Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks
Patent and Trademark Office (P.T.O.)
RE: TRADEMARK APPLICATION OF VYCOM ELECTRONICS
LTD.
36-86
July 18, 1986
*1 Petition Filed: May 30, 1986
For: THE FUTURE SHOP
Serial No. 490,694
Filed: July 19, 1984
Attorney for Petitioner
Robert B. McMorrow
Sughrue, Mion, Zinn, Macpeak & Seas
Margaret M. Laurence
Assistant Commissioner
for Trademarks
On Petition
Vycom Electronics Ltd.
has petitioned the Commissioner, pursuant to Trademark Rule 2.146, to exercise
supervisory authority and vacate the April 30, 1986 ruling of the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board.
The ruling in question
was on a motion to suspend proceedings. This motion was filed together with a
request for reconsideration of the Board's March 14, 1986 decision affirming
the Examining Attorney's refusal to allow registration of the above identified
mark. Petitioner had asked the Board to suspend proceedings in order that
petitioner might investigate whether the marks which were the basis for the
refusal of registration were abandoned, in which case petitioner intended to
file petitions to cancel them.
The Board denied this
motion to suspend, advising petitioner that where an application has been
considered and decided on appeal, it will not be reopened except for the entry
of a disclaimer or upon order of the Commissioner.
Petitioner claims that
there was no valid reason for the Board to deny the motion to stay proceedings,
and that if petitioner's information that the cited registrations have been
abandoned is correct and it is successful in the cancellation proceedings which
it brought contemporaneously with the filing of the subject petition, the above identified
application can then be passed to publication. Thus, petitioner argues, by
staying the proceedings the Board could avoid the need for petitioner to appeal
the Board's decision and thereby conserve judicial time and effort.
Rule 2.146(a)(3) provides
that the Commissioner will exercise supervisory authority in appropriate
circumstances. While a final decision by the Board is not an appropriate
circumstance for the exercise of supervisory authority, Miss Nude Florida, Inc.
v. Drost, 198 USPQ 485, 486 (Com'r.Pats.1977), the subject petition concerns a
ruling by the Board on a motion to stay proceedings, and is therefore within
the jurisdiction of the Commissioner. However, the Commissioner will exercise
supervisory authority only where the Board has committed clear error or abused
its discretion. Riko Enterprises, Inc. v. Lindsley, 198 USPQ 480
(Com'r.Pats.1977). That has not occurred here.
Although petitioner has
characterized its motion as one to stay proceedings, in fact it is a motion to
reopen prosecution because of what was at the time contemplated and are now
filed petitions to cancel. Rule 2.142(g) makes it clear that a motion to
reopen, except for entry of a disclaimer, must be upon order of the
Commissioner.
*2 Further, even
if petitioner had couched his petition as a request to reopen, it would be
denied. A review of Commissioner's decisions on reopening prosecution indicates
that such requests are denied when reopening prosecution would require additional examination in order
to determine suitability for registration. See, Ex parte Helene Curtis
Industries, Inc., 134 USPQ 73 (Com'r. Pats.1962); Ex parte Simoniz Co., 161
(USPQ 365 (Com'r.Pats.1969); and In re Mack Trucks, Inc., 190 USPQ 642
(Com'r.Pats. and Trademarks 1976).
Petitioner's information
about possible nonuse of the marks cited against petitioner's, and the petitions
to cancel which were filed contemporaneously with the subject petition, do not
constitute sufficient cause for consideration of matter not already
adjudicated. The filing of a petition to cancel does not place the application
in condition for publication, since the cancellation proceeding would have to
be completed, with a conclusion favorable to petitioner, before the refusal to
register could be withdrawn.
Further, during the
pendency of the application before the Examining Attorney, petitioner could
have elected to file petitions to cancel the cited registrations and to request
suspension of further action on its application. TMEP § 1108.01. Instead, petitioner elected to file
an ex parte appeal and pursue it to a final decision by the Board. Rule
2.142(g) was not intended to permit an applicant to pursue the wholly different
procedural alternative of a cancellation proceeding after the Board has finally
disposed of an application by a decision adverse to applicant on an ex parte
appeal.
The petition is denied.
21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1799
END OF DOCUMENT