Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks
Patent and Trademark Office (P.T.O.)
ORIKASA ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
OONISHI ET AL., RESPONDENTS
Interference No. 101,617
January 18, 1989
Donald J. Quigg
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks
DECISION ON PETITION
*1 Orikasa et al.
(Orikasa--hereinafter "Junior Party") have filed a "PETITION UNDER 37 CFR 1.644(a)(2) or
(3)" seeking review of a decision redeclaring Interference No. 101,617.
Oonishi et al. (Oonishi--hereinafter the "Senior Party") have not
filed a response.
Timeliness of petition
The Junior Party seeks to
invoke the supervisory authority of the Commissioner to review a decision
redeclaring an interference. 37 CFR §
1.644(a)(2). Alternatively, the Junior Party seeks relief under 37 CFR §
§ 1.183 and 1.644(a)(3), although it is
not clear from the petition which rule the Junior Party wants waived.
A petition in an
interference seeking to invoke the supervisory authority of the Commissioner is
properly filed only after entry of a final decision by the board. The Junior
Party's petition was filed on November 30, 1988, after entry of the board's
final decision entered August 29, 1988. The rules also provide, however, that
any petition filed more than fifteen (15) days after entry of the decision
sought to be reviewed may be dismissed as untimely. 37 CFR § 1.644(b). The period for filing a response
to a petition is also fifteen (15) days. Id. The purpose of the two 15-day
periods is to permit a petition to be filed, responded to, and decided prior to
expiration of the 60-day period for seeking judicial review. 35 U.S.C. § 142; 37 CFR § 1.304(a). If a petition cannot be decided within the 60-day
period, an extension of time to seek judicial review may be granted by the
Commissioner, sua sponte or on request of a party.
In this case, the petition was filed after a
notice of appeal had been filed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. A review of the petition, in light of the application and interference
files, demonstrated that some relief might well be appropriate in this
particular case. Accordingly, in the interest of conserving judicial resources,
the Commissioner filed a motion to intervene in the Federal Circuit. The
Commissioner also moved to vacate the August 29, 1988, decision of the board
and to remand the matter to the Patent and Trademark Office for such action as
might be appropriate. The Federal Circuit granted both motions. Orikasa v.
Oonishi, No. 89-1105 (Fed.Cir. Jan. 4, 1989).
In this case, the 15-day
period for filing a petition will be excused in view of the unique interference
record, the fact that this is one of the first petitions under 37 CFR § 1.644(a)(2), and for the purpose of
conserving judicial resources. Parties in interferences are advised, however,
that in the future, the 15-day periods of 37 CFR § 1.644(b) will be strictly enforced and untimely filed petitions
may be dismissed.
Background
*2 This is an
interference between two pending applications. Both parties rely exclusively on
the filing dates of their respective Japanese applications.
35 U.S.C. § 119.
At the time the
interference was declared, the Senior Party's application contained four claims
which the examiner found allowable--subject to resolution of the interference.
Claims 1 and 2 are directed to a copolymer. Claims 3 and 4 are directed to a
method of making a copolymer. Claims 1 and 3 are representative and read as
follows:
Senior Party's Claim 1:
An ethylene copolymer
for use as electrical insulation derived from ethylene and an ethylenically
a,B-unsaturated acid halogenated phenyl ester represented by the formula (1):
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH ATTHIS POINT IS NOT
DISPLAYABLE
(wherein R is hydrogen or a methyl group, X is fluorine, chlorine,
bromine, or iodine, Y is an alkyl group having 4 to 18 carbon atoms, n is 0 or
1, m is an integer of 1 to 5, and L is 0 or an integer of 1 to 4), wherein the
halogenated phenyl ester group unit content is about 0.005 to about 10 mol%.
Senior Party's Claim 3:
A process for producing an ethylene copolymer which comprises copolymerizing ethylene and about 0.005 to
about 10 mol% (based on the total amount) of an ethylenically a,B-unsaturated
acid halogenated phenyl ester at a temperature of about 120 <<degrees>>
C. or more and a pressure of about 500 kg/cm2 or more by the use of a free
radical group releasing initiator.
It should be noted that
the ethylenically a,B-unsaturated monomer is defined broader in method claim 3.
The definition in claim 3 would appear to be broader than the description of
the process in the Senior Party's specification. Page 4, lines 14-19 of the
Senior Party's specification states:
"In another
embodiment, the present invention relates to a process for producing an
ethylene copolymer which comprises copolymerizing ethylene and about 0.005 to
about 10 mol% ... of an ethylenically a,B-unsaturated acid halogenated phenyl
ester of the formula (1)...."
Formula (1) is the formula in the Senior Party's claim 1. Whether
the subject matter of the Senior Party's claim 3 is "described" [FN1]
in the specification is a matter which the parties may raise inter partes with
a preliminary motion [FN2] or the examiner can re-evaluate after the
interference is concluded.
The Junior Party's application
contains fifteen (15) claims. The precise subject matter sought to be covered
by claims 1-14 is not entirely clear. Claims 2-14 depend from
"independent" claim 1, which reads:
Junior Party's Claim 1: [FN3]
A method for improving
impulse destructive strength of an electrical insulating material which is
characterized by employing, as said electrical insulating material, an ethylene
copolymer prepared by subjecting, to a high- pressure radical polymerization,
ethylene or a mixture of ethylene and another monomer in the presence of at
least one compound selected from the group consisting of one-to three-ring
aromatic compounds (except styrene and substituted styrenes each having a
single ring) each having one carbon-carbon double bond in one molecule, at a
polymerization pressure of 500 to 4,000 kg/cm 2 at a polymerization temperature
of 50 to 400 <<degrees>> C., with said ethylene copolymer
containing 0.005 to 1 mol% of a unit derived from said aromatic compound as a
polymeric component.
*3 The Junior Party's dependent claims 2, 13, and 14 read as
follows:
Junior Party's Claim 2:
A method according to
Claim 1 wherein said aromatic compound is an aromatic hydrocarbon. [FN4]
Junior Party's Claim 13:
A method according to claim 1 wherein said
aromatic compound is selected from the group consisting of:
allyl benzene,
phenylbutene,
benzyl methacrylate,
benzylacrylate,
indene,
beta-methyl styrene,
phenylcyclohexene,
methoxybeta-methyl
styrene,
chlorophenyl
cyclohexene and
phenylvinyl ether.
Junior Party Claim 14:
A method according to
claim 1 wherein said aromatic compound is selected from the group consisting of
allylbiphenyl,
diphenylethylene,
phenyl styrylethane,
phenylbenzyl methacrylate,
phenylbenzylacrylate,
isopropenyl biphenyl,
vinyl naphthalene,
phenylisopropenyl
phenylmethane and
vinylanthracene.
The breadth of the
"copolymer" of the Junior Party's claim 1 is broader than the
corresponding scope of the "copolymer" of the Senior Party's claim 1.
The Junior Party's specification reveals that the copolymer can be a copolymer
of ethylene and any number of a,B-ethylenically unsaturated monomers, including
those specified in the Junior Party's claims 13 and 14.
The Junior Party's claims
1-14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §
103 as unpatentable over U.S. patents to Schrott [FN5] and Vollkommer.
[FN6] While it is not the purpose of this opinion to review any rejection of
claims 1-14, it will be noted that Schrott describes copolymers of ethylene and
olefins having the formula:
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT
DISPLAYABLE
where:
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT
DISPLAYABLE
is a phenyl radical containing up to 5 halogen atoms and
is a hydrocarbon radical having 1-16 carbon atoms. See generally,
col. 2, lines 18-38 and col. 3, 55-57. Thus, Schrott provides a colorable basis
for the examiner's present view that some of the subject matter claimed by the
Junior Party may not be patentable. Nevertheless, in view of the examiner's
conclusion that the Junior Party's claim 15 defines patentable subject matter,
it is also apparent that at least the Junior Party's claims 1 and 3-12 include,
i.e., "read on," some subject matter which is patentable under 35
U.S.C. § § 102 and 103, even if they
may also include subject matter which may not be patentable.
In order to set up an
interference, the examiner gave the Junior Party an opportunity to copy a claim
to a copolymer. Claim 15 was timely presented by the Junior Party and reads:
Junior Party Claim 15:
An ethylene copolymer
for use as electrical insulation derived from ethylene and an ethylenically
a,B-unsaturated acid halogenated phenyl ester represented by the formula:
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT
DISPLAYABLE
wherein R is hydrogen or
a methyl group, wherein the halogenated phenyl ester group unit content is
about 0.005 to 1 mole percent.
*4 Following presentation of the
Junior Party's claim 15, the examiner completed Form PTO-850, an
"Interference--Initial Memorandum" used for forwarding cases to the
board for declaration of an interference under the "new" rules, viz.,
37 CFR § 1.601 et seq. The Form
PTO-850, as completed by the examiner, specifies that there should be one
count. The examiner designated claims 1-4 of the Senior Party and claim 15 of
the Junior Party to correspond to the count. The count was to be based
essentially on the Senior Party's claim 1. The examiner indicated on Form
PTO-850 that the Junior Party's claims 1-14 were not to correspond to the
count.
When Form PTO-850 reached
the board, a change was made to designate the Junior Party's claims 1-15 to
correspond to the count. Consultation with the examiner in the course of
deciding this petition, reveals that the examiner did not make the change.
On July 25, 1986, an
interference was declared with a single count. Count 1 reads:
An ethylene copolymer
for use as electrical insulation derived from ethylene and an ethylenically
a,B-unsaturated acid halogenated phenyl ester represented by the formula (1):
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT
DISPLAYABLE
(wherein R is hydrogen or
a methyl group, X is fluorine, chlorine, bromine, or iodine, Y is an alkyl
group having 4 to 18 carbon atoms, n is 0 or 1, m is an integer of 1 to 5, and L is 0 or an
integer of 1 to 4), wherein the halogenated phenyl ester group unit content is
about 0.005 to about 10 mol%.
The Junior Party's claims
1-15 and the Senior Party's claims 1-4 were designated by the examiner-in-chief
to correspond to the count.
During the interference,
the Junior Party filed a motion to redefine the interference. Specifically, the
Junior Party sought entry of an order seeking to designate the Junior Party's
claims 2, 13, and 14 as not corresponding to the count. Such a motion is
authorized by 37 CFR § 1.633(c)(4). See
also 37 CFR § 1.637(c)(4). The Junior
Party pointed out that the count was directed to copolymers made from ethylene
and a monomer having an ester group, i.e.,
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT
DISPLAYABLE
and a halogen group, i.e., fluoro (-F), chloro (-Cl), bromo (-Br),
or iodo (-I). Based on this difference between
the subject matter of the Junior Party's claim 2 and the count, it was argued
that the subject matter of claim 2 was not the same patentable invention as
that defined by the count (sic--the other claims corresponding to the count).
See 37 CFR § 1.601(n).
With respect to the
Junior Party's claim 13, it was argued that copolymer of ethylene and the
monomers recited in the Markush group of claim 13 would not constitute the same
patentable invention as the copolymer of the count. While the Junior Party
conceded that two monomers were "esters," [FN7] it argued that neither is halogenated. The Junior Party also
conceded that one monomer was halogenated, [FN8] but argued that it was not an
"ester." Similar arguments were made with respect to the monomers
listed in the Markush group of the Junior Party's claim 14. The Junior Party
also argued that:
*5 (a) none of
the subject matter of claims 2, 13, or 14: (i) overlapped the subject matter of
the count [FN9] or
(ii) was described in the Senior Party's
application and
(b) the Senior Party's application "will not be prior art to
... [the Junior Party] as to any non-overlapping subject matter ... [in view
of] In re McKellin, [529 F.2d 1324,] 188 USPQ 428 (CCPA 1976)." [FN10]
The Senior Party did not
oppose the motion.
The examiner-in-chief
denied the Junior Party's motion to redefine the interference. The
examiner-in-chief indicated that the examiner had determined that claims 1-4 of
the Senior Party interfered with claims 1-15 of the Junior Party. [FN11] Based
on this fact, the examiner-in-chief held that there is a presumption that the
parties are claiming the same patentable invention, i.e., that an
interference-in-fact exists. See Case v. CPC Int'l Inc., 730 F.2d 745, 750, 221
USPQ 196, 200 [headnote 9] (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 872 (1984). The
examiner-in-chief, citing 37 CFR §
1.637(c)(4)(ii), also noted that the Junior Party had presented no
evidence to establish that the invention
defined by the Junior Party's claims 2, 13, and 14 was patentably distinct from
the other claims of both parties corresponding to the count. [FN12]
The Junior Party did not
allege a date of invention prior to the effective date of the Senior Party.
Accordingly, the examiner-in-chief issued an order to show cause why judgment
should not be entered against the Junior Party. In response to the order, the
Junior Party requested review of the motion decision at a final hearing. See 37
CFR § 1.640(e) and Commissioner's
Notice of Dec. 8, 1986, 1074 Off.Gaz.Pat.Off. 4 (Jan. 6, 1987).
In due course, the Junior
Party timely filed a brief. The Senior Party did not file a brief.
On May 18, 1988, a panel
of the board entered an order holding that the interference had not been
properly declared. In effect, the board held that the "issue [FN[13]] of
the interference as presently formulated is not broad enough to encompass the
subject matter of ... [the Junior Party's] claims 13 and 14. Count 2 was
proposed to replace count 1 [indentation added]:
An ethylene copolymer
for use as electrical insulation derived from ethylene and
(i) an aromatic
compound selected from the group consisting of
allyl benzene,
benzyl methacrylate,
benzylacrylate,
indene,
betamethyl styrene,
phenylcyclohexene,
methoxybeta-methyl
styrene,
chlorophenyl
cyclohexene
phenylvinyl ether,
allylbiphenyl,
diphenylethylene,
phenyl styrylethane,
diphenyl methylpentene,
phenylbenzyl
methacrylate,
phenylbenzylacrylate,
isopropenyl biphenyl,
*6 vinyl
naphthalene,
phenylisopropenyl
phenylmethane and
vinylanthracene or
(ii) an ethylenically
alpha,beta-unsaturated acid halogenated phenyl ester represented by the formula
(1):
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT
DISPLAYABLE
(wherein R is hydrogen or
a methyl group, X is fluorine, chlorine, bromine, or iodine, Y is an alkyl
group having 4 to 18 carbon atoms, n is 0 or 1, m is an integer of 1 to 5, and
L is 0 or an integer of 1 to 4), wherein the halogenated phenyl ester group
unit content is about 0.005 to about 10 mol%.
The board stated that
Count 2 was specifically drawn narrow enough not to encompass the subject
matter of the Junior Party's rejected claim 2. The reason given was that the
Junior Party's claim 2 had been held unpatentable by the examiner.
The parties were given 30
days to state any objection to redeclaration of the interference. The Junior
Party timely filed an objection. The Junior Party continued to insist that the
subject matter of its claims 2, 13, and 14 was patentably distinct from the
subject matter of the remaining claims of both parties involved in the
interference. The Junior Party made several observations, some of which were:
1. No one, whether
expert or not, has testified that species [of claims 2, 13, or 14] were
patentably indistinct. There is no documentation, extensive or otherwise, in
support of ... a conclusion [that the subject matter of claims 2, 13, and 14 is
the same patentable invention as the remaining claims of the parties involved
in the interference]. (Paper No. 21, page 2, lines 2- 24).
2. Proposed Count 2 in
effect equates a halogenated ester with a halogenated
non-ester. No basis for doing so is proposed. (Paper No. 21, page 3, lines
8-9).
3. Proposed Count 2 in
effect equates a halogenated ester with a non- halogenated ester. No basis for
doing so is advanced. (Paper No. 21, page 3, lines 10-11).
4. No reason has been
proposed or evidence advanced in support of the proposition that those skilled
in this art would recognize one could substitute the aromatic compound (i) of
proposed Count 2 for the halogenated ester of the count in interference. The
only disclosure of such a possibility is in the application of the Junior Party
... and reliance thereon is clearly improper. In re Grabiak, [769 F.2d 729,]
226 USPQ 870 (Fed.Cir.1985). (Paper No. 21, page 3, lines 12-18).
The Senior Party did not
respond. On August 29, 1988, the board enteredits final decision. It found the
Junior Party's arguments unpersuasive. In response to the Junior Party's
arguments, the board made the following observations:
A. The primary examiner
failed to cause this interference to be declared [FN14] with a count sufficiently broad so as to encompass the
broadest corresponding patentable [FN15] claim of each party. (Page 2, lines
13-19).
B. When the
interference was declared, all of the Junior Party's claims as well as all of
the Senior Party's claims were designated [FN16] as corresponding to count 1
and presumptively [FN17] all the parties' claims define the same patentable invention. (Page
2, line 34--page 3, line 5).
*7 C. "We
merely proposed to correct a clerical [FN18] error with respect to the scope of
the count." (Page 3, lines 5-6).
D. "When an
examiner causes an interference to be declared [sic--forwards applications to
the board for declaration of an interference], he is authorized to designate a
claim under rejection as corresponding to a count as long as he deems that the
claim defines the same patentable invention as the count." [FN19] (Page 3,
lines 28-32).
E. "[The Junior
Party] ... has the burden of establishing with sufficient evidence his
contention that his claims 2, 13, and 14 do not define the same patentable
invention as any other claim designated ... as corresponding to the
count." (Page 5, lines 14-17).
F. "We hold that
... [the Junior Party's] claims 2, 13, and 14 define the same patentable
invention as that defined by any other claim designated as corresponding to
count 2." (Page 6, lines 18-20).
G. "[The Junior
Party] has not submitted any evidence to show, for example, that benzyl
methacrylate of his claim 13 defines a separate patentable invention from the
corresponding halogenated benzyl methacrylate of ... [the Senior Party's] claim
1 or that phenylbenzyl methacrylate of his claim 14 defines a separate
patentable invention from the corresponding halogenated phenylbenzyl
methacrylate of ... [the Senior Party's] claim 1. (Page 7, line 29-page 8, line 3).
The board's final decision
Based on its review of
the record, the board concluded that the interference should be redeclared with
Count 2 and that the Junior Party's claims 1-15 and the Senior Party's claims
1-4 should be designated to correspond to the count.
The board declined to
grant the Junior Party's motion to designate claims 2, 13, or 14 as not
corresponding to the count--now Count 2. The board's "judgment" was
that the Junior Party is not entitled to a patent containing claims 1-15 [FN20]
and that the Senior Party was entitled to a patent containing claims 1-4.
[FN21]
Opinion
A review of the
application files and the interference file reveals several problems.
The first problem which
readily surfaces in these files is the fact that Count 2 is directed to a
copolymer and the claims corresponding to the count are directed to copolymers,
methods of making copolymers, and arguably a use of the copolymer as insulation
for an electrical conductor.
A second problem is the meaning and scope of
the Junior Party's claims 1-14. Are they directed to a method or to an
electrical conductor insulated with a copolymer?
A third problem is the
manner in which the board in this case applied the presumption that all claims
designated to correspond to a count are directed to the same patentable
invention.
These problems will be
discussed seriatim.
I.
Depending on the facts of
any particular case, it is possible, although highly unlikely, that a method of
making a material and the material are directed to the same patentable
invention. Likewise, it is possible that a material and a use of the material
are directed to the same patentable invention. Finally, it is possible that a
method of making a material, the material, and use of the material could be the
same patentable invention. More likely, however, the method of making the
material, the material, and a use of the material are separate patentable
inventions.
*8 In those cases
where a method of making a material and the material are the same patentable invention,
the count must be drawn in language to include, in the alternative, both the
material and the method for making the material. For example, if the material is a copolymer
of ethylene and styrene and the method is copolymerizing ethylene and styrene,
then the count should read:
A copolymer of ethylene
and styrene
or
A method of making a
copolymer of ethylene and styrene comprising copolymerizing ethylene and
styrene.
All claims of both parties directed to either the copolymer or the
method of making the copolymer may then be designated to correspond to the
count. The important fact is that proof of priority with respect to an
embodiment within the scope of the count will suffice to establish priority of
the "patentable" invention in question. Thus:
The "count"
... is merely the vehicle for contesting priority which, in the opinion of the
Commissioner, effectively circumscribes the interfering subject matter, thereby
determining what evidence will be regarded as relevant on the issue of
priority.
Squires v. Corbett, 560 F.2d 424, 433, 194 USPQ 513, 519 (CCPA
1977).
The same rationale
applies to a material and a use of the material. Thus, if a copolymer of
ethylene and styrene and an electrical conductor insulated with the copolymer
are a single patentable invention, then the count should be drawn as follows:
A copolymer of ethylene
and styrene
or
an electrical conductor
insulated with a copolymer of ethylene and styrene.
Obviously, if the method
of making the material, the material and a use of the material define a single
patentable invention the count should read as follows:
A copolymer of ethylene
and styrene
or
A method of making a
copolymer of ethylene and styrene comprising copolymerizing ethylene and
styrene
or
an electrical conductor
insulated with a copolymer of ethylene and styrene.
As indicated above, it
should be rare that a method of making a material and the material or the
material and a method of using the material are a single patentable invention. Consultation with the
examiner assigned to examine the Junior Party's and the Senior Party's
applications reveals that in this case he regards the method of making the
copolymer, the copolymer and the use of the copolymer as an electrical
insulator to be three separate patentable inventions. Since both the Junior
Party and the Senior Party disclose all three inventions, there should have
been three counts in this interference.
In view of the examiner's
opinion, further proceedings in this interference will be ordered.
Junior Party Orikasa is
given one (1) month from the date of this decision to copy the following claims
for purposes of further proceedings in the interference:
Suggested Claim 16:
A process for producing
a copolymer of ethylene and an a,B-unsaturated monomer having the formula:
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT
DISPLAYABLE
*9 wherein R is
hydrogen or a methyl group and wherein the halogenated phenyl ester group unit
content is about 0.005 to 1 mole percent, comprising copolymerizing ethylene
and the a,B-unsaturated monomer at a temperature of 50 <<degrees>>
to 400 <<degrees>> C. and a pressure of 500 to 4,000 kg/cm2 in the presence of a free radical catalyst.
Suggested Claim 17:
An electrical conductor
insulated with a material comprising a copolymer of ethylene and an
a,B-unsaturated monomer having the formula:
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT
DISPLAYABLE
wherein R is hydrogen or
a methyl group and wherein the halogenated phenyl ester group unit content is
about 0.005 to 1 mole percent.
Senior Party Oonishi is
given one (1) month from the date of this decision to copy the following claim
for purposes of further proceedings in the interference:
Suggested Claim 5:
An electrical conductor
insulated with a material comprising a copolymer of ethylene and an
a,B-unsaturated monomer having the formula:
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT
DISPLAYABLE
wherein R is hydrogen or
a methyl group, X is fluorine, chlorine, bromine, or iodine, Y is an alkyl
group having 4 to 18 carbon atoms, n is 0 or 1, m is an integer of 1 to 5, and
L is 0 or an integer of 1 to 4 and wherein the halogenated phenyl ester group unit content
is about 0.005 to about 10 mol%.
Failure of a party to timely copy the suggested claims in its
respective application will be considered a disclaimer by that party of the
subject matter of the suggested claims under the provisions of 37 CFR § 1.605(a).
Assuming the Junior Party
and the Senior Party timely copy the suggested claims, the interference shall
be redeclared by substituting for Count 2 the following Counts 3, 4, and 5.
Count 3
A copolymer of ethylene
and an a,B-unsaturated monomer having the formula:
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT
DISPLAYABLE
wherein:
R is hydrogen or methyl;
n is 0 or 1;
X is fluoro, chloro,
bromo, or iodo;
Y is an alkyl group
having 4 to 18 carbon atoms;
L is 0 or an integer of 1
to 4; and
m is 1-5; and
further wherein the a,B-unsaturated monomer unit content is about
0.005 to about 10 mole percent of the copolymer.
Count 4
A process for producing a
copolymer of ethylene and an ethylenically a,B- unsaturated acid halogenated
phenyl ester wherein the a,B-unsaturated ester content is about 0.005 to about
10 mole percent of the copolymer, comprising copolymerizing ethylene and the
a,B-unsaturated ester at a temperature of 50 << degrees>>> C. to
400 <<degrees>> C. and a pressure of at least about 500 kg/cm 2 in
the presence of a free radical catalyst.
Count 5
An electrical conductor
insulated with a material comprising a copolymer of ethylene and an
a,B-unsaturated monomer having the formula:
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT
DISPLAYABLE
wherein:
R is hydrogen or methyl;
n is 0 or 1;
X is fluoro, chloro,
bromo, or iodo;
Y is an alkyl group
having 4 to 18 carbon atoms;
L is 0 or an integer of 1
to 4; and
further wherein the a,B-unsaturated monomer unit content is about
0.005 to about 10 mole percent of the copolymer.
*10 The claims of
the parties will be designated to correspond to Counts 3, 4, and 5 as follows:
Count Junior Party
Orikasa Senior Party Oonishi
-----
--------------------
--------------------
3 15 1-2
4 16 3-4
5 3-12 and 17 5
The Junior Party's claims
2, 13, and 14 will not be designated to correspond to any count.
The examiner-in-chief is
authorized to reopen proceedings by setting a new period for filing preliminary
motions and to continue renewed proceedings from that point.
II.
A second problem is the
meaning of the Junior Party's claims 1-14. As discussed
above, it is not apparent what "method" is being claimed. To
"infringe" the claims, one would have to use the copolymer as an
insulator on an electrical conductor. Such a use would necessarily include the
"step" of "improving [the] impulse destructive strength" of
the material used to insulate the electrical conductor. While further ex parte
prosecution after the interference may clear up any ambiguity, for the purpose
of further interference proceedings, the Junior Party claims 1-14 may be
construed to cover an electrical conductor insulated with a copolymer. Hence,
the Junior Party's claims 3-12 should be designated to correspond to Count 5.
III.
The starting point for
declaring an interference is Form PTO-850 as filled out by the examiner. Thus,
in the first instance, the examiner indicates the count and the claims which
correspond to the count. See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, § 2309.02 [5th Ed., Rev. 9, Sept. 1988].
Subsequent events in the interference, such as a preliminary motion, may
convince an examiner-in- chief or a panel of the board that an interference was
not properly declared in the first instance.
Upon reviewing the
application and/or patent files involved and the Form PTO- 850, as completed by
the examiner, an examiner-in-chief may have reason to believe that the count is not correct, that
there are not a sufficient number of counts, or that claims have not been
properly initially designated to correspond to a count. If so, the
examiner-in-chief should consult with the examiner with the view to declaring
the interference with proper counts and a proper designation of claims to
counts. If the original Form PTO-850 submitted by the examiner has to be
changed, it should be re-signed by the examiner. When the examiner and the
examiner-in-chief agree that a proper Form PTO-850 has been prepared, that form
becomes part of the record in the interference file.
It is important that the
interference be carefully declared in the first instance. One important reason
is the presumptions which attach to the declaration of an interference. Thus,
when an interference is declared, there is a rebuttable presumption that:
*11 (1) different
counts define separate patentable inventions;
(2) each claim designated
to correspond to a count defines the same patentable invention as all other
claims designated to correspond to the count; and
(3) a claim which is not
designated to correspond to the count is not directed to the same patentable
invention as the claims designated to correspond to the count.
These presumptions are
necessary in order to give the parties a "starting point" and for
establishing who has the burden of persuasion and proof when a preliminary motion is filed under 37 CFR
§ 1.633. Time is conserved by all
involved, both parties and PTO personnel, when the interference is declared
properly in the first instance.
Decision
The petition is granted
to the extent indicated and the interference is remanded to the jurisdiction of
the examiner-in-chief for further proceedings consistent with the views
expressed in this opinion.
FN1. Compare In re DiLeone, 436 F.2d 1033, 168 USPQ 598 (CCPA
1971) (claim 11 held to be broader than written description of the invention in
specification).
FN2. 37 CFR §
1.633(a)--motion for judgment on ground claim corresponding to count is
not patentable.
FN3. There are two obvious problems with the language of Claim 1.
First, the claim seemingly is broad enough to call for polymerizing ethylene
alone. Note the language "ethylene or a mixture of ethylene and another
monomer." On the other hand, the claim seemingly is limited to preparing a
"copolymer." Second, it is not
apparent what "method" is being claimed. In point of fact, the claim
seems to call for using a copolymer as an insulating material. Thus, the claim
is perhaps directed to an electrical conductor insulated with a copolymer. Any
"indefiniteness" (35 U.S.C. §
112, second sentence) in the Junior Party's claims can be corrected in
ex parte prosecution after the interference is concluded.
FN4. An "aromatic hydrocarbon" is a compound which
contains only carbon and hydrogen atoms. Thus, an aromatic hydrocarbon cannot
have an ester group or a halogen atom.
FN5. U.S. patent 3,741,947 issued June 26, 1973.
FN6. U.S. patent 4,211,730 issued July 8, 1980.
FN7. Benzyl methacrylate and benzyl acrylate.
FN8. Chlorophenyl cyclohexene.
FN9. As will appear later in this opinion, a count should be drawn
broad enough to include all patentable subject matter falling within all claims
designated to correspond to the count.
FN10. Arguments (a)(ii) and (b) made by the Junior Party did
not--and could not--persuade either the examiner-in-chief or the board to grant
the motion. There is no requirement that the subject matter claimed by one
party be described in the specification of the other party. The only question
is whether the subject matter claimed by one party is the same patentable
invention as the subject matter claimed by the other party. See Aelony v. Arni,
547 F.2d 566, 192 USPQ 486 (CCPA 1977), where the subject matter claimed by the
respective parties was not disclosed in the opponent's application. For this
same reason, McKellin is not relevant. After the CCPA's decision in McKellin, a
second interference was declared between McKellin and Maltha. McKellin won the
second interference, thereby taking away from Maltha the subject matter Maltha
thought he had won in the first interference. See Ex parte Tytgat, 225 USPQ
907, 911-912 (Bd.App.1985). Thus, whereas McKellin involved proceedings after
an interference, here we are concerned with proceedings during an interference.
One object of an interference should be to avoid a second interference, as
unfortunately occurred in McKellin.
FN11. The statement by the examiner-in-chief is only partially
correct. The examiner determined that an interference existed only between the
subject matter of the Junior Party's claim
15 and the Senior Party's claims 1-4.
FN12. A motion to redefine an interference does not necessarily
have to be supported by "evidence." Thus, 37 CFR § 1.637(c)(4)(ii) requires the moving party to
"[s]how the claim [sought to be designated as not corresponding to the
count] does not define the same patentable invention as any other claim
designated ... as corresponding to the count." A party may be able to make
a necessary showing with argument. However, where the moving party is in
possession of the necessary evidence, there is no legitimate reason why it should
not be presented with the motion. If the motion is not accompanied by then
available proof of a material fact, no further evidence should be received in
the interference in connection with the issue raised in the motion. 37 CFR § 1.639. It was not the intention of the
"new" rules to permit routine requests to take testimony in lieu of
presenting timely affidavits and other available proof of material facts with
the motion.
FN13. The use of the word "issue" should be avoided in
interference papers to mean "count." Confusion will be minimized if
parties and the board use the terms defined in 37 CFR § 1.601 when possible. The term
"count" is defined in the rules; the term "issue" is not.
FN14. The examiner
does not declare an interference. Only an examiner-in-chief can declare an
interference.
FN15. The examiner has never determined that the subject matter of
the Junior Party's claims 2, 13, or 14 is patentable. In fact, claims 2, 13,
and 14 stand rejected.
FN16. The examiner did not make this designation. Apparently, the
designation was made by the examiner-in-chief. The basis for the
examiner-in-chief's decision, contrary to the examiner, that claims 2, 13, and
14 define the same patentable invention as the rest of the parties' claims is
not apparent on the record.
FN17. The initial presumption that claims designated to correspond
to a count define the same patentable invention is one that rests on a decision
by an examiner in the first instance. In this case, consultation at the
petition level reveals that the examiner did not designate the Junior Party's
claims 2, 13, or 14 to correspond to the count, because he does not regard the
subject matter of those claims to define the same patentable invention as the
subject matter of the Senior Party's claims 1-4 and the Junior Party's claim
15.
FN18. The
"error" corrected was something more than a mere "clerical"
error.
FN19. An examiner may designate a rejected claim as corresponding
to a count provided:
(1) the claim covers
both patentable and unpatentable subject matter;
(2) the patentable
subject matter of the claim is to the same patentable invention as the count;
and
(3) the unpatentable
subject matter of the claim is not to the same patentable invention as the
count.
The reason the rejected
claim is designated as corresponding to the count is to cause cancellation of
the claim in the event the party loses the interference.
FN20. The "judgment" constitutes a final agency decision
that the losing party is not entitled to a patent with claims corresponding to
a lost count.
FN21. This is a decision authorizing the examiner to issue a
patent to the Senior Party containing claims 1-4 unless it should develop,
based on additional evidence, that those claims are not patentable to the Senior
Party. It should be rare, indeed, that a reason should develop after an
interference for rejecting claims which the board has found patentable to the
winning party in an interference.
10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1996
END OF DOCUMENT