Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks
Patent and Trademark Office (P.T.O.)
RE: TRADEMARK APPLICATION OF CUSTOM
TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
Serial No. 74/009,549
September 12, 1991
*1 Petition Filed: February 11, 1991
For: VERTIVEYOR
Filing Date: December 11, 1989
Attorney for Petitioner
Edward G. Greive
Renner, Kenner, Greive, Bobak, Taylor & Weber
Jeffrey M. Samuels
Assistant Commissioner for Trademarks
On Petition
Custom Technologies, Inc.
has petitioned the Commissioner pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 2.146(a) to grant an extension of time for
filing a Statement of Use pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 2.89(g) for the above-captioned application.
The subject application,
filed based upon a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce, pursuant to
Section 1(b) of the Trademark Act, was published for opposition on April 24,
1990. When no opposition was filed, the Notice of Allowance issued on July 17,
1990. Pursuant to Section 1(d) of the Act, a Statement of Use, or request for
an extension of time to file a Statement of Use, was required to be filed
within six months of the mailing date of the Notice of Allowance.
On January 14, 1991,
petitioner filed a request for an extension of time for filing a Statement of
Use. The request was initially granted by the ITU/DivisionalUnit in an undated
Notice of Approval of Extension Request. However, in an Office action dated
January 31, 1991, the Applications Examiner in the ITU/Divisional Unit
indicated that, upon further review, the request was denied because it did not
include a verified statement by the applicant that the applicant has a
continued bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce. Specifically, the
phrase "in commerce" had been omitted from the request. This petition was filed on February 11, 1991.
Petitioner maintains that
it filed a proper extension request because the request indicated that
petitioner "still maintains an intent to use the subject mark" which
can only "connote to the Office an intent to use the mark in commerce,"
which was referred to in the original application. Further, the declaration
accompanying the request included a statement of continued bona fide intention
to use the mark.
Section 1(d) of the
Trademark Act specifies that the Commissioner shall extend the time for filing
the Statement of Use, upon timely written request by the applicant. However,
"[a]ny request for an extension under this paragraph shall be accompanied
by a verified statement that the applicant has a continued bona fide intention
to use the mark in commerce...."
Contrary to petitioner's
argument that there is no statutory requirement that the exact words "in
commerce" must be used in the verified statement, the statute explicitly
requires the request to include a verified statement that "the applicant
has a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce." The statute is not
served by reference, after the filing of the extension request, to a conforming
statement in the original application. The statement must be included in the
extension request itself.
*2 Trademark Rules
2.146(a)(5) and 2.148 permit the Commissioner to waive any requirement of the
rules, not being a requirement of the statute, in an extraordinary circumstance, when justice
requires and no other party is injured. However, the requirement to include the
phrase "in commerce" in an extension request for filing a Statement
of Use is statutory and the Commissioner has no authority to waive it. In re
Kruysman, Inc., 199 USPQ 110 (Comm'r Pats.1977); Ex parte Buchicchio, 118 USPQ
40 (Comm'r Pats.1958); Ex parte Radio Corporation of America, 114 USPQ 403
(Comm'r Pats.1957).
Even if inclusion of the
phrase "in commerce" were not a statutory requirement, petitioner has
presented no showing of extraordinary circumstance. Oversights that could have
been prevented by the exercise of ordinary care or diligence are not
extraordinary situations as contemplated by the Trademark Rules. In re Bird
& Son, Inc., 195 USPQ 586 (Comm'r Pats.1977).
The petition is denied.
The application file will be forwarded to the Examining Attorney to be
processed for abandonment.
24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1713
END OF DOCUMENT