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H.R. 12112

DEVELOPMENT OF SYNTHETIC FUELS

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Wednesday, June 2, 1976

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House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization
of the Committee on Banking, Currency and Housing,
Washington, D. C.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 o'clock
a.m., in Room 2128, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable
William S. Moorhead (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Moorhead (presiding), Schulze,
and McKinney.

Also present: Representative Rousselot.

Also present: Ike Webber, Staff Director; and Larry
Feldman, Minority Counsel.

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Mr. Moorhead. The Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization
of the House Committee on Banking, Currency and Housing will
please come to order.

Today, hopefully, we conclude our hearings on synthetic fuels
legislation pending before the Congress. The bill, H.R. 12112,
was referred on a sequential basis to this Committee, following the
report of the legislation by the Committee on Science and

sb 5 1 STATEMENT OF MR. HOWARD W. BREMER, AMERICAN
2 COUNCIL ON EDUCATION

3 Mr. Bremer. Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee,
4 my name is Howard Bremer. I appear before you this morning as
5 a representative of the American Council on Education. The
6 Council was founded in 1918, and is the nation's largest associa-
7 tion of colleges and universities. Its membership includes
8 approximately 1300 institutions of higher education, 20 national
9 and regional associations, and 80 affiliate institutions and
10 organizations concerned with higher education in the United
11 States.

12 I might add that ^{I am also here on behalf of} ~~one of the subsidiary organizations is~~ the
13 National Association of College and University Business Officers,
14 which is a group representing 100 major universities.

15 I appreciate the opportunity to address the Subcommittee on
16 behalf of the groups I represent relative to certain provisions
17 of H.R. 12112 having to do with ownership and disposition of
18 proprietary rights ⁱⁿ ~~on~~ inventions, patents, and know-how.

19 The concerns of the Council and the universities which it
20 represents ^{are} ~~is~~ in the provisions of Sections 18(r) and 18(g)(4).
21 These provisions present some of the same concerns as did com-
22 parable provisions in the Federal Non-Nuclear Energy Research and
23 Development Act, which were amply aired in the public hearings
24 held on November 19, 1975, ^{and} ~~which~~ are a matter of public record.

25 Consequently, it appears that in having again to consider the

sb 6 1 impact of such provisions in H.R. 12112, we are dealing with
2 piecemeal legislation which is not only burdensome but in fact
3 inequitable in its effect. More importantly, this is the first
4 time in history that the Government seeks to take title to
5 inventions for which it has not paid.

6 The mere presence of Section 18(g)(4) and 18(r) in the bill
7 would appear to indicate that the thrust of the previously given
8 testimony on behalf of the university community and others, and
9 the recommendation of the Conference Committee of ERDA on patent
10 policy was either not considered or was ignored during framing of
11 the bill.

12 If these two provisions are included to function as safe-
13 guards for the Government in this bill, they are safeguards
14 which it is believed will tend to discourage rather than to
15 encourage participation by the private sector in the development
16 of new or alternative energy sources, and just as importantly,
17 in the development of the ancillary technology necessary for the
18 utilization of such sources, or the more efficient use of known
19 energy sources for the benefit of the public.

20 Both of the sections are believed inequitable in terms of
21 their impact upon the proprietary rights of others. For example,
22 under Section 18(r), the Government, through ERDA, would take
23 title to all inventions made where a loan guarantee was in effect
24 and where no default of payment to the Government under the
25 guarantee occurred. Thus, in its operation, Section 18(r) would

sb 7. 1 appear to contravene what was understood to be the desire of the
2 Government relative to its support of research and development
3 effort; namely, to encourage the expenditure of funds ^{from} ~~for~~ the
4 private sector to develop and market inventions initially made
5 with Government funds.

6 This approach to invention development has worked admirably
7 under the patent policies of the Department of Health, Education
8 and Welfare and the National Science Foundation. There, the
9 universities with proven technology transfer capability have been
10 permitted to retain title to inventions made with funds from
11 these agencies. They have been further permitted to license
12 such inventions under conditions which will provide the necessary
13 incentive to the private sector to invest the capital necessary
14 to develop the inventions for the public benefit.

15 In all cases, the public is adequately protected by
16 suitable provisions ⁱⁿ ~~and~~ agreements between the funding agencies
17 and universities.

18 Under H.R. 12112, we are presented, peculiarly enough, with
19 a reversal of that situation. Under the guarantee approach,
20 there has already been an indicated willingness by the private
21 sector to spend its own money on the development of the project.
22 One can also assume that any competent developer will recognize
23 that such expenditure could generate valuable proprietary rights
24 in patentable inventions, as well as in trade secrets and
25 know-how.

sb 8 1 Where, then, is the contractor's incentive to engage in such
2 a development effort, spending his own money, whether borrowed
3 or not, if such proprietary rights are to be vested in the Gov-
4 ernment, as they must under Section 18(r), and whether or not
5 the borrower defaults on the loan? That the Government will
6 waive such rights ^{to} ~~for~~ the ^{contractor} ~~contract~~ is a chancy gamble, at best.
7 This is not a direct funding situation, where the risk to the
8 grantee or contractor is minimum. Here, the contractor is
9 assuming a substantial risk to itself, and such actions should
10 be encouraged by the Government.

11 Section 18(r) would operate ^{to} ~~and~~ take proprietary rights
12 from the contractor on the basis of a contingency which may never
13 occur. It is most likely that retention of this section would
14 discourage, rather than encourage, participation in the program.

15 Section 18(g)(4) is inequitable_x in that it would treat as
16 project assets, in the case of a loan default, not only the
17 background patent rights owned by the demonstration facility
18 contractor, but any patents under which that contractor would
19 operate that have been waived under Section 9 of the Federal
20 Non-Nuclear Energy Research and Development Act.

21 This would include any patents which might have been pre-
22 viously waived to a university or another under Section 9, and
23 which have then been licensed to the demonstration facility
24 contractor. Under such a prevailing condition, there would be
25 great reluctance to license such waived inventions, or any other

sb 9. 1 inventions, or know-how, to a demonstration program participant
2 with a loan guarantee, since the proprietary rights to such
3 inventions and know-how could be lost through the operation of
4 Section 18(g)(4) and without recourse or recompense.

5 It is also believe highly doubtful that any high-technology
6 group would knowingly subscribe to an arrangement susceptible
7 to the Section 18(g)(4) conditions.

8 It is respectfully and strongly urged, on behalf of the
9 American Council on Education, that Sections 18(r) and 18(g)(4)
10 be deleted from H.R. 12112. Thank you, gentlemen.

11 Mr. Moorhead. You mean delete it completely?

12 Mr. Bremer. Delete it.

13 Mr. Moorhead. Thank you, sir.

14 The Subcommittee would like to hear now from Mr. Raymond
15 Woodrow, Society of University Patent Administrators. Mr.

16 Woodrow?
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1 Mr. Morton. That is right. That is what I think is
2 just.

3 Mr. McKinney. Because there is the matter that
4 the Government does not mind operating a redline operation,
5 whereas private enterprise would not be able to live up to
6 the loan, if it is a redline enterprise, for too long.

7 Mr. Bremer. Mr. McKinney, one suggestion I might
8 have for Section 18(g)(4) would be by treating only those
9 patents which are ^{owned} owed by the borrowing contractor, or ^{which are} waived
10 to it specifically, as project assets. This would be one
11 ~~begin with the revision of Section 18(g)(4). In addition, the Government~~
12 ~~place to start and by further recognizing specifically and~~
13 ~~the Government assuming any obligations of that borrowing~~
14 ~~contractor to a licensor of patents or know-how germane~~
15 ~~to the demonstration facility.~~
16 In those circumstances the licensor is protected, and he
17 ^{licensed proprietary} would not lose his rights and would be guaranteed the
18 same return that he was guaranteed by the contractor ^{engaged in} to
19 complete the project.

20 Mr. McKinney. Right. In other words, if someone has
21 licensed a process to Gulf Oil for liquefaction or something
22 of that sort, somewhere along the line, and Gulf has agreed
23 to pay them X number of dollars for the use of this process,
24 the Government would continue to pay the same license fee if
25 they took over the patent and the process as part of the
collateral.

I thank you gentlemen. I think this section needs

acs 11

1 does not pay if off, you have got two possibilities: take
 2 the car and pay if off yourself, or pony up as they say, to
 3 the bank for the unpaid amount.

4 And, then you have some rights you can argue to the
 5 property, I would assume, and against the individual that you
 6 co-signed for. But, once a guaranteed program -- it is not
 7 even a loan, which is what bothers me, because, you are going
 8 one step even further back so that to say that the Government
 9 has intrinsic rights afterwards.

10 And, I find, Mr. Chairman, great problems with these
 11 words that we throw around all the time, you know, the national
 12 security or the public protection. What in God's name is
 13 the public protection? That is my problem.

14 I mean, I could argue that the public protection is
 15 not good in almost any of them.

16 Mr. Moorhead. We had that experience with classified
 17 material, and they have used language that is not even as
 18 broad as that.

19 Mr. McKinney. The Pentagon still has top secret on their
 20 jello recipe probably.

21 Mr. Bremer. Mr. Chairman, I would like to comment on this.
 22 I think the same error was made on this as was made in drafting
 23 the ~~ERDA~~ ^{original ERDA Procurement Regulations} legislation in that the university community was
 24 not considered at all, because ^{peculiar nature of the} an exclusive royalty-free
 25 license for the use of the patents commercially does not mean

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1 anything to the university community.

2 It must have the right to license or sub-license those
3 rights, the proprietary rights, to others. Because they have
4 no manufacturing facility, they are not capable of engaging,
5 commercially, in the project. And, the language, as it is
6 presented here, excludes, literally, the university community
7 from consideration.

8 Mr. Moorhead. Thank you, Mr. Bremer, for that comment.
9 And, I also appreciate your taking the chance of reading
10 this very complicated language and having it just thrown
11 at you, and then commenting on it. That is why I was so
12 careful not to make any suggestion of insisting that the
13 comment be made.

14 But, I think for overall patent policy procedures, your
15 comments are most welcome. And, while I doubt that we get
16 into that with this Subcommittee during the balance
17 of the loan guarantee situation, I think it is good to have
18 these things on the record for the Congress generally.

19 Mr. McKinney. As a layman questioner and ex-retailer,
20 do the universities at the present time make money by licensing
21 out patents and ideas?

22 Mr. Bremer. Yes, very definitely.

23 Mr. Woodrow. Not a great deal, most of them.

24 Mr. McKinney. Knowing the one or two that keep asking for
25 money, I am sure it is not a great deal.

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1 Mr. Bremer. It can be very substantial though. And,
2 I think the major benefit is that the technology is transferred;
3 which does not occur with Government patents. When you have
4 a portfolio, as the Government does, of some 26,000 patents
5 with a very, very small percentage, in the 2 or 3 percent
6 range, that are being used in a commercial sense, as opposed
7 to a much better record for the transfer of technology from
8 the university system. I think the record speaks for itself.
9 ~~on that.~~

10 Mr. McKinney. Thank you.

11 Mr. Schellin. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a
12 comment on the text of the material handed to us. Part of
13 the material is very much akin to our proposal number one
14 in the statement that you have, Mr. Chairman, some changes
15 we would suggest.

16 Let me quote to you just two small lines from recommendation
17 one: "Further, that qualified small business be given special
18 preference who may or may not be the contractor in acquiring
19 an exclusive license which may be for a field of use or
20 geographic for a reasonable royalty for a period of time less
21 than the life of the patents, with a right to sue."

22 And, then we jump and we say, "unless the contractor has
23 demonstrated expertise by possessing background patents and/or re-
24 vealed trade secrets and the contractor has given evidence
25 of an intent to commercialize the invention or has in fact