for there is at common law no right to the delivery up of copies of a pirated work (but see McRae v. Holdsworth, 2 De G. & Sm. 497).

Under this Act (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45), it would appear that a defendant may be proceeded against for each and every distinct act of sale, no matter whether it occurs on the same day or not (see Brooke v. Milliken, 3 T. R. 509; Jarrold v. Heywood, 18 W. R. 281, per James, V.-C.).

If an action is brought against any person for doing anything in pursuance of the Act, it is provided (s. 26) that the defendant in such action may plead the general issue, and give any special matter in evidence. No case has as yet been decided under this section, but persons will probably be held entitled to protection, who have reasonable ground for supposing that what they do is done under the sanction of the Act, as well as in cases where they overstep their authority in the course of doing it (see Cook v. Leonard, 6 B. & C. 356; Chamberlain v. King, L. R. 6 C. P. 474; Addison on Torts, 5th ed., 713).
In an action for piracy, the defendant cannot successfully allege in his statement of defence that the work alleged to be pirated, was printed without the name and place of abode of the printer upon the first or last leaves thereof (see 2 & 3 Vict. c. 12). A defendant who intends to rely upon an incomplete, invalid, or misleading registration of the plaintiff’s name, or upon the other requirements of the Act, must plead specially, and he cannot give in evidence, anything but what is included within the scope of his statement of defence. Where the statement of defence is not in this respect sufficiently comprehensive, leave to amend will not be given under O. XXVIII., Rules Supreme Court, 1883 (Collette v. Goode, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 842).

All actions, suits, bills, indictments, or informations for any offence committed against the Act (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45) shall be brought, sued, and commenced within 12 calendar months next after such offence committed, except in cases of actions respecting default in the delivery of copies of works to the British Museum and other libraries (s. 26).

The effect of this section is, however, much weakened, for it has been held applicable only in cases of penalties and forfeitures, and consequently an action for damages, or for an injunction, may be maintained although more than a year has passed since the wrong was done (Hogg v. Scott, L. R. 13 Eq. 444; and see also Stewart v. Black, 9 Sc. Sess. Cas. 2nd Ser. 1026). In the case of proceedings being taken for the recovery of penalties and forfeitures, the fact that an offence is committed every time a copy of a pirated work is sold (Jarrold v. Heywood, 18 W. R. 281, see the remarks of James, V.-C.), may, in some instances at least, be of the highest importance.

Any printseller, or other person whatsoever, who shall engrave, etch, or work in mezzotinto, or chiaro-oscuro, any historical or other print or prints, or in any other manner
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copy and sell, or cause to be engraved, etched, or copied and sold, in the whole or in part, by varying, adding to, or diminishing from the main design, or who shall print, reprint, or import for sale, or cause to be printed, reprinted, or imported for sale, any such print or prints, or any parts thereof, without the consent of the proprietor or proprietors thereof first had and obtained in writing, signed by him or them respectively in the presence of two or more credible witnesses, or knowing the same to be so printed or reprinted without the consent of the proprietor or proprietors, shall publish, sell, or expose to sale or otherwise, or in any other manner dispose of, or cause to be published, sold, or exposed to sale or otherwise, without such consent as aforesaid, then such offender shall forfeit the plate from which the print has been copied, and all and every sheet or sheets (being part of or whereon such print or prints are or shall be so copied or printed), to the proprietor of the original print, who shall forthwith destroy the same, and further such offender is made liable to a penalty of 5s. for every pirated print found in his custody (8 Geo. II. c. 13, s. 1).

This provision however is not to extend to purchasers of plates from the original proprietors (ibid. sec. 2), and any action or suit brought against any person, for doing or causing to be done anything in pursuance of the Act, shall be brought within three calendar months after the act committed (s. 3); and any special matter may be given in evidence on the general issue (s. 3).

And it is further provided, that any action or suit brought against any person for an offence committed against the Act, must be brought within three months after the discovery of the offence (s. 4).

The general scope and efficiency of this enactment are 7 Geo. III much extended by the provisions of 7 Geo. III., c. 38. c. 38.

Under this Act, however, prosecutions for penalties
must be commenced within six calendar months after the offence committed (sect. 6), and all actions and suits against persons for doing anything in pursuance of the Act must be commenced within a similar time, the defendant being at liberty to plead the general issue, and to give any special matter in evidence (sect. 8).

By 17 Geo. 3, c. 57, an action on the case for damages is given to the proprietor of the pirated print or engraving, and this action is maintainable against any one who engraves, etches, or works, or causes or procures so to be engraved &c., or in any other manner copies, in the whole or in part, by varying, adding to or diminishing from the main design; also against any one who shall print, reprint, or import for sale, or cause to be so printed, &c., or who shall publish, sell, or otherwise dispose of, or cause, &c., any copies of the prints mentioned in the Act, which have been or shall be engraved, etched, drawn or designed, in any part of Great Britain, without the express consent of the proprietor in writing, signed by him in the presence of two witnesses.

It would appear to be doubtful, whether it is necessary in an action for damages under this Act to prove special damage, or whether the plaintiff would be entitled to nominal damages on proof of the piracy (see Moore v. Clarke, 9 Mees. & W. 694). In an action on the case for pirating an engraving, the plaintiff charged that the defendant had copied his print “in the whole or in part, by varying, adding to, or diminishing from, the main design;” and Lord Abinger directed the jury to consider whether the main design of the plaintiff’s engraving had been copied, and whether the plaintiff had sustained any damage. Held, on motion for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection, that this direction was right (ibid., p. 692).

Any person charged with publishing, selling, or exposing
to sale contrary to 8 Geo. 2, c. 13, must be proved to guilty
have done so knowingly, but under 17 Geo. 3, c. 57, a
vendor is liable, although he did not know the engraving
to be a copy (see West v. Francis, 5 B. & Ald. 737; Gambart v. Sumner, 5 H. & N. 5); further, it has
been held that the statute 17 Geo. 3, c. 57 does not apply
even to a seller, unless the copies sold were unlawfully
printed or imported; in other words, a defendant is not
guilty of piracy if he has printed the copies from the
original plate (Murray v. Heath and Others, 1 B. & Ad.
804). The sale of such engravings may amount to a
breach of contract on the part of somebody, but no question
of copyright is involved.

This conclusion would, however, seem to be more than
doubtful, for the mere possession of a plate does not
necessarily incorporate the exclusive right of printing and
publishing the engraving; the question is, or should be,
whether the printing was done with or without authority
(see Stevens v. Gladding, 17 How (Amer.), 453).

The common law, in its application to augment or pro-
provide a remedy in those cases in which a statute announces
a right, but either provides an insufficient remedy, or no
remedy at all (see ante, p. 169), cannot be extended under
any of the Engravings Acts, to prohibit the exhibition of
a copy of an engraving (Martin v. Wright, 6 Sim.
297).

It is to be observed that no time is limited by 17 Geo.
III. c. 57, within which an action for damages must
be brought, and it is therefore assumed that such action
may be commenced at any time within six years after the
commission of the offence (see Graves v. Mercer, 16 W. R.
790); it is also assumed, that where the assignee of the
copyright maintains such an action, as he clearly may do
(Thompson v. Symonds, 5 T. R. 41), the time within
which he may bring it will be the same.
It is a doubtful question whether an unauthorised copy of an engraving made by hand, would be considered a piracy (Gambart v. Ball, 14 C. B. (N. S.) 318, per Willes, J.), for the Engravings Acts apply only to any process by which copies may be indefinitely multiplied (ibid.), and to "prints taken by lithography, or any other mechanical process by which prints or impressions of drawings or designs are capable of being multiplied indefinitely" (15 & 16 Vict. c. 12, s. 14). The process of photography is clearly a mechanical process (Gambart v. Ball, 14 C. B. (N. S.) 306), and consequently comes within the provisions of the section, although under the Engravings Acts, it must be remembered, that subjects may be pirated by any process, whether mechanical or not, so long as copies may by it be indefinitely multiplied (Graves v. Ashford, L. R. 2 C. P. 410). Such copies need not be exactly like the original in every particular (Roworth v. Wilkes, 1 Camp. 94; West v. Francis, 5 B. & Ald. 737; Moore v. Clarke, 9 M. & W. 692); for instance, they may be either larger or smaller (Graves v. Ashford, L. R. 2 C. P. 419; Gambart v. Ball, 14 C. B. (N. S.) 317, per Erle, C.J.).

In an action for the piracy of an engraving, it is not necessary to produce the plate itself in evidence, but a print taken from it will be sufficient (Thompson v. Symonds, 5 T. R. 41), and such print must bear the date of publication, and be truly engraved with the name of the proprietor (ante, p. 88). It may be stated as a sound proposition that in all actions of damages, under 17 Geo. III. c. 57, for infringement of copyright in engravings, the locus of the infringement should be stated (Graves v. Logan, 7 Sc. Sess. Cas. 3rd Ser. 204).

Maps, charts, and plans are sometimes treated as books, and sometimes as engravings; in the former case, any remedies at law for infringement must be sought under
5 & 6 Vict. c. 45. The law on the subject of maps, charts and plans, is, however, in a very unsettled state (see Stannard v. Lee, L. R. 6 Ch. 346; Do. v. Harrison, 24 L. T. (N. S.) 570).

If the author of any painting, drawing, or photograph in which there is subsisting copyright, after having sold or disposed of such copyright, or if any other person, not being the proprietor for the time being of copyright in any painting, drawing, or photograph, shall, without the consent of the proprietor, repeat, copy, colourably imitate, or otherwise multiply for sale, hire, exhibition, or distribution, or cause, &c., any such work, or the design thereof, or, knowing that any such repetition, copy, or other imitation has been unlawfully made, shall import into any part of the United Kingdom, or sell, publish, let to hire, exhibit, or distribute, or offer for sale, hire, exhibition, or distribution, or cause, &c., any repetition, copy, or imitation of such work, or of the design thereof, made without such consent as aforesaid, such person is liable to a fine not exceeding 10l. for every such offence, and all such repetitions, copies, and imitations made without such consent, and all negatives of photographs made for the purpose of obtaining such copies are forfeited to the proprietor of the copyright (25 & 26 Vict. c. 68, s. 6).

This section applies, it will be observed, to the author himself, who repeats or makes duplicate copies of his production, "or of the design thereof," after sale of the copyright, as well as to a person who, not being the proprietor, acts contrary to the provisions of the Act.

If any person, knowing that photographic copies of an engraving have been made unlawfully, sells such copies, he can be proceeded against under this section (Ex parte Beal, L. R. 3 Q. B. 387), and the penalty will attach in respect of every copy sold, even although a number of copies be enclosed in a parcel and disposed of as a
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whole (ibid.; and see Brooks v. Milliken, 3 T. R. 509); but a person who copies, or imitates for sale, hire, exhibition, or distribution, is liable even although he acted innocently in the matter. And, it will be observed, that merely to exhibit a pirated production constitutes an offence, provided that a knowledge of the piracy can be brought home to the exhibitor.

When an engraving is made from a painting, and a person afterwards unlawfully copies the painting, the question arises whether this can be considered an unlawful copying of the engraving as well as of the picture. When the subject of a picture is copied, it would not seem to be of any consequence whether that is done directly from the picture itself, or through intervening copies (Ex parte Beal, L. R. 3 Q. B. 394, per Blackburn, J.; and see Ex parte Graves, L. R. 4 Q. B. 715), and consequently on this view of the case the copy would infringe not only the original production, but copies thereof also. This statement of the law may be correct, but it is difficult to see upon what principle, and moreover in the case referred to, the remarks of Mr. Justice Blackburn were in this respect merely obiter, since both picture and engraving were the property of one and the same person (Ex parte Beal, supra; and see also De Berenger v. Wheble, 2 Stark. 548).

If the author of any painting, drawing, or photograph, in which there is subsisting copyright, after having sold or otherwise disposed of such copyright, or of any other person, not being the proprietor for the time being of such copyright, shall, without the consent of such proprietor, repeat, copy, colourably imitate, or otherwise multiply, or cause or procure to be repeated, &c., for sale, hire, exhibition, or distribution, any such work, or the design thereof, or the negative of any such photograph, or shall import or cause to be imported into any part of the United
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Kingdom, or sell, publish, let to hire, exhibit, or distribute, or offer for sale, hire, exhibition, or distribution, or cause or procure to be sold, &c., any repetition, copy, or imitation of such work, or the design thereof, or the negative of any photograph, made without such consent as aforesaid, then every such proprietor, in addition to the remedies given for the recovery of penalties and forfeiture, may recover damages by a special action on the case, to be brought against the person so offending, and may in such action recover and enforce the delivery to him of all unlawful repetitions, copies, and imitations, and negatives of photographs, or may recover damages for the retention or conversion thereof: Provided that nothing contained in the section, nor any proceeding, conviction, or judgment, for any act thereby forbidden, is to affect any remedy which any person aggrieved by such act may be entitled to either at law or in equity (25 & 26 Vict. c. 68, s. 11).

An action would seem to lie under this section whether the offender knew or did not know that he was doing wrong, whereas in proceedings for penalties under sect. 6 it is in certain cases necessary to show scirent. In any action for infringement of copyright in paintings, &c., the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court, or any Judge of that Division in Chambers, has power to make an order for an injunction, inspection, or account (sect. 9). The utility of this provision will, however, seem less marked, now that each division has jurisdiction to issue injunctions, whenever it may seem just or convenient to do so (Judicature Act, 1873).

Heavy penalties and forfeitures are imposed upon persons fraudulently signing or affixing any name, initials, or monogram, to a painting, drawing, or photograph, or fraudulently selling, publishing, exhibiting, or disposing of any such production, or doing any of the other things mentioned in the section, provided that the penalties
therein imposed shall not be incurred, unless the person whose name, initials, or monogram, shall be so fraudu-

lently signed or affixed, or to whom such spurious or altered work shall be fraudulently or falsely ascribed, shall have been living at or within twenty years next before the time when the offence may have been committed (sect. 7).

In addition to the remedies here pointed out, the guilty party can be indicted for a cheat at common law (Reg. v. Closs, 7 Cox, 494, as to form of indictment, ibid., per Cockburn, C. J.), but the prosecutor, whether he proceeds at common law or for penalties under the Act, must show scirent (see Reg. v. Cohen, 8 Cox, 41). All repetitions, copies, &c., which, contrary to the provisions of the Act, have been made in any foreign state, or in any part of the British dominions, are absolutely prohibited to be im-

ported into any part of the United Kingdom, except by or with the consent of the proprietor of the copyright, or his agent, authorised in writing (sect. 10).

All pecuniary penalties incurred and productions forfeited under the Act, or pursuant to any Act for the protection of copyright engravings, may be recovered in England, either by action against the party offending, or by summary proceeding before any two justices having jurisdiction where the party offending resides (sect. 8); but no time is limited within which proceedings must be taken.

The Small Penalties Act (28 & 29 Vict. c. 127) applied to penalties under the Copyright Act (25 & 26 Vict. c. 68), and a convicted defendant could not therefore escape by compounding with his creditors (Ex parte Graves, re Prince, 19 L. T. (N. S.) 241; but see Re Johnson, 15 W. R. 160). The Small Penalties Act is now, however, repealed by the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1869, the terms of which are extended so as to embrace penalties up to 20l. in amount, and in respect of these it is thought
that the defendant must either pay or go to prison (42 & 43 Vict. c. 49, s. 5, and see also s. 6).

The copyright in sculpture is protected solely by the *Sculpture* statute 54 Geo. III. c. 56, but only in those cases in which the proprietor shall have caused his name, with the date, to be put on the sculpture, model, copy, or cast, before the same shall be put forth or published. Assuming the proprietor to have done this, an action for damages is given against any person who shall “make or import, or cause to be made or imported, or exposed to sale, or otherwise disposed of, any pirated copy or pirated cast” produced “by moulding or copying from, or imitating in any way,” the matters or things published under the protection of the Act (sect. 3). No person, however, who has purchased the right or property of any new and original sculpture or model, or copy, or cast, is liable to an action, provided he purchased the work by deed, executed by him in the presence of two or more witnesses (sect. 4). All actions commenced under the Act must be brought within six calendar months next after the discovery of every such offence, and not afterwards (sect. 5).

For preventing the piracy of registered designs, it is provided by the Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883, that during the existence of copyright in any design “it shall not be lawful for any person, without the license or written consent of the registered proprietor, to apply such design, or any fraudulent or obvious imitation thereof, in the class or classes of goods in which such design is registered, for purposes of sale, to any article of manufacture, or to any substance, artificial or natural, or partly artificial and partly natural. It shall not be lawful for any person to publish, or expose for sale, any article of manufacture, or any substance to which such design, or any fraudulent or obvious imitation thereof, shall have been so applied, knowing that the same has been so ap-
plied without the consent of the registered proprietor” (sect. 58).

Any person acting in contravention of this section, is liable to a penalty of 50l. for every offence, to be recovered by the proprietor of the registered design as a simple contract-debt in any Court of competent jurisdiction (ibid.).

Notwithstanding this remedy, the registered proprietor may (if he elects to do so) “bring an action for the recovery of any damages arising from the application of any such design, or of any fraudulent or obvious imitation thereof, for the purpose of sale, to any article of manufacture or substance, or from the publication, sale, or exposure for sale, by any person, of any article or substance to which such design, or any fraudulent or obvious imitation thereof, shall have been so applied, such person knowing that the proprietor had not given his consent to such application (ibid., sect. 59).

It will be observed that the words of this latter section cover “publication, sale, or exposure for sale,” while sect. 58, sub-sect. (b), constitutes it an offence, not to sell, but to “publish or expose for sale;” where, therefore, a person sells an article of manufacture or any substance, to which a fraudulent design has been applied, without in the first instance “exposing” it for sale, and under such circumstances that the sale does not amount to a “publication,” it is assumed that although an action of damages might lie against him, he would be entitled to judgment in an action for the recovery of the penalty.

The Act does not contain any provision for the delivery up to the plaintiff of articles with the pirated design affixed, but in a case under the old statute an order to this effect was made (McRae v. Holdsworth, 2 De G. & Sm. 496).

Any person who describes any design applied to any article sold by him as registered, which is not so, is liable
for every offence, on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding 5l. (sect. 105), and it is further provided that a person shall be deemed to represent that a design is registered, if he sells the article with the word "registered," or any word or words expressing or implying that registration has been obtained for the "article" stamped, engraved, or impressed on, or otherwise applied to, the article.

No limitation of time within which an action may be brought is provided by the Act, nor is any penalty expressly provided to meet a case where a person describes his design as registered after his copyright has expired.

If the magistrates should convict in respect of a design not within the statute, the proper remedy is to move to quash the conviction (Bessell v. Wilson, 1 E. & B. 489), and the defendant cannot be restrained from bringing an action; at least this was so where a conviction was quashed under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 65 (Reg. v. Bessell, 15 Jur. 773).

Where the Comptroller refuses to register any design presented to him for registration, the person aggrieved has an appeal to the Board of Trade, who shall, if required, hear the applicant and the Comptroller, and may make an order determining whether, and subject to what conditions, if any, registration is to be permitted (sect. 47, sub-sects. 6, 7). The applicant must, within a month from the date of the decision appealed against, leave at the Patent Office, Designs Branch, a notice (Rule 16), accompanied by a statement of the grounds of appeal, and of the applicant's case in support thereof (Rule 17; and see also Rules 18, 19, 20).

It was decided under the old Copyright of Designs Acts, that the proprietor of a design could not proceed in respect of any infringement unless the proper registration marks were affixed to all articles to which the design was applied (see sect. 4; 5 & 6 Vict. c. 100), and it was not material
whether such proprietor was a British subject or a foreigner,
or whether such articles were sold abroad or in this country
(see 24 & 25 Vict. c. 73; Sarazin v. Hamel, 32 L. J. Rep.
(N. S.) Ch. 380).

Under the new Act, the proprietor of the design is bound
to cause each article, before delivery on sale, to be marked
with the prescribed mark, or with the prescribed word or
words, or figures, denoting that the design is registered;
and if he fails to do this, the copyright in the design is
to cease (46 & 47 Vict. c. 57, s. 51; and see Rule 32).

By 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15, it is enacted that if any person
shall represent, or cause to be represented, without the
consent in writing of the author or other proprietor, at
any place of dramatic entertainment, any tragedy, comedy,
play, opera, farce, or any other dramatic piece or enter-
tainment, composed, and whether printed and published
or not, every such offender shall be liable for each and
every such representation to the payment of an amount
not less than 40s., or to the full amount of the benefit or
advantage arising from such representation, or the injury
or loss sustained by the plaintiff therefrom, whichever
shall be the greater damages, to the author or other pro-
prieter of such production so represented (ss. 1, 2).

The 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 20, enacts that the statute
3 & 4 Will. IV., c. 15, shall apply to musical compositions,
and that the sole liberty of representing or performing
any dramatic piece or musical composition, shall be the
property of the author and his assigns for the term
therein mentioned; sect. 21 provides that the person who
shall have such sole liberty of representing such dramatic
piece or musical composition, "shall have and enjoy the
remedies given and provided by 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15, as
if the same were re-enacted" in that Act (see Wall v.

Where an infringement has taken place under these
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statutes, it would appear that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the penalty, although he may have sustained no actual damage (ibid.; see also Planche v. Brahom, 4 Bing. N. C. 19; Chatterton v. Cure, 3 App. Cas. 498), but his right to costs is now very materially restricted (45 & 46 Vict. c. 40, s. 4).

All actions or proceedings for any offence or injury committed in contravention of 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15, must be brought, sued, and commenced within twelve calendar months next after such offence committed, or else the same shall be void and of none effect (s. 3).

It would appear that registration is not essential either to the vesting of playright, or to the right of the owner to maintain an action for infringement (Clark v. Bishop, 25 L. T. (N. S.) 908; Marsh v. Conquest, 17 C. B. (N. S.) 418); but where the proprietor of the copyright in any musical composition, shall be entitled to and be desirous of retaining in his own hands exclusively, the right of public representation or performance of the same, he shall print or cause to be printed upon the title-page of every published copy of such musical composition, a notice to the effect that the right of public representation or performance is reserved. Provision is also made for cases in which the right of performance and copyright are respectively vested in different owners (45 & 46 Vict. c. 40, ss. 1, 2).
CHAPTER VI.

ON THE REMEDIES FOR INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT (continued).

(β) Proceedings in the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice.

The extensive jurisdiction of granting injunctions originally given to the Common Law Courts by the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, is now vested in the High Court of Justice, and the jurisdiction thus vested is practically unlimited, and can be exercised by any judge of the High Court in any case in which it is right or just to do so, having regard to settled legal reasons or principles (Daniell, Ch. Pr. p. 22, 6th ed.).

Generally in all matters not in the Judicature Acts particularly mentioned, in which there is any conflict or variance between the rules of equity and the rules of the common law with reference to the same matter, the rules of equity are to prevail (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, s. 25 (11); this provision does not, however, refer to mere technical rules of procedure, but to matters of substantive law, for the practice is regulated from a standpoint of convenience, and sometimes common law forms will be used, and sometimes Chancery forms, as the nature of the case may require (Bustros v. Bustros, 14 Ch. Div. 849).

The ancient Court of Chancery had formerly no power to try the legal question, upon the solution of which depended the right to maintain or defend a suit, and in cases of doubt the Court frequently refused to interfere by injunction until the plaintiff had established
his title at law. Sometimes, however, an interim injunction was granted pending the trial of the action.

By virtue of the Act 15 & 16 Vict. c. 80, s. 62, the Court of Chancery was invested with full power to determine questions of fact, without remitting the parties to another tribunal, and had, moreover, the same powers, jurisdiction, and authority, as belonged to any judge of the Superior Courts sitting at Nisi Prius (21 & 22 Vict. c. 27, s. 4).

By 25 & 26 Vict. c. 42, s. 1, the discretionary powers conferred by the above-mentioned statutes were rendered compulsory, and extended to questions of law (Fernie v. Young, L. R. 1Ir. App. 79; and see Durell v. Prichard, 1 Ch. 244; and the Court was further empowered to direct an issue to try any question of fact at any sitting in London or Middlesex, or at the Assizes, where such question of fact might be more conveniently tried by a jury there (sect. 2).

Although the Chancery Division may try any question of fact and assess damages either with or without a jury, this would not seem to enable the Court of Appeal, on an application for a new trial, to reverse the Court below on mere issues of fact; where, however, the issues raise questions of law as well as fact, a new trial as to the facts may be refused, and judgment pronounced on the issues of law (Simpson v. Holliday, L. R. 1 App. Cas. 315).

So, also, it cannot be considered that the statute 21 & 22 Vict. c. 27, affected in any way the right of appeal which formerly existed (Curtis v. Platt, L. R. 1 App. Cas. 337); nor could either or any of the parties insist, upon the construction of that Act and the statute 25 & 26 Vict. c. 42, upon having the action tried by a jury, for the method of trial is entirely in the discretion of the Court (Bovill v. Hitchcock, L. R. 3 Ch. 419).

Again, it was provided that it should not be necessary for a Court of Equity to grant relief in any suit concerning any matter as to which a Court of Law had concurrent juris-
diction, in case it should appear that such matter has been improperly brought into equity (25 & 26 Vict. c. 42, s. 4). Where a plaintiff had no ground of equitable relief, the action was improperly brought under this section, and the Court would not proceed to try any question of damages under 21 & 22 Vict. c. 27, and 25 & 26 Vict. c. 42 (Durell v. Pritchard, L. R. 1 Ch. 244). The rule was, that the Court gave a remedy to a plaintiff in those cases only in which it could interfere by injunction, and where it could grant an injunction it could likewise order an account; in any other event the plaintiff's remedy was, and in some cases now is, at law (Bailey v. Taylor, 1 Russ. & My. 75).

The above-named statutes, regulating in part the practice and course of procedure in the High Court of Chancery, are now, however, repealed (46 & 47 Vict. c. 49), and reference must be made to the Judicature Acts.

Under the Judicature Acts, every division of the High Court of Justice has concurrent jurisdiction in redressing grievances, although it is submitted that if a plaintiff should in the first instance, proceed for the recovery of penalties under any of the Copyright Acts applicable to the particular case, the Chancery Division would afterwards decline to interfere (see Colburn v. Simms, 2 Hare, 554), and in this respect the American law is the same (Stevens v. Gladding, 17 How, 455).

Actions to restrain the infringement of copyright are in practice exclusively brought in the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice.

The writ of summons is endorsed with statement of the relief or remedy required, and this, in the case of a book, generally takes the form of,—

(a) An injunction to restrain a threatened infringement, or an infringement already commenced or entered upon.

(b) An account of the net profits realised by defendant from the infringement aforesaid.
(γ) Payment of such net profit.
(δ) Damages (if no account is claimed).
(ε) Delivery up of the unsold pirated copies.

Separate actions should as a rule be instituted against separate infringers, the Court, however, has power to order such actions to be consolidated (R. S. C., O. XLIX. r. 8).

If the plaintiff can show an equitable title, that is May be founded sufficient to ground an application for an injunction, on equitable title.
whether interim or otherwise (Sims v. Marryat, 17 Q. B. 281; and see also Sweet v. Cuter, 11 Sim. 572; Chappell v. Purday, 4 V. & C. 485); and for the purpose of trying the question of piracy, the legal title may pro tem. be directed to be admitted (Dickens v. Lee, 8 Jur. 183; Sweet v. Shaw, 8 L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 216; Sweet v. Cuter, supra).

Whether, therefore, the title of the plaintiff be legal or equitable, he will be entitled to an injunction, provided of course he can make out that a piracy has been committed. If possible, however, a legal title should always be shown, as the practice of the Court is, to withhold as far as it fairly can an interlocutory injunction based on a mere equitable title (Bacon v. Jones, 4 My. & Cr. 433; Colburn v. Duncombe, 9 Sim. 151; Stevens v. Keating, 1 Mac. & G. 659; Norton v. Nicholls, 6 W. R. 764; McNeill v. Williams, 11 Jur. 344). And, besides this, it is in some cases exceedingly difficult to say what will amount to an equitable title or interest sufficient for the maintenance of an action.

Where on an application for an injunction, a third person should swear that the legal title is in him, the motion will be dismissed, although such person does not produce an assignment (Lowndes v. Duncombe, 1 L. J. Ch. 51).

A mere agent for sale has not a sufficient title upon which to base an application for an injunction (Nicol v. Stockdale, 3 Swanst. 687).
Where a person took a parol assignment of a copyright, the Court interfered to protect him, and granted an injunction (Hodges v. Welsh, 2 Ir. Eq. 266; Chappell v. Purday, 4 Y. & C. 485; and see Longman v. Oxberry, cited Godson on Patents, 314); and it is moreover settled that where a plaintiff obtains an injunction and the defendant offers to submit, he (the plaintiff) can insist upon having his title admitted on record (Kelly v. Hooper, 1 Y. & C. Ch. 197).

Assuming that the Court is satisfied with the plaintiff's title, and that an infringement has taken place, the practice is to grant an *interim* injunction without any undertaking as to damages; but where the title is not clear, nor the infringement palpable, such an injunction will only be granted accompanied by the usual undertaking, or the motion may be directed to stand adjourned until the hearing, the defendant in the meantime to keep proper accounts. What the Court will or will not do under particular circumstances, depends entirely on the nature of the case, but, generally speaking, the question for the Court, before it interferes by injunction is, which of the two parties to the dispute is more likely to suffer by an erroneous or hasty judgment of an interlocutory nature against him? The Court is also guided by a consideration of the very possible, if not probable effect, which an injunction may have to the defendant's prejudice in the action (McNeill v. Williams, 11 Jur. 344, per Knight-Bruce, V.C.; and see Ingram v. Stiff, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 947).

It may be here further stated, that an interlocutory injunction will be granted where the plaintiff can show that, should the application be refused, great loss will happen to the property or estate (Dickens v. Lee, 8 Jur. 183).

An *interim* injunction is not usually granted in doubtful cases (Morris v. Wright, L. R. 5 Ch. 279),
nor where the grounds of application are slight, but the whole consideration will be postponed to the hearing (Redfield v. Myddleton, 7 Bosw. (Amer.) 649). Further, where it is doubtful whether the plaintiff could recover damages, an application for an injunction will be postponed (Lord Byron v. Dugdale, 1 L. J. Ch. 239), and this is equally the case where, from the amount of matter pirated, and the profits made by the defendant, the infringement cannot be considered of any material consequence (Whittingham v. Wooler, 2 Swanst. 428; and see Bell v. Whitehead, 8 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 141; Baily v. Taylor, 1 Russ. & Myln. 73), or where the defendant has been misled by the plaintiff's conduct (Tinsley v. Lacy, 1 Hem. & M. 752), or been induced to suppose that his behaviour would not meet with the plaintiff's disapproval (Saunders v. Smith, 3 Mylne & C. 711), and this is so whether such conduct took place with the defendant himself or with third persons (ibid., and see Rundell v. Murray, Jacobs, 816).

Where the production is of an ephemeral nature (as in the case of an almanac), an interim injunction will in all probability be refused, because works of this class owe their chief marketable value to a prompt sale, and an injunction of any kind would be equivalent to a perpetual injunction (Spottiswoode v. Clarke, 2 Phillips, 154); the Court might, however, direct the defendant to keep an account (Spottiswoode v. Clarke, supra; Jollie v. Jaques, 1 Blatchf. 618). But where a defendant pirates a work and offers it for sale at a greatly reduced price, he will be restrained ex parte, even although the work should be of a highly ephemeral nature, because the plaintiff otherwise might, and probably would, be unable to sell his own production; and, moreover, the defendant could not be made to account for anything more than his nett profits (Matthewson v. Stockdale, 12 Ves. 275, 277).
Although each case must rest on its own foundation, it would appear to be the general rule that an injunction can be claimed, even although the damage complained of has been actually perfected at the time (*Durell v. Pritchard*, L. R. 1 Ch. App. 250).

The mere fact that the plaintiff could not bring an action for penalties, is no defence whatever to a motion for an injunction. Thus, the vendor of a pirated work is only liable in an action for the penalties if he *knew* that the work was pirated, but that is no reason why an injunction should not be granted against him, since mere ignorance is no defence to an action in which the primary object is to obtain a cessation of the acts complained of. The right to an injunction is therefore grounded on a right of property, and where this right of property exists, there also is the plaintiff entitled to have it protected (see *Sheriff* v. *Coates*, 1 Russ. & My. 107).

An application for an *interim* injunction must be supported by affidavit, stating when the plaintiff first became aware of the piracy, and if the application is *ex parte*, that notice to the defendant would be deleterious, or that the matter is very urgent (*Anon.*, 1 L. J. Ch. 4). In any case, if no statement of defence has been delivered, the affidavit must show the plaintiff's title; but in any other event this is not necessary (*Platt v. Buxton*, 19 Ves. 447; *Norway v. Rowe*, *ibid*., 143); nor is it in any case necessary to tender proof of damages; for if the plaintiff is able to show an infringement, this is sufficient (*Campbell v. Scott*, 11 Sim. 39; *Tinsley v. Lacy*, 32 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 539).

Where a defendant contravenes the terms of an interim injunction, the Court will commit him on motion, but as a rule, not where he has subsequently endeavoured to set himself right (*Cornish v. Upton*, 4 L. T. (N. S.) 862).

An application to make an interim injunction perpetual
is properly made at the hearing, but by consent it may be made on interlocutory motion (Morrell v. Pearson, 12 Beav. 284), and in no case is it incumbent on the plaintiff to move for an interim injunction at all, but he may, if he thinks fit, apply for a perpetual injunction at the hearing (Bacon v. Jones, 4 My. & Cr. 436; Gale v. Abbot, 8 Jur. (N. S.) 987). Should he do this however, he must have his facts in such order that the Court can adjudicate on the matter without unnecessary delay (Bacon v. Jones, supra; Patent Type Founding Co. v. Walter, Johns. 727). So, also, where an interim injunction is refused, the plaintiff is at liberty to renew the application at the hearing (Baily v. Taylor, 1 Russ. & Mylne, 76).

An interim injunction will occasionally be dissolved on the application of the defendant, as, for instance, on his throwing reasonable doubts on the exclusive legal right of the plaintiff, on the basis of which the injunction had been obtained (Bramwell v. Halcomb, 3 My. & Cr. 737; Spottiswoode v. Clark, 2 Phil. Ch. 156), or where the publication complained of is of an ephemeral nature (Spottiswoode v. Clark, supra), but not where the defendant in his statement of defence sets up a sufficient answer to the plaintiff's allegations (see Wroe v. Clayton, 10 Sim. 185).

Where an interim injunction is obtained with the usual undertaking as to damages, such damages will be accurately inquired into in case the action is dismissed at the hearing, the payment of costs may or may not be a sufficient satisfaction (Novello v. James, 5 De G. M. & G. 876); but if it is, it is clear that such costs will be paid as costs, and not as damages, for the question of damage is a separate matter entirely from the question of the costs of the action (ibid., per Turner, L. J.).

On an application for an interim injunction, it would appear, from the report of an American case, that a
reference to the chief clerk will not be ordered (see Smith v. Johnson, 4 Blatchf. 252).

Where the plaintiff obtains an interim injunction, and the defendant has no defence to the action, his best course is to admit the plaintiff's right, by submitting to the injunction, and paying all the costs up to that time; if the plaintiff then proceeds to a hearing, it will be, in some cases at any rate, at his own expense (Potts v. Levy, 2 Drew. 278, per Kindersley, V. C.).

On the hearing of the action the defendant will be restrained by perpetual injunction, assuming of course that the plaintiff has made out his case (Macklin v. Richardson, Amb. 694); and this will be so, although the defendant may promise to commit no further infringement (Geary v. Norton, 1 De G. & Sm. 9), and has in fact consented to the interlocutory injunction previously obtained (Beaufort (Duke of) v. Morris, 6 Hare, 350, 12 Jur. 614). On such hearing the affidavit filed on the application for the interim injunction might have been read on the part of the plaintiff (15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, s. 36; repealed by 46 & 47 Vict. c. 49).

The form of the injunction varies according to the circumstances of the particular case.

Probably the most comprehensive form of words ever employed, is that given in Faden v. Stockdale (Reg. Lib. A. 1796, fol. 32), where the defendant was restrained from publishing a map "compiled, drawn, or engraved by or for the use of the plaintiff, or any other of the like nature or kind, or upon any such or the like plan."

In some instances the injunction is directed only against the part pirated, in others against the whole production; the question is, can the pirated portion be separated from that which is original, without destroying the utility and value of the original matter?—if it can, the offending portion only will be dealt with (Mawman v. Tegg, 2 Russ.
385, 391, per Lord Eldon; and see Story’s Executors v. Holcombe, 4 McLean (Amer.) 306, 315); if it cannot, the entire work (Stevens v. Wildy, 19 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 190).

Where it is apparent that after eliminating the pirated passages the work would be practically useless, the Court will direct an injunction against the whole, and will not order an inquiry into the precise extent of the infringement (ibid.; and see also Hogg v. Scott, L. R. 18 Eq. 458, following Lewis v. Fullarton, 2 Beav. 14); and as to this Lord Eldon observes, “in the cases which have come before me, my language has been, that there must be an injunction against such part as has been pirated; but in those cases the part of the work, which was affected with the character of piracy, was so very considerable, that, if it were taken away, there would have been nothing left to publish except a few broken sentences” (Maxman v. Tegy, 2 Russ. 399).

Where the external appearance of a work is imitated so closely as to be calculated to deceive persons of ordinary capacity (Bradbury v. Beeton, 18 W. R. 33), the injunction will lie against the work in its present “form, title page, and cover,” and not against the contents (Metzler v. Wood, L. R. 8 Ch. D. 606).

Sometimes a defendant is restrained from circulating such part of a work as contains items of particular information, and in these cases it is the defendant’s business to ascertain what passages come within the scope of the words made use of (Scott v. Stunford, 36 L. J. (N.S.) Ch. 732).

A note to Jarvold v. Houlston, 3 K. & J. 723, gives a form of injunction intended to inhibit particular portions of a work only.

An injunction should not be framed so as to extend beyond damage actually done or threatened, and the word
“imitating” is therefore objectionable, for non constat that an imitator is necessarily either a plagiarist or a pirate (see Dickens v. Lee, 8 Jur. 185).

The Court frequently takes upon itself the comparison of works alleged to be pirated, but more frequently the matter is ordered to be referred to one of the officers of the Court, upon whose report the Court will act; but query whether a reference should be ordered on motion for an interlocutory injunction (Smith v. Johnson, 4 Blatchf. (Amer.) 252). The ordinary rule at the final hearing is, to order a reference in all cases where the piracy is not apparent, or cannot be discovered without much comparison and consequent expenditure of time (see Pike v. Nicholas, L. R. 5 Ch. App. 231).

It occasionally happens that an injunction will be refused on the ground that the Court would have no means of enforcing it. In Cox v. Land and Water Journal Co., where the proprietor of a newspaper, sought to restrain the piracy of "a list of hounds," the Court was of opinion that although the piracy might be established, the list was liable to such frequent changes, and a correct list was so easily obtained, that it was not a case for an interlocutory injunction; that if an injunction were granted, it could not be acted upon (L. R. 9 Eq. 332).

It is clear that where an action would not lie for damages, a motion for an injunction will be refused (Southey v. Sherwood, 2 Mer. 435; Clark v. Freeman, 11 Beav. 112; Walcot v. Walker, 7 Ves. 1). And the same rule applies where the composition, the piracy of which is sought to be restrained, is on the face of it a gross libel (Hime v. Dale, 2 Camp. 27); so, also, where the evidence of the plaintiff is contradicted by that of the defendant, the Court will not as a rule grant an injunction until the matters in difference are judicially determined (Lowndes v. Duncombe, 1 L. J. (Ch.) 51).
Where a person falsely represents that his production is in point of fact the work of the plaintiff he will be restrained (Byron v. Johnston, 2 Mer. 29; and see Wright v. Tallis, 1 C. B. 303), and where a defendant has disposed of his right to use his name in connection with a specific publication, he will also be restrained from doing anything in contravention of his agreement (Ward v. Beeton, L. R. 19 Eq. 207). The same remark applies to a person who is about to publish manuscripts or prints, to which he has no title (Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 De G. & Sm. 592, 1 M. & G. 25).

A person who seeks the aid of the Court to assist him in the protection of his right of copy, must do so at the earliest possible stage (Tinsley v. Lucy, 1 H. & M. 747), for it cannot be expected that the Court will interfere by injunction where the party claiming it has allowed the infringement to take place (Randell v. Murray, Jac. 310; Chappell v. Purday, 4 Y. & C. 485), or has acquiesced in such infringement for any great length of time (Platt v. Button, 19 Ves. 447).

The question as to what amounts to a great length of time is referable to the circumstances of each case, thus, where a plaintiff did not take any steps for 18 years, he was very properly held to be barred (Baily v. Taylor, Taml. 305); and so where the defendant commenced a certain work, and the plaintiff knew of it at the time, it was held that no injunction could be claimed, as he (the plaintiff), had allowed 12 months to elapse before commencing proceedings after a complete copy of the work had come to his hands (Lewis v. Chapman, 3 Beav. 134); in this case the plaintiff had permitted the defendant to continue his work without protest, and had not even taken the trouble to procure a copy for five years after publication.

It may, moreover, be taken as a well-defined rule, that
an *ex parte* injunction will never be granted, where a person has knowingly permitted another to proceed with the production complained of for any length of time; this acquiescence may not, however, be fatal so far as a final injunction is concerned (see *Moxborough v. Bower*, 7 Beav. 131, *per* M. R.,)

Where a defendant seeks to prove acquiescence on the part of the plaintiff, he must be prepared to show, either that the plaintiff gave his authority for the carrying on of the work, or that his conduct conducted to what has been done, or that there is sufficient evidence to displace the *prima facie* proof of the plaintiff's copyright (*Morris v. Ashbee*, L. R. 7 Eq. 39, *per* Giffard, V.-C.); if he can do this, he will succeed, for although the Court may acknowledge a right, it frequently refuses an injunction where the conduct of the party complaining has led to the state of things with reference to which the complaint is made (*Rundell v. Murray*, Jacobs, 316). The proprietor of a copyright cannot, however, be said to have abandoned it, merely because he has allowed his work to remain out of print, no matter for what length of time (*Weldon v. Dicks*, 10 Ch. Div. 247).

By 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 26, any proceedings for an offence (with the exception therein mentioned) committed against the Act, must be brought, sued, and commenced within twelve calendar months next after such offence committed. This, however, does not operate to prevent an injunction being applied for, since the plaintiff sues in respect of his copyright; an "offence" is something done in contravention of the provisors of the Act, whereas an application for an injunction is outside the Act altogether (see *Hogg v. Scott*, L. R. 18 Eq. 451).

Where no time is specified by the Legislature, within which proceedings to restrain the infringement of copy-
right must be taken, the plaintiff will, as we have seen, have to come into Court as speedily as possible; it is always open to him, however, to explain the grounds of any delay that may have taken place. Consequently, the necessity of comparing the work complained of, with that from which the matter is alleged to be stolen, may afford sufficient excuse (Maxwell v. Tegg, 2 Russ. 393), and the fact of the law at the time being in an uncertain state, may justify the plaintiff in withholding proceedings (Buxton v. James, 5 De G. & Sm. 84). But where a plaintiff, being informed of the defendant’s proceedings, had the necessary legal documents prepared within five months after, and then took no steps for seven months, a motion for an injunction was refused, the distinction being, between cases where it is absolutely necessary to make due and proper inquiries in the first instance, and those where the delay is referable to the more private convenience of the plaintiff (Bridson v. Benecke, 12 Beav. 1; Lewis v. Chapman, 3 Beav. 135).

Where the damage committed by the defendant is slight, and the plaintiff has delayed the assertion of his right, the Court will take the extent of the damage into consideration, in determining whether an injunction ought or ought not to be granted (Wintle v. Bristol & South Wales Union Railway Co., 6 L. T. (N. S.) 20).

In most actions for infringement, the chief object Account the plaintiff has in view, is to obtain an injunction, and generally speaking, therefore, matters relating to “account” and “damages” are entirely subordinate (see the remarks of Romilly, M. R., in Cartier v. Carville, 31 Beav. 298). A plaintiff may obtain a final injunction, but yet be denied an account on the ground of delay (Harrison v. Taylor, 11 Jur. (N. S.) 408), although the general rule is that the right to an account is incidental to the plaintiff’s other relief, and follows almost as of course
(Grierson v. Eyre, 9 Vsa. 347, per L. C.). In the case above quoted (Harrison v. Taylor) an injunction would probably not have been granted, but for the plaintiff persevering with his piratical designs.

As a corollary, it follows that if the Court should refuse an injunction it cannot grant an account (Price's Patent Candle Co. v. Bauwen's Patent Candle Co., 4 K. & J. 727; Baily v. Taylor, 1 Russ. & M. 78).

The Court has no jurisdiction to give to a plaintiff a remedy for an alleged piracy, unless he can make out that he is entitled to the equitable interposition of the Court by injunction; and, in such case, the Court will also give him an account, that his remedy here may be complete (Baily v. Taylor, supra, 78, per Leach, M.R.).

A plaintiff having obtained an injunction, may insist on an account, no matter how trivial the injury complained of may be (Fraulella v. Weller, 2 Russ. & My. 230), although, of course, where the defendant has actually made no profit out of the transaction, no account can as a matter of possibility be taken (Colburn v. Simms, 2 Hare, 560, per Wigram, V.-C.; Powell v. Aiken, 4 K. & J. 351).

Where it appears that the defendants have sold articles since an interim injunction was applied for and refused, an account will not be directed merely because had the facts and law been sufficiently ascertained at the time of the application for such injunction, the Court would have restrained the defendants from selling (Price's Patent Candle Co. v. Bauwen's Patent Candle Co., supra).

It is also a general principle that a person cannot stand by and allow another to risk his money on a venture, and then come for an account on such venture proving successful (Parrott v. Palmer, 3 Myl. & K. 648).

An account is in most cases directed to be taken of the nett profits gained by the defendant through the sale of
the pirated work; the plaintiff has no right to an account of the gross proceeds (Delf v. Delamotte, 3 Jur. (N. S.) 983, 3 K. & J. 581), even although he can show that he could have sold the production at a greater profit. It has, however, been decided in an American case, that commissions received from the sale of a pirated work are profits, to be accounted for by the commission agent in an action by the proprietor of the copyright (Stevens v. Gladding, 2 Curtis, 608). Even where the piracy consists of the publication of the plaintiff's work in a cheaper form, the Court will only direct the defendant to hand over the profits he has made, for it would be impossible to go into the question of how many copies of the plaintiff's more expensive work have been excluded from sale by reason of the defendant's conduct (Colburn v. Simms, 2 Hare, 500; and see Pike v. Nicholas, 20 L. T. (N. S.) 908, per James, V.-C.)

Where an interim injunction is granted, and the action directed to be tried with a jury, the plaintiff should urge that the defendant be directed to keep an account in the meantime. This was the invariable practice of the Court when actions were sent for trial before a court of common law (Mawman v. Tegg, 2 Russ. 385).

Assuming an injunction to be granted, and that the Court directs an account to be taken, it will, if necessary, refer back the account from time to time so that the certificate can be reviewed, and the defendant and his witnesses are liable to be called upon for their evidence in the usual manner (Kelly v. Hodge, 29 L. T. (N. S.) 387). So, also, the defendant's publishers may give evidence, and can be called upon so to do, for the purpose of enabling the plaintiff to ascertain how many copies of the defendant's work have been sold, and what profit the plaintiff
would have secured from the sale of so many additional copies of his work (Pike v. Nicholas, 20 L. T. (N. S.) 902, per James, V.-C.).

**Damages.**

A court of equitable jurisdiction has power to assess and award damages (21 & 22 Vict. c. 27, s. 2; now repealed, 40 & 47 Vict. c. 40; but see R. S. C., O. XXXVI. r. 58; 46 & 47 Vict. c. 49, s. 6, sub-sec. c.). Such Court has also power to grant an injunction without any inquiry as to damages, and in this respect the matter is one of discretion (Tinsley v. Lacy, 1 H. & M. 747).

In an American case, where the plaintiff omitted to ask for an injunction and only sought an account, he was remitted to the common law courts for damages (Monk v. Harper, 3 Edw. Ch. 109), and it is apprehended that the result would be the same in this country, notwithstanding the power conferred on the courts of equity to try any question of damages, and also notwithstanding the rule that the powers of law and equity are concurrent, for in questions of copyright, an injunction is the foundation of all equitable relief (Baily v. Taylor, 1 Russ. & My. 75).

Where a material piracy is clearly proved, the plaintiff is entitled to an injunction, the question of damage or no damage being immaterial, for what has been done is against the plaintiff, and he is the most competent judge of the injuries he may have sustained (Campbell v. Scott, 11 Sim. 30; Tinsley v. Lacy, 32 L. J. (N. S.) (Ch.) 580, per Wood, V.-C.).

It is a rule that the plaintiff must make his election between damages on the one hand, and an account on the other; he cannot claim both: but this rule would appear to be founded more upon convenience than upon any question of law; for instance, an account only approxi-
measures out the damage the plaintiff has sustained, but he may notwithstanding have sustained greater or less damage, according to circumstances. Keeping an account of the profits may prevent the defendant from deriving any profit, as he may ultimately be obliged to account to the plaintiff for all his gains; yet, if the work which the defendant is publishing in the meantime, really affects the sale of the work which the plaintiff seeks to protect, the consequence is, that the rendering the profits of the former work to the complaining party may not be a satisfaction to him for what he ought to have been enabled to have made of his own work, if it had been the only one published; for he would argue that the profits of the defendant, as compared with the profits which he, the plaintiff, has been improperly prevented from making, could only be in the proportion of any eight shillings, the price of a copy of the one book, to one guinea, the price of a copy of the other (Mawman v. Tegg, 2 Russ. 400, per Lord Eldon). An account is therefore the nearest approximation that the Court can make, for the wrongdoer is compelled to give up to the plaintiff all the profits he has made. There would seem to be no reason, however, why the Court might not proceed to inquire what further damnification (if any) the plaintiff has sustained (ibid.).

A defendant cannot be compelled to make discovery of any facts, the disclosure of which would subject him to penalties and forfeitures at the suit of the plaintiff (Atwill v. Ferrett, 2 Blatchf. 39). The forfeiture should therefore be waived, and the defendant may then be compelled to disclose the number of piratical copies sold, printed, or imported, or the sources from which he has compiled his work (see Kelly v. Wyman, 17 W. R. 399).

The measure of damages in cases of literary piracy has
been thus stated,—"the defendant is to account for every copy of his book sold as if it had been a copy of the plaintiff's, and to pay the plaintiff the profit which he would have received from the sale of so many additional copies" (Pike v. Nicholas, L. R. 5 Ch. 200).
CHAPTER VII.

ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADING, AND HEREIN OF JOINER
OF PARTIES AND COSTS.

Where a prima facie case of piracy is made out against Evidence, the defendant, the onus of proof to show the contrary is thrown upon him, and under these circumstances he may either establish the fact that his own work was prepared without recourse to that of the plaintiff, or that, while he has used the latter, the parts complained of were taken from other sources; it will not be enough for him to show that the passages in question are to be found in the productions of authors other than the plaintiff. Again, the defendant may possibly succeed by showing that any quotations he may have made, are more extensive than those made use of by the plaintiff (see Pike v. Nicholas, L. R. 5 Ch. 262, per Lord Hatherley); or that any errors in his work, and upon which the plaintiff may have relied to make out his case, are to be found in the works of another author. It does not of course follow, that the defendant may not have copied from the plaintiff; but such evidence will be entitled to a certain amount of weight, especially if the defendant produces his manuscript (Hotten v. Arthur, 1 Hem. & M. 609). Circumstances of time and place may tell against the defendant, as where a person charged with copying, stated that he consulted original authorities, but was unable to say where he obtained their works, or where certain meetings were held from which he purported to have drawn much of his information (Pike v. Nicholas, L. R. 5 Ch. 251).
A defendant should not deny copying, if his defence is a fair user for which he would not be liable (see Spiers v. Brown, 6 W. R. 352; Jarrold v. Houston, 3 Ray & J. 708).

Where the onus is thrown on the defendant, it will not do for him to urge a probability as to where he derived the matter complained of, but he must show definitely from whence he obtained it, producing his manuscript, and offering every facility for investigation (see Hotten v. Arthur, 1 Henn. & M. 603; Mawman v. Tegg, 2 Russ. 385, and the judgment of the L. C. in Pike v. Nicholas, L. R. 5 Ch. 251).

It is never necessary for a party who complains that his copyright has been infringed, to specify in his statement of claim the parts of the defendant's work which he thinks have been pirated from his work, but it is sufficient to allege generally that the defendant's work contains several passages which have been pirated from the plaintiff's work, and to verify the allegation by affidavit. Thus, where an injunction was moved for, the two works were brought into Court, and counsel pointed out to the Court, the passages which they relied upon as showing the piracy (Street v. Mungham, 11 Sim. 58, per Shadwell, V.-C.). The articles alleged to be piracies, whether consisting of literary productions or not, should therefore be brought into Court for comparison (Sheriff v. Coates, 1 Russ. & My. 159), although it must be understood that this is by no means absolutely essential (Fradella v. Weller, 2 Russ. & My. 249).

Where the defence relied on is that the plaintiff's production is of a blasphemous or immoral tendency, either the work itself should be produced, or the defendant must be prepared to prove its true character (Gale v. Leckie, 2 Stark. 107).

Substantial identity or great similarity, is in itself
prima facie proof of unlawful copying, and it rests on the defendant to explain such identity or similarity (Pike v. Nicholas, L. R. 5 Ch. 251).

Where the defendant pleads that the plaintiff authorized the act complained of, the consent must be affirmatively proved (Bouicault v. Wood, 2 Biss. (Amer.), 40).

Where an action is brought to recover damages for the unlawful destruction of an unpublished manuscript, evidence is admissible to show that the plaintiff has been in the habit of publishing works injurious to the government of the state (Priestley's Cases, cited 2 Meriv. 437).

If the plaintiff can describe the modus operandi, show how, in what way, or by what process, the defendant committed, or endeavoured to conceal the acts of piracy, it will be to the last extent desirable for him so to do (see Lownes v. Browne, 12 Ir. Law Rep. 293).

On the trial of an action for piracy, the defendant's counsel cannot ask a skilled witness called on behalf of the plaintiff, whether he has not seen printed copies of the work in question, many years ago, in a foreign country; for such a question has reference to an object not produced or accounted for, and the evidence, if given, would be merely secondary (Boosey v. Davidson, 18 Q. B. (N. S.), 257); it is settled that secondary evidence will not be accepted when primary, as, for instance, the production of the publication itself, might be procured (Gale v. Leckie, 2 Stark. 110).

Where a defendant is clearly guilty of an act of piracy, he cannot shelter himself by adducing evidence to show that his conduct is justified by the custom of trade (Maxwell v. Somerton, 80 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 11).

Where an action was brought to restrain the breach of an agreement not to publish a certain work, it was held that the defendant could not give in evidence an offer on the part of the plaintiff to stay proceedings for a specific
sum of money, at least not for the purpose of defeating the injunction, although possibly he might do so for other purposes (Ainsworth v. Bentley, 14 W. R. 680, 682).

In an action for infringement, the plaintiff must prove his title, that is to say, show conclusively that he is either author or proprietor; and he should also produce a copy or example of the work or production alleged to be pirated, and prove the allegations of the statement of claim by suitable evidence, pointing out in what the piracy consists, and showing if possible the modus adopted by the defendant, upon whom the onus will thereupon be thrown. The fact that the plan, arrangement, and combination of a copyright work originated in the brain of its author, may, however, be proved by some other person than such author (Bullinger v. Mackey, 15 Blatchf. (Amer.) 550).

Where the action is for pirating prints or engravings, the evidence to be adduced at the trial is that the plaintiff is the proprietor of such print or engraving, and he may produce the prints taken from the original plate without producing the plate itself.

Although the most obvious method of arriving at a conclusion in a question of piracy, is by a comparison of the offending production with one proved to be genuine, yet the plaintiff may, and most frequently does, produce other evidence, that of an expert for instance, in support of his allegation, or of witnesses to prove an intention on the part of the defendant to deceive, or to prove such facts as tend *prima facie* to put such a construction on his conduct (Chappell v. Sheard, 2 K. & J. 117; Prowett v. Mortimer, 2 Jur. (N. S.), 414).

It is however impossible to establish a charge of piracy of a book, where mere passages or lines of print have been reproduced here and there through hundreds of pages, or
where the authors of a work have applied their labours to various sources of information (Jarrald v. Heywood, 15 W. R. 279).

An action will lie at the suit of the assignee of a print, and as already stated a print taken from the original plate is sufficient evidence without the production of the plate itself (Thompson v. Symonds, 5 T. R. 41).

If the assignee of the right of copying a painting, alleges that some other publication is an infringement of his copyright, he must show that the publication complained of has not been taken from the painting, but from his copy (Lucas v. Cooke, 13 Ch. D. 872).

In all cases a plaintiff suing as assignee must show how, i.e., in what way, he obtained the assignment, but he need not prove any means transfer or transfers (Morris v. Kelly, 1 Jac. & W. 481).

A certified copy of registration under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, ss. 11, 13, is only a prima facie proof of ownership or assignment, and the defendant can bring forward evidence to rebut such evidence (Lucas v. Cooke, supra). The same remark would seem to apply to designs registered under the Patents Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883. Under this same Act, printed or written copies or extracts, purporting to be certified by the Comptroller and sealed with the seal of the Patent Office, of or from patents, specifications, disclaimers and other documents in the Patent Office, and of or from registers and other books kept there, shall be admitted in evidence in all courts in her Majesty's dominions, and in all proceedings, without further proof or production of the originals (sect. 89). Where a contract provided, that if a second edition of a work should be called for the publishers would stereotype it, it was held they became bound to fulfil the contract in this respect; the question whether or no a new edition is required is a matter of fact to be determined by evidence.
ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADING, AND HERIN OF

(Pulte v. Derby, 5 McLean, 328; see Read v. Bentley, 4 K. & J. 665).

In an action for piracy, the plaintiff should deliver stringent interrogatories for the examination of the defendant, *ex. gr.*, as to the number of works printed, sold, or imported, as the case may be, the cost of such printing, &c., and the proceeds realized from the disposition thereof, the number of copies yet on hand, and the source from whence he derived his materials (*Kelly v. Wyman*, 17 W. R. 899; *Tipping v. Clarke*, 2 Hare, 383). Where a defendant offers to submit to an injunction and pay all costs, the plaintiff is nevertheless justified in insisting on a full and complete answer to his interrogatories (*Stephens v. Brett*, 10 L. T. (N. S.) 231) and for this purpose may continue the suit.

Profits on sales already taken place, may be proved by affidavit made by or on behalf of the defendant (*Kelly v. Hodge*, 29 L. T. (N. S.) 387).

Where a motion is made under s. 14 of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, to expunge an entry of proprietorship of copyright it must be clearly and unequivocally shown that such entry is false; if the motion be to vary it, the Court must be satisfied by affidavit that in so doing they would make a true entry (*Ex parte Davidson*, 18 C. B. 207).

Where a person offers to take a certain sum of money as the price of his rights, such offer cannot be given in evidence against him, for he might be willing to forego his rights and so avoid litigation; but after the litigation has begun the circumstances are altered, and he is at perfect liberty to insist on his rights to the utmost (*Ainsworth v. Bentley*, 14 W. R. 682).

Any party in any cause or matter, might require the attendance of any witness before an examiner, and examine such witness orally, for the purpose of using his evidence upon any claim, motion, petition, or other proceeding
before the Court; and any party having made an affidavit to be used, or which should be used, on any claim, motion, petition, or other proceeding before the Court, should be bound to attend before the examiner for the purpose of being examined: Provided that the Court should have discretionary power of acting upon such evidence as might be before it at the time, and of making such interim orders, or otherwise, as might appear necessary to meet the justice of the case. The statute embodying this provision is, however, now repealed (15 & 16 Vict. c. 80, s. 40, repealed by 46 & 47 Vict. c. 49), and the examination of witnesses is provided for by R. S. C. 1883, O. XXXVII.

It was held under the section (s. 40) that no weight is to be attached to an affidavit where the opposite party has had no opportunity to cross-examine the witness (Wightman v. Wheelton, 28 Beav. 397).

Every pleading must contain a statement in a summary form, of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence, as the case may be, but not of the evidence by which they are to be proved. The rules relating to pleading generally will be found set forth in the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883 (O. XIX. rr. 1—28; O. XX. rr. 1—9; O. XXI. rr. 1—21).

The Court or a Judge may, at any stage of the proceedings, allow either party to alter or amend his endorsement or pleadings, in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties (see R. S. C., O. XXVIII. rr. 1—13).

The statement of claim must, as before stated, allege all the facts necessary to show that the plaintiff not only has a title to the copyright, but a right to relief in respect of the infringement of it. In an action under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, the statement should show:

(a.) That the plaintiff is the original proprietor of
the copyright, or if he claims by assignment that such assignment is in writing.

Whether an assignment of copyright in a book should be in writing or not, has been discussed on a previous page, but whatever the state of the law, there is no doubt that it will be far safer to have a transfer in writing, and when this is the case the fact of such transfer being in writing should be alleged by the plaintiff. Where the plaintiff is assignee of an assignee, he need only allege the last assignment to himself (Morris v. Kelly, 1 J. & W. 481), and if the defendant intends to rely on any previous irregularity, he must plead it.

(8.) That the plaintiff was duly registered as proprietor before action brought.

We have seen that so long as the plaintiff is registered as proprietor before action, it is perfectly immaterial that he was not registered when the actual infringement took place (ante, p. 149).

(y.) That the defendant, without the consent in writing of the plaintiff, printed or caused to be printed a book, &c., or that he infringed the copyright by selling copies unlawfully printed, or in some other way interfered with the plaintiff’s copyright, alleging distinctly the form such interference assumed.

Where scienter is necessary to be proved, it should be alleged in a separate paragraph.

(6.) That the defendant intends to commit or continue the act constituting infringement, unless restrained from so doing, and that he has the power to commit or continue it.

This allegation is only necessary where an injunction is claimed, and in many cases the defendant’s power to commit or continue will be presumed from the nature of the case (see Adair v. Young, 12 Ch. D. 13).

Where the defendant has in his possession or under his
control, any considerable number of copies of the pirated work, an injunction to restrain the sale or disposition of them should always be claimed.

(a) That the plaintiff claims an account, or damages.

He cannot claim both.

Form No. 7, Appendix C., Sect. VI. Rules of S. C. 1883, prescribes a form of statement of claim applicable to a simple case of infringement. It omits, however, to state in what way the defendant has infringed the plaintiff's copyright, nor does it show any title in the plaintiff.

Where the action is for the infringement of copyright in a title, the statement of claim should allege that the defendant has continued to publish the work with the intention of inducing the public to believe, and has in fact induced the public to believe, that the book so published by him was identical with that published by the plaintiff. There is properly speaking no right of copy in a mere title.

The plaintiff may also include in his statement, a claim for an order for the cancellation of all plates used by the defendant in the commission of the piracy, and for the delivery up of all copies of the pirated work.

The following is a list of the more usual defences put forward in answer to a statement of claim for the infringement of copyright in a book:—

(a.) That a proper entry of copyright has not been made (3 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 13; see ante, p. 150).

(β.) Where the plaintiff sues as assignee, that a proper entry of such assignment has not been made.

(γ.) That the matter in respect of which the infringement took place is not a proper subject of copyright.
(d.) That there has been a prior publication of the work in question either in this country or abroad. (But see 7 & 8 Vict. c. 12; see ante, p. 185).

e.) That the plaintiff acquiesced in the infringement after knowledge thereof (see ante, p. 202).

(f.) That the work in question is immoral, libellous, obscene, &c. (see ante, p. 23).

(g.) That the plaintiff has endeavoured to deceive the public by misstatements as to authorship (ante, p. 22).

(h.) That no infringement has taken place.

With respect to this last defence, it must be observed, that where the defendant is charged with copying from the plaintiff's work, and the defence is that he made a fair use of it only, that should be pleaded. A total denial, if untrue, would be evidence of bad faith.

(i.) That the plaintiff's title is defective for some reason, e.g. gr., that his copyright has expired.

(j.) That the plaintiff's right of action is barred by lapse of time (3 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 26; see ante, p. 202).

If any action is brought against any person for doing or causing to be done anything in pursuance of the Act, the defendant may plead the general issue, and give the special matter in evidence (s. 26, R. S. C., O. XIX. r. 12).

In addition to the statement of defence, the defendant must also deliver in certain cases, a notice in writing of any objections on which he means to rely on the trial of the action (ibid. s. 10, ante, p. 171). A comprehensive form of notice is given in Appendix A., post.

When such notice is not delivered within the prescribed time, the action may nevertheless be dismissed, if a fatal defect is brought out from the plaintiff's evidence (Cooke v. Judd, 23 Ch. D. 727; 48 L. T. 205).
In an action for the infringement of copyright in engravings, prints, and lithographs, the statement of claim should show:—

(a) That the copyright invaded is vested in the plaintiff, either as original inventor, designer, &c., as proprietor, or as assignee.

That is to say, the statement should clearly define the way in which the copyright so became vested, alleging all the material facts on which the plaintiff relies.

(b) That the provisions of the statute 8 Geo. II. c. 13, s. 1, respecting the engraving of the name of the proprietor and the date of first publication on each plate, &c., have been complied with, ante, p. 88).

Owing to the decisions (Stannard v. Lee; Stannard v. Harrison, ante, p. 89), the proprietor of engravings, &c., should, in addition to engraving the date of first publication and the proprietor's name on the plate and every copy, register his production as a book under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, and when this is done the statement of claim should contain an allegation to that effect, as well as a further statement that the plaintiff was duly registered as proprietor before action brought.

(y) The facts of the piracy, alleging how and in what way the defendant pirated the plaintiff's production.

If the defendant is charged with publishing, selling, or exposing to sale, or otherwise or in any manner disposing of or causing to be published, sold, or exposed to sale or otherwise, or in any other manner disposed of, any print, &c., scirenter must be alleged and proved (8 Geo. II. c. 13, s. 1).

(8) The remedies to which the plaintiff considers himself entitled.

These are or may be:—(1), an injunction; (2), damages,
under 17 Geo. III. c. 57, in respect of a past infringe-
ment; (3), forfeiture of the plate or plates on which the
print or prints, &c., are or shall be copied, and all and
every sheet or sheets (being part of or whereon such
print or prints are or shall be so copied or printed); (4), a
penalty of 5s. for every print found in the defendant's
custody, either printed or published and exposed to sale,
or otherwise disposed of contrary to the true intent and
meaning of the Act (8 Geo. II. c. 13, s. 1).

Defence.

The statement of defence may of course deny any one
or more of the allegations contained in the statement of
claim, the scienter, where that is necessary to be proved,
and also that the action has not been brought within the
space of three calendar months after the commission of
the offence complained of (8 Geo. II. c. 13, s. 3; 7 Geo.
II. c. 88, s. 3; 17 Geo. III. c. 57). The defendant may
also plead that the plaintiff's copyright has expired, and
that the author was not a British subject or resident within
the dominions of the Crown at the time of publication.

In an action against any person for doing or causing to
be done anything in pursuance of the Acts (supra), the
defendant may plead the general issue and give the
special matter in evidence (R. S. C., O. XIX. r. 12).

In an action for the infringement of copyright in paint-
ings, drawings, and photographs, the statement of claim
should show, according to the circumstances of the case:

(a.) The title of the plaintiff, either as author or
assignee.

(b.) That the copyright was retained by the author
or disposed of to an assignee, by instrument
in writing, signed, &c. (25 & 26 Vict. c. 68,
s. 1).

(y.) That the work was executed for the plaintiff on
commission.

(b.) That the plaintiff has a license of user, conferred
by instrument in writing, signed by the proprietor or his agent authorised in writing (ibid. s. 3; see Lucas v. Cooke, 13 Ch. D. 872).

(e.) That the plaintiff, as author or assignee, duly registered the production pursuant to 25 & 26 Vict. c. 68, s. 4, before the alleged infringement took place.

(f) The facts of the piracy, alleging how and in what manner the defendant pirated the plaintiff's production.

(g) The remedy to which the plaintiff considers himself entitled.

This may be—(1) an injunction; (2) damages under sect. 11 of the Act; (3) Penalties under sect. 6.

Penalties are recoverable either by action or by summary proceedings before two justices of the peace.

The defendant's statement will traverse that of the defence, plaintiff, or it may confess and avoid it on the ground that the production is immoral, or on one or more of the other grounds previously set out (ante, pp. 217, 218).

No limitation of time is prescribed by 25 & 26 Vict. c. 68.

With respect to photographs, see Nottage v. Jackson, L. R. 11 Q. B. D. 627.

With respect to sculpture, an action for penalties was given by the statute 13 & 14 Vict. c. 104, but this Act is now repealed (46 & 47 Vict. c. 57), and the plaintiff can only proceed for infringement under the provisions of the Sculpture Copyright Act, 1814 (34 Geo. III. c. 56).

The plaintiff's statement of claim will allege:

(a.) That the right for the invasion of which the plaintiff brings the action is vested in him either as author or assignee.

That is to say, he should allege all the material facts tending to show that he is invested with the right of copy under the Act.
(9.) If vested in the plaintiff as assignee, that the assignment is by deed executed by the proprietor in the presence of two or more witnesses (sect. 4).

(γ.) That the plaintiff caused his name, with the date, to be put on all and every new and original sculpture, model, copy, or cast, and on every cast from nature, before the same was put forth or published (sect. 1).

(δ.) The nature of the relief or remedy to which the plaintiff considers himself entitled.

The remedies are—(1). An action for an injunction based on the original equitable jurisdiction of the Court (and see 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, s. 25 (8)). (2.) An action for damages under the 3rd sect. of the Sculpture Act.

Defence. The defendant may deny all the material allegations contained in the statement of claim, and state further—

(a.) That the action was not brought within six calendar months next after the discovery of the offence (sect. 5).

(δ.) That the plaintiff's copyright has expired.

(γ.) That the work in question is immoral, libellous, &c.

and any one or more of the defences in confession and avoidance referred to in the case of infringement of copyright in books (ante, pp. 217, 218).

In the case of designs the plaintiff now bases his right to protection exclusively upon the statute 46 & 47 Vict. c. 57, repealing all previous Acts on the subject.

His statement of claim should allege:—

(a.) That he is entitled as proprietor to the design (showing how he is entitled).

(δ.) That such design is new or original (see ante, p. 107), and has not been previously published in the United Kingdom.
(y.) That such design was duly registered in respect of class (state the number of class) before publication (giving the date when).

(b.) That before delivery on sale of any articles to which the design has been applied the plaintiff furnished to the Comptroller the prescribed number of exact representations or specimens of the design (giving the date when).

If exact representations or specimens were furnished on the application for registration, this allegation will be unnecessary (sect. 50).

(c) That before delivery on sale of any articles to which the design has been applied, the plaintiff caused each such article to be marked with the prescribed mark, or with the prescribed word or words or figures denoting that the design is registered (sect. 51).

(ξ) That the defendant has, without the license or written consent of the plaintiff, applied the design (or a fraudulent or obvious imitation thereof) to certain articles of manufacture (naming and describing them) in the class or classes of goods in respect of which the design is registered.

(η.) That the defendant published or exposed for sale a certain article of manufacture (naming it), or some substance (naming it) to which such design or any fraudulent or obvious imitation thereof had been applied.

Under this allegation it will be necessary for the plaintiff to prove scienter, and it should be alleged in the clause above.

(θ.) The relief or remedy to which he considers himself entitled.
These remedies are—(1), injunction; (2), action for penalties (sect. 58); (3), action for damages.

The plaintiff must make his election between suing for penalties and for damages, as he cannot obtain both.

*Defence.*

The defendant in his statement of defence may deny all or any of the allegations made by the plaintiff; he may also allege that the plaintiff's "design" is not in point of fact such a design as the Act meant to protect (sect. 60, ante, pp. 102—3), that the plaintiff's copyright has expired, that the acts alleged to have been done do not amount to piracy, or that if done that any piracy was in fact committed.

No time is limited by the Act within which an action for the infringement of a design must be brought.

The plaintiff in an action for the infringement of his copyright (as distinguished from playright) in a dramatic piece or musical composition, will, in his statement of claim, allege the same facts as in the case of an action for the infringement of copyright in books (ante, p. 215); but where the complaint is, that his acting right has been infringed, the circumstances will be somewhat different. In an action of this nature he should show:—

(a.) *That he has such a title in the playright as justifies him in bringing the action.* (The title should be set forth.)

If the plaintiff claims the playright by reason of the assignment of the copyright to him, he must allege that an entry of such assignment has been made (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 22). If he claims as assignee of the playright only, he need not allege any registration.

(b.) *The date of the first representation or performance, and the place where it took place.*

(y.) *That the defendant represented or caused to be represented (as the case may be) the play, &c., at a place of dramatic entertainment (naming it; see Wall v. Taylor; Wall v. Martin, 11
Q. B. D. 102), without the consent in writing of the plaintiff.

(b.) That the defendant, or caused, &c., such play, &c., to be represented on so many occasions (naming them).

(c.) The nature or relief to which he considers himself entitled.

The remedy for each and every representation or performance is a penalty of not less than 40s., or to the full amount of the benefit or advantage arising from such representation, or the injury or loss sustained by the plaintiff therefrom, whichever shall be the greater.

The proprietor of a musical composition should in an action for infringement also allege:

(6) That he printed or caused to be printed upon the title-page of every published copy of such musical composition a notice to the effect that the right of public representation or performance was reserved. (See 45 and 46 Vict. c. 40, s. 1, and the following section, in cases where the right of performance and the copyright are vested in different owners.)

The defendant may of course, and in all cases does, deny defence, the infringement, and further he may allege:

(a.) That the plaintiff has no title to the exclusive right of representation.

This may be because he claims as assignee of the copyright, and has omitted to make the entry required by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 22, or because there has been a prior publication abroad within the meaning of 7 Vict. c. 12, or that the plaintiff being assignee does not claim by instrument in writing.

(β.) That the plaintiff has only an undivided share (see Powell v. Head, 12 Ch. Div. 686), and is
entitled only to a proportionate part of the penalty.

(γ.) Tender before action as to the proportionate part, or payment into Court.

(δ.) That the plaintiff is barred by lapse of time (3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15, s. 3).

(ε.) That the plaintiff has parted with the whole or some portion of his exclusive rights.

For in this case the licensee must be made co-plaintiff, or the action will fail (see Taylor v. Neville, 20 W. R. 290).

In an action for penalties a plea of ignorance is bad, but where a person is sued for "causing to be represented," it must be shown that the representation took place under his direction (nulce, p. 130), and to this extent proof of guilty knowledge is necessary.

Before publication, the author of an intellectual creation has a right of copy therein at common law, and the remedy for infringement is (1) action for damages at common law, (2) injunction.

The plaintiff in an action of damages would allege the right of copy as exclusively existing in him, either as author or transferee, and that the defendant unlawfully and without the consent of the plaintiff published the work in question. To this the defendant might plead that the production was immoral, blasphemous, or indecent, that the plaintiff or his predecessors in title had published the work, or that he (the defendant) had leave and license from the plaintiff to do so.

There is at common law no right in the author or proprietor to the delivery up of pirated works.

Forms of injunction for the protection of a common law right are given in 1 Seton, 252.

Joiner. All persons may be joined as plaintiffs in whom the right to any relief claimed is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative. And judgment
may be given for such one or more of the plaintiffs as may be found to be entitled to relief, for such relief as he or they may be entitled to, without any amendment. But the defendant, though unsuccessful, shall be entitled to his costs occasioned by so joining any person who shall not be found entitled to relief, unless the Court or a judge in disposing of the costs shall otherwise direct (R. S. C. 1883, O. XVI. r. 1).

Provision is also made for the substitution or addition of plaintiffs (r. 2), and the joinder of defendants (rr. 4, 5, 6, 7).

The question of joinder of parties is now of little importance, although it is still as necessary as heretofore to have the proper parties before the Court.

It will be remembered that although a plaintiff may have a right to an injunction upon the strength of an equitable title, he must nevertheless join the owner of the legal title as co-plaintiff.

The costs of and incident to all proceedings in the Court are now in the discretion of the Court: Provided that where any action, cause, matter, or issue is tried with a jury the costs shall follow the event, unless the judge by whom such action, cause, matter, or issue is tried, or the Court shall, for good cause, otherwise order (R. S. C., O. LXV. r. 1).

Subject to this section, and to the general law on the subject of costs, which in most cases is as applicable to actions for the infringement of copyright as to any other species of action, the following decisions may be noted:—

Where a fatal objection appears on the face of a statement of claim, and the defendant does not raise the point of law in his pleadings, in dismissing the action it will be without costs, except where an injunction is sought (Page v. Wisden, 20 L. T. (N. S.) 435).

A defendant who imported copyright matter for sale contrary to the statute, was ordered to pay the costs of an
action, although he had acted without knowledge, and had sold none of the works (Cooper v. Whittingham, 28 W. R. 720).

Where a plaintiff obtains a perpetual injunction he is entitled to costs, no matter how trivial the subject-matter of the action may be, sed ulter in some cases, as, for instance, where the defendant immediately after an interim injunction tenders the full costs up to that date (see Fradella v. Weller, 2 Russ. & My. 247).

And so also where a defendant offers to submit to all the relief to which the plaintiff is entitled, it is the duty of the latter to stay proceedings, and, if he insists on further prosecuting the suit, he will not be entitled to costs from that time (Colburn v. Simms, 2 Hare, 343). But where a plaintiff is compelled to bring the action to a hearing, by reason of the defendant's refusing to pay costs which he ought to have paid, he will be entitled to the whole costs, even although he should at the hearing waive his claim for an account (Kelly v. Hooper, 1 Y. & C. (Ch.) 197).

Where a person deliberately copies another's advertisement, although the Court cannot restrain him, it will as a rule refuse to allow him his costs (Cobbett v. Woodward, L. R. 14 Eq. 407, per Romilly, M.R., see ante, p. 73).

The Court will not, save in instances of bad faith, take any notice of negotiations prior to the action, unless indeed they amount to a release or binding contract, and a plaintiff who proceeds to enforce his rights will accordingly be entitled to costs (Eidelsten v. Eidelsten, 1 De Gex, J. & S. 208).

Where a plaintiff demands more than he is entitled to, and the defendant offers by way of settlement less than he ought to perform, and the plaintiff thereupon brings the action to a hearing, neither party is entitled to costs (Moet v. Couton, 33 Beav. 578).
A plaintiff who after hearing but before judgment becomes bankrupt, cannot be compelled personally to pay the costs, assuming judgment to be entered eventually for the defendant (Boucicault v. Delafield, 10 Jur. (N. S.) 937, 1003).

Where there is not a clear misrepresentation, but the conduct of the defendants is such as to justify the plaintiff in demanding an investigation, the action will be dismissed, and each party must pay his own costs (Ainsworth v. Walmsley, L. R. 1 Eq. 527).

Where in an action (by reason of the defendant having discontinued the piracy), a judge makes no other order than "that the defendant do pay the costs of the action," an appeal by defendants is not for "costs only" within the 49th section of the Judicature Act, 1873 (Dicks v. Yates, 50 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 809).

Notwithstanding the provisions of the Act 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15, to amend the laws relating to dramatic literary property, or any other Act in which those provisions are incorporated, it is now provided (45 & 46 Vict. c. 40, s. 4), that the costs of any action or proceedings for penalties or damages in respect of the unauthorised representation or performance of any musical composition, published before the passing of the Act, shall in cases in which the plaintiff shall not recover more than 40s. as penalty or damages, be in the discretion of the Court or judge before whom such action or proceeding shall be tried.
PART II.—TRADE MARKS.

CHAPTER VIII.

ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY SUBSISTING IN A TRADE MARK AND ON CLAIMS ANALOGOUS TO SUCH RIGHT.

A TRADE MARK, although partaking to some extent of the nature of a monopoly, differs essentially from copyright. Copyright refers to and is intended to protect the substance of a production, whether of a literary or artistic nature, while a trade mark merely protects the identification of an article, and of itself in no way affects the production or sale of a similar article by a third person (see Dicks v. Yates, 50 L. J. N. S. (Ch.) 809). Anyone who has adopted a particular mode of designating his particular manufacture has a right to say, not that other persons shall not sell exactly the same article, better or worse, or an article looking exactly like it, but that they shall not sell it in such a way as to confound the identity, and lead purchasers to believe that it is the manufacture to which that trade mark was originally applied (Farina v. Silverlock, 6 De G. M. & G. 218). The consideration of a true trade mark is primarily centered in an actual mark or device, necessarily annexed to some description of goods or to the envelope or receptacle containing them, and properly registered under the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 57). This Act and the
rules made in pursuance thereof repeal all previous enactments and rules relating to the registration of trade marks (see Sect. 113; Trade Mark Rules, 1883, r. 60), except that the repeal of enactments is not to affect the past operation of any of those enactments, or right to use a trade mark granted or acquired, or application pending, or appointment made, or compensation granted, or order or direction made or given, or right, privilege, obligation, or liability acquired, accrued, or incurred, or anything duly done or suffered under or by any of those enactments before or at the commencement of the Act, nor is such repeal to interfere with the institution or prosecution of any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, in respect thereof, and any such proceeding may be carried on as if the Act had not been passed. Further, such repeal shall not take away or abridge any protection or benefit in relation to any such action or proceeding (46 & 47 Vict. c. 57, s. 113), and the repeal of the rules made under the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875, is without prejudice to any proceeding which may have been taken under such rules (Trade Mark Rules, 1883, r. 60).

It must be observed that there are other species of property which are protected by the Courts, on principles analogous to those governing trade marks proper, as, for instance, the goodwill of a trade so far as it is contained in the style or title of the partnership, the name of a trader, the description of his place of business or peculiar manufacture or product, the wrappers in which goods are enveloped, such wrappers being of a distinguishing style, and the right to a trade secret under certain circumstances.

The protection afforded in these and similar cases does not necessarily depend upon the existence of any trade mark, but is directed against false representations calculated to injure the property, legal or actual,
of another. It is obvious that the assumption of the name of a firm or of a single individual, and whether placed over a shop door, or made known to the public by means of a label or ticket affixed to goods, is in either case a violation of a private right, and if anything it is a greater violation in the former case, where the fraud is extended to the whole business, than in the latter, where the false representation is merely confined to a particular class or classes of goods to which an actual trade mark is affixed (Churtion v. Douglas, Johns. 174, see per Wood, V.-C.).

A trade mark, properly so called, may be described as a particular mark or symbol, used by a person for the purpose of denoting that the article to which it is affixed, is sold or manufactured by him or by his authority, or that he carries on business at a particular place (Kerr on Injunctions, 356), and to the same effect are the remarks of Lord Cranworth in a well-known case (Leather Cloth Co. v. American Leather Cloth Co., 35 L. J. Ch. 61).

The American statutes (Act of July 8th, 1870, ss. 77—84, August 14th, 1876, ss. 1—8), do not contain any definition of a trade mark, and it is frequently a matter of extreme difficulty to say what amounts to one. Thus it has been decided that the exclusive use of a tin pail with a handle to it, the tin ornamented with a geometrical pattern, and used to contain paper collars for sale, and sold with the collars, could not be claimed as a trade mark, either under the statute or by virtue of the general law of trade marks (Tingen v. Libby, 14 Blatchf. (Amer.) 128, and see F. Banks v. Jacobus, ibid. 337). It may be here mentioned that the American Courts have decided that the legislation by Congress on the subject of trade marks, is not authorised, either by the letter or spirit of the constitutional provision from which such authority is sought to be deduced (Leidersdorf v. Flint, 8 Bissell, 327), and
consequently that such legislation is unconstitutional and void. This, however, does not apply to a common law proceeding for enjoining the use of a trade mark (United States v. Roche, 1 McCray (Amer.) 383).

Such rights as are analogous to those subsisting in trade marks are covered by a similar definition, except that the symbol or sign by which the business or goods is or are identified, is not necessarily affixed to the subject-matter. There is consequently no right in such symbol or sign save when used in connexion with a trade or business (Du Boulay v. Du Boulay, L. R. 2 P. C. 441; 38 L. J. (P. C.) 35). It would appear to be definitely settled, that the right to a trade mark proper is not the right in the symbol constituting such mark, but in the application of that symbol to a particular class of goods, or for a particular purpose, or in other words, there can be no right to the exclusive ownership of any symbols or marks universally in the abstract (Leather Cloth Co. v. American Leather Cloth Co., 33 L. J. Ch. 199). Even this modified right of property has only comparatively recently been recognized (Holloway v. Holloway, 13 Beav. 209; Edelsten v. Edelsten, 1 De G. J. & S. 185; 9 Jur. (N. S.) 479; Hall v. Burrows, 4 De G. J. & S. 150; 33 L. J. Ch. 204; Barnett v. Loucarts, 13 L. T. (N. S.) 405; 14 W. R. 166; Ainsworth v. Walmsley, L. R. 1 Eq. 518; 35 L. J. Ch. 352; Wotherpoon v. Currie, L. R. 5 H. L. 522, per Lord Westbury; The Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Wilson, 45 L. J. Ch. 490; 2 Ch. D. 448, in the House of Lords, 47 L. J. (Ch.) 481; 26 W. R. 664), since so late as 1742 Lord Hardwicke denied all right of property, and based whatever remedy a plaintiff might have upon a mere question of fraud (Blanchard v. Hill, 2 Atk. 484), and a hundred years later the same doctrine was apparently held (Perry v. Truefitt, 6 Beav. 66).

The principle upon which the Courts interpose to pre-
vent infringement is, that no man has a right to sell his own goods as the goods of another, either by positive statements or misrepresentations, or by adopting the trade mark, name, or designation of another as descriptive of quality, and in such a way as may be calculated to deceive unwary and incautious customers (Craft v. Day, 7 Beav. 90; Wotherpoon v. Currie, L. R. 5 H. L. 508); and this principle is in no way altered by the Trade Marks Act, 1883 (see Mitchell v. Henry, 15 Ch. Div. 181).

It was laid down by Pearson, J., that the object of the registration of trade marks in England, was to protect trade marks which were in use, and which were intended to be used continuously in this country, and it was not intended to allow all the world to come to England and register trade marks which were not to be used here. Consequently, a person who did not carry on business in England, and did not intend to do so, and had never used his trade mark in this country, would have no right to be put on the register as the proprietor thereof (Re Rivière's Trade Mark, W. N. 1883, p. 212). This decision was, however, reversed on appeal (W. N. 1884, pp. 27, 75).

Where goods are sold with such marks as would denote that they are of the genuine manufacture of the plaintiff, an action will lie, even although the immediate purchaser was perfectly well aware that the plaintiff was not in point of fact the manufacturer (Sykes v. Sykes, 3 B. & Cress. 541; Orr Ewing & Co. v. Johnston, 13 Ch. Div. 434; 7 App. Cas. 219), and this for the obvious reason that the purchaser might sell the goods again without any statement as to their true character (supra; see also Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Wilson, 2 Ch. Div. 434; L. R. 3 App. Cas. 376). The probable fraud on the public, combined with the injury to the plaintiff's purse or business reputation, is therefore the justification of the principle. Should the plaintiff seek to obtain protection on the sale
ground that the public may be or have been imposed upon, he would fail, the protection of the public not being the duty of a private person, but of the Attorney-General (see Clark v. Freeman, 17 L. J. Ch. 142; Hall v. Barrows, 32 L. J. (Ch.) 551, per Romilly, M.R.; Webster v. Webster, 3 Swanst. 400). On the other hand, the plaintiff will equally fail if the alleged imitation of his mark has not deceived and is not likely to deceive ordinary purchasers (Hurricane Lantern Co. v. Miller, 38 How (N. Y.) Pr. 234).

So far as the person aggrieved is concerned, the injury done to his trade by loss of custom is sufficient to support his title to relief (Eidelberg v. Edelsten, 1 De C. & S. 185; Burgess v. Hills, 26 Beav. 247), and he has nothing more to do than to show that his trade mark has been taken (Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Wilson, per Jessel, M.R., 2 Ch. D. 442), or in some cases that part of it has been taken, for if a thing consists of 25 parts and only one is taken, such an imitation may be sufficient to contribute to a deception (Guinness v. Ullmer, Sebastian Dig. 46), although it is quite possible for a valid device to consist of a design which forms a considerable portion of an existing trade mark (Ex parte Farina, 26 W. R. 261; Orr Ewing & Co. v. Johnston, 13 Ch. Div. 434, 7 App. Cas. 219; Liebhjen's Extract of Meat Co. v. Anderson, W. N. 1882, p. 147, affirmed on appeal W. N. 1883, p. 185); in all these cases the question is whether the representation taken as a whole is distinguishable in the ordinary course of business from other representations (Ex parte Orr Ewing & Co. 47 L. J. Ch. 180; 26 W. R. 259).

From the foregoing remarks it will be understood that in cases relating to trade marks proper, it is never necessary in an application for an injunction and an account to prove actual fraud on the part of the defendant, although for reasons to be given in the proper place it may sometimes
be advisable to do so if possible. With respect to a trade name not used as a trade mark affixed to goods, all that has to be proved is, that the defendant has acted in a way calculated to deceive (*Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Wilson*, L. R. 3 App. Cas. 301; *Ditto v. Larmen*, 8 Biss. (Amer.) 151); but in other cases of false representation not amounting to the infringement of a trade mark strictly so called, fraud must be proved even in the Chancery Division (*ibid.*, 2 Ch. Div. 444).

Lord Romilly, in *Hall v. Barrows*, 32 L. J. Ch. 551; divided trade marks proper into two classes—local, denoting where the goods were manufactured, and personal, or those which denote the person who manufactures them; but it is obvious that these divisions do not comprise symbolical trade marks consisting of devices, such as an eagle or an elephant, or a fancy name, and in this respect at least, such a division would hardly seem to be sufficiently extensive. It has also been distinctly disapproved of under other circumstances. A trade mark may, however, be of such a personal nature as of necessity to import that the goods sold under its protection have been manufactured at a particular place, or under certain circumstances, or by a particular person; and when this is the case the distinction drawn would seem to be warranted, as embodying at least one necessary incident, namely, the inability of the owner to assign, at any rate without proper alterations (see *Motley v. Downman*, 3 My. & Cr. 1; *Hall v. Barrows*, 33 L. J. Ch. 204; remarks of Lord Westbury in the *Leather Cloth Co. v. American Leather Cloth Co.*, 33 L. J. Ch. 199, and those of Lord Cranworth in the same case, 11 H. L. Cas. 523; *Bury v. Bedford*, 33 L. J. Ch. 465, per LJI; and see *Robinson v. Finlay*; *Ward v. Robinson*, 9 Ch. D. 487).

A trade mark when registered, can be assigned and
transmitted only in connection with the goodwill of the
business concerned in the particular goods, or classes of
goods, for which it has been registered, and is determinable
with that goodwill (s. 70); and, further, where a person
becomes entitled by assignment, transmission, or other
operation of law, to a registered trade mark, the com-
troller shall on request, and on proof of title to his satisfac-
tion, cause the name of such person to be entered as
proprietor of the trade mark in the register. The person
for the time being entered in the register of trade marks
as proprietor of a trade mark, shall, subject to any rights
appearing from such register to be vested in any other
person, have power absolutely to assign, grant licenses as
to, or otherwise deal with the same, and to give effectual
receipts for any consideration for such assignment, license
or dealing. Provided that any equities in respect of such
trade mark, may be enforced in like manner as in respect
of any other personal property (s. 87, and see s. 78).

Where several trade marks have been registered in a
series, under s. 66, such series of trade marks is assignable
and transmissible only as a whole, but for all other pur-
poses each of the trade marks composing a series shall be
deemed and treated as registered separately.

There shall not be entered in any register kept under
the Act, or be receivable by the comptroller, any notice of
any trust expressed, implied, or constructive (s. 85).

Trade marks properly so called consist of some descrip-
tion or device in some way or other affixed to the article
sold, and that description or device may be either
affixed to, or impressed upon, the goods themselves by
means of a stamp or an adhesive label or ticket, or it
may be made to accompany the goods by being impressed
or made to adhere to an envelope or case containing
them (Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Wilson, 2 Ch. D.
441).
And by the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883, the name of an individual or firm used as a trade mark, must be printed, impressed, or woven in some particular and distinctive manner (sect. 64). Under the Trades Mark Registration Act, 1875, the plaintiff’s mark must, in order to support an action, have been put forth to the world by the party complaining of the misuser of it (Lawson v. Bank of London, 18 C. B. 93), that is to say, it must have been affixed to a vendible article actually in the market (McAndrew v. Bassett, 4 De G. J. & S. 386); but no questions of this kind can now arise under the new Act, as it is provided that “registration of a trade mark shall be deemed to be equivalent to public use of the trade mark” (46 & 47 Vict. c. 57, s. 73), and in order to constitute a public user it is sufficiently plain that the trade mark must be actually in the market, for so it was held with respect to the public user of goods (McAndrew v. Bassett, supra; Maxwell v. Hogg, L. R. 2 Ch. 307). The section of the Act therefore provides in effect that registration of a trade mark shall be equivalent to placing the class of articles protected by it in the market as vendible articles.

The question as to what constitutes a sufficient length of user to give the plaintiff an exclusive right to a trade name or designation not registered under the Act, may be resolved by reference to the judgment in Hall v. Barrows, 32 L. J. Rep. 551, in which a decided opinion was expressed that the interference of a Court of Equity does not depend on the length of time the name has been used, and that although it might not have been adopted a week, and might not have acquired any reputation in the market, still the right to use it would be protected. It is to be observed, however, that in order to make out a case for the interference of the Court, it must be shown that there is at least a probability of pecuniary loss or damage resulting
from the wrongful act (Leather Cloth Co. v. American Leather Cloth Co., 33 L. J. Ch. 200, per Westbury, L.C.), and, therefore, if a plaintiff can show that the defendant has copied his trade name or designation under circumstances calculated to deceive the public, he proves in effect that such name and designation were sufficiently identified with his business, otherwise the public could not possibly suffer, nor would he himself sustain any loss prospective or otherwise. And again, the mere fact of a person imitating the name of another would seem to show that such name is known in the market, for in any other event the plagiarist would gain nothing by his pains.

If a person should endeavour to use his right in a trade mark for the purpose of getting a monopoly in particular articles, as if he had a patent for the manufactured goods, such trade mark will not be protected (Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Wilson, 2 Ch. Div. 456, per Mellish, L.J.; Morgan v. McAdam, 36 L. J. Ch. 228, per Wood, V.C.; Flavel v. Harrison, 10 Hare, 467; Linoleum Manufacturing Co. v. Nairn, 7 Ch. Div. 834, and refer also to Wheeler v. Wilson v. Shakespeare, 39 L. J. Ch. 36). The name by which a patented article is generally known becomes publici juris at the expiration of the patent, and cannot properly be registered as a trade mark (Re Ralph, 53 L. J. N. S. (Ch.) 188).

Where also the inventor of a new substance had given it a name and taken out a patent for his invention, he is nevertheless not entitled to the exclusive use of that name after the expiration of the patent (Linoleum Manufacturing Co. v. Nairn, 7 Ch. D. 834).

There is no advantage to be gained by registering a trade mark under any of the Copyright Acts (Maxwell v. Hogg, L. R. 2 Ch. 307; In re Meikle, 46 L. J. (Ch.) 19), and irrespective of the Copyright Law, the Court will
restrain a person from publishing a newspaper or periodical, purporting to be a continuation of the plaintiffs, or intituled in such a way as to lead the public to purchase it as such (Hogg v. Kirby, 8 Ves. 215; Prowett v. Mortimer, 2 Jur. (N. S.) 414; Kelly v. Hutton, L. R. 3 Ch. 703; Bell v. Locke, 8 Paige (Amer.) 75).