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AN OVERVIEW OF ANTITRUST AND MISUSE ISSUES
IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1970, Bruce B. Wilson of the United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, laid out what he considered to be nine provisions sometimes found in patent license agreements which were considered anticompetitive and therefore would be pursued under the antitrust laws by the Department of Justice. These provisions became commonly known to the bar as the “nine no-nos.” This paper will examine the status of the nine “no-nos” in light of case law and Department of Justice policy which has evolved since Mr. Wilson’s pronouncement. The paper also will examine the antitrust implications of acquiring intellectual property and in refusing to license intellectual property, as well as other litigation-related issues. Finally, the paper will address issues unique to trademark and copyright law.

II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PATENT MISUSE DOCTRINE AND ANTITRUST ALLEGATIONS

Anticompetitive acts constituting patent misuse are a complete defense to a patent infringement action. *Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart*, 803 F.2d 661, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1986). A successful patent misuse defense results in rendering the patent unenforceable until the misuse is purged. *Id.* at 668 n.10. The same acts may also be used offensively to constitute an element of an antitrust claim. A successful complaint for antitrust violation results not only in unenforceability but also in treble damages. *Id.* It is important to note that a patentee’s actions may constitute misuse without rising to the level of an antitrust violation.

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1 I wish to acknowledge the contributions of Arthur Gray, Paul Heller, and Kevin Godlewski. I also acknowledge use of a paper by Gerald Sobel of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, entitled “Exploitation of Patents And The Antitrust Laws.”
Patent misuse is viewed as a broader wrong than antitrust violation because of the economic power that may be derived from the patentee’s right to exclude. Thus misuse may arise when conditions of antitrust violation are not met. The key inquiry is whether, by imposing conditions that derive their force from the patent, the patentee has impermissibly broadened the scope of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect.


III. ANALYTICAL TOOLS FOR ANTITRUST ISSUES

A. PER SE ANALYSIS

Certain types of conduct presumably restrain trade and are therefore *per se* illegal. The Supreme Court still uses the *per se* analysis in some situations. *See Jefferson Parish Hospital v. Hyde*, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). However, the *per se* rule should not necessarily be considered a “pure” *per se* rule. The *per se* rule is applied when surrounding circumstances make the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct so great as to render unjustified further examination of the challenged action. *NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma*, 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1986). Since Congress intended to outlaw only unreasonable restraints on trade, the Supreme Court deems unlawful *per se* only those restraints which “have such predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effect, and such limited potential for pro competitive benefit.” *State Oil Co. v. Khan*, 522 U.S. 3, 118 S. Ct. 275, 279 (1997). The Court expresses a “reluctance” to adopt *per se* rules with regard to “restraints imposed in the context of business relationships where the economic impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious.” *Id.*, quoting *FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists*, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986).

The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) released antitrust guidelines in April of 1995 entitled “U.S. Department of Justice & Federal
Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property.” Reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) T 13, 132 (April 6, 1995) (hereinafter “1995 IP Guidelines”). In the 1995 IP Guidelines, the DOJ and the FTC (collectively, “the Agencies”) remarked that those licensing restraints which have been held to be per se unlawful include “naked pricefixing, output restraints, and market division among horizontal competitors, as well as certain group boycotts and resale price maintenance.” IP Guidelines, at 20,741. The DOJ will challenge a restraint under the per se rule when “there is no efficiency-enhancing integration of economic activity and if the type of restraint is one that has been accorded per se treatment.” Id. The DOJ noted that, generally speaking, “licensing arrangements promote such [efficiency enhancing] integration because they facilitate the combination of the licensor’s intellectual property with complementary factors of production owned by the licensee.” Id.

B. RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS

Most antitrust claims are analyzed under a rule of reason, “according to which the finder of fact must decide whether the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into account various factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its condition before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.” State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 118 S. Ct. 275, 279 (1997). When analyzing a restraint under the rule of reason, the DOJ will consider “whether the restraint is likely to have anticompetitive effects and, if so, whether the restraint is reasonably necessary to achieve procompetitive benefits that outweigh those anticompetitive effects.” 1995 IP Guidelines, at 20,740.
The 1995 IP Guidelines “embody three general principles: (a) for the purpose of antitrust analysis, the Agencies regard intellectual property as being essentially comparable to any other form of property; (b) the Agencies do not presume that intellectual property creates market power in the antitrust context; and (c) the Agencies recognize that intellectual property licensing allows firms to combine complementary factors of production and is generally procompetitive.” 1995 IP Guidelines, at 20,734.

“Licensing arrangements raise concerns under the antitrust laws if they are likely to affect adversely the prices, quantities, qualities, or varieties of goods and services either currently or potentially available.” Id. at 20,737. In assessing the competitive effects of licensing arrangements, the DOJ may be required to delineate goods markets, technology markets, or innovation (research and development) markets. Id.

When a licensing arrangement affects parties in a horizontal relationship, a restraint in that relationship may increase the risk of coordinated pricing, output restrictions, or the acquisition or maintenance of market power.... The potential for competitive harm depends in part on the degree of concentration in, the difficulty of entry into, and the responsiveness of supply and demand to changes in price in the relevant markets.

Id. at 20,742; see also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 282 (“[t]he primary purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect interbrand competition.”).

When the licensor and the licensees are in a vertical relationship, the Agencies will analyze whether the licensing arrangement may harm competition among entities in a horizontal relationship at either the level of the licensor or the licensees, or possibly in another relevant market. Harm to competition from a restraint may occur if it anticompetitively forecloses access to, or increases competitors’ costs of obtaining, important inputs, or facilitates coordination to raise price or restrict output.

IP Guidelines at 20,742.

* * * * *
If the Agencies conclude that the restraint has, or is likely to have, an anticompetitive effect, they will consider whether the restraint is reasonably necessary to achieve procompetitive efficiencies. If the restraint is reasonably necessary, the Agencies will balance the procompetitive efficiencies and the anticompetitive effects to determine the probable net effect on competition in each relevant market.

*Id.* at 20,743.

In an effort to encourage intellectual property licensing agreements, which the Agencies believe promote innovation and enhance competition, the IP Guidelines establish an antitrust “safety zone”. This “safety zone” is designed to create more stability and certainty for those parties who engage in intellectual property licensing. However, the “safety zone” is not intended to be the end-all for lawful, procompetitive intellectual property licenses, as the “Agencies emphasize that licensing arrangements are not anticompetitive merely because they do not fall within the scope of the safety zone.” *Id.* at 20,743-2. The “safety zone” is defined as follows:

1. Absent extraordinary circumstances, the Agencies will not challenge a restraint in an intellectual property licensing arrangement if (1) the restraint is not facially anticompetitive and (2) the licensor and its licensees collectively account for no more than twenty percent of each relevant market significantly affected by the restraint. Whether a restraint falls within the safety zone will be determined by reference only to goods markets unless the analysis of goods markets alone would inadequately address the effects of the licensing arrangement on competition among technologies or in research and development.

*Id.* (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

2. Absent extraordinary circumstances, the Agencies will not challenge a restraint in an intellectual property licensing arrangement that may affect competition in a technology market\(^2\) if (1) the restraint is not facially anticompetitive and (2) there are four or more independently controlled

\(^2\) The 1995 Guidelines describe technology markets as consisting of “the intellectual property that is licensed ... and its close substitutes.”
technologies in addition to the technologies controlled by the parties to the licensing arrangement that may be substitutable for the licensed technology at a comparable cost to the user.

*Id.* (emphasis added).

3. Absent extraordinary circumstances, the Agencies will not challenge a restraint in an intellectual property licensing arrangement that may affect competition in an innovation market if (1) the restraint is not facially anticompetitive and (2) four or more independently controlled entities in addition to the parties to the licensing arrangement possess the required specialized assets or characteristics and the incentive to engage in research and development that is a close substitute of the research and development activities of the parties to the licensing agreement.

*Id.* (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

Views on how the Antitrust Division has conducted its rule of reason analysis to determine whether a particular license violates the antitrust laws are reflected in Remarks of Roger B. Andewelt, Deputy Director of Operations, Antitrust Division, before the American Bar Association, Patent, Trademark & Copyright Section (hereinafter “Andewelt (1985)”)(July 16, 1985).

[P]erhaps the ultimate licensing issue -- how does the Antitrust Division conduct its rule of reason analysis to determine whether a particular license violates the antitrust laws. While patent licenses, even between competitors, [are] at their essence vertical and not horizontal arrangements, they can in some circumstances have horizontal anticompetitive effects. Our rule of reason analysis would exclusively search for such horizontal effects.

*Andewelt (1985)* at 18.

Where an intellectual property license is merely a sham to hide *per se* illegal horizontal restraints, such as an agreement to fix prices on products unrelated to the intellectual property involved, the analysis of the lawfulness of the license is short and condemnation certain. In all other situations, however, a more studied analysis of the effect of the license would be required.

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3 The 1995 Guidelines describe innovation markets as consisting of “the research and development directed to particular new or improved goods or processes, and the close substitutes for that research and development.”

Once the product and geographic markets are defined, the analysis would proceed with an assessment of the competitive effect of the license in these markets. The focus of this analysis would not be on the extent to which the license creates competition between the licensor and the licensee or among licensees. The licensor has no obligation to create competition- antitrust policy demands only that the licensor not restrain competition. A patent license therefore typically will not be of competitive concern if it impacts only competition in the use, manufacture, distribution, or sale of the patented invention; the patent grant already gives the patent owner the right to exclude all such competition.

Instead of focusing on the failure to create competition, antitrust analysis should generally focus on the extent to which the license decreases competition. Sometimes the effect of a patent license extends beyond products embodying the patented invention and can reach competition in competing products. For example, licenses can decrease competition compared to no license at all, when they decrease the licensee’s incentive or freedom to market products that compete with products embodying the invention, or decrease the licensee’s incentive or freedom to engage in [research and development] aimed at producing such competing products.

The license is illegal if on a net basis it is anticompetitive. In addition... a particular provision [in a procompetitive] license is illegal if it is anticompetitive in itself, and is not reasonably related to serving any of the procompetitive benefits of the license.
IV. THE NINE NO-NO’S -- LICENSING PROVISIONS TO WATCH FOR

A. TIE-INS

A “tie-in” is an arrangement in which a seller conditions the sale of its product upon a buyer’s purchase of a separate product from the seller or a designated third party. The anticompetitive vice is the denial of access to the market for the tied product.

Tying is a *per se* violation of the Sherman Act only if it is probable that the seller has exploited its control over the tying product to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms. *Jefferson Parish*, 466 U.S. at 12-16.

In *Jefferson Parish*, the *per se* rule was reaffirmed by a bare majority of the Supreme Court, with the soundness of the rule having come under attack. As stated by the court in *Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc.*, 833 F.2d 1342, 1345 n.2 (9th Cir. 1987), *cert. denied*, 488 U.S. 870 (1988):

Two Justices relied on Congress’ silence as a justification for preserving the *per se* rule. *See* 466 U.S. at 32, 104 S. Ct. at 1568 (Brennan, J., concurring). Four Justices, recognizing that tying arrangements may have procompetitive effects, would analyze these arrangements under the Rule of Reason. *Id.* at 32-47, 104 S. Ct. 1568-76 (O’Conner, J., concurring). Thoughtful antitrust scholars have expressed serious doubts about the alleged anticompetitive effects of tie-ins. *See* 5 P. Areeda & D. Turner, *Antitrust Law* ¶¶ 1129c, 1134b (1980); R. Bork, *The Antitrust Paradox* 372-75 (1978).

For a tie-in to rise to the level of an antitrust violation, the seller must have “the power, within the market for the tying product, to raise prices or to require purchasers to accept burdensome terms that could not be exacted in a completely competitive market. In short, the question is whether the seller has some advantage not shared by his competitors in the market for the tying product.” *United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises Inc.*, 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977).
Courts have identified three sources of market power: (1) when the government has granted the seller a patent or similar monopoly over a product; (2) when the seller’s share of the market is high; and (3) when the seller offers a unique product that competitors are not able to offer. *Tominga v. Shepherd*, 682 F. Supp. 1489, 1493 (C.D. Cal. 1988); *Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America*, 833 F.2d at 1342, 1345-46.

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which handles all appeals in cases arising under the patent laws, has stated that “[a] patent does not of itself establish a presumption of market power in the antitrust sense.” *Abbott Lab. v. Brennan*, 952 F.2d 1346 (Fed. Cir.1991), *cert. denied*, 505 U.S. 1205 (1992). More recently, the Court directly confronted the question of whether a patent establishes a presumption of market power in a tying product for purposes of analyzing a potential violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court held that “a rebuttable presumption of market power arises from the possession of a patent over a tying product. *Independent Ink, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc.*, 396 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Court explained:

> [T]he Supreme Court cases in this area squarely establish that patent and copyright tying, unlike other tying cases, do not require an affirmative demonstration of market power. Rather, *International Salt* and *Loew’s* make clear that the necessary market power to establish a Section 1 violation is presumed. The continued vitality of *International Salt* and *Loew’s* as binding authority, and the distinction between patent tying and other tying cases that was articulated in *Loew’s*, have been consistently reaffirmed by the Court ever since.

*Id.* at 1348-49. The Court recognized that the Supreme Court precedent “has been subject to heavy criticism.” However, the Court noted its “duty” to follow these precedents until the Supreme Court itself decides to expressly overrule them. “The time may have come to abandon the doctrine, but it is up to Congress or the Supreme Court to make this judgment.” *Id.* at 1351.
A 1988 amendment to the patent statute addresses the market power requirements in a tie-in analysis, in at least the patent misuse context. 35 U. S.C. § 271(d)(5). Under the statute, misuse shall not be found by reason of a patentee having “conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product, unless in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned.” The Independent Ink court noted that Congress limited the provision to defense of patent misuse claims, and declined to extend this protection to affirmative tying claims. 396 F.3d at 1349.

After reviewing the legal history of tie-in arrangements in American courts, Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1285-91 (U.S. 2006), and noting that enforcement agencies, most economists, and Congress (in the 1988 amendment) had all concluded that a patent does not necessarily confer market power, Id. at 1293, the Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s holding that market power is presumed when the purchase of a patented product is conditioned upon an agreement to be an unpatented good from the patentee. Id. at 1292. Instead, the court noted that “[m]any tying arrangements, even those involving patents and requirements ties, are fully consistent with a free, competitive market[,]” Id., and unanimously held that “in all cases involving a tying arrangement, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has market power in the tying product.” Id. at 1293.

The Justice Department also has indicated that it will require proof of market power, apart from the existence of a patent right, in order to invoke the antitrust laws against a tie-in. The 1995 IP Guidelines state that tying arrangements are likely to be challenged by the DOJ (and/or the Federal Trade Commission) if:
(1) the seller has market power in the tying product, (2) the arrangement has an adverse
effect on competition in the relevant market for the tied product, and (3) efficiency
justifications for the arrangement do not outweigh the anticompetitive effects. The [DOJ
and the FTC] will not presume that a patent... necessarily confers market power upon its
owner.

IP Guidelines, at 20,743-3 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). The DOJ and the FTC define
market power as the “ability profitably to maintain prices above, or output below, competitive
levels for a significant period of time.” Id. at 20,735 (footnote omitted).

Even where market power is present, tie-ins may be justified and not violative of
the Sherman Act if they are technically necessary. In one case, tie-in provisions in a license
agreement conditioning the license of a wood preservative on the use of a particular organic
solvent were held to necessary to insure sufficient quality and effectiveness of the wood
preservative, and therefore not an antitrust violation. Idacon Inc. v. Central Forest Products, 3
patented silo unloader on use of silos by the same manufacturer were held justified where
attempts to use silos manufactured by others together with the patented product had proved

The Ninth Circuit has ruled that a tie-in does not violate the antitrust laws if
implemented for a legitimate purpose and if no less restrictive alternative is available. In Mozart
Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, agreements between the exclusive U.S. distributor of
Mercedes-Benz automobiles (MBNA) and franchised dealerships required the dealers to sell only
genuine Mercedes parts or parts expressly approved by the German manufacturer of Mercedes
automobiles and their replacement parts. The court found substantial evidence to support
MBNA’s claim that the tie-in was used to assure quality control, and concluded that the tie-in was
implemented for a legitimate purpose, and that less restrictive alternatives were not available.  

F.2d at 1348-51. Thus, there was no antitrust violation.

An issue which sometimes arises is whether a “product” is a single integrated product or two products tied together.  See Nobody in Particular Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel Communications, 311 F. Supp.2d 1048 (D. Colo. 2004) (separate consumer demand for radio air play and concert promotions indicates existence of two products for purposes of tying analysis).

In United States v. Microsoft Corp., a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit vacated a contempt order, ruling that Microsoft’s Windows 95/Internet Explorer package is a genuine integration, and that Microsoft was not barred from offering it as one product under a previous consent decree.  147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  The court ruled that an integrated product is a product which “combines functionalities (which may also be marketed separately and operated together) in a way that offers advantages unavailable if the functionalities are bought separately and combined by the purchaser.”  Id. at 948.  The court explained that:

The question is not whether the integration is a net plus but merely whether there is a plausible claim that it brings some advantage.  Whether or not this is the appropriate test for antitrust law generally, we believe it is the only sensible reading of [the consent decree].

Id. at 950 (emphasis in original).

The dissenting opinion urged a balancing test where:

the greater the evidence of distinct markets, the more of a showing of synergy Microsoft must make in order to justify incorporating what otherwise would be an ‘other’ product into an ‘integrated’ whole.  If the evidence of distinct markets is weak, then Microsoft can get by with a fairly modest showing (although perhaps not the minimal showing required by the majority).
Id. at 959. The dissent also relied on Jefferson Parish, which it concluded did not permit a product to be “integrated” simply “where some benefit exists as a result of joint provision.” Id. at 961 (emphasis in original).

Subsequently, the Justice Department brought a Sherman Act claim against Microsoft. After a lengthy trial, the district court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law in which it held that Microsoft had violated the Sherman Act. United States v. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp.2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999), and 87 F. Supp.2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000). In its findings of fact, the court found that Microsoft was a monopolist which had tied access to its Windows operating system to its Internet Explorer web browser. The court first found that Microsoft “enjoys monopoly power in the relevant market.” 84 F. Supp.2d at 19. The court found that Microsoft’s dominant market share was protected by an “applications barrier to entry.” That is, the significant number of software applications available to a user of the Windows operating system, and lack of significant available applications for other Intel-compatible operating systems, presents a significant hurdle for a potentially competitive operating system. Id. at 18-20. The court found that:

> The overwhelming majority of consumers will only use a PC operating system for which there already exists a large and varied set of high-quality, full-featured applications, and for which it seems relatively certain that new types of applications and new versions of existing applications will continue to be marketed at pace with those written for other operating systems.

Id. at 18.

The operating system supports the applications by exposing interfaces, termed “API’s.” Id. at 12. The court found that Microsoft feared that the applications barrier to entry could be breached by so-called “middleware,” which it stated “relies on the interfaces provided by

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4 The court found that the relevant market is “the licensing of all Intel-compatible PC operating systems world-wide.” Id. at 14.
the underlying operating system while simultaneously exposing its own APIs to developers.” *Id.* at 17-18, 28. The court found that Microsoft believed that this middleware could provide consumers with extensive applications, through their own APIs, while being capable of running on many different operating systems. Thus, the barrier to entry in the operating system market could be greatly diminished, and Microsoft’s monopoly in operating systems thereby threatened. *See Id.* at 28. Netscape Navigator and Sun’s Java technologies were middleware which the court found to be particularly threatening to Microsoft’s operating system monopoly. *Id.* Much of the court’s findings focused on Microsoft’s response to Netscape Navigator Web browser.

With respect to the Netscape Navigator Web browser, the court found first that Web browsers and operating systems are separate products, based on the preference of many consumers to separate their choice of Web browser from choice of an operating system, and the response of software firms in efficiently supplying the products separately. *Id.* at 48-49. The court then found that “Microsoft decided to bind Internet Explorer to Windows in order to prevent Navigator from weakening the applications barrier to entry, rather than for any pro-competitive purpose.” *Id.* at 48. The court stated that Microsoft bound Internet Explorer (“IE”) with Windows: (1) by contractually requiring its OEM customers to ship IE with Windows, and (2) by technically binding IE to Windows so that, as one Microsoft executive wrote, “running any other browser is a jolting experience.” *Id.* at 49-53. The court found that, with Windows 95, Microsoft initially permitted uninstallation of IE, but eventually precluded even that step. With Windows 98, Microsoft not only precluded uninstallation of IE, in certain instances it required IE to override another browser which was installed as a “default” browser. *Id.* at 52.

The court also found that there was “no technical reason” why Microsoft (1) refused to license Windows 95 without IE versions 1.0, 2.0, 3.0 or 4.0; (2) refused to permit
OEM’s to uninstall IE 3.0 or 4.0; and (3) refused to “meet consumer demand for a browserless version of Windows 98.” *Id.* at 53-54. In essence, the court also found that Microsoft provided no benefit to consumers by bundling Windows and IE:

Microsoft could offer consumers all the benefits of the current Windows 98 package by distributing the products separately and allowing OEM’s or consumers themselves to combine the products if they wished.

*Id.* at 56, emphasis added.\(^5\)

The court further explained that Microsoft forbade OEMs from obscuring IE, imposed technical restrictions to increase the cost of promoting Navigator, offered valuable consideration to OEMs promoting IE exclusively, and threatened to penalize OEMs who insisted on pre-installing and promoting Navigator. 84 F. Supp.2d at 69. The court also analyzed Microsoft’s conduct with respect to internet access providers (such as America Online), internet content providers (such as PointCast and Disney), and others (such as Apple), and found that Microsoft had taken great pains to make it more inconvenient for consumers to navigate the Web using Netscape Navigator. *See Id.* at 69-98\(^6\)

The court found that Microsoft greatly increased its share of the browser market in approximately two years, at Navigator’s expense. The court noted that Microsoft’s

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\(^5\) This finding appears to address the D.C. Circuit’s ruling that an “integration” must provide a “plausible claim that [bundling the functionalities together] brings some advantage” over providing them independently. 147 F.3d at 950. Presumably, a product package which qualifies as an “integration” under the D.C. Circuit’s test could be more difficult to establish as an illegal tying of two products under the Sherman Act.

\(^6\) In these dealings, Microsoft generally was not licensing Windows to the providers, as it does with OEMs. The court focused its analysis instead on Microsoft’s control of access to the Windows desktop, channel bars and other features used by consumers. The court found that Microsoft would permit (or refuse) access by providers to these interfaces provided by Windows to barter favorable treatment for IE, and to make Navigator a less-favored browser. For example, the court found that Microsoft permitted an AOL icon to be included in the Online Services folder in.
improvements to IE and its decision to give it away free played a role in that market shift. However, “[t]he relative shares would not have changed nearly as much as they did . . . had Microsoft not devoted its monopoly power and monopoly profits to precisely that end.” *Id.* at 98. The court concluded that this erosion of Navigator market share was sufficient to preserve the barriers to entry in the operating system market.

Navigator’s installed base may continue to grow, but Internet Explorer’s installed base is now larger and growing faster. Consequently, the APIs that Navigator exposes will not attract enough developer attention to spawn a body of cross-platform, network-centric applications large enough to dismantle the applications barrier to entry.

*Id.* at 103.

Although the court found that Microsoft’s development of IE “contributed to improving the quality of Web browsing software, lowering its cost, and increasing its availability, thereby benefitting customers,” it also “engaged in a series of actions designed to protect the applications barrier to entry, and hence its monopoly power, from a variety of middleware threats, including Netscape’s Web browser and Sun’s implementation of Java.” *Id.* at 111. The net result of Microsoft’s use of its monopoly power, according to the court, was that:

some innovations that would truly benefit consumers never occur for the sole reason that they do not coincide with Microsoft’s self-interest.

*Id.* at 112.

In its conclusions of law, the district court ruled that Microsoft had violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by engaging in “exclusionary acts that lacked procompetitive justification.” 87 F. Supp.2d at 39. With regard to its analysis of the tying issues under Section 2, the court stated that the D.C. Circuit’s decision set forth “an undemanding test [which] appears

Windows only upon obtaining AOL’s agreement to use IE as its default browser. *See Id.* at 77-85.
to this Court to be inconsistent with the pertinent Supreme Court precedent in at least three respects.” *Id.* at 47. Those perceived flaws were (1) it views the market from the defendant’s perspective; (2) it does not require proof of advantages of integration, but rather only positing a plausible advantage; and (3) it dispenses with any balancing of the advantages against anticompetitive effects. *Id.* at 47-48. The court explained that under *Jefferson Parish*, which was “indisputably controlling,” the “character of the demand” for the products determined whether separate products were involved. *Id.* at 48-49. Ruling that under this test, the Windows operating system was a separate product from the Internet Explorer browser, and further concluding that the products were not bundled due to technical necessity or business efficiency, Microsoft had illegally tied the products together. *Id.* at 50-51. The court noted the difficulty of applying the *Jefferson Parish* test to software products, but explained that “this Court . . . is not at liberty to extrapolate a new rule governing the tying of software products.” *Id.* at 51.

On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed-in-part. *United States v. Microsoft Corp.*, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The district court’s ruling on the monopoly maintenance, under § 2 of the Sherman Act, was affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The court reversed the finding of liability based on a theory of attempting to monopolize browser market. The court also vacated and remanded the ruling that Microsoft was liable for tying browser to operating system, under Sherman Act § 1. The court also vacated the remedies in light of its modification of the ruling on liability, the district court’s failure to hold a remedies hearing, and because of improper *ex parte* contacts between the trial judge and the media. *Id.* at 45-46.

On the monopoly maintenance claim, the court of appeals held that the government did not establish liability for the integration of IE and Windows, in particular because there had been no rebuttal of Microsoft’s technical justifications for the integration. *Id.* at 64-67. On the
attempted monopolization claim, the court found that the relevant browser market had not been adequately defined, and that barriers to entry of the browser market not been established, thereby precluding liability. *Id.* at 80-84.

On the tying claim, the court declined to follow *Jefferson Parish*, and instead held that a rule of reason should govern “tying arrangements involving platform software products.” *Id.* at 94-95. The court noted that this case presented the “first up-close look at the technological integration of added functionality into software that serves as a platform for third-party applications.” *Id.* at 84. Embarking on its rule of reason analysis, the court stated that “not all ties are bad,” citing examples of math co-processors and memory into microprocessor chips and spell checkers in word processors. *Id.* at 87. The court explained that it viewed the separate products test of *Jefferson Parish* to be a “poor proxy” for net efficiency from newly integrated products. *Id.* at 92. It also noted the “ubiquity” of bundling by other platform software vendors, and was concerned that new efficiencies may exist in integration in the platform software market. *Id.* at 93. Thus, the judgment of liability on the tying claim was reversed.

In *Abbott Laboratories v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.*, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33952 (D. Del. 2006), a district court applied a similar analysis to hold that an antitrust dispute in the pharmaceutical market should be evaluated under the rule of reason. In a counterclaim to a patent infringement suit, Teva Pharmaceuticals claimed that on multiple occasions, Abbott Laboratories had changed the formulation of its branded drug TriCor in order to repeatedly trigger the thirty-month stay of approval of generic substitutes mandated under the Hatch-Waxman Act. *Id.* at *11-14. The court recognized that product innovation generally has a procompetitive effect on the market, even though it harms competitors, *Id.* at *26-28, but declined to hold that product innovation is *per se* lawful. *Id.* at *31. Instead, the court
considered the nature of the pharmaceutical market, and noted that when a new version of a branded drug is introduced in the market, previous versions are simultaneously removed, so consumers are not presented with an “unfettered” choice in an “open market.” *Id.* at *33-34. After applying the rule of reason, the court denied Abbott’s motion to dismiss the antitrust claims. *Id.* at *5.

The use of trademarks in alleged tying arrangements sometimes has been challenged as a violation of the antitrust laws. In *Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc.*, Chicken Delight allegedly conditioned the licensing of its franchise name and trademark on the franchisees’ purchasing cooking equipment, food mixes and packaging exclusively from Chicken Delight. 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), *cert. denied*, 405 U.S. 955 (1972). The court held that the trademark itself was a separate item for tying purposes, and so this contractual agreement constituted a tying arrangement in violation of the Sherman Act. *Id.* at 49-52. In ruling that there existed two separate items for tying purposes, the court relied on the fact that it was not essential to the fast food franchise that the tied products of cooking equipment, food mixes and packaging be purchased from Chicken Delight. *Id.* at 49. However, in *Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co.*, the Baskin-Robbins trademark was held not to be a separate item from ice cream for tying purposes, because the ice cream was made by Baskin-Robbins “in accordance with secret formulae and processes.” 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982). Likewise, in *Principe v. McDonald’s Corp.*, the Fourth Circuit found allegedly tied products to be integral components of the business method being franchised, and rejected an antitrust suit. 631 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980), *cert. denied*, 451 U.S. 970 (1981).

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently applied the *per se* rule to a “block booking” arrangement, whereby a copyright holder licensed certain properties on the condition
that the licensee also license other properties. *MCA Television Ltd. v. Public Interest Corp.*, 171 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 1999).

**B. GRANTBACKS**

A grantback is a license provision in which a patentee requires a licensee to assign or license improvements to the patent to the patentee. The Supreme Court has held that a rule of reason test, not a *per se* test, should be used to analyze the propriety of grantbacks. See *Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co.*, 329 U.S. 637, *reh. denied*, 330 U.S. 854 (1947) (*grantbacks are not per se against public interest, and the specific grantback provision at issue was not per se illegal and unenforceable*). No case appears to have held a grantback clause standing alone to be an antitrust violation. *Cf. United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co.*, 83 F. Supp. 284, 289 (N.D. Ohio 1949), *aff’d*, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), *overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.*, 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (*the exclusive grantback provision did not by itself violate the antitrust laws - only in conjunction with the other illegal practices were the grantbacks “integral parts of the general scheme to suppress trade.”*).

Courts have articulated many factors relevant to the rule of reason analysis for grantbacks, among them:

(i) whether the grantback is exclusive or nonexclusive;

(ii) if exclusive, whether the licensee retains the right to use the improvements;

(iii) whether the grantback precludes, permits or requires the licensor to grant sublicenses;

(iv) whether the grantback is limited to the scope of the licensed patents or covers inventions which would not infringe the licensed patent;

(v) the duration of the grantback;
(vi) whether the grantback is royalty-free;
(vii) the market power of the parties;
(viii) whether the parties are competitors; and,
(ix) the effect of the grantback on the incentive for developmental research.


A network of grantback arrangements in an industry, resulting in the funneling of all inventions to the original patentee perpetuating his control after his basic patents expired may be illegal. Transparent-Wrap, 329 U.S. at 646-47 (1946) (dictum). See also U.S. v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. at 816, where such an arrangement contributed to GE’s continued control over incandescent lamp pricing and production volume of its competitors after the patents on the lamp had expired, and was held to be a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act.
Currently, the DOJ evaluates grantback provisions under a rule of reason approach, paying particular attention to whether the grantback is exclusive and whether the licensor has market power in the relevant market.

If the Agencies determine that a particular grantback provision is likely to reduce significantly licensees’ incentives to invest in improving the licensed technology, the Agencies will consider the extent to which the grantback provision has offsetting procompetitive effects, such as (1) promoting dissemination of licensees’ improvements to the licensed technology, (2) increasing the licensors’ incentives to disseminate the licensed technology, or (3) otherwise increasing competition and output in a relevant technology or innovation market. In addition, the Agencies will consider the extent to which grantback provisions in the relevant markets generally increase licensors’ incentives to innovate in the first place.

IP Guidelines, at 20,743-45.

C. RESTRICTIONS ON RESALE OF PATENTED PRODUCT

Wilson’s prohibition considered it unlawful to attempt to restrict a purchaser of a patented product in the resale of that product. However, critics contend that restrictions on resale should be judged by analysis parallel to other vertical restraints. A seller has a rightful incentive to achieve maximum economic return from intellectual property.

Since the patent right is exhausted by the first sale of the patented article, use restrictions generally may not be imposed thereafter. E.g., Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873); U.S. v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942). For example, restrictions on bulk sales of drug products have been upheld in manufacturing licenses, but not upon resale by a purchaser. U.S. v. Glaxo Group, Ltd., 410 U.S. 52,62 (1973); U.S. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 508 F. Supp. 1118 (D.N.J. 1976); see also United States v. Bristol-Myers Co., 82 F.R.D. 655 (D.D.C. 1979) (consent decree enjoined manufacturer from restraining the sale of drugs in bulk form and from imposing restrictions on resale).
In *Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.*, the patentee had affixed a “Single Use Only” label on its patented medical inhaler device, used to deliver radioactive material to the lungs of a patient. 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The patentee sued for alleged induced infringement against refurbishing the inhaler devices in violation of the prohibition against reuse. *Id.* at 701. In reversing a grant of summary judgment for the alleged infringer, the Federal Circuit held that this single use only restriction was not *per se* patent misuse, nor illegal under the antitrust laws. The Federal Circuit explained that “[t]he appropriate criterion [for analyzing a restriction on a licensee’s use] is whether [the] restriction is reasonably within the patent grant, or whether the patentee has ventured beyond the patent grant and into behavior having an anticompetitive effect not justifiable under the rule of reason.” *Id.* at 708.

Similarly, in *B. Braun Medical Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories*, the Federal Circuit reversed a jury verdict of misuse which was based on jury instructions that any use restrictions accompanying the sale of a patented item were impermissible. 124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The court cited two “common” examples of impermissible restrictions as use of the patent to restrain competition in an unpatented product, and employing the patent beyond its term. However, where a condition does not impermissibly broaden the physical or temporal scope of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect, there is no misuse. *See also Monsanto Co. v. McFarling*, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (license permitting use of patented seeds to grow commercial crop but not to “make” patented seeds by reharvest of seeds was not misuse since the patent would read on all generations of seeds; prohibition does not extend rights under the patent statute), *Ariz. Cartridge Remanufacturers Ass’n v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc.*, 421 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 2005) (license including use restrictions for printer cartridges sold to consumers at a lower price was not misuse, because restrictions were reasonably within the patent grant).
In *PSC Inc. v. Symbol Tech. Inc.*, 26 F. Supp. 2d 505 (W.D.N.Y. 1998), the district court ruled that it was patent misuse for a licensor to attempt to collect royalties from two licensees for the same patents, covering the same products. The court stated that the patentee’s “attempts to collect royalties for the same product violates the exhaustion doctrine, and impermissibly extends the scope of the patent grants.” *Id.* at 510, citing *Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc.*, 995 F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993); *Cyrix Corp. v. Intel Corp.*, 846 F. Supp. 522, 539 (E.D. Tex.), aff’d, 42 F.3d 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

In *United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.*, a case not dealing with patented products, the Supreme Court held that territorial restraints imposed by a manufacturer on resale by its customers constituted a *per se* violation of the Sherman Act. 388 U.S.365 (1976), *overruled by Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.*, 433 U.S. 36 (1977). In a footnote, the Court alluded to the possibility of a different rule as to patented products, but declined to decide the issue. (“We have no occasion here to consider whether a patentee has any greater rights in this respect.”).

Field of use restrictions, which restrict the type of customer to whom a manufacturing licensee may sell and the type of article it may make, use and sell, generally are upheld as lawful. The seminal case in this regard is *General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co.* 304 U. S. 175, *aff’d on reh.*, 305 U.S. 124 (1938), *reh. denied*, 305 U.S. 675 (1939). Although General Talking Pictures remains essentially unencumbered by later Supreme Court pronouncements on antitrust issues, lower courts “have occasionally distinguished [it] and held the restraint illegal where they perceived that the field-of-use restriction was being used to extend the patent into areas not protected by the patent monopoly...” *United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle m.b.H*, 670 F.2d 1122,1133 (D.C. Cir. 1981). It is important to keep
in mind that although courts are reluctant to find field of use restrictions a violation of the Sherman Act, they will hold unlawful such restrictions if the patent is being “stretched . . . to continue the monopoly after the sale of the product.” *Munters Corp. v. Burgess Indus., Inc.*, 201 U.S.P.Q. 756, 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). One court has explained that, under the rule of reason approach set forth in *Continental T V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.*, 433 U.S. 36 (1977), “what is beyond the protection of the patent laws in this case is also forbidden by the antitrust laws.” 201 U.S.P.Q. at 759.

The Justice Department has indicated that restrictions on resale ought to be judged by the same general standards as those that ought to be in use outside the patent field, that is, the rule of reason expressed in *Continental T.V.*

D. RESTRICTIONS ON LICENSEE’S FREEDOM TO DEAL IN PRODUCTS AND SERVICES NOT IN SCOPE OF PATENT

Wilson’s prohibition stated that a patentee may not restrict its licensee’s freedom to deal in products or services not within the scope of the patent. However, critics contend that the rule has no general validity in the vertical context.

Several Courts have held that it is a patent misuse to require a licensee to refrain from dealing in competitive products. *See Berlenbach v. Anderson & Thompson Ski Co.*, 329 F.2d 782 (9th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 379 U.S. 830 (1964); *McCullough v. Kammerer Corp.*, 166 F.2d 759 (9th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 335 U.S. 813 (1948); *National Lock Washer Co. v. George K. Garrett Co.*, 137 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1943); *Krampe v. Ideal Indus., Inc.*, 347 F. Supp. 1384 (N.D. 111. 1972). At least one court, however, has upheld a provision converting a license from exclusive to non-exclusive if the licensee handled competing products. *See Naxon Telesign Corp.*
Moreover, at least one court has ruled that the amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5), precluding a presumption of market power from the existence of a patent, applies to a “tie-out.” In re Recombinant DNA Tech. Patent & Contract Lit., 850 F. Supp. 769, 776-77 (S.D. Ind. 1994).

In an interesting turn, one court upheld a contractual restriction against a licensor marketing unpatented products which competed with those of an exclusive patent licensee. See Abbott Laboratories v. Baxter Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5475 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2002). In Abbott, Baxter exclusively licensed patent rights to Abbott related to an anaesthetic called sevoflurane. Baxter later acquired a company which had developed a sevoflurane product which did not infringe the licensed patent rights, and took steps to market the acquired product. The court confirmed an arbitration ruling that Baxter breached a duty of good faith owed to Abbott by acquiring and planning to market the competing (albeit non-infringing) sevoflurane product. The court rejected Baxter’s argument that any agreement imputed between the parties that Baxter would not compete in the sevoflurane market would be a violation of the antitrust laws. The court applied a rule of reason analysis, and explained that the licensing arrangement was pro-competitive in that it promoted Abbott’s investment to introduce sevoflurane into the market, and did not restrain other competitors from entering the market. Id. at *32-33.

When a license prevents a licensee from dealing in competing technologies, the DOJ will evaluate the agreement under the rule of reason. The DOJ will consider whether such an arrangement “is likely to reduce competition in a relevant market,...tak[ing] into account the extent to which the arrangement (1) promotes the exploitation and development of the licensor’s technology and (2) anticompetitively forecloses the exploitation and development of, or otherwise
constrains competitively forecloses the exploitation and development of, or otherwise constrains
competition among, competing technologies.” IP Guidelines, at 20,743-4.

E. LICENSEE CONSENT REQUIRED FOR LICENSOR TO GRANT OTHER LICENSES

The prohibition stated that it is unlawful for a patentee to agree with its licensee that it will not grant licenses to anyone without the licensee’s consent. However, a licensee’s success in exploiting a patent depends upon its investment in research and development, the fruits of which may not be patentable; in its physical plant; in its goodwill; and in its marketing capability. That investment may be justified only if the licensee expects some level of return.

The Supreme Court, in *E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co.*, held that it was not a Sherman Act violation for a patentee to agree that the patentee would not license any other person to manufacture or sell any licensed product of the peculiar style and construction then used or sold by the licensee. 186 U. S. 70 (1902). The Court noted that any agreement containing such a provision is proper “for the protection of the individual who is the licensee, and is nothing more in effect than an assignment or sale of the exclusive right to manufacture and vend the article.” *Id.* at 94.

The current view of the DOJ is that “generally, an exclusive license may raise antitrust concerns only if the licensees themselves, or the licensor and its licensees, are in a horizontal relationship.” IP Guidelines, at 20,742. Examples of such licensing arrangements which may raise antitrust concerns “include cross-licensing by parties collectively possessing market power, grantbacks, and acquisitions of intellectual property rights.” *Id.* (citations omitted).
F. MANDATORY PACKAGE LICENSING

The prohibition stated that mandatory package licensing is an unlawful extension of the patent grant. The justification is that it is more efficient to allow parties to negotiate on a per patent basis rather than forcing packages. This rule encourages a free market because people will pay for what they want, leaving what they do not want for someone who values it more. This aids efficient allocation of resources. However, this is not a world with perfect information and zero transaction costs. Package licensing allows a patentee to maximize the net return on a portfolio of patents, given the restraint on the patentee’s limited knowledge concerning the value of the patents to different licensees, and the ease with which it can negotiate separate licenses for each patent. Profit from the package is limited to the maximum amount the patentee could extract lawfully in the world of perfect information and zero transaction costs.

Compelling the licensing of patents not desired by the licensee as a condition for receiving a license under desired patents, has been held to be an antitrust violation. *Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.*, 395 U.S. 100 (1969); cf. *Applera Corp. v. M.J. Research, Inc.*, 309 F.Supp.2d 293 (D. Conn. 2004) (coercion occurs where the potential licensee does not have a “realistic choice” to obtaining a license to a package of patents, and a package arrangement must not be “structured so that no reasonable buyer would purchase the rights separately”). Similarly, discriminatory royalties which economically cause the same result have also been held illegal. *Id.; cf. Studiengesellschaft Kohle m.b.H. v. Northern Petrochemical*, 225 U.S.P.Q. 194, 197 (N.D. Ill. 1984), *rev’d & remanded on other grounds*, 784 F.2d 351 (Fed. Cir.), *cert. denied*, 478 U. S. 1028 (1986) (plaintiffs’ offer to license patent separately from package of patents and applications including first patent at same royalty as the entire package held not to be
misuse where the royalty was no more than that charged for the first patent in a third party license).

“Trade is restrained, frequently in an unreasonable manner, when rights to use individual patents or copyrights may be obtained only by payment for a package of such rights-but the opportunity to acquire a package of rights does not restrain trade if an alternative opportunity to acquire individual rights is fully available.” *Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc., v. ASCAP*, 620 F.2d 930, 935-36 (2d Cir. 1980), *cert. denied*, 450 U.S. 970, *reh. denied*, 450 U.S. 1056 (1981) (percentage fee licensing of all copyrighted musical compositions in inventory of performing rights organization does not violate the rule of reason under §1 of the Sherman Act since users may negotiate directly with copyright owners); *see also Western Electric Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp.*, 631 F.2d 333, 338-39 (4th Cir. 1980), *cert. denied*, 450 U.S. 971 (1981) (no coercive package licensing, where no showing that “Western did not give [licensee] a choice to take a license under the Derick-Frosch patent alone or in combination with other patents on reasonable terms.”)

More recently, the Federal Circuit has held that mandatory package licensing is not *per se* unlawful. *U.S. Philips Corp. v. ITC*, 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In *Philips*, a package license was made available which included patents which were essential to making compact disk products conforming to industry standards, as well as patents allegedly useful—but not essential—to meeting the standards. A uniform license fee was applied, irrespective of whether the non-essential patents were used. The infringement defendants alleged patent misuse, arguing that they might have achieved a lower license fee if they were permitted to license only the essential patents. The Federal Circuit reversed an order of the International Trade Commission which had held the asserted patents unenforceable for misuse. *Id.*
The court distinguished Supreme Court precedent applying the *per se* rule to patent-product tying arrangements as inapplicable to mandatory package licenses. *Id.* at 1188. The court noted that the package licenses at issue did not require that the licensees actually use the allegedly nonessential patents, and noted that there was “no evidence that a portion of the royalty was attributable to the patents that the Commission characterized as nonessential.” *Id.* at 1188-89. The court ruled that such a “package license is thus not anticompetitive in the way that a compelled purchase of a tied product would be.” *Id.* at 1190. The court explained:

For the patentee in this situation to offer its nonessential patents as part of a package with the essential patent at no additional charge is no more anticompetitive than if it had surrendered the nonessential patents or had simply announced a policy that it would not enforce them against persons who licensed the essential patent. In either case, those offering technology that competed with the nonessential patents would be unhappy, because they would be competing against free technology. But the patentee would not be using his essential patent to obtain power in the market for the technology covered by the nonessential patents. This package licensing arrangement cannot be fairly characterized as an exploitation of power in one market to obtain a competitive advantage in another. *Id.* at 1192. Thus, even under a rule of reason analysis, the Commission’s decision was stated to have been predicated on legal errors and factual findings that were not supported by substantial evidence. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

The Department of Justice also has stated that it no longer believes that mandatory package licensing is inherently unlawful. Package licensing allows the patentee to maximize the net return on its patent portfolio. The DOJ has recognized that package licensing can be efficient in that it avoids the necessity of costly individual negotiations between the parties with respect to each patent.
G. CONDITIONING LICENSE ON ROYALTIES NOT REASONABLY RELATED TO SALE OF PRODUCTS COVERED BY THE PATENT

The prohibition had stated that it is unlawful for a patentee to insist, as a condition of the license, that a licensee pay royalties not reasonably related to the licensee’s sales of products covered by the licensed patent.

It is not per se a misuse of patents to require a licensee to pay royalties based on a percentage of its sales, even though none of the patents are used. *Automatic Radio Company v. Hazeltine*, 339 U.S. 827, 830-34, *reh. denied*, 340 U.S. 846 (1950). “A patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate with the leverage of that monopoly.” *Brulotte v. Thys*, 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964), *reh. denied*, 379 U.S. 985 (1965). Likewise, a patentee/licensor is not required to renegotiate an existing agreement to change the royalty scheme from one based on the right to use any of group of patents, to one based on royalties for each specified patent used. *Hull v. Brunswick Corp.*, 704 F.2d 1195 (10th Cir. 1983). “If the mutual convenience or efficiency of both the licensor and the licensee results in a royalty base which includes the licensee’s total sales or sales of nonpatented items, there can be no patent misuse.” *Magnavox Co. v. Mattell Inc.*, 216 U.S.P.Q. 28, 59 (N.D. Ill. 1982); but see *Instruments S.A. v. American Holographic Inc.*, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1852 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 2000) (agreement purporting to require royalty payments on all diffraction grating devices interpreted to require royalties only on products covered by licensor’s patents, where the agreement did not clearly state that the parties intended to use a percentage of the sales price of all devices as a measuring device for the value of the use of the patented technology).

However, to use the leverage of a patent to project royalty payments beyond the life of the patent has been held to be an illegal enlargement of the patent grant. *Brulotte*, 379 U.S.
at 33. The Eleventh Circuit also has employed a similar rationale in striking down a hybrid
agreement licensing patent rights and trade secrets, where royalty obligations remain unchanged
after patents expire, as unenforceable beyond the date of expiration of the patents. *Pitney Bowes,

A licensor may collect royalties on the manufacture of items based on confidential
information that is within the scope of a patent application, even where the patent does not
ultimately issue. In *Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co.*, the Supreme Court upheld a contract
providing for the payment of royalties in exchange for the right to make or sell a keyholder even
though the patent on the keyholder was ultimately rejected and the licensed confidential
information became public. 440 U.S. 257 (1979). Likewise, a manufacturer may be obliged to
pay royalties under an agreement involving a patent application even though the scope of the
issued patent was narrower than the original patent application referred to in the agreement. *See
1052 (1983). However, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have held that the Brulotte rule precludes
enforcement of license provisions extending beyond the statutory patent grant period for an item
that was unpatented at the time the agreement was executed, if such license provisions were
agreed to in anticipation of patent protection. *Boggild v. Kenner Products*, 776 F.2d 1315 (6th
Cir. 1985), *cert. denied*, 477 U.S. 908 (1986); *Meehan v. PPG Indus., Inc.*, 802 F.2d 881 (7th

A package license agreement which requires the constant payment of royalties
beyond the expiration of some of the patents until the expiration of the last patent has been
deemed valid if voluntarily entered into. *Beckman Instruments Inc. v. Technical Development
Corp.*, 433 F.2d 55, 61 (7th Cir. 1970), *cert. denied*, 401 U.S. 976 (1971); *McCullough Tool Co.*

Discriminatory licensing rates which impair competition, may constitute patent misuse and an antitrust violation. See Laitram Corp. v. King Crab Inc., 245 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Alaska 1965) (charging twice as much to lessees of patented shrimp peeling machines in the Northwest than to lessees in the Gulf of Mexico area because of the labor costs of the lessees in the Northwest, was held to constitute patent misuse where the Northwest canners suffered competitive injury); LaPeyre v. F.T.C., 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966) (same practice held to be an unfair method of competition in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act); Peelers Co. v. Wendt, 260 F. Supp. 193 (W.D. Wash. 1966) (same practice held to be a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act). See also Allied Research Products, Inc. v. Heatbath Corp., 300 F. Supp. 656, 657 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (patentee’s refusal to license its patented technology to Heatbath “solely because of a personal dispute,” although a license had previously been granted to Heatbath’s competitor held to be patent misuse. The court declared that “Allied had no right to refuse a license to Heatbath as to [the prior licensee].”)

In a later case involving another shrimp peeling patent, a district court held that a uniform royalty rate based on uncleaned shrimp poundage was not discriminatory, even though licensees in the Northwest realized less shrimp after the cooking and cleaning process than did licensees in other regions. Laitram Corp. v. Depoe Bay Fish Co., 549 F. Supp. 29, 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 65,268 (D. Ore.1982).

In USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 513, cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1107 (1983), the court held that discriminatory licensing rates did not constitute patent
misuse where plaintiff “made no effort to present evidence of actual or probable anticompetitive effect in a relevant market.”

The Seventh Circuit has held that an agreement between a patent owner and licensees to charge a company a substantially higher royalty for a license than that being paid by other industry members does not amount to a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Such an agreement should be tested under the rule of reason. *Hennessey Inds. Inc. v. FMC Corp.*, 779 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1985).

Although the 1995 IP Guidelines are silent as to the royalty rates to be allowed in patent licenses, prior DOJ statements indicate that it will consider the reasonableness of the patentee’s choice of method for approximating the value of the license paramount, not the actual royalty paid on the sale of the patented item. Sales may be a reasonable method in some instances, but not in others. Where the patentee and licensee are horizontal competitors, a rule of reason approach should be employed against the risk of unnecessary cartelization.

**H. SALES RESTRICTIONS OF PRODUCTS MADE BY PROCESS PATENT**

Wilson’s prohibition stated that it is unlawful for the owner of a process patent to attempt to place restrictions on its licensee’s sales of products made by the patented process, since it enables the patentee to attain monopoly control over something not necessarily subject to his control by virtue of the patent grant.

A number of courts have analyzed the validity of restrictions on use of an unpatented product of a patented process. In the seminal case, *United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H.*, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that a license to
a process which permitted the licensee only to use the resulting product, but not sell it, was valid. 670 F.2d 1122, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

In Studiengesellschaft, Ziegler held a patent on a process for making certain catalysts (which themselves were useful to make plastics). Ziegler licensed one manufacturer (Hercules) to sell the catalyst made from the process patent. Ziegler required other licensees to restrict use of the catalyst solely to meet their own needs for making plastics, and prohibited them from selling the catalyst on the open market. The court, using a rule of reason analysis, held that this was a valid restriction because the patentee was legally entitled to grant an exclusive license to a single licensee if he so desired, thereby prohibiting any use of the process by others. Id. at 1131. Therefore, the patentee was not deemed to have acted “unreasonably” under the antitrust laws since he had taken the less extreme step of licensing additional manufacturers, subject to the condition that the resultant product be restricted to their own use. Id. at 1131, 1135. In justifying this conclusion, the court stated that the licensor had no monopoly over the unpatented product produced by other processes. The court stated that a de facto monopoly of the product can continue only so long as its process remains “so superior to other processes that [the unpatented product] made by those other processes could not compete commercially. . .” Id. at 1129.

The same Ziegler patents and licenses also had been examined in Ethyl Corp. v. Hercules Powder Co., 232 F. Supp. 453, 455-56 (D. Del. 1963). In Ethyl Corp., the district court ruled that Ziegler could not convey an exclusive right to sell the product of the patented process. The court explained that a process patentee “can restrict the use of his process, but he cannot place controls on the sale of unpatented articles produced by the process.” Id. However, in a supplemental opinion, the court did state (somewhat semantically) that, although the patentee
could not convey an exclusive right to sell the catalyst -- which was unpatented -- it could convey an exclusive license to use the patented process to make product for the purpose of sale. Thus, the patentee also could prevent another licensee from using the process to make product for sale. *Id.* at 460.


An interesting question is whether restrictions in a license of a trade secret process should be treated any differently under the antitrust laws from a process patent license. At least one case advises that the licensor of a trade secret process may restrict the use of a product of that process as long as the restriction may be said to be ancillary to a commercially supportable licensing arrangement, rather than a sham set up for the purpose of controlling competition while avoiding the consequences of the antitrust laws. *Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp.*, 766 F. Supp. 670, 689 (C.D. Ill. 1991), *quoting A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co.*, 396 F.2d 710, 715 (9th Cir. 1968). In determining whether a licensing arrangement is a sham, the court will examine the licensor’s secret process to determine the extent of know-how or technology exclusively possessed by the licensor, and provided to the licensee, and whether the substance of such technology may fairly be said to support ancillary restraints. *A. & E. Plastik Pak*, 396 F.2d at 715. Under the *Christianson* case, a party challenging such a license provision bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the arrangement is a sham, or
that the licensor asserted its trade secrets with the knowledge that no trade secrets existed. If the challenger fails to carry this burden of proof, then the court should conclude that the actions of the licensor have a sufficient legal justification and are reasonably necessary to enforce the licensor’s trade secrets. 766 F. Supp. at 689.

Similar to the owner of a process patent, the owner of a trade secret under ordinary circumstances may grant an exclusive license without antitrust implications. See Frank M. Denison, D.D S., Inc. v. Westmore Dental Arts, P.C., 212 U.S.P.Q. 601, 603 (W.D. Pa. 1981). However, unlike a patent licensor, the licensor of a trade secret is not relying upon (and hence, not arguably improperly extending) a statutorily-based exclusivity, which historically has been a concern of the antitrust laws. Thus, at least one commentator has suggested that a licensor of a trade secret process may have somewhat greater latitude under the antitrust laws than a process patent licensor. ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS 10-175 (1998).

I. PRICE RESTRICTIONS

The prohibition stated that it is unlawful for a patentee to require a licensee to adhere to any specified or minimum price with respect to the licensee’s sale of the licensed product. Under the Sherman Act, a combination formed “for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se.” United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil, Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223, reh. denied, 310 U.S. 658 (1940); see also Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, reh. denied, 340 U.S. 939 (1951), overruled by Copperweld v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U. S. 752 (1984); and United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). However, not all arrangements among competitors that have an impact on price are per se
Sherman Act violations. *Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.*, 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979). *See Gerlinger v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 311 F. Supp. 838 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (agreement that Amazon.com would not sell books at its website at a price lower than it offered the same books through internet shoppers it serviced through Borders.com “does not set a minimum, maximum or range for the prices Amazon.com can charge for the books it sells on the web sites and thus does not constitute *per se* price-fixing).

In 1997, the Supreme Court overruled a thirty-year old precedent, and held that vertically-imposed maximum price restrictions should be analyzed under the rule of reason, and are not a *per se* antitrust violation. *State Oil Co. v. Khan*, 522 U.S. 3, 118 S. Ct. 275 (1997), overruling *Albrecht v. Herald Co.*, 390 U.S. 145 (1968). The Court explained that although minimum price restrictions would remainder *per se* illegal, there was insufficient economic justification for *per se* invalidation of vertical maximum price fixing. The Supreme Court decision in *Khan*, and much of the *per se* treatment of price fixing, is outside the intellectual property context. There is little recent precedent analyzing whether intellectual property licenses should be analyzed under different standards than other agreements with regard to price restrictions.

The Supreme Court previously has upheld the right of a patent owner to control the prices at which its licensee may sell a patented product. *United States v. General Electric Co.*, 272 U.S. 476 (1926).

One of the valuable elements of the exclusive right of a patentee is to acquire profit by the price of which the article is sold. The higher the price, the greater the profit, unless it is prohibitory. When the patentee licenses another to make and vend, and retains the right to continue to make and vend on his own account, the price of which his licensee will sell will necessarily affect the price of which he can sell his own patented goods. It would seem entirely reasonable that he should say to the licensee, “Yes, you may make and sell articles under my patent, but not so as to destroy the profit that I wish to obtain by making them and selling them myself.”
The Supreme Court and lower courts have applied the General Electric case narrowly. The Supreme Court itself has explained that General Electric “gives no support for a patentee, acting in concert with all members of an industry, to issue substantially identical licenses to all members of the industry under the terms of which the industry is completely regimented, the production of competitive unpatented products suppressed, a class of distributors squeezed out, and prices on unpatented products stabilized.” United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 400 (Frankfurter, J., concurring), reh. denied, 333 U.S. 869 (1948); see also Barber-Colman Co. v. National Tool Co., 136 F.2d 339 (6th Cir. 1943) (owner of a process patent could not by license agreement lawfully control selling price of unpatented articles produced by use of patented machine and process).

However, the General Electric holding has not been overturned, and has maintained some vitality in the lower courts. The D.C. Circuit, while noting that General Electric has “been seriously questioned, and has survived twice only by the grace of an equally divided court,” nonetheless recognized that it remains “the verbal frame of reference for testing the validity of a license restriction in many subsequent decisions.” Studiengesellschaft Kohle, 670 F.2d at 1131, citing United States v. Huck Mfg. Co., 382 U.S. 197 (1965); United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948). Both the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court have employed the General Electric framework in upholding agreements challenged as illegal price-fixing. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, 444 F. Supp. 648 (D.S.C. 1977) (agreement between patent owner and licensing agent as to amount of use royalty to be paid by purchasers of patented machine did not constitute illegal price-fixing), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (blanket licensing of flat fee of performance rights in copyrighted musical compositions through performing rights societies does not constitute price-fixing per se).

Notwithstanding General Electric, the Justice Department has stated that it will “enforce the per se rule against resale price maintenance in the intellectual property context.” IP Guidelines, at 20,743-3. Although this pronouncement was prior to the Supreme Court decision in Khan, given the longstanding existence of General Electric, there is a substantial question whether Khan would change the DOJ view on this issue, at least outside the arena of maximum vertical resale price maintenance.

The geographical reach of the Sherman Act in addressing price fixing was addressed by the Supreme Court in F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004). The case involved an alleged international price fixing scheme by manufacturers and distributors of certain vitamins. The Court explained that the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act provides that the Sherman Act does not apply to conduct involving trade with foreign countries, except where such conduct significantly harms domestic commerce and has an anti-competitive effect that gives rise to a Sherman Act claim. However, where price-fixing conduct significantly and adversely affects both customers inside and outside the United States, but the adverse foreign effect is independent of any adverse domestic effect, the Sherman Act does not apply to a claim based solely on the foreign effect.

V. ACQUISITION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

The acquisition and accumulation of patents have been analyzed under the antitrust laws from two perspectives -- patents acquired by internal invention, and patents acquired from third parties.

Once a company had acquired monopoly power, it could not thereafter acquire lawful patent power if it obtained new patents on its own inventions primarily for the purpose of blocking the development and marketing of competitive products rather than primarily to protect its own products from being imitated or blocked by others.

Id. at 1007. See also GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 519 F. Supp. 1203, 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).

The prohibitions of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, against asset acquisitions likely to produce a substantial lessening of competition, may be applied to the acquisition of patents. E.g., SCM v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982);


While patent acquisitions are not immune from the antitrust laws, the analysis should focus on the “market power that will be conferred by the patent in relation to the market position then occupied by the acquiring party.” SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1205, 1208 (2d Cir. 1981) (emphasis in original), *cert. denied*, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982). Section 7 of the Clayton Act may prohibit an acquisition if the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

Though acquisitions of patents may be subjected to antitrust scrutiny, the mere holding of a patent, lawfully acquired, ordinarily should not implicate the antitrust laws. The Second Circuit has explained that:

> Where a company has acquired patents lawfully, it must be entitled to hold them free from the threat of antitrust liability for the seventeen years that the patent laws provide. To hold otherwise would unduly trespass upon the policies that underlie the patent law system. The restraint placed upon competition is temporarily limited by the term of the patents, and must, in deference to the patent system, be tolerated throughout the duration of the patent grants.

645 F.2d at 1212.
Although private parties may bring suit for Clayton Act violations, they must allege a cognizable antitrust injury. Thus, in *Eastman Kodak*, summary judgment dismissing a Clayton Act claim was affirmed since the mere acquisition and enforcement of a patent did not amount to antitrust injury. “Goodyear alleges injuries stemming from Eastman’s enforcement of the ’112 patent. Goodyear, however, would have suffered these same injuries regardless of who had acquired and enforced the patent against it.... These injuries, therefore, did not occur ‘by reason of’ that which made the acquisition allegedly anticompetitive.” *114 F.3d* at 1558.

The Justice Department has stated that it will analyze acquisitions of intellectual property rights by applying a merger analysis to outright sales by an intellectual property owner and to licenses that preclude all other persons, including the licensor, from using the licensed intellectual property. *1995 IP Guidelines*, at 20,743-5 to 20,744 (footnote omitted). The merger analysis employed by the DOJ will be consistent with the principles and standards articulated in the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, *Horizontal Merger Guidelines* (April 2, 1992). *Id.*

**VI. REFUSALS TO LICENSE**

Once a party is deemed a monopolist, business practices that might otherwise seem ordinary sometimes are subjected to closer antitrust scrutiny. One such area concerns refusals to license intellectual property. In litigation involving the computer industry, one district court granted a preliminary injunction against Intel for allegedly violating its “affirmative duties not to misuse its monopoly power and to compete in a manner which does not unreasonably or unfairly harm competition.” *Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp.*, 3 F. Supp.2d 1255, 1277 (N.D. Ala. 1998). However, the preliminary injunction was vacated on appeal. The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit held that Intergraph had not proven a likelihood of success on its Sherman Act claims. 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

As stated in the district court’s fact findings, Intergraph is a developer of computer-aided designing and drafting workstations. In the 1990's, Intergraph began designing workstations which incorporated Intel microprocessors, and by the end of 1993 had ceased further development of its own “Clipper” microprocessor. From 1993 to 1997, Intergraph received confidential information from Intel related to Intel’s microprocessors, subject to various confidentiality agreements. In 1997, Intergraph began threatening some Intel customers with patent infringement, based in part on the use by those customers of Intel microprocessors in their products, and Intergraph sued Intel for patent infringement. Intel sought a license under the Intergraph patents, and also proposed licensing its own patents to Intergraph. Intergraph declined the Intel proposal. Eventually, Intel invoked the provisions of the confidentiality agreements to terminate those agreements and demand return of its confidential information. Intergraph then asserted an antitrust claim against Intel for its refusal to supply it with confidential information. Intergraph moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Intel from refusing to engage in business with Intergraph in a manner similar to that existing between 1993 and the commencement of the parties’ disputes. On April 10, 1998, the district court granted the preliminary injunction. On November 5, 1999, the Federal Circuit vacated that injunction.

The district court had found that Intel had monopoly power in both the microprocessor market and in the separate market for Intel microprocessors. It found that Intergraph was “locked in” to Intel’s microprocessors and technical information. 3 F. Supp.2d at 1275-76. The court then explained that:
Even conduct by a monopolist that is otherwise lawful may violate the antitrust laws where it has anticompetitive effects. *Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.*, 125 F.3d 1195, 1207 (9th Cir. 1997). The court concludes that Intel has violated its affirmative duties not to misuse its monopoly power and to compete in a manner which does not unreasonably or unfairly harm competition.

*Id.* at 1277.

The court stated that Intel’s attempt to “coerce Intergraph into relinquishing its intellectual property rights as a condition of Intel permitting Intergraph to continue as a competitor in the high-end graphics workstation market” and its alleged inducement for Intergraph to discontinue its Clipper microprocessor development evidenced Intel’s “willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power,” in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. *Id.* at 1276-77. In its decision, the district court also concluded that “Intel is an actual and serious competitor of Intergraph” and that Intel had “conspir[ed] with Intergraph’s competitors to take away Intergraph’s customers.” The court therefore found Intergraph likely to succeed under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits a “contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.” *Id.* at 1280-81.

The district court also found Intergraph likely to prevail on one or more of the following “established theories” of liability under Section 2 of the Sherman Act: (1) unlawful refusal to deal and denial of access to essential facilities; (2) unlawful monopoly leveraging; (3) unlawful coercive reciprocity; (4) use of patented technology to restrain trade; and (5) retaliatory enforcement of non-disclosure agreements. *Id.* at 1277-80.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that none of these theories were supported by sufficient evidence of an antitrust violation. First, the court rejected the notion that Intergraph and Intel competed in a market in which Intel had a monopoly. Since Intergraph potentially competed with Intel only in the graphics subsystems market, in which Intergraph admitted that
Intel did not have monopoly power, the court ruled that Intel’s conduct with respect to Intergraph “does not constitute the offense of monopolization or the threat thereof in any market relevant to competition with Intergraph. The Sherman Act is a law in the public, not private, interest.” 195 F.3d at 1356.

Among the more interesting issues raised by the Intergraph decision is its analysis of Intel’s “refusal to deal” with Intergraph. Prior to the Federal Circuit’s decision in Intergraph, several courts had examined the potential limits on a refusal to license intellectual property. A patent owner’s refusal to license its patents ordinarily raises no antitrust scrutiny. However, the circuit courts have held somewhat differing views on the absolute limits of a patentee’s discretion in refusing to license others. At least one appellate court has explained, without qualification, that a patent owner “cannot be held liable under Section 2 [of the Sherman Act] . . . by refusing to license the patent to others.” Miller Insituform, Inc. v. Insituform of North America, 830 F.2d 606 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964) (“The patent laws which give a 17-year monopoly on ‘making, using, or selling the invention’ are in pari materia with the antitrust laws and modify them pro tanto.”); see also Schlafly v. Caro-Kann Corp., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 8250, at *19 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 28, 1998) (unpub.) (“a patentee may lawfully refuse to issue licenses at all.”). The Ninth Circuit has promulgated a rule whereby a monopolist’s otherwise unlawful refusal to deal presumptively is justified where the refusal to deal involves patented or copyrighted technology. See Image Technical Services Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218 (9th Cir. 1997).

Kodak’s contention that its refusal to sell its parts . . . was based on its reluctance to sell its patented or copyrighted parts was a presumptively legitimate business justification. Kodak may assert that its desire to profit from its intellectual property rights justifies its conduct, and the jury should presume that this justification is legitimately procompetitive.
Id. at 1219 (citation omitted). According to the Ninth Circuit, the presumption can be rebutted, such as by evidence that the intellectual property was acquired unlawfully, or evidence that the desire to profit from its intellectual property was a mere pretext. Id.

At least one subsequent district court decision refused to follow the Ninth Circuit’s institution of a rebuttable presumption of legitimacy, and instead concluded that “where a patent or copyright has been lawfully acquired, subsequent conduct permissible under the patent or copyright laws cannot give rise to any liability under the antitrust laws.” In re Independent Svc. Orgs. Antitrust Litigation, 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1134 (D. Kan.), appeal denied, 129 F.3d 132 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In that case, the court followed the Miller line of cases, and affirmed that “a patent holder’s unilateral refusal to sell or license its patented invention does not constitute unlawful exclusionary conduct under the antitrust laws even if the refusal impacts competition in more than one relevant antitrust market.” Id. at 1138. The court applied a similar rule to a refusal to sell or license copyrighted properties. Id. at 1142-44.

Although the district court in Intergraph appeared to accept that Intel’s information was proprietary intellectual property, in its discussion of Intel’s refusal to deal the court did not directly address the Miller line of cases, nor the rebuttable presumption of business justification set forth in Image Technical Services. The Federal Circuit relied on both Miller and Image Technical Services in vacating the injunction. The court noted that “the antitrust laws do not negate the patentee’s right to exclude others from patent property.” Intergraph, at 1362. After chastising the district court for citing Image Technical Services without recognizing its rebuttable presumption of business justification in refusing to license intellectual property, the Federal Circuit agreed with the Image Technical Services court that it could find “no reported case in which a court had imposed antitrust liability for a refusal to sell or license a patent or
copyright.” *Id.*, quoting *Image Technical Services*, 125 F.3d at 1216. Of course, an antitrust violation was found in *Image Technical Services* itself when the court ruled that the presumption of valid business justification had been rebutted. The Federal Circuit then stated that “the owner of proprietary information has no obligation to provide it, whether to a competitor, customer, or supplier.” *Id.* at 1363. The court found the district court’s conclusion on this issue “devoid of evidence or elaboration or authority.” *Id.* Since there was no anticompetitive aspect to Intel’s refusal to license Intergraph, given the absence of significant competition between them, the court ruled that there was no antitrust violation. *Id.*

The district court also had premised its ruling on the “essential facilities” doctrine. The district court ruled that Intel’s proprietary information is an essential facility that Intel could not withhold from Intergraph without violation of the Sherman Act. As set forth in *MCI Communications Co. v. American Tel. & Tel.*, “the antitrust laws have imposed on firms controlling an essential facility the obligation to make the facility available on non-discriminatory terms.” 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 464 U.S. 891 (1983). The *MCI* court identified four elements for liability under the essential facilities doctrine:

1. control of the essential facility by a monopolist;
2. a competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility;
3. the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and
4. the feasibility of providing the facility.

*Id.* at 1132-33.

However, at least one subsequent court has stated that the essential facilities doctrine is inapplicable where the defendant is not a monopolist in a market in which it competes with the plaintiff. See *Ad-Vantage Tel. Directory Consultants v. GTE Directories Corp.*, 849 F.2d 1336, 1348 (11th Cir. 1987) (rejecting Sherman Act essential facilities claim because plaintiff did not compete in market where defendant had monopoly power and defendant did not have
monopoly power in market where it did compete with plaintiff). In *Intergraph*, the Federal
Circuit followed this line of reasoning, stating that “the essential facility theory does not depart
from the need for a competitive relationship in order to incur Sherman Act liability and remedy.”
*Intergraph*, 195 F.3d at 1356. The court explained that no court had taken the essential facility
doctrine “beyond the situation of competition with the controller of the facility. . . . [T]here must
be a market in which plaintiff and defendant compete, such that a monopolist extends its
monopoly to the downstream market by refusing access to the facility it controls.” *Id.* at 1357.
Thus, under the *Intergraph* ruling, and also taking the rules of *Miller* and *Ad-Vantage* together, a
monopolist should be free to refuse to license its proprietary intellectual property to another, even
if the intellectual property qualifies as an “essential facility,” so long as the potential licensee does
not compete with the licensor in the market in which the licensor is a monopolist.

The Federal Circuit also found Intergraph’s use of an alternative “refusal to deal”
theory unavailing. The court noted that a refusal to deal may raise antitrust concerns if it is
“directed against competition and the purpose is to create, maintain, or enlarge a monopoly.” *Id.*
at 1358. However, since Intel did not compete with Intergraph, there was no need for it to
establish a business justification for its actions. *Id.* Moreover, the patent infringement lawsuit
filed by Intergraph provided valid grounds for Intel to terminate relations with Intergraph. “The
bringing of a lawsuit may provide a sound business reason for [a] manufacturer to terminate []
relations” with a customer. *Id.*, quoting *House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co.*, 298
F.2d 867, 871 (2d Cir. 1962).

The Federal Circuit rejected Intergraph’s remaining antitrust theories, primarily on
the ground that the absence of competition by Intergraph in the microprocessor market precluded
Sherman Act liability for Intel’s conduct toward it. “Although undoubtedly judges would create a
kinder and gentler world of commerce, it is inappropriate to place the judicial thumb on the scale of business disputes in order to rebalance the risk from that assumed by the parties.” *Id.* at 1364.7

In *In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation*, 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000), *cert. denied*, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 1102 (Feb. 20, 2001), the Federal Circuit reiterated that a refusal to sell or license patented technology cannot give rise to antitrust liability absent “illegal tying, fraud in the Patent and Trademark Office, or sham litigation.” Unless a patent infringement suit is objectively baseless, the patentee’s subjective motivation in exerting statutory rights is irrelevant. *See also Sheet Metal Duct Inc. v. Lindab Inc.*, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1480, 1485 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (patent holder is permitted to maintain its monopoly over a patented product by refusing to license, or to deal only with those with whom it pleases); *Schor v. Abbott Labs.*, 378 F. Supp. 2d 850 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (applying the Federal Circuit’s rule, and concluding that “subject to narrow limitations... a patentee's exercise of its statutorily-granted market power does not constitute a Sherman Act violation, even if such conduct affects a second market”).

**VII. HATCH-WAXMAN ISSUES**

The complex interactions between pharmaceutical patent owners and generic drug companies sometimes touch on the antitrust laws. Not infrequently, a generic company will

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7 During the pendency of the appeal from the preliminary injunction, Intel settled an administrative action brought by the Federal Trade Commission against it which was based, in part, on Intel’s dealings with Intergraph. In the Consent Agreement, entered March 17, 1999, Intel agreed for a period of ten years not to withdraw or refuse access to certain technical information for reasons related to an intellectual property dispute, if at the time of the dispute the customer is receiving such information from Intel. Intel is permitted to withhold information specific to any Intel microprocessor that the customer has asserted is infringing its patent, copyright or trade secret rights, unless the customer agrees not to seek an injunction for the asserted infringement. The Consent Agreement does not constitute any admission by Intel that it violated any law. *See www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9903/d09288intelagreement.htm* The Federal Circuit’s decision simply noted
challenge a pharmaceutical patent, and seek FDA approval to market a generic version of the patented product prior to patent expiration. In such instances, the patent owner may bring a suit for infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2), notwithstanding the fact that FDA approval has not been granted and the product is not on the market. It has been reported that in some instances, the patent owner and generic company have settled such infringement litigation on terms including a promise by the generic company not to market its product for a certain time and a promise by the patent owner to pay the generic company a sum of money. Such arrangements are at issue in several FTC investigations, as well as private antitrust litigation. Further monitoring and antitrust enforcement may be forthcoming. Sections 1111 et seq. of the Medicare Act, enacted in November 2003, require certain agreements between branded and generic drug companies, or among generic drug companies, to be filed with the Justice Department and the FTC within 10 days of their execution.

One court has held that an agreement between a generic drug company and a pharmaceutical patent owner, in which the generic company agreed not to market its product for a period of time is per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. In re: Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d 682 (E.D. Mich. 2000). The court characterized the agreement as placing three restraints on Andrx, the generic company: (1) it restrained it from marketing its generic version of Cardizem CD in July 1998 when FDA approval was expected and obtained; (2) it restrained Andrx from marketing other generic versions of Cardizem CD not at issue in the patent litigation, including a reformulated product it had developed; and (3) it restrained Andrx from relinquishing or compromising its 180-day Hatch-Waxman exclusivity.
against other generic drug companies. *Id.* at 697. By the time the agreement terminated, Andrx had been paid almost $90 million dollars by the patent owner, Hoechst Marion Roussel Inc. *Id.* at 689. The court ruled that the agreement was an agreement between horizontal competitors to allocate the United States market for Cardizem CD, and thus was *per se* illegal. *Id.* at 699. The court rejected various arguments from the defendants that the agreement was in fact pro-competitive, stating that the plain terms of the agreement belied such contentions. *Id.* at 703.

[T]he clear and unambiguous terms of the Agreement indicate that its main thrust was to have Andrx refrain from going to market with its generic version of Cardizem CD beyond the July 8, 1998 date when it could have entered the market, and to have Andrx continue the prosecution of its ANDA (the alleged infringing act) and not otherwise compromise its right to the 180-day exclusivity period (which would delay the entry by others with generic versions of Cardizem CD because, under the scheme of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, these potential generic competitors would be forced to wait out this exclusivity period before obtaining FDA approval), and to have HMRI pay Andrx tens of millions of dollars as long as Andrx complied. The HMRI/Andrx Agreement, on its face, allocates the entire U.S. market for Cardizem CD and its bioequivalents to HMRI for the life of the Agreement. Accordingly, this Court concludes that it is a naked horizontal market allocation agreement and thus constitutes a restraint of trade that is illegal *per se* under section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act and under the various state antitrust laws at issue here. *Id.* at 705-06.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court ruling that the agreement was *per se* illegal under the Sherman Act. *In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Lit.*, 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003). The court stated that the agreement “cannot be fairly characterized as merely an attempt to enforce patent rights or an interim settlement of the patent litigation.” *Id.* at 908. The court also was unpersuaded by efforts to argue that the case presented a “novel” application of the *per se* rule, quoting Supreme Court precedent that “the Sherman Act, so far as price-fixing agreements are concerned, establishes one uniform rule applicable to all industries alike.” *Id.*
court also found arguments that the agreement lacked anticompetitive effects and had procompetitive benefits to be “simply irrelevant” to a *per se* analysis. *Id.* at 908-09.

A Sherman Act violation similarly had been found by a district court in *In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation*, 164 F. Supp.2d 1340 (S.D. Fla. 2000). In that case, the court ruled that agreements between Abbott Laboratories and two generic drug companies were a *per se* violation of the Sherman Act. The court characterized the agreements as ones in which the generic companies “forswore competing with Abbott in the United States market for terazosin hydrochloride drugs and promised to take steps to forestall others from entering that market for the life of their respective agreements in exchange for millions of dollars in monthly or quarterly payments.” *Id.* at 1348-49. The court termed the agreements a “classic example” of a territorial allocation undertaken to minimize competition. *Id.* at 1349, citing *United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc.*, 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).

However, unlike *Cardizem*, the Eleventh Circuit reversed this decision on appeal, holding that the *per se* rule was inapplicable to the agreements at issue. The Court remanded for a determination of the Sherman Act issue under a rule of reason analysis. *Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.*, 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003).

The Eleventh Circuit began with the proposition that an agreement between competitors to allocate markets is “clearly anticompetitive.” 344 F.3d at 1304. However, the court explained that the existence of Abbott’s patent played a critical role in the antitrust analysis.

If this case merely involved one firm making monthly payments to potential competitors in return for their exiting or refraining from entering the market, we would readily affirm the district court’s order. This is not such a case, however, because one of the parties owned a patent.
Id. The court noted that a patent provided a right of exclusion, which provided the patent owner “whatever degree of market power it might gain thereby.” Id. Such exploitation is “an incentive to induce investment in innovation and the public disclosure of inventions.” Id. The court noted two ways in which the exclusionary power cannot be exploited (patent pooling and fixing licensee’s sale prices), but then listed the following permissible avenues of exploitation:

1) exclude everyone from producing the patented article;
2) choose to be the sole supplier itself;
3) grant exclusive territorial licenses carving up the United States among its licensees, citing 35 U.S.C. § 261;
4) “[w]ithin reason,” subdivide markets in ways other than territorial, such as by customer class.

Id. at 1304-05. The court noted that each of these actions were anticompetitive, but yet were not violations of the Sherman Act because of the inherent power of exclusion granted by a patent. Id. at 1305. The court rejected the district court’s characterization of the parties’ agreement as a “territorial allocation,” and stated that the district court had failed to consider the power to exclude created by the patent right. Id. The court explained that the parties’ agreements were “no broader than” the exclusionary right of Abbott’s patent, and deemed the “exclusion of infringing competition . . . the essence of the patent grant.” Id. The court summarized its ruling as follows:

Because the district court failed to consider the exclusionary power of Abbott's patent in its antitrust analysis, its rationale was flawed and its conclusion that these Agreements constitute per se violations of the antitrust laws must be reversed.

Id. at 1306.
The court also discussed several issues it stated were relevant to remand, based on the arguments raised by the parties. First, it rejected the argument that the subsequent holding of invalidity of Abbott’s patent rendered it inapplicable to the antitrust analysis. It explained that the reasonableness of conduct in question is measured at the time an agreement is entered. At the time of the Abbott agreements, its patent had not been held invalid. *Id.* at 1306-07.

We conclude that exposing settling parties to antitrust liability for the exclusionary effects of a settlement reasonably within the scope of the patent merely because the patent is subsequently declared invalid would undermine the patent incentives. Patent litigation is too complex and the results too uncertain for parties to accurately forecast whether enforcing the exclusionary right through settlement will expose them to treble damages if the patent immunity were destroyed by the mere invalidity of the patent.

*Id.* at 1308. The court held that to the extent that a party demonstrates “nothing more” than subsequent invalidity, it is insufficient to render the patent irrelevant to the antitrust analysis. *Id.* at 1309. The court also ruled that Abbott’s monetary payment to the generic companies did not constitute a *per se* antitrust violation.

If Abbott had a lawful right to exclude competitors, it is not obvious that competition was limited more than that lawful degree by paying potential competitors for their exit.

*Id.* The court stated that in some instances the size of the payment might indicate that the parties lacked faith in the merits of a patent suit, but ruled that it was difficult to infer such bad faith from the record in the case before it. *Id.* at 1309-10. The court noted that the Sixth Circuit appeared to take a different view in *In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation*, 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003), but explained that the “antitrust analysis cannot ignore the scope of the patent exclusion.” *Id.* at 1310-11. See also *Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. v. Pentech Pharmaceuticals, Inc.*, 289 F.Supp.2d 986 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (settlement of infringement suit providing free product to defendant to sell in
Puerto Rico, and permission to enter remaining U.S. market on entry by another generic company is not an antitrust violation; settlement led to increased competition).

On remand, the district court again found on summary judgment a *per se* Sherman Act violation. *In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation*, 352 F. Supp.2d 1279 (S.D. Fla. 2005). The court adopted a three-part test to evaluate whether the agreement was a “reasonable implementation of the exclusionary potential” of the Abbott patent: (1) evaluation of the exclusionary scope of the patent, and the extent of protections afforded by Abbott; (2) evaluation of the likely outcomes of the patent litigation; and (3) whether the settlement represented a reasonable implementation of the protections afforded by the patent. *Id.* at 1295-96. The court ruled that the extent of protections afforded by the patent must take into account Geneva’s challenge to validity, which the court deemed to have been “premised on solid legal precedent.” *Id.* at 1298. The court then decided that “Abbott was unlikely to obtain a preliminary injunction” to keep Geneva off the market, and that “there was only one likely ultimate outcome of the ‘207 patent litigation: that the patent would be found invalid.” *Id.* at 1306-07. Finally, the court ruled that the settlement agreement was not a reasonable implementation of the patent protections. *Id.* at 1308. Having found that the restrictions in the settlement agreement “exceeded the statutory grant of patent protection,” the court applied the *per se* rule and held the agreement to be a violation of the Sherman Act. *Id.* at 1319.

Another district court refused to dismiss a suit brought by a generic manufacturer which alleged that a settlement agreement between another generic company and a branded company violated the Sherman Act. *Biovail Corp. v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc.*, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6726 (N.D. W.Va. Mar. 22, 2002). The court ruled that a sufficient allegation of anti-competitive behavior and antitrust injury had been made to survive a motion to dismiss.
The Federal Trade Commission brought an administrative action based on settlement of several patent infringement suits which Schering-Plough Corporation had filed against generic drug companies. In a decision dated June 27, 2002, an administrative law judge dismissed the complaint. *In re Schering-Plough Corp. et al.*, Docket No. 9297 (F.T.C. Jun. 27, 2002), located at [http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/d9297.htm](http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/d9297.htm). The facts, as described in the opinion, indicate that Schering-Plough brought two patent infringement suits related to applications to market generic versions of Schering’s microencapsulated potassium chloride products.

The FTC Complaint alleged that Schering sued Upsher-Smith for patent infringement in 1995, and then settled that litigation in 1997. The Complaint alleges that through this settlement agreement, Schering agreed to make unconditional payments of $60 million to Upsher-Smith; Upsher-Smith agreed not to enter the market, either with the allegedly infringing generic product, or with any other generic version of the product 20, until September 2001; both parties agreed to stipulate to the dismissal of the litigation without prejudice; and Schering received licenses to market five Upsher-Smith products.

The FTC Complaint also related to a suit filed by Schering in 1996 against ESI Lederle, Inc., a division of American Home Products Corp., which was settled in 1998. The Complaint states that AHP agreed that its ESI division would not market any generic version of Schering’s product until January 2004, would not market more than one generic version of Schering’s product between January 2004 and September 2006, and would not support any study of the bioequivalence or therapeutic equivalence of a generic version of the product until September 5, 2006. According to the Complaint, AHP received a payment from Schering of $5
million, and an additional payment of $10 million when its generic product received FDA approval in 1999.

In dismissing the Complaint, the ALJ provided the following summary:

Based upon the theories advanced by Complaint Counsel, for Complaint Counsel to prove that the agreements to settle the patent litigation between Schering and Upsher-Smith and between Schering and ESI were anticompetitive requires a presumption that the ‘743 patent was not valid or that Upsher-Smith’s and ESI’s products did not infringe the ‘743 patent. There is no basis in law or fact to make that presumption. In addition, Complaint Counsel has failed to meet its burden of proving the relevant product market or that Schering maintained an illegal monopoly within that market. Despite the emotional appeal which may exist for Complaint Counsel’s position, an initial decision must be based on substantial, reliable evidence and well reasoned legal analysis. [T]he violations alleged in the Complaint have not been proven and the Complaint will be dismissed.

Id. at 4.

The ALJ determined that the rule of reason should govern the antitrust analysis. The ALJ explained that “[w]ithout established case law holding that temporal market allocations pursuant to a patent or payments in connection with the settlement of patent litigation are per se violations, the ‘considerable experience’ needed to support per se condemnation is lacking and application of the per se rule is inappropriate.” Id. at 98. When analyzing the facts, the ALJ found significance in the evidence that (i) it was uncertain how the patent litigation would have concluded, (ii) the generic company would have been unlikely to market its product until the litigation was concluded, and (iii) under the settlement, the generic company was permitted to enter the market prior to expiration of the patent.

More specifically, the ALJ found that the FTC’s witnesses “did not reach an opinion as to whether the [Schering] patent is invalid or infringed by Upsher-Smith’s or AHP’s products.” Id. at 21. The ALJ also relied on evidence that there “is no way” to determine the date or the outcome of the judicial determination of the patent litigations. Id. at 74. The ALJ
also found that, even though Upsher-Smith and ESI had final FDA approval as of November 1998 and June 1999 respectively, to market their respective products, “it is highly unlikely that either would have marketed on those dates while patent litigation was still pending.” *Id.* at 74.

The ALJ distinguished the *Cardizem* and *Terazosin* decisions by stating that they “did not involve final settlements of patent litigation; and they did not involve agreements permitting the generic company to market its product before patent expiration.” *Id.* at 98. The ALJ noted that “[u]nder the Upsher-Smith settlement agreement, for example, consumers are enjoying low priced generic versions of [Schering’s product] today. In the absence of the settlement, it is impossible for anyone to say whether there would be generic competition today or not because we can’t know who would have won the litigation.” *Id.* at 100. Having noted that there was no proof that there was any delay in generic market entry because there was no proof that the Schering patent was invalid or not infringed, the ALJ concluded that there was no proof of anticompetitive effects from Schering’s agreements.

[T]o prove anticompetitive effects, Complaint Counsel must prove that better settlement agreements or litigation results would have resulted in Upsher-Smith and ESI selling their generic equivalents prior to September 1, 2001 and January 1, 2004. Complaint Counsel did not demonstrate this. Nor has Complaint Counsel brought forth evidence that the entry dates agreed upon were “unreasonable.” Thus, without sufficient evidence to prove that Upsher-Smith or ESI would have entered the market sooner than the agreements allow, Complaint Counsel failed to prove that any unlawful delay resulted from the agreements. *Id.* at 103.

On appeal to the full Commission, the judgment was reversed. See [http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9297/031218commissionopinion.pdf](http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9297/031218commissionopinion.pdf) (Dec. 18, 2003). The Commission explained that a “naked agreement to pay a potential competitor to delay its entry date could logically be treated the same way [as a naked agreement to allocate business by customers or geographic region] because an allocation of time is analogous to an allocation of
geographic space.” Slip op. at 12. Absent proof of other offsetting consideration, the Commission ruled, it is logical to conclude that the quid pro quo for [a payment from a branded company to a generic] was an agreement by the generic to defer entry beyond the date that represents an otherwise reasonable litigation compromise.” Slip op. at 26. The Commission held that “reverse payment” agreements should not be considered per se illegal, but explained that such agreements raise a “red flag” mandating further inquiry. Id. at 29. The Commission specifically rejected the ALJ’s opinion to the extent it required an inquiry into the merits of the underlying patent suit. Id. at 35. After reviewing the evidence, the Commission found that the payments from Schering were for delayed generic entry into the market which, under the circumstances, was an agreement that unreasonably restrains commerce. Id. at 79. See also In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 338 F. Supp. 2d 517, 532 (D.N.J. 2004) (private lawsuit contesting the same settlement agreement challenged by the FTC in Schering-Plough, holding that the plaintiff had sufficiently pled its Sherman Act claim despite a failure to contest the validity of the underlying patent, and noting that the settlement agreement extended beyond the scope of the patent because it prohibited the plaintiff not only from marketing its allegedly infringing drug, but also from marketing or supporting other non-infringing drugs).

Schering-Plough and Upsher-Smith then sought review of the Commission decision by the Eleventh Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the FTC order. Schering-Plough Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005). The court ruled that neither the rule of reason nor the per se approach were “appropriate” to resolving the issues. Id. at 1065-66. Consistent with its earlier decision in Valley Drug, supra, the court stated that the analysis “requires an examination of: (1) the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to which the agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive effects.”
Id. at 1066. The court found that the settlement terms were within the patent’s exclusionary power and reflected a reasonable implementation of the protections afforded by the patent laws.”

Id. 1072. The court noted that the district court on remand from Valley Drug had again ruled that the agreement at issue there violated the Sherman Act. The court found a “critical difference” here in that the agreements in Valley Drug did not involve final settlements of patent litigation and did not permit the generic company to market its product before patent expiration. Id. at 1065 n.14. The Supreme Court currently is considering whether to grant a writ of certiorari, with the Justice Department and FTC having taken opposing sides on whether the appeal should be heard.

The Eleventh Circuit has applied the factors enumerated in Schering-Plough in Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Elan Corp., PLC, 421 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2005). In Andrx, the court concluded that Andrx had sufficiently pled an antitrust violation regarding a settlement agreement entered between Elan and SkyePharma. In the settlement agreement, SkyePharma admitted that its generic naproxen product infringed an Elan patent, and received a license from Elan under the patent. Id. at 1231. As the first to file an ANDA, SkyePharma had an exclusive 180-day period to market a generic version of the drug. Id. Andrx’s complaint, however, alleged that the settlement agreement was in essence a conspiracy to manipulate the exclusivity period to control the market indefinitely.

SkyePharma had no intention of marketing its generic drug and therefore would never trigger the running of the 180-day exclusivity period. Accordingly, the settlement agreement had the effect of preventing any generic competition in the controlled release naproxen market . . . .

Id.
The court concluded that all three of prongs of the Schering-Plough test were satisfied by the combination of the settlement agreement and SkyePharma's failure to market its generic drug. *Id.* at 1235. Notably, the ability to control the market for naproxen indefinitely exceeded the temporal scope of the patent and satisfied the second prong of the test. *Id.*

In another case involving generic pharmaceuticals, a district court denied a motion by a patentee (Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.) to dismiss antitrust claims brought against it by several generic companies related to the drug buspirone. *In re Buspirone Patent Litigation*, 185 F. Supp.2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The antitrust plaintiffs contended that BMS engaged in fraud by submitting information to the FDA that a patent covered the use of buspirone, when in fact it did not. The plaintiffs also contended that after BMS listed the ’365 patent in the Orange Book, it pursued patent infringement suits against generic companies, and obtained an automatic stay of FDA approval of generic products, knowing it was making false statements. The court agreed with the antitrust plaintiffs that there was no objective basis for BMS to assert that the patent claimed the use of buspirone, and dismissed patent infringement cases. BMS raised the Noerr-Pennington doctrine as a defense to the antitrust suits. However, the court ruled that the act of listing was more in the nature of a ministerial act than a petitioning activity (which constitutes an attempt by a private party to influence government decision-making), that Noerr-Pennington immunity did not apply to its listing actions. BMS also argued that the listing was linked to its patent infringement suit, bringing it within the scope of petitioning activity. However, the court ruled that the listing and lawsuits were independent acts, since BMS could have brought a suit without relying on the Orange Book listing. The court also ruled that a Walker-Process type exception to Noerr-Pennington existed here for fraudulent mis-listing of the ’365 patent. The court also concluded that the patent listing and subsequent patent infringement suits were
objectively baseless and therefore came within the sham exception of the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine.

One district court dismissed antitrust actions against two pharmaceutical companies based on settlement of litigation, in which a generic company dismissed a patent challenge and agreed to stay off the market with its generic product until patent expiration, in exchange for a payment of $21 million and a license to distribute the patent owner’s product. *In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation*, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9156 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2003). In *Tamoxifen*, the generic company (Barr) had prevailed in the district court on a charge of patent unenforceability for inequitable conduct. The parties settled on appeal, and successfully moved to vacate the judgment of the district court. Subsequent ANDA filers challenged the patent on grounds similar to Barr, but did not prevail.

In the subsequent class action antitrust suit, the district court found that the settlement agreement was not anticompetitive because the parties “actually resolved their complex litigation, and in so doing they cleared the field for other generic manufacturers to challenge the patent.” *Id.* at *31. The court stated that this distinguished the *Tamoxifen* case from cases such as *Terazosin* and *Diltiazem*. The court also stated *Tamoxifen* differed from prior cases in that “no pattern of settlements or continuing behavior is involved.” *Id.* at *39. Finally, the court ruled that there was no antitrust injury, since generic competition was precluded by the patent owner’s successful enforcement of the patent against other generic companies, which is not anticompetitive conduct. *Id.* at *42-45.

On appeal, the Second Circuit recognized what it described as the district court’s “thorough and thoughtful opinion,” and affirmed. *In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.*, 429 F.3d 370, 381 (2d Cir. 2005). The court began by recognizing the benefits of encouraging the
settlement of litigation, *Id.* at 386-87, and by rejecting both a rule that would hold that reverse payments are *per se* antitrust violations (as such payments are to be expected given the nature of the pharmaceutical industry), *Id.* at 389-91, and a rule that would hold that “excessive” reverse payments are *per se* illegal. *Id.* at 393. In applying the rule of reason to affirm, the court recognized three factors weighing against a finding of antitrust liability. First, the settlement terms did not extend the monopoly beyond the scope of the patent by “restraining the introduction or marketing of unrelated or non-infringing products.” *Id.* at 397. Second, the agreement “ended all litigation between [the parties] and thereby opened the tamoxifen patent to immediate challenge by other potential manufacturers. . . .” *Id.* at 398. Third, the settlement allowed for some competition in the market between the manufacturer of the branded drug and its licensee distributor. *Id.* at 399-400.

Settlement agreements between branded and generic companies also were called into question in *In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Lit.*, 261 F. Supp.2d 188 (E.D.N.Y.2003). In that case, the generic companies settled patent litigation by acknowledging patent validity and agreeing to drop efforts to market a generic ciprofloxacin product prior to expiration of Bayer’s patent. The generics also entered into a supply agreement with Bayer, whereby Bayer either would supply its product to the generics for distribution or to make quarterly payments into an escrow account established for the generics. *Id.* at 196. Bayer chose to make payments, instead of supplying product, and its payments to the escrow account through December 2003 were stated to total approximately $398 million. *Id.*

The district court acknowledged some “facial appeal” to applying the *per se* rule to the agreements. *Id.* at 232. However, it noted that the *per se* rule is applied to “narrow, carefully demarcated categories” of behavior. *Id.* In analyzing the ciprofloxacin agreements, the court
noted that they did not exceed the scope of Bayer’s patent rights. It distinguished the district
court decisions in Cardizem and Terazosin on that basis, concluding that the agreements at issue
there covered noninfringing and potentially noninfringing products. Id. at 241. The court also
noted that the ciprofloxacin agreements finally resolved pending litigation, and did not create a
“bottleneck” for future generic challengers to Bayer’s patent. Id. at 242-43. The court stated
that this circumstance also was distinct from the facts of Cardizem and Terazosin. Id. Finally, the
court explained that “when patents are involved, case law directs that the exclusionary effect of
the patent must be considered before making any determination as to whether the alleged restraint
is per se illegal.” Id. at 249. The court noted that Bayer’s patent, until it expired or was
invalidated, “lawfully precludes . . . any generic product containing the compound ciprofloxacin
hydrochloride.” Id. at 250. Since the agreements “do not restrict competition in areas other than
those protected” by the patent, they are not per se illegal. Id. The court noted as follows:

Although a policy in favor of settlement of litigation cannot save a per se violation from
the strictures of the Sherman Act, a rule that too quickly condemns actions as per se
illegal, potentially chilling efforts to research and develop new drugs and challenged the
patents on brand-name drugs, does competition – and thus, the Sherman Act – a
disservice.

Id. at 256.

In a subsequent decision, the court applied a rule of reason analysis and concluded
that the agreement did not have anti-competitive effects since the restraints were not beyond the
scope of the patent claims. In re Ciprofloxacin Antitrust Hydrochloride Litigation, 363 F.
Supp.2d 514 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). The court ruled that unless a patent is shown to have been
procured by fraud, or an objectively baseless suit is brought, no antitrust injury can be shown as
long as competition is restrained within the scope of the patent. Id. The court also ruled that it is
inappropriate for the antitrust court to conduct an “after-the-fact inquiry into the validity of the underlying patent” in determining the reasonableness of the settlement agreement.  *Id.*

**VIII.  BAD FAITH LITIGATION**

Generally, conduct which tends to restrain competition unlawfully in an appropriately defined relevant market constitutes an antitrust violation. Bad faith in initiating a lawsuit is considered such conduct, and thus has been recognized as a defense to patent infringement causes of action. However, an infringement suit initiated without bad faith does not violate the Sherman Act, because there is a presumption of patent validity. *Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc.*, 601 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1979), *cert. denied*, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980) and 743 F.2d 1282 (1984), *cert. denied*, 469 U.S. 1190 (1985) establishes that an infringement suit is presumptively in good faith.  *See also C.R. Bard Inc. v. M3 Sys. Inc.*, 157 F.3d 1340, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998), *cert. denied*, 119 S. Ct. 1804 (1999). This presumption can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that the patentee acted in bad faith in enforcing the patent because he knew the patent was invalid.  *See Argus Chem. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., Inc.*, 812 F.2d 1381, 1385-86 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (pre-trial correspondence containing allegations by an accused infringer that the patent is invalid cannot be turned into evidence that the patentee knew the patent was invalid when it instituted an infringement suit).

A defendant in a patent infringement action must prove three elements to establish a § 2 Sherman Act violation: (1) by clear and convincing evidence that patent suit was pursued in bad faith; (2) that plaintiff had specific intent to monopolize the relevant market; and (3) that a dangerous probability of success existed.  *Argus Chem. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat*, 645 F.

IX. FRAUD ON THE PATENT OFFICE

The Supreme Court, in Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965), held that the maintenance and enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the Patent Office may be grounds for an action for monopolization or attempted monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2. The Court distinguished “intentional fraud,” which is actionable, from mere “technical fraud,” which the Court described as an “honest mistake” as to the effect on patentability of withheld information. Id. at 177.

In Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 265 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1018 (1985), Judge Posner stated that getting a patent by means of a fraud on the Patent Office can, but does not always, violate §2 of the Sherman Act. The court explained that three conditions must be satisfied besides proof that the defendant obtained a patent by fraud:


Although the Patent Office does not require that an invention have commercial value, only apparent utility, the patent must have a significant impact in the marketplace in order to have any anti-trust significance.

b. The invention sought to be patented must not be patentable. Plaintiff must show that “but for” the fraud, no patent would have issued to anyone.
c. The patent must have some colorable validity, conferred, for example, by the patentee’s efforts to enforce it by bringing patent infringement suits. The fact that a patent has some apparent validity by virtue of being issued is insufficient.

In *Argus Chemical Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., Inc.*, 812 F. 2d 1381, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1987), the Federal Circuit refused to extend the fraud standard under *Walker Process* to conduct that is inequitable. The Court relied on its decision in *American Hoist & Derrick Co.*, *supra*, and the Ninth Circuit case, *Agricultural Equip., Inc. v. Orchard-Rite Ltd.*, 592 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1979), in holding that under *Walker Process*, “knowing and willful patent fraud is required to establish a violation of §2 of the Sherman Act based on the use of an invalid patent to monopolize a segment of the market.” *Id.* at 1385 (quoting *Agricultural Equip. Inc.*, 592 F.2d at 1103-04).


In *Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc.*, 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998), the Federal Circuit upheld a jury verdict awarding antitrust damages for a *Walker Process*-type claim. The court explained the analysis as follows:

[I]f the evidence shows that the asserted patent was acquired by means of either a fraudulent misrepresentation or a fraudulent omission and that the party asserting the patent was aware of the fraud when bringing suit, such conduct can expose a patentee to liability under the antitrust laws.... Such a misrepresentation or omission must evidence a clear intent to deceive the examiner and thereby cause the PTO to grant an invalid
patent.... In contrast, a conclusion of inequitable conduct may be based on evidence of a lesser misrepresentation or an omission, such as omission of a reference that would merely have been considered important to the patentability of a claim by a reasonable examiner.

_Id._ at 1070. The court further explained that a _Walker Process_ claim “must be based on independent and clear evidence of deceptive intent together with a clear showing of reliance, _i.e._, that the patent would not have issued but for the misrepresentation or omission.” _Id._ at 1071.

The enforcement or assertion of the patent is an element necessary to establish _Walker Process_ antitrust liability. _K-Lath v. Davis Wire Corp._, 15 F. Supp. 2d 952 (C.D. Cal. 1998); _see also California Eastern Labs. v. Gould_, 896 F.2d 400, 403 (9th Cir. 1990). Where the patentee has not threatened an infringement claim, such that there is no jurisdiction for an action seeking a declaration of invalidity or unenforceability, dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) of a _Walker Process_ claim is warranted. _K-Lath_, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 963-64; _see Hydril Co., L.P. v. Grant Prideco, L.P._, 385 F. Supp. 2d 609, 611 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (dismissing a _Walker Process_ claim because plaintiffs, who had publicized the existence of the patent in the industry and had directed their attorney to send letters to persons in the industry warning that the patent may have been violated, failed to allege the minimum level of enforcement activity necessary).

If an alleged infringer is successful in making out a _Walker Process_ claim, it can recover treble the damages sustained by it, and the cost of the suit, including reasonable attorney’s fees. _Walker Process_, 382 U.S. at 178; _see also Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey_, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39652 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (holding that even though no monetary relief was awarded to the victor in an _Walker Process_ counterclaim, the victor was nonetheless entitled to attorneys' fees and costs).
X. **LITIGATION RELATED ISSUES**

A. **JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT**

1. **Patent Misuse Issues**

   The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) has exclusive jurisdiction on all patent issues pursuant to 28 U. S.C. § 1295 and will be bound by its prior decisions and those of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA).

2. **Antitrust Issues**

   The CAFC has exclusive jurisdiction over any complaint involving an antitrust claim and a non-trivial claim arising under the patent laws. The CAFC will apply the law of the originating circuit to antitrust claims over which it has jurisdiction because of the existence of non-trivial patent claims. Nonetheless, even in such instances, the Federal Circuit will apply its own law to “resolve issues that clearly involve our exclusive jurisdiction.” *Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc.*, 141 F.3d 1059, 1067 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (applying Federal Circuit law to question of “whether conduct in the prosecution of a patent is sufficient to strip a patentee of its immunity from the antitrust laws”). Regional circuit law applies only to such issues as relevant market, market power, damages, etc., which are not unique to patent law. *Id.* at 1068.

   Confusion had existed regarding which circuit has jurisdiction to resolve an antitrust claim under the Sherman Act where the patent laws provide the answers to the determinative issues. In one case, the Seventh Circuit and CAFC claimed they lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court settled the jurisdictional dispute by holding that the Seventh Circuit was the proper forum in such a case. *Christenson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp.*, 798 F.2d 1051 (7th Cir. 1986), 822 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir.), *cert. granted*, 484 U.S. 985 (1987), *vacated*, 486 U.S.
B. NOERR-PENNINGTON IMMUNITY AND PATENT LITIGATION

In the antitrust context, even though an actor’s conduct is allegedly anti-competitive, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine has traditionally conferred antitrust immunity on such conduct when it involves the petitioning of a branch of the federal government. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). This petitioning right has been held to include the right to petition the federal courts via a lawsuit that is not considered to be “sham” litigation. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972). In Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993), the Supreme Court articulated a definitive standard for what constitutes “sham” litigation.

In Professional Real Estate, several large motion picture studios sued a hotel owner for copyright infringement based on the fact that the hotel rented copyrighted videodiscs to its guests for viewing on in-room videodisc players. The hotel owner filed an antitrust counterclaim alleging that this lawsuit was instituted only to restrain trade and was sham litigation. Id. at 52. In affirming the grant of summary judgment for the hotel owner on the copyright claim and for the motion picture studios on the antitrust counterclaim, the Supreme Court defined sham litigation employing the following two-part test:

First, the lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits. If an objective litigant could conclude that the suit is reasonably calculated to elicit a favorable outcome,... [then] an antitrust claim premised on the sham exception must fail. Only if challenged litigation is objectively meritless may a court examine the litigant’s subjective motivation. Under this second part
of our definition of sham, the court should focus on whether the baseless lawsuit conceals “an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor”...

Id. at 60-61 (footnote omitted) (first emphasis added) (quoting Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961)). Thus, in articulating its definition of sham litigation the Court has created a high hurdle in order for the antitrust claimant to overcome the Noerr-Pennington immunity.

Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the Professional Real Estate decision, as it relates to patent litigation, is the Court’s comment that it “need not decide here whether and, if so, to what extent Noerr permits the imposition of antitrust liability for a litigant’s fraud or other misrepresentations.” Id. at 61 n.6 (citing Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 176-77 (1965)). Because the Court did not explicitly apply its analysis to cases involving fraud or misrepresentation, the applicability of the two-part sham litigation test to Handgards and Walker Process claims remain open issues in the Supreme Court. However, because Handgards claims have been explicitly analyzed in the past as sham exceptions to Noerr-Pennington immunity, see Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282, 1294 (9th Cir. 1984) (“We believe that Handgards I established a standard that embodies both the Noerr-Pennington immunity and the sham exception.”), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1190 (1985), it appears that the two-part sham litigation test of PRE may apply to Handgards claims. See, e.g., Bio-Technology General Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 267 F.3d 1325, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Novo Nordisk of North America, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 885 F. Supp. 522, 526 (S.D.N.Y 1995); see also C.R. Bard Inc. v. M3 Sys. Inc., 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1804 (1999).
The applicability of the two-part sham litigation test to *Walker Process* claims is perhaps less clear. Prior to *Professional Real Estate, Noerr-Pennington* immunity and *Walker Process* claims were two distinct doctrines which were analyzed in separate contexts. After twice declining to decide the issue, the Federal Circuit now has ruled that the sham litigation test does not apply to *Walker Process* claims. *Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc.*, 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998). *See also Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co.*, 360 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (it never is an antitrust violation to bring a suit for patent infringement unless the patent was obtained through willful fraud on the Patent Office or the suit is a sham to interfere with a competitor’s business relationships).

The “objectively baseless” standard of the PRE test has not been easy to meet in the Federal Circuit. In both *Filmtec Corp. v. Hydranautics*, 67 F.3d 931, 939 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1995), *cert. denied*, 117 S. Ct. 62 (1996) and *Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Sys., Inc.*, 15 F.3d 1573, 1583 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1993), although the patentee lost on its infringement claim, the court still held that the claim was not “objectively baseless,” thereby entitling the patentee to *Noerr-Pennington* immunity from an antitrust counterclaim. *See also Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Elan Corp., PLC*, 421 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2005) (ruling that previous court decisions rejecting on-sale bar defense showed that a patent infringement lawsuit was not objectively baseless, and therefore was covered by *Noerr-Pennington* immunity). *But see In re Wellbutrin SR Antitrust Litig.*, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9687, *31 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (concluding that an infringement suit filed by the owner of patents related to an antidepressant drug fell under the sham exception to *Noerr-Pennington* immunity because any reasonable litigant would have concluded that prosecution history estoppel would bar the claims).
One district court denied a motion by a patentee (Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.) to
dismiss antitrust claims brought against it by several generic companies related to the drug
antitrust plaintiffs contended that BMS engaged in fraud by submitting information to the FDA
that a patent covered the use of buspirone, when in fact it did not. The plaintiffs also contended
that after BMS listed the ’365 patent in the Orange Book, it pursued patent infringement suits
against generic companies, and obtained an automatic stay of FDA approval of generic products,
knowing it was making false statements. The court agreed with the antitrust plaintiffs that there
was no objective basis for BMS to assert that the patent claimed the use of buspirone, and
dismissed patent infringement cases. BMS raised the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine as a defense to
the antitrust suits. However, the court ruled that the act of listing was more in the nature of a
ministerial act than a petitioning activity (which constitutes an attempt by a private party to
influence government decision-making), that *Noerr-Pennington* immunity did not apply to its
listing actions. BMS also argued that the listing was linked to its patent infringement suit, bringing
it within the scope of petitioning activity. However, the court ruled that the listing and lawsuits
were independent acts, since BMS could have brought a suit without relying on the Orange Book
listing. The court also ruled that a *Walker-Process* type exception to *Noerr-Pennington* existed
here for fraudulent mis-listing of the ’365 patent. The court also concluded that the patent listing
and subsequent patent infringement suits were objectively baseless and therefore came within the
sham exception of the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine.

The court in *Organon, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc.*, 293 F. Supp.2d 453 (D.N.J.
2003) ruled that listing a patent in the Orange Book is not a “petitioning activity” for which
*Noerr-Pennington* immunity can apply. On the facts, however, the court dismissed an antitrust
claim because it found that there was a reasonable basis for listing the patent in the Orange Book.

Patent infringement actions brought on the listed patent were protected by Noerr-Pennington, and antitrust claims based on those infringement suits were dismissed because they were deemed not to qualify within the “sham litigation” exception to the immunity.

An administrative law judge recently ruled that actions taken by a party in persuading the California Air Resources Board (“CARB”) to adopt certain regulations pertaining to gasoline additives was protected from antitrust scrutiny by Noerr-Pennington immunity. In re Union Oil Company of California, No. 9305 (F.T.C. Nov. 25, 2003), located at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/11/031126unionoil.pdf. In Union Oil, it was alleged that Union Oil misled CARB into adopting regulations which were covered by then-pending patent applications which the company had filed. The ALJ ruled that CARB acted in a quasi-legislative manner, as opposed to a quasi-adjudicatory manner, and thus Union Oil’s actions were protected acts of petitioning the government. The ALJ explained that in assessing whether a body acts in a quasi-legislative or quasi-adjudicatory manner, the following factors should be analyzed: (1) the level of political discretion granted to the body; (2) whether the body was setting policy; (3) the procedures used during the rulemaking; and (4) the authority invoked by the body during rulemaking. Id., slip op. at 34, citing Western States Petroleum Ass’n v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 4th 559, 565 (1995). After finding that CARB’s actions were quasi-legislative, the ALJ ruled that because the anticompetitive harm alleged... arises from the adoption of regulations that substantially overlap [Union Oil’s] patents, the harm arises from governmental action and thus Noerr-Pennington applies. Id. at 49. The ALJ also ruled that Union Oil’s actions in seeking to persuade certain industry groups to petition CARB were protected by Noerr-Pennington as “indirect petitioning.” Finally, the ALJ held that the FTC did not have jurisdiction to evaluate
Union Oil’s alleged fraudulent actions toward the industry groups that were not related to its dealings with CARB. The ALJ explained that the FTC may have jurisdiction over cases that “touch on patent law,” but does not have jurisdiction over allegations that “depend on and require the resolution of substantial questions of federal patent law.” Id. at 64. Since the ALJ viewed the allegations of the complaint as “requiring an examination of the scope of patents and infringement or avoidance thereof,” it concluded that there was no jurisdiction for the FTC to resolve the matter. Id. at 65.

An interesting question is whether Noerr-Pennington immunity applies to pre-litigation threats of litigation. In a decision by a divided panel, in Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Association, 182 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 1999), the Tenth Circuit held that “whether or not they are consummated,” pre-litigation threats are entitled to Noerr-Pennington immunity to the same extent as litigation itself. Id. at 1137. The court also held that the two-part PRE sham test must be applied to pre-litigation threats. Id. The court noted that it was following the decisions of three other circuits which have addressed the issue. Id. at 1136, citing McGuire Oil Co. v. Mapco, Inc., 958 F.2d 1552, 1558-60 (11th Cir. 1992); CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 850-51 (1st Cir. 1985); Coastal States Mfg., Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1983). The court stated that applying the immunity to pre-litigation threats “is especially important in the intellectual property context, where warning letters are often used as a deterrent against infringement.” Id. at 1136 n.4, citing Matsushita Elec. Corp. v. Loral Corp., 974 F. Supp. 345, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Thermos Co. v. Igloo Prods. Corp., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14221 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 1995).

The reasoning in the Cardtoons panel decision quickly was adopted several other courts. See Miller Pipeline Corp. v. British Gas plc, 69 F. Supp.2d 1129, 1138 (S.D. Ind. 1999);
Avery Dennison Corp. v. Acco Brands, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3938, *67 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2000). However, on rehearing en banc, the Tenth Circuit reversed the panel decision.


The court drew a distinction between Noerr-Pennington immunity from antitrust claims, and immunity based on the First Amendment right to petition to the government. The court explained that Noerr-Pennington immunity is based, at least in part, on statutory construction of the Sherman Act and “is not completely interchangeable with cases based solely on the right to petition.” Since the claims at issue were for prima facie tort, libel and negligence, and were not Sherman Act claims, Noerr-Pennington did not apply. The court also rejected an immunity based on the right to petition, since the Constitution requires that such petition be made “to the Government.” The pre-litigation letters were not sent to the government, nor even known to the government, prior to the declaratory judgment action filed by Cardtoons. A dissenting opinion would have granted immunity from tort liability for pre-litigation cease-and-desist letters, in order to “provide breathing space to the First Amendment right to petition the courts, further the interests that right was designed to serve, and promote the public interest in efficient dispute resolution.”

The Second Circuit has approvingly cited McGuire Oil, and stated that Noerr-Pennington immunity applies “generally to administrative and court proceedings or to steps preliminary to such proceedings.” PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture v. National Broadcasting Co., 219 F.3d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 2000). The en banc Cardtoons decision was cited approvingly in Porsche Cars North America, Inc. v. Lloyd Design Corp., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9612, *128-130 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2002) (“the Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not immunize parties from liability based on claims arising out of purely private communications outside the context of
litigation.”). See also Meridian Project Sys. v. Hardin Constr. Co., 404 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1222-23 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (ruling that although Noerr-Pennington immunity extends to communication with the customers of an opponent in an infringement suit, it does not cover communication undertaken in bad faith in order to disrupt the opponent's relationships with his customers).

The district court in In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9156 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2003), declined to address the “difficult question” of whether a Settlement Agreement which disposes of litigation is itself protected by Noerr-Pennington immunity. The court cited cases standing for the proposition that concerted activity among co-defendants in settling litigation was protected activity, while settlements between adverse parties are not protected. Id. at *38 n.11, citing Hise v. Philip Morris, Inc., 46 F. Supp.2d 1201 (N.D. Okla. 1999), aff’d, 208 F.3d 226 (10th Cir. 2000) and In re Cardizem Antitrust Litigation, 105 F. Supp.2d 682 (E.D. Mich. 2000). On appeal before the Second Circuit, the defendants claimed that because the Settlement Agreement included a provision that timed the filing of an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification and subsequent 180-day exclusivity period, Noerr-Pennington immunity should apply. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 400-01 (2d Cir. 2005). The court declined to base its holding on Noerr-Pennington, however, noting that actions with respect to the 180-day waiting period that were a mere sham were not immunized by Noerr-Pennington, and that such an agreement “to extend a patent’s monopoly power might well constitute anticompetitive action outside the scope of a valid patent. . . .” Id. at 401.

The district court in In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Lit., 261 F. Supp.2d 188 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) refused an effort to apply Noerr-Pennington immunity to the parties’ settlement agreements. Id. at 212-13. The court ruled that this effort was “easily
refuted” since the agreements were private agreements between the antitrust defendants, in which the court in the patent case was said to have played no role other than signing the Consent Judgment. *Id.*

Although originally applied to federal causes of action, *Noerr-Pennington* also has been applied to state law causes of action. *Raines v. Switch Mfg.*, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 1997).

C. COMPULSORY VERSUS PERMISSIVE ANTITRUST COUNTERCLAIMS IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS

Another issue which commonly arises in the patent/antitrust litigation context is whether an antitrust counterclaim is compulsory or permissive when raised in a patent infringement action. In *Tank Insulation Intl., Inc. v. Insultherm, Inc.*, 104 F.3d 83 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 118 S. Ct. 265 (1997), the Fifth Circuit held that a Sherman Act antitrust claim was not a compulsory counterclaim in a patent infringement action. In this case, the district court had dismissed an antitrust claim by an alleged infringer, ruling that it was a compulsory counterclaim to an earlier patent infringement action which had been waived by the alleged infringer’s failure to assert it in the infringement answer. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found the antitrust claim to meet the established definition of a compulsory counterclaim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a), but relied on *Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co.*, 320 U.S. 661 (1944), as creating a limited exception thereto “for antitrust counterclaims in which the gravamen is the patent infringement lawsuit initiated by the counterclaim defendant.” *Tank Insulation Int’l, Inc.*, 104 F.3d at 87. However, the Fifth Circuit stopped short of extending this *Mercoid* exception to every antitrust counterclaim resulting from patent infringement litigation. Because both
Mercoid’s and Tank Insulation International’s counterclaims were so factually similar in alleging “that the patent infringement litigation violated the antitrust laws,” the Fifth Circuit found it unnecessary to decide whether all antitrust counterclaims should receive like treatment. *Id.* at 87-88; see also *Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp.*, 70 F.3d 533 (9th Cir. 1995).


In *Critical-Vac*, the Second Circuit held that a Sherman Act monopolization claim based on an attempt to enforce an invalid patent was a compulsory counterclaim to a patent infringement action. The court stated that *Mercoid* should be limited to its facts, which it characterized as an attempted misuse of a valid patent. *Critical-Vac*, 233 F.3d at 702-03. In *Glitsch*, the Federal Circuit distinguished *Mercoid* on the ground that it dealt with the ability to raise a misuse defense in a second infringement action when it had not been raised as a defense in the first action, whereas *Glitsch* involved a declaratory judgment suit for misuse after a motion to
amend the answer in the infringement action had been denied as untimely. *Glitsch*, 216 F.3d at 1385-86.

XI. ANTITRUST AND MISUSE ISSUES IN OTHER TYPES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

A. TRADEMARK LAW

The Lanham Act, in 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(7), explicitly provides that use of a mark in violation of the antitrust laws of the United States is a defense in trademark infringement actions, even for incontestable trademarks. However, successful assertion of this defense has proven to be no easy task. *See Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. VEB Carl Zeiss Jena*, 298 F. Supp. 1309, 1314-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (dismissal of antitrust misuse defense because defendant could not meet heavy burden of proving that trademark itself was the “basic and fundamental vehicle” used to accomplish the antitrust violation), *aff’d*, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970), *cert. denied*, 403 U.S. 905 (1971). *See also Estee Lauder Inc. v. Fragrance Counter Inc.*, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1786, 1789 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“an antitrust-related trademark misuse case is not impossible to maintain as a matter of law. Nevertheless, the defense is extremely narrow.”); *De Beers LV Trademark Ltd. v. Debeers Diamond Syndicate Inc.*, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9307 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that monopolistic behavior including price-fixing, colluding with oppressive regimes to obtain access to diamond-rich land, and other "collateral activities" are "not sufficiently related to the subject matter of the action to support an affirmative defense of unclean hands").

Whether a trademark “misuse” which does not rise to the level of an antitrust violation is cognizable as a defense or affirmative cause of action is less clear. In *Juno Online Services, L.P. v. Juno Lighting, Inc.*, 979 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ill. 1997), the court refused to recognize an affirmative cause of action for trademark misuse. Characterizing the history of
affirmative claims of patent misuse as “suspect,” and noting that plaintiff presented no case permitting a claim for trademark misuse, the court dismissed a cause of action for trademark misuse. In *Northwestern Corp. v. Gabriel Mfg. Co.*, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1902 (N.D. Ill. 1998), the court likewise noted the checkered history of the trademark misuse defense. Characterizing trademark misuse as a “phantom defense,” the court ruled that “if” the defense exists, “it probably is limited to misrepresentations, just as patent and copyright misuse is limited to anticompetitive conduct.” *Id.* at 1907-09.

**B. COPYRIGHT LAW**

Similar to the patent misuse defense sometimes asserted in patent infringement suits, the defense of copyright misuse may be available to an alleged copyright infringer when the copyright owner has utilized the copyright “in a manner violative of the public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright.” *Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds*, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990). In *Lasercomb*, the Fourth Circuit held that it was copyright misuse for a software developer to include anticompetitive clauses in his licenses which could potentially outlast the term of the copyright. *Id.* at 978-79. The Fourth Circuit also concluded that an antitrust violation need not be shown in order to assert a successful copyright misuse defense. *Id.* at 978. The Ninth Circuit re-affirmed the defense of copyright misuse in *A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.*, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), but rejected its applicability to the case on the grounds that there was no evidence that the plaintiffs sought to control areas outside of their grant of monopoly. *Id.* at 1071-72. Other circuits have recognized that copyright misuse is a defense to a claim of copyright infringement. *See DSC Comm. Corp. v. Pulse Comm., Inc.*, 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999); *Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co.*, 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995)
(recognizing copyright misuse defense); Static Control Components, Inc. v. Dallas Semiconductor Corp., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 1203 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (copyright misuse is appropriate counterclaim in infringement suit, but is a compulsory counterclaim that cannot be raised in a separate action).

Although the copyright misuse defense is available in some circuits, this is not the rule everywhere. Because the Supreme Court has never explicitly recognized the copyright misuse defense, some courts have not allowed it to be asserted in defense of a copyright infringement action. See, e.g., Allen-Myland, Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp., 746 F. Supp. 520, 549 n.45 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (court noted in dictum that “[m]ost courts which have addressed [the validity of the copyright misuse defense] have held that violation of the antitrust laws cannot provide a valid defense to a copyright infringement claim”).