Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks
Patent and Trademark Office (P.T.O.)
RE: TRADEMARK APPLICATION OF M.V ET ASSOCIES
Serial No. 73-813,814
August 8, 1991
*1 Petition Filed: June 19, 1990
For: FORMES ET COULEURS and design
Filed: July 21, 1989
Attorney for Petitioner
W.M. Webner
Baker & Hostetler
Jeffrey M. Samuels
Assistant Commissioner for Trademarks
On Petition
M.V Et Associes has
petitioned the Commissioner for review of the Examining Attorney's refusal to
accept certain proffered amendments to the identification of goods for the
above referenced application. Review of the petition is undertaken pursuant to
Trademark Rules 2.146 and 2.148, 37 C.F.R. § §
2.146 and 2.148.
FACTS
When petitioner's
application was first filed, the identification of goods read: "Clothing
and underclothing for men, women and children; belts, shawls, scarves, ties,
foulards, gloves, footwear, headgear."
Upon review of the
application, the Examining Attorney found the identification to be indefinite.
Changes to the identification were suggested in the initial Office action which
issued October 4, 1989. Petitioner responded to the action on April 4, 1990 and
requested amendment of the identification to read: "Clothing, namely
pants, shirts, sweaters, jackets, underwear, belts, shawls, scarves, ties,
foulards, gloves, footwear, headgear." The application file reveals the
requested amendment to the identification was entered into the Office's Trademark Reporting and Monitoring
(TRAM) system on April 13, 1990.
Further procedural facts
established by the application file or through reference to TRAM records
reveal: that the Review and Amendment Clerk reviewed the file for publication
on April 23, 1990; a telephone interview was held between the Examining Attorney
and counsel for petitioner on April 24, 1990; allowance of the application was
withdrawn on May 4, 1990. The Examiner's Amendment resulting from the telephone
interview of April 24 was mailed on May 5, 1990. [FN1] This amendment was
entered in the TRAM system on May 7, 1990 and resulted in the identification
being amended to read: "Clothing, namely pants, shirts, T-Shirts, tunics,
sweaters, pullovers, sweater vests, jackets, underwear, belts, shawls, scarves,
ties, foulards, gloves, footwear and headwear." [Underscoring indicates
changes effected by Examiner's Amendment as compared to operative
identification following entry of the express amendment of April 4.]
The mark was approved for
publication on May 9, 1990 and was eventually scheduled for publication in the
Official Gazette of August 7, 1990. The instant petition was filed on June 19,
1990, but was not immediately identified as a petition to the Commissioner.
Thus, the application file was retrieved from the Publication and Issue
Section, and the petition was mistakenly processed as a request for amendment
of the identification. As a result the TRAM system was changed on July 24, 1990
so that the identification reverted to its
form following the entry of petitioner's express amendment of April 4, 1990.
[FN2]
DECISION
*2 The only issue
raised by the instant petition involves petitioner's latitude to effect further
amendments to the identification of goods. There is no dispute that the express
amendment of April 4, 1990 acted to clarify and limit the identification of
goods. Subsequent to the filing of that amendment, however, counsel for
petitioner attempted, by phone, to further amend the identification to list
eight specific items of clothing. It is the Examining Attorney's refusal to accept
all of the requested amendments which petitioner seeks to have reviewed.
The provision of the
Trademark Rules which applies in this case is subsection (b) of Rule 2.71, 37
C.F.R. § 2.71, which states: "The
identification of goods or services [in an application] may be amended to
clarify or limit the identification, but additions will not be permitted."
The effect of this rule
was discussed in "Examination Guide 3-89: Implementation of the Trademark
Law Revision Act of 1988 and the Amended Rules of Practice in Trademark
Cases," which was published as a supplement to the TMEP and reprinted in
the Official Gazette on November 21, 1989, 1108 TMOG 30. Exam Guide 3-89 explained the rationale behind
Rule 2.71(b) by noting the "constructive use" and "nationwide
priority" provisions of Trademark Act Section 7(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c), and noting that the identification
of goods or services in an application "defines the scope of those
rights." Thus, Rule 2.71(b) precludes all amendments to an identification
of goods which would impermissibly enlarge the scope of those rights after
filing of the application.
Exam Guide 3-89, at pages
48-50, sets forth the following principles for handling amendments, which apply
to the case at hand. First, amendments which substitute more specific language
in place of more general language so as to limit the goods as to certain types
within a more general category are clearly acceptable. Second, if a proffered
amendment seeks to insert an item which is "logically encompassed by an
item already included in the identification," then the amendment can be
accepted. However, the guide cautions: "The scope of the goods and
services, as originally identified or as amended by an express amendment,
establishes the outer limit for any later amendments." (emphasis added)
In the case at hand,
petitioner filed an express amendment which clarified its original
identification to remove indefiniteness and which acted to limit more general
language by substituting specific types of goods. Once this amendment was
filed, it established the outer limit for later amendments. Thus, when petitioner's counsel attempted, by phone,
to further amend the identification of goods by specifically listing
"T-shirts, tunics, pullovers, vests, coats, bermuda shorts, skirts, and
dresses," the Examining Attorney was required to assess the propriety of
the requested amendments in light of Rule 2.71(b) and through comparison with
the identification as it stood following entry of the express amendment of April
4.
*3 The Examiner
allowed the identification to be amended through the listing of
"T-shirts" and "tunics." These items were permissibly
included in the identification because they constitute items "logically
encompassed" within the category of "shirts," an item which was
already within the operative identification. In addition, "pullovers"
and "sweater vests" (rather than "vests") were permissibly
listed as items "logically encompassed" within the category of "sweaters,"
also an item within the operative identification. "Coats, bermuda shorts,
skirts and dresses" were not "logically encompassed" within the
scope of any items set forth in the identification as changed by the express
amendment of April 4. Therefore, the examiner acted properly when she refused
to allow telephone amendment of the identification to list these items.
Petitioner's counsel
asserts that the Examining Attorney had not even "acted on" the
express amendment of April 4, despite its filing, when counsel sought, at
petitioner's behest, to introduce the referenced eight items into the
identification. The file indicates otherwise. The Review and Amendment clerk completed a pre-publication review of the
application file on April 23. Such a review would not have been undertaken
unless the file, with the amendment of April 4, had already been reviewed by
the Examining Attorney and approved for publication. In any event, it is
irrelevant whether the examiner had considered the amendment prior to the
telephone interview of April 24, when the interview was conducted which led to
the Examiner's Amendment of May 5.
The changes requested by
petitioner's express amendment of April 4 had been entered into the Office's
computer systems as of April 13 and remained there until further changes were
effected in the TRAM system on May 7, in accordance with the Examiner's
Amendment mailed on May 5. Thus, for more than three weeks, third parties
checking the status of petitioner's application in the Office's computer
systems would have been put on notice that petitioner's formerly indefinite
identification had been significantly restricted.
Petitioner acknowledges
the purpose underlying Rule 2.71(b) but argues that the language precluding
additions "is clearly meant to preclude additions to the description of
goods outside the scope of goods as first set forth in the application."
Further, petitioner asserts that the determination as to whether an amendment
acts to clarify or limit an identification must be determined through a
comparison with the identification as filed, rather than as it may have been
amended. Office policy, as set forth in Exam Guide 3-89, rejects this approach.
Trademark Rule 2.146(a)(3), 37 C.F.R. § 2.146(a)(3), permits the Commissioner to
invoke his supervisory authority in appropriate circumstances. However, the
Commissioner will reverse the action of an Examining Attorney in a case such as
this only where there has been a clear error or abuse of discretion. In re
Richards-Wilcox Manufacturing Co., 181 USPQ 735 (Comm'r Pats.1974); Ex parte
Peerless Confection Co., 142 USPQ 278 (Comm'r Pats.1964). No such error has
been demonstrated in this case; the examiner has properly applied Rule 2.71(b).
*4 Trademark Rules
2.146(a)(5) and 2.148, 37 C.F.R. § §
2.146(a)(3) and 2.148, permit
the Commissioner to waive any provision of the Rules which is not a provision
of the statute, where an extraordinary situation exists, justice requires and
no other party is injured thereby. All three conditions must be satisfied
before a waiver is granted. In this case, the provision of Rule 2.71 which acts
to bar the amendments petitioner seeks to enter is not statutory in nature.
However, its application will not be waived. Office policy regarding the
interpretation of the rule is clear and petitioner has not established that an
extraordinary situation exists which warrants waiver of the rule.
CONCLUSION
The examiner's handling of petitioner's
various amendment requests has been completely in keeping with the guidelines
set forth in Exam Guide 3-89 and all extant Office policies governing
application of Rule 2.71(b). Accordingly, the petition is denied. The
application file will be returned to the Examining Attorney so that the changes
effected by the Examiner's Amendment of May 5 can be re-entered into the TRAM
system and the file can once again be reviewed for possible publication.
FN1. It is noted that the changes effected in the identification
of goods via the Examiner's Amendment mailed on May 5, 1990 were the product of
a telephone interview between the Examining Attorney and an attorney apparently
acting on behalf of the petitioner but who had never been appointed as an
attorney by petitioner. However, since the Examiner's Amendment has been
acknowledged by appointed counsel in the instant petition, the changes effected
by the amendment are deemed to have been ratified by appointed counsel.
FN2. Though the mistaken processing of the petition as a request
to amend the identification of goods has "undone" the changes
effected by the Examiner's Amendment, this error will be corrected.
21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1628
END OF DOCUMENT